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55th Congress, ) CONFIDENTIAL. (Executive 

3d Reunion. \ i C. 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 



LETTER 



THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, 



IN RESPONSE 



TO THE SENATE RESOLUTION OP JANUARY 23, 1899, SUBMITTING 
FACTS AND MILITARY RECORDS AFFECTING THE PROPOSAL 
THAT CERTAIN OFFICERS IN THE NAVY BE ADVANCED AC- 
CORDING TO THE NOMINATIONS SENT TO THE SENATE ON 
DECEMBER 7, 1898. 



February 8, 1899.— Ordered to be printed in confidence for the use of the Senate. 
February 14, 1899.— Referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs, and injunction of 

secrecy removed. 



Navy Department, 
Washington, February (J, 1899. 
Sir : In compliance with the Senate resolution of January 23, 1899, 
which is as follows : 

In Executive Session, Senate of tiie United States, 

January 23, 1899. 

Besolved, That the Secretary of the Navy be, and he is hereby, directed to furnish 
the Senate with the facts and military records in the possession of hia Department 
affecting the proposal that, under section 1506 of the Revised Statutes, Commodore 
Sampson be advanced eight numbers and Commodore Schley six numbers; and the 
same information with respect to other nominations for promotion under same sec- 
tion and section 1605, which were sent to the Senate along with the above nomina- 
tions on December 7, 1898. 

Attest: Wm. R. Cox, Secretary. 

I have the honor to submit herewith numbered copies of the military 
records in the possession of the Department affecting the proposal that 
certain officers be advanced under sections 1500 and 1005, Revised 
Statutes, according to the nominations sent by the President to the 
Senate on December 7, 1898. 

The following are facts in the possession of the Department called 
for in said resolution : 

On April 22, 1898, Capt. W. T. Sampson, who had previously com- 
manded the United States naval forces on the North Atlantic Station, 
as a captain and commander in chief, hoisted the Hag of a rear-admiral, 
in obedience to orders from the Department (1, 2*). 

Commodore VV. S. Schley was given command of the Flying Squad- 
ron at Fortress Monroe. At the same time he was verbally informed 



f Numbers in heavy type refer to numbered papers herewith. 



2 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

by the Secretary of the Xavy that if his command and Admiial Samp- 
son's came together the latter would have command of the whole. He 
expressed ready acquiescence in this arrangement. 

At the outbreak of the war Admiral Sampson was directed to estab- 
lish a blockade of the coast of Cuba from Cardenas to Bahia Honda, 
and to blockade Cienfuegos as soon as the strength of the force under 
his command would permit (3). 

This blockade was immediately established, and was later extended 
to take in the whole coast of Cuba (some 1,200 miles), and was effect- 
ively maintained until the close of hostilities. San Juan, Porto Rico, 
was blockaded from June 22 (4). 

On May 19 the Spanish force under Bear- Admiral Pascual Cervera 
entered Santiago 1 1 arbor (5, 6). Thisforce had previously been reported 
at Martinique and Curacao, and Commodore Schley's force had been 
brought from Hampton Roads, first off Charleston and then to Key 
West (7), to reenforce Admiral Sampson. On May 17 the Department 
telegraphed the naval base, Key West, directing that Admiral Samp- 
son "should dispatch the Flying Squadron, with such reenforcements as 
he might consider necessary, to Cienfuegos, that the remainder of his 
force should blockade Havana, and that he himself should command at 
Havana or at Cienfuegos, it being directed that Commodore Schley 
should remain with his own squadron (8). Admiral Sampson on May 
10, in accordance with the instructions of the Department, directed 
Commodore Schley to sail with his command — the Brooklyn, Texas, 
Massachusetts, and Scorpion — for Cienfuegos, and to blockade that 
port (9). 

In accordance with the orders of Admiral Sampson, the Iowa sailed 
from Key West on May 20 with the Castinc and the collier Merrimac, 
the last having 4,500 tons of coal on board. The Ioiva joined Commo- 
dore Schley at Cienfuegos on May 22 (10, 11) and the Merrimac and 
Castinc joined on May 23. 

On May 24 the Department issued orders formally attaching Commo- 
dore Schley's command to that of Admiral Sampson (12). Telegrams 
sent to Commodore Schley on May 13 and May 14 (7) had directed him 
to report to Commodore Bemey, who, under Admiral Sampson, com- 
manded the naval base at Key West. 

About this time the Department and Admiral Sampson were informed 
that the Spanish force was at Santiago. On May 21 Admiral Sampson 
sent instructions to Commodore Schley to proceed with all dispatch, 
but cautiously, to Santiago, if satisfied that the Spanish squadron was 
not at Cienfuegos, and to blockade the enemy in Santiago, if there; and 
suggested that communication be established with the inhabitants, to 
learn definitely that the ships were in the port of Santiago (13). These 
instructions were sent by the Marblehead, and also, to make sure, a lit- 
tle later by the Hawlc ( 13, 14). The Hawk arrived at Cienfuegos at 7.30 
a. m., May 23 (15 — A, 17 — A) and the Marblehead arrived on May 24, 
and at 8 a. m. reported with the Vixen and Eagle for duty under Commo- 
dore Schley (16 — A — B, 17 — B). These instructions were acknowledged 
under date of May 23 (18, 19). Commodore Schley reported that he was 
Dot satisfied . 18) that the Spanish squadron was not at Cienfuegos, and 
held his position there until 0.05 p. m., May 24 (17— C, 20— A, 16— C). 
Before 3. .so that afternoon he had been positively informed by the Eagle 
and Marblehead that Admiral Cervera's squadron had not been and was 
not at Cienfuegos (21 — A,22). Commander McCalla having asked per- 
mission to communicate with the Cuban force located 13 miles west of 
Colorados Point, stating that he could ascertain definitely what ships 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 6 

were then in the harbor of Cienfuegos, Commodore Schley directed him 
to proceed upon that duty. Commodore Schley had been at Cienfue- 
gos for thirty hours without having taken any initiative to procure this 
information from the natives before Commander McCalla's arrival (21, 
18, 19, 17). 

Upon leaving Cienfuegos the Flying Squadron, composed of the 
Brooklyn, lou-a, Massachusetts, Texas, Marble-head, Vixen, Eagle, with 
the collier Merrimac, steamed eastward, Commodore Schley making 
signal that the destination was Santiago (23 — A, 15 — B). The squadron 
was frequently slowed to allow the Eagle to hold her position, the aver- 
age speed during the 25th being about G knots (15 — C, 17 — D). The 
Eagle was of small importance as a fighting force compared with the 
rest of the force. She was allowed to reduce materially the speed of 
the squadron (15— C, 17— D). 

On the 26th the Eagle was directed to proceed to Port Antonio for 
coal (17 — D). On that day the speed was about 6£ knots. 

Commodore Schley reached a point about 22 miles to the southward 
of Santiago late in the afternoon of May 26 (20 — B). He immediately 
communicated with the three scouts — Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Yale 
(17 — E), receiving the reports of their commanding officers, as also the 
reports of two pilots brought from Jamaica by the St. Paul (24), but 
he did not make further effort to establish communication with the 
inhabitants — fishermen or others — to learn definitely that the ships were 
in port, it being impossible to see them from the outside, as suggested 
in the orders of the commander in chief, dated May 21 (13 — A). Three 
hours after his arrival at this point the commodore turned and stood to 
the westward, signaling to his squadron that the destination was Key 
West, and proceeded with it in that direction for three hours, making 
about IS miles, when he again stopped (25 — A, 20 — C, 23 — B). 

On the morning of May 27 (20 — D) the Harvard, coming from theeast- 
ward, delivered to Commodore Schley the Department's dispatch of 
May 25 (26,27,28 — A), directing him to remain at Santiago and ascertain 
whether the enemy was t here or not (27). Thereupon he replied by tel- 
egraph that on account of shortage of coal, bad weather, and difficulty 
in coaling, he would be obliged to proceed to Key West and disobey the 
Department's orders, at the same time acknowledging the Department's 
orders of May 25 to remain off Santiago (28). That afternoon at 1 he 
again proceeded westward until he had made about 25 miles, when he 
again stopped until between 1 and 2 o'clock on the afternoon of May 28, 
coaling in the meantime (20 — E, 17 — F). 

No mention of the speaking of the Harvard or of the delivery of this 
dispatch is made in Commodore Schley's written report of the operations 
of this time. It contains, however, his statement of the considerations 
which prompted him to disregard the Department's instructions (17). 

With reference to his coal supply, the facts are that his effective 
fighting force at this time was the Brooklyn, Massachusetts, loira, Texas, 
and Marblehead. The Vixen and Eagle had also accompanied him. The 
Eagle, however, was detached and sent to Port Antonio, Jamaica, for 
coal, although, as shown by her log, she had yet on board 3 days' sup- 
ply (27 tons) (29). During the twenty-four hours in which Commodore 
Schley signaled that his destination was Key West and telegraphed 
the Department that he would be unable to remain at Santiago, there 
was still on board the Brooklyn between 10 and 12 days' coal supply, 
being 940 tons, for full steaming in squadron; between 8 and 10 days' 
supply, or 789 tons, on board the Massachusetts; between 5 and 6 days' 
supply, or 391 tons, on board the Texas; between 3 and 1 days' supply, 



4 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

or 116 tons, on board the Marblehead; betweens 8 and 10 days' supply, 
or 7 Gil tons, on board the Iowa; and 4,300 tons on board the collier 
Merrimac (29), from which daring the two following days his vessels 
were coaled. The Department had suggested the possibility of a near 
coaling base (27 — A), but no effort was made to reach it, although Com- 
modore Schley had senl the Eagle to Port Antonio for coal. There was 
coal enough to return to Key West and therefore to remain at Santiago 
till further supplies came. He could also have counted on the Depart- 
ment's sending him a further coal supply (27 — B). 

At 1 p. m. of the 27th, the squadron having been stopped since mid- 
night, it steamed westward until 8 p. m., when it again stopped to coal 
the Texas and Marblehead (20— E, 17— F). The weather conditions 
becoming more favorable, and having gone west about 48 miles in all 
since the t'vening of the 26th, between 1 and 2 o'clock on the afternoon 
of the 28th Commodore Schley again turned and shaped his course 
back for Santiago (17 — G), being \'l miles off that port at 8 p. m. 
(20 — F). dp to this time there had been nothing to prevent the escape 
of the Spanish fleet, but the scout St. Paul was ordered to remain off 
Santiago (17— X). 

A i 1 1.15 a. m. on May 28 Commodore Schley signaled, "Rendezvous 
in Gonaives Bay;" at L1.30 a. m., "Incase of separation, tleet will 
rendezvous at a place which will be designated by signal — Lat. 19° 24' 
N.. bong. 78 03' W.;" at 4.05 p. m., "While off Santiago the general 
meeting place will be 25 miles south of that place" (23 — C — D). 

At 7.40 a. in. on May 29, the Flying Squadron having approached 
nearer to Santiago, the Cristobal Colon was sighted in its entrance. 
Before noon two vessels of the Vizcaya class were sighted near the 
entrance, and between 4 and G p. m. a torpedo boat was sighted 
(23 — E, 17 — H). it was not, however, until May 31 that an attack on 
the Colon was ordered. This attack was ordered at a range of 7,000 
yards, at a speed of 10 knots, and under instructions for the Iowa and 
New <>r!< <nis, which latter vessel had joined on May 30, to follow the 
Massachusetts (23 — F); but it is reported by the commanding officer of 
the Massachusetts, to which vessel Commodore Schley had shifted his 
flag, as having taken place at ranges varying from 7,500 to 9,500 yards 
(15 — D). and by the commanding officer of the Iowa, which was 
ordered to follow as above, as at ranges varying from 9,500 to 11,000 
yards (23 — G). Commodore Schley's signal to the fleet was to fire at 
the Colon (23 — F). 1'nder date of June 1 Commodore Schley reports 
this engagemenl as a reconnaissance (30). 

On dune 1 Admiral Sampson, who had been guarding Bahama Chan- 
nel and covering Havana from the west (31), arrived off Santiago with 
the New York, Oregon, and Mayflower, and at once instituted the block- 
ade described in his report (31). 

Dining the period from May 30 to duly 3, Santiago and the Spanish 
ships in the harbor were several times bombarded, a close blockade 
maintained, and the Army convoyed and landed by the Navy \Z\.). 

On duly .">, when the Spanish ships came out of the harbor of San- 
tiago, Admiral Sampson, under orders from the Department, proceeding 
to meet General Shatter at Siboney, was between and 8 miles to the 
eastward of The Mono, but in plain view of his command, lie moved 
;it once toward the scene of the battle, and at the close had gained 3 
miles on the Brooklyn and was within 2 miles of the Texas. In passing 
The Morro he sustained the undivided fire of the batteries there at a 
range of 3,800 yards 32, 33). 

The battle which ensued was begun by each commanding officer 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 5 

doing his part as prescribed in the standing orders of Admiral Samp- 
son, and, subject thereto, was fought as each individual commander 
directed his ship (33, 33— B). 

The report, of Commodore Schley to Admiral Sampson states that 
"Signal was made to the western division (composed of the Brooklyn, 
Texas, and Vixen) as prescribed in your general orders" (33 — C); and 
the report of Captain Chad wick, commanding the Neic York, and chief 
of staff of Admiral Sampson, that signal was made by the New York 
to the eastern division, composed of the New York, Iowa, Oregon, and 
Indiana, "Close in toward harbor entrance and attack vessels" (33 — D), 
as prescribed in Squadron General Order, No. 9, of June 7 (33 — E). 

The only other signals of which mention is made in the reports of 
commanding officers are a signal "The enemy is escaping" (33 — A), 
made by the Brooklyn at 9.35 a. m., which, according to the Brooklyn's 
signal record, was first received by her from the Iowa (33 — C), and 
three signals noted in the report of the commanding officer of the Ore- 
gon; the first " Oregon, well done," at the time when the Vizcaya went 
ashore, and second, "Cease firing," and "Congratulations for the grand 
victory, thanks for your splendid assistance," sent as the Colon went 
ashore and her flag came down (33 — F). No commanding officer of any 
ship speaks in his report of any signal from the Brooklyn except the 
above. From the reports no command over the fleet and no order of 
command except the above appears other than the original commands 
and orders of the commander in chief (33 — G — H — K). The log of the 
Brooklyn notes two other signals made at 9.36 a. m. and 9.45 a. m., 
respectively: "Clear for action" and "Close up," but, as indicated 
above, no commanding officer reports having seen them, and at the 
time when they were made the ships were independently clearing for 
action and chasing at full speed (33). 

In following Sampson's order of battle of June 2, requiring "If the 
enemy tries to escape, the ships must close and engage as soon as pos- 
sible and endeavor to sink his vessels or force them to run ashore in 
the channel" (33 — L), the Brooklyn at the beginning of the battle stood 
for the enemy's ships, using port helm to close with them. After the 
leading Spanish ship, the Maria Teresa, had passed to the westward, 
and the Vizcaya had clearly indicated her intention to escape, the 
Brooklyn's helm was put hard aport, and she was turned in a circle 
around to the southward and then to the westward, and in doing so, 
increased her distance from the Spanish ships by her tactical diameter 
of 800 yards (32). 

The orders of Admiral Sampson issued in the beginning of June to 
prevent the escape of the Spanish vessels, and to make the blockade 
effective, are pertinent facts (33 — K). They provide for a close watch 
night and day, for picket boats, search lights at night, guard against 
torpedo boat attack, nearness to the harbor entrance, readiness of 
engines, for keeping the ships always headed toward land instead of 
away from it, and for signals to be used in case of attempted escape 
(33— K). 

The foregoing statement has been verified upon careful comparison 
with the records by a board of naval officers, consisting of Capt. Kobley 
D. Evans, who commanded the Iowa; Capt. Henry C. Taylor, who com- 
manded the Indiana, and Lieut. James H. Sears, who was Commodore 
Schley's flag-lieutenant on board the Brooklyn, assisted by Ensign 
Henry H. Ward, who report that the facts as stated therein correspond 
with the facts and military records in the possession of the Department. 

The advancement of Admiral Sampson was proposed in recognition 



6 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

of Lis services in the execution of his duties as commander in chief of 
all our ships engaged in the campaign in the West Indies; in the super- 
vision of all its details wherever distributed; in the blockade of the 
island of Cuba; in the convoying and landing of the Army and cooper- 
ation with its movements, and in the pursuit, blockade, and destruction 
of the Spanish Meet, which destruction, on the 3d of July, by our fleet 
under his command, was the consummation of his orders and prepara- 
tions, beginning on the 1st day of June. In this connection the dis- 
patch of I 'ommodore Schley, dated July 10 (34), is a pertinent fact. 

The advancement of Commodore Schley was proposed in recognition 
(it his services as next iii rank at the victory at Santiago. Where so 
much was achieved in this culminating battle and where his ship was 
such a conspicuous force in the tight, his conduct while in independent 
command prior to June 1, the record of which has been given above 
and which by reason of its unsteadiness in purpose and in push and 
failure to obey orders did not meet the approval of the President and 
the Department, was yet not permitted to stand in the way of his 
nomination for promotion to a higher grade for the part he took in the 
final triumph. In this connection a pertinent fact is the letter of 
Admiral Sampson (35 — A) in which, while not overlooking Commodore 
Schhy's reprehensible conduct above referred to, he asks that ample 
justice be done him for his part in the action of July 3. 

It is just to both these otlicers to say that each of them was selected 
for his command in the war without solicitation or suggestion on the 
part of himself or of anyone in his behalf. The head of the Depart- 
ment, under the approval of the President, is responsible for these 
selections, which were made under the responsibilities of the war situ- 
ation and in the exercise of the corresponding discretion in the assign- 
ment of officers which is authorized by law. This discretion was 
exercised solely with a view to the best interests of the public service, 
whether wisely or not results show. Neither of these officers was then 
the senior of his grade. In the case of Admiral Sampson he was, just 
before the breaking out of the war, second in command to the then 
commander in chief of the North Atlantic fleet, and, upon the illness of 
the latter, became its senior officer. He had been with it during all its 
evolutions and practice of the previous year, possessed the confidence 
of its officers to a very high degree, was familiar with its workings, 
and had had special experience and training in ordnance. To retain 
him in command was, therefore, in the judgment of the Department, 
the best thing to do. 

The advancements of Captains Philip, Evans, Taylor, Cook, Clark, 
Chadwick, Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright, Lieutenant Command- 
ers P. P. Rodgers, John A. Kodgers, James K. Cogswell, William P. 
Potter, Giles B. Harbor, and Newton E. Mason, Lieutenant Sharp, and 
Chief Engineer Kobert W. Milligan were proposed upon the recom- 
mendation of the commander in chief (35, 36, 37, 38) and in recognition 
of the service of each during the campaign against Admiral Cervera, 
including the bombardments and blockade of Santiago and the battle 
Of duly;; (31, 33). 

The advancements of Captain LTigginson and Lieutenant-Commander 
Seaton Schroeder were proposed upon the recommendation of the com- 
mander in chief (35, 36) and in recognition of their services during the 
bombardments and blockade of Santiago (31). 

The advancement of Lieut. Harry P. Huse was proposed in recog- 
nition of his pari as executive officer in the conspicuous conduct of the 
Gloucester in the battle of July 3 (33). 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. ( 

The advancements of Chief Engineers McGonnell, Hannnm, Bates, 
Eae, Cowie, aud Passed Assistant Engineer McElroy were proposed 
in recognition of their part in the campaign against Admiral Cervera 
aud in the battle of July 3 (31, 33). 

The advancement of Chief Engineer Bayley was proposed in recogni- 
tion of his services on board the Massachusetts during the bombardments 
and blockade of Santiago (31). 

The advancement of Commander Bowman H. McCalla was proposed 
in consideration of his eminent and conspicuous conduct in command 
of the naval base at Guantanamo and in directing the cable-cutting 
expedition at Cienfuegos on May 11 (41, 44, 45, 46). 

The advancements of Lieut. Cameron McR. Win slow and Lieut. 
Edwin A. Anderson were proposed in recognition of their extraordi- 
nary heroism when engaged in cable-cutting expeditions at Cienfuegos 
on May 14 (41). 

The advancement of Capt. Charles D. Sigsbee was proposed in 
consideration of his conduct in command of the Maine, and of the St. 
Paul when repelling the attack of the torpedo-boat destroyer Terror 
and the cruiser Iscibel II (42). 

The advancement of Lieut. Victor Blue was proposed upon the rec- 
ommendation of the commander in chief in recognition of his extraor- 
dinary heroism in scouting around Santiago to determine what Spanish 
ships were in the harbor and how they were placed (43). 

The advancements of Lieuts. Benjamin Tappan, Thomas M. Brumby, 
Ensigns Harry H. Caldwell, William P. Scott, and ISTaval Cadet William 
R. White were proposed in accordance with the recommendations of 
Bear- Admiral George Dewey (39, 40). 

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, 

John D. Long, Secretary. 

The President of the Senate. 



INCLOSDRES WITH THE LETTER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, DATED 

FEBRUARY 6, 1899, IN COMPLIANCE WITH SENATE RESOLUTION 

OF JANUARY 23, 1899. 

Note.— The page numbers in brackets in the center of the line refer to the 
Appendix to the Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, 1898. 
The numbers to the right in the same line correspond to the references in 
the letter of the Secretary. 



[Page 167.] No. 1. 

104748. 
101026. 

[Squadron General Order No. 6.] 

North Atlantic Station, 
U. S. Flagship New York, 1st Rate, 

Key Went, Fla., April 21, 1898. 
Having received the following telegraphic instructions from the Navy 
Department : 

You are assigned to command of the United States forces on the North Atlantic 
Station, with the rank of a rear-admiral. Hoist the flag of a rear-admiral imme- 
diately. 

J Long. 

I shall hoist the flag of a rear-admiral at 8 o'clock to-morrow morning, 
the 22d instant. 

William T. Sampson, 
Bear-Admiral. Commander in Chief U. 8. Naval Force, 

North Atlantic Station. 



[Page 174.] No. 2. 

Washington, April 21, 1898. 
Sampson, Key West, Fla. : 

You are assigned to command of the United States naval force on 
the North Atlantic Station, with the rank of a rear-admiral. Hoist the 
flag of a rear-admiral immediately. 

Long. 






[Page 174.] No. 3. 

Washington, April 21, 1898. 
Sampson, Key West, Fla. : 

Blockade coast of Cuba immediately from Cardeuas to Bahia Honda. 
Blockade (Jienfuegos, if it is considered advisable. Issue a proclama- 



10 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 



tion of blockade covering blockaded ports. Permit neutrals now load- 
ing to come out. Do not bombard, according to terms of my letter of 
April <i. 

Long. 



liMor>7. 



[Page 220.] No. 4. 

[Blockade of San Juan and engagement w ith Terror.] 

U. S. S. St. Paul, 
At Sea, Lat. 20° 35' N., Long. 73° 45' W., 

June 28, 1898. 

Sir : I have the honor to report the recent movements and operations 
of the St. Paul, including an engagement with the enemy off San Juan, 
Porto Rico. 

On June 19 the St. Paul, having transferred many of her own stores 
and some arms and ammunition to other vessels, parted company with 
our squadron oil' Santiago de Cuba. Under orders from the comman- 
der in chief, I proceeded to San Juan, Porto Pico, to institute a block- 
ade of that port. My orders included the information that the Yosemite, 
Commander W. H. Emory, would soon join the St. Paul off San Juan, 
thus enabling me to proceed to New York for coal, the necessity for 
which would soon arise. The St. Paul, with a view of intercepting 
Spanish vessels, proceeded at a moderate speed by the route south of 
Haiti and through the Mona Passage. She was unsuccessful in her 
search, and arrived off San Juan at 8 a. m., Wednesday, June 22, at 
which time the weather was clear, a strong trade wind was blowing, 
and the sea was moderately rough. 



The Secretary of the Navy. 



CD. SlG-SBEF,, 

Captain, U. S. N., Commanding. 



[Page 432.] No. 5, 

Abstract of the log of the Cristobal Colon from Aprils to July S, 1S98. 





Course. 


Dis- 
tance 


Noon position. 


Speed. 


Wind. 


Remarks. 


Date. 


Latitude. 


Longitude. 


Direction. 


o 
9 

u 

o 


18 19.. 










5. 0-12. 5 


SE.-NNE. 


0-6 


At4.30a. m. sightedislani 
of Cuba ahead. En 
tered Santiago Harbo 
on tlic morning of tin 
lutli of May. 'At 8.2 
anchored in 10 m.wate 
with 15 fathoms on stan 
board chai n ; bottom 
mud. Cheered by Mei 
cedes on coming in. 




















[P 

[Ma] 


age 428 
opposi 


] 

te.] 




No. C 




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ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 11 

[Pages 385 and 387.] No. 7. 

Washington, May 13, 1898. 
Schley, Fort Monroe, Va.: 

Direct squadron to proceed at once off Charleston, S. C, taking col- 
liers. Anchor. Keep in communication with Department by vessel. 
You are thus moved to be more near to reenforce either Sampson or 
blockade of Cuba, as movements of Spanish squadron may require. 
Keep the New Orleans at Hampton Eoads. The Department will send 
St. Paul immediately to cruise Windward Passage. 

Long. 



Washington, May 14, 1898. 
Commodore Schley : 

(Transmitted by light-house tender off Charleston, S. C.) 
Proceed to Key West with all possible dispatch, and on arrival report 
Eemey. He will have instructions. 

Long. 



[Page 462.] No. 8. 

Washington, May 17. 
Naval Station, Key West: 

Armored vessels and monitors, the naval force on the North Atlantic 
Station, and Flying Squadron must be coaled immediately upon arrival 
at Key West; also four gunboats of the force of the Marblehead. 
Flying Squadron, after being increased by the armored vessels com- 
mander in chief North Atlantic Station considers most suitable, pro- 
ceed with dispatch (utmost) off Cienfuegos, accompanied by the smaller 
vessels above mentioned and such torpedo boats, if any, as the com- 
mander in chief will choose to send. The remainder of the naval force 
on the North Atlantic Station and the monitors will blockade Havana 
closely, remembering the importance of having current in their favor. 
Sampson have choice the command off Havana or at Cienfuegos, Schley 
in either case to remain with his own squadron. Commander in chief 
is authorized to make such changes of detail in this plan as he may 
think proper. In general, the object is to engage and capture the 
enemy off Cienfuegos if possible, or otherwise blockade him in that 
port. 

Long. 



[Pages 463-464.] No. 9. 

[Extract from report of commander in chief, North Atlantic Station, dated A»gust 3, 1898, to Secretary 

of the Navy.] 

May 19. — Coaling of all ships was proceeded with with all dispatch, and 
about 9 a. m. of the 19th Commodore Schley sailed with the Brooklyn, 
Texas, Massachusetts, and Scorpion for Cienfuegos, with instructions 
as follows : 

No. 5.] U. S. Flagship New York, 1st Rate, 

Key West, Fla., May 19, 1S98. 
Sir: I send you a copy of a telegram received last night from Secretary Long con- 
cerning a \essel which was to sail on the 15th and carrying a large amount of specie, 
and is supposed to be going to land it at Trinidad or to the east of Cienfuegos. 



12 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

This may be a blind, however, and the vessel may be bound for Cienfuegos, or even 
Havana. 

The two cruisers will bo sent out to-day, and with the two torpedo boats following 
tin in. As soon as the Iowa is coaled she will follow you. 

It is unnecessary for me to say that you Bhould establish a blockade at Cienfuegos 
with the least possible delay, and that it should be maintained as close as possible. 

Should the Spanish vessels show themselves in that vicinity, and iindiug you on 
the Lookout, attempt to come around the island, either eas f or west, please send me 
notice by the best vessel you have lor that purpose as to their direction, that I may 
lie prepared tor them at Havana. 

I will try and increase the number of light vessels at your disposal, in order that 
you may have them to send with messages to me in case you desire to do so. 

After I have the situation more in hand 1 will write you and give you any infor- 
mation that suggests itself. 

Very respectfully, W. T. Sampson, 

Rear-Admiral, Commander in Chief U. $. Xaral Force, 

North Atlantic Station. 



[Page 418.] No. 10. 

IT. S. S. Iowa, 
Guantanamo, Cuba, July 24, 1898. 

Sir : In obedience to your order of the 22d instant (No. 14), I have 
the honor to make the following report: 

This ship left Key West (Sand Key anchorage) at 11 a. m. May 20, 
and reached the blockade off Havana at 6.40 p. in., when the course 
was at once changed to the westward and the ship started for Cienfue- 
gos. The light on Morro was lost at 9 o'clock. 

At 9.30 a. in. of May 21 sighted the Dupont and gave her bearing 
and distance of Cape San Antonio. At 10.30 exchanged numbers with 
Cincinnati, cruising to westward of us. At 12.15 rounded Cape San 
Antonio. 

On May 22, just before noon, sighted the squadron under command of 
Commodore Schley lying off Cienfuegos. At 1.30 joined the squadron 
and saluted the Commodore's pennant with 11 guns. At 5.45 site of 
light-house (entrance to Cienfuegos) bore (magnetic) K 10° E., distant 
about 5 miles. 

On May 23 the Hawk, Castine, and M> errimac joined. Began coaling 
at 10 a. m. from Merrimac. An Atlas liner came in from southward, 
and after communicating with tiagship entered harbor of Cienfuegos. 
At 4, site of light-house (entrance to Cienfuegos) bore NE. by E. £ E. 
(magnetic), distant about 3.5 miles. At 6.30 stopped coaling, having 
received 255 tons of coal on board during the day. 

K. D. Evans, 

Captain, U. S. JV., Commanding. 

Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Eorce, 

North Atlantic Station. 



[Page 467.] No. 11. 

[Extract from report of «■ mander in chief, North Atlantic Station, dated August 3, 1898, to the 

Secretary of the Navy.] 

May 22. 
* # # * * # # 

Commodore Remeyhad replied to the above that the lo wa left yes- 
terday with collier Merrimac 4,500 tons for Flying Squadron. 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 13 

[Page 394.] No. 12. 

Washington, May 24, 1898. 
Sampson (care Naval Base), Key Vest, Fla.: 

Till further orders the Flying Squadron is under your orders, and 
Schley will be so informed. 

Long. 



Washington, May 24, 1898. 
Schley: 

Till further orders the Flying Squadron is under the orders of Samp- 
son, commander in chief North Atlantic Station. 

Long. 



[Page 466.] No. 13. 

[Extract from report of commander in chief North Atlantic Station, dated August 3, 1898, to Secretary 

of the Navy.] 

May 21. — On the 21st the following instructions were written for 
Commodore Schley, aud sent them at 3 a. m. to the Marblehead to be 
delivered with all dispatch : 

No 8 ] U. S. Flagship New York, 1st Rate, 

Key West, Fla., May 21, 1898. 

Sir : Spanish squadron probably at Santiago de Cuba— 4 ships and 3 torpedo-boat 
destroyers. If you are satisfied that they are not at Cienfuegos, proceed with all 
dispatch, but cautiously, to Santiago de Cuba, and if the enemy is there block- 
ade him in port. You will probably find it necessary to establish communica- A 
tion with some of the inhabitants— fishermen or others— to learn definitely that 
the ships are in port, it being impossible to see into it from the outside. 

When the instructions sent by the Iowa and Dlipont (duplicates) were written, I 
supposed that two fast scouts would be in the vicinity of Jamaica, but I have since 
learned that they have been ordered by the Department to set touch with the Span- 
ish lleet on the north coast of Venezuela. I have just telegraphed them to report 
for orders at Nicholas Mole. 

Report from Nicholas Mole. 

Very respectfully, W. T. Sampson, 

Bear-Admiral, etc. 

The Commodore, 

U. S. Flying Squadron. 



[Pages 466-467.] No. 14. 

Feeling much concern as to the early delivery of the orders (No. 8) to 
Commodore Schley,of the Flying Squadron, by the Marblehead, I ordered 
the Hawle to carry a duplicate of these orders, with an additional memo- 
randum, as follows: 

[Memorandum.] 

U. S. Flagship New York, 1st Rate, 

Off Havana, May 21, 1898. 
It is thought that the inclosed instructions will reach you by 2 o'clock a. m., May 
23. This will enable you to leave before daylight (regarded very important), so that 
your direction may not be noticed, and be at Santiago a. m., May 24. 

It is thought that the Spanish squadron would probably be still at Santiago, as 
they must have some repairs to make and coal to take. 



14 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

Tho .9/. Paul and Minneapolis have been telegraphed to scout oft* Santiago, and if 
tlie Spanish Bquadron goes westward, one is to keep touch and one is to go west and 
attempt to meet you; if the Spanish squadron goes east, one will keep iu touch and 
the other go into Nicholas Mole to telegraph me at Key West. I shall be oft' Cay 
Frances, 200 miles east of Havana. If you arrive oft" Santiago, and no scout meets 
you, send a vessel to call at Nicholas Mole and get information to be left there by 
scout as to direction taken by Spanish in case they may have left Santiago de Cuba. 

llic Vale has been ordered to cruise in the Bahama Channel until May 24. It is 
fchonghl possible thai the Spanish, hearing of your departure from Cienfuegos, may 
at tempt to go there. 

If this word does not reach yon before daylight, it is suggested to mask your real 
direction as much as possible. Follow the Spauish squadron, whichever direction 
they take. 

W. T. Sampson, 
Bear-Admiral, U. S. N., etc. 

The Commodore, Flying Squadron. 

and also the following': 

Instructions were sent to the St. Paul and Minneapolis, at Nicholas Mole, to scout 
oil' Santiago, and if the Spanish squadron moves west the scouts to communicate 
with Schley, who is expected at Santiago from Cienfuegos, May 24. If the Spanish 
go east the scouts are to telegraph the Admiral at Key West from Nicholas Mole, 
ami leave a letter tor Schley, then go oft' Santiago to meet him. The Admiral will 
go with the squadron to Cay Frances. Should two scouts be available, one is to keep 
touch with the Spanish squadron. 

The orders for the Hawk were as follows : 

U. S. Flagship New York, 1st Rate, 

Havana, May 21, 1898. 
Sir: You will proceed with the utmost dispatch with the accompanying orders, 
which are to be delivered to Commodore Schley, oft' Cienfuegos, at the earliest possi- 
ble moment. When this duty shall have been completed return to your station off 
Havana. 

In case you meet with the Vesuvius in going, and she can make better speed than 
yourself, transfer the papers to her, with this memorandum, with the direction that, 
after delivery, she is to return and report to the commander in chief oft' Havaua. 

In case you fall in with the Vesuvius, either coming or going, an order to report off 
Havana is to be given her. 

Very respectfully, W. T. Sampson, 



Commanding Officer, 

U. S. S. Hawk. 



Bear- Admiral, etc. 



[Pages 415-416.] No. 15. 

13715C. 

[Report of operations of Massachusetts from May 19 to June 1, 1808.] 

U. S. S. Massachusetts, 1st Rate, 
Guantanamo Bay, Culxt, August .5, 1898. 

Sir: In obedience to your instructions of July 22, 1898, I have the 
honor to submit (lie following report of my operations from the time of 
leaving Key West. May L9, until the, 1st of June, 1898: 

May l!>: At Key West. At 8.20 a. m., in obedience to signal from 
U. S. F. S. New York, the Flying Squadron, composed of the Brooklyn, 
Massachusetts, Texas, and Scorpion, got underway lor Cienfuegos via 
west coast of < 'nba. 

May 20: Oil' Cape San Antonio. Passed and. spoke the Cincinnati 
and Vesuvius standing to the eastward. 

May 21 : Off Isle of Fines. 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 15 

May 22: Fleet caine off Cienfuegos shortly after daybreak and took 
up the blockade. The Dupont arrived at 9 a. in. from the eastward. 
At 1.15 p. in. the loica joined the fleet from the southward. At 3.45 
p. m. headed in toward the entrance and at 5 p. in. turned and stood 
out till 6.35 p. m., when fleet stopped and took up blockading positions; 
Dupont steamed inshore, Scorpion left to south of eastward. 

May 23: Off Cienfuegos. At 7.30 a. m. the Haich arrived with A 
dispatches. At 11.45 a. m. the British steamer Adula was per- 
mitted to enter the port of Cienfuegos. The HaicJc left at 11.30 a. m. 
Took up blockading* positions for the night ; Castine and. Dupont close 
inshore. 

May 24: At a. m. sighted the Marblehead, Vixen, and Eagle. 
Coaled ship from the Merrimac. At 8 p. m. the fleet left for San- B 
tiago de Cuba, with orders to rendezvous at Gonaives Bay in case 
of separation. The Dupont was left behind to go to Key West. The 
Castine was obliged to remain, on account of trouble with machinery. 
Steamed in two columns— Merrimac, BrooTclyn (flag), Massachusetts, 
Iowa, Texas, Marblehead, Vixen, Eagle. 

May 25 : En route for Santiago de Cuba. Weather rough and 
squally. The Eagle fell behind, retarding the progress of the C 
iieet. Noon position, latitude 20° 29' north, longitude 79° 16' 
west. Average speed of fleet about 7 knots. 

May 26: Sighted land at 6.55 a.m. on port beam and quarter, western 
point bearing northeast. Noon position, latitude 19° 29' north, longi- 
tude 76° 37' west. At 5 p. m. about 18 miles south of Santiago. Flag- 
ship exchanged signals with the Minneapolis, Yale, and St. Paul. At 7.45 
p.m. the flagship signaled "Destination Key West via south side of 
Cuba and Yucatan Channel as soon as collier is ready, speed 9 knots." 
At 9.20 p. m. formed in column, natural order, and steamed west. At 
11.25 p. m. stopped, in order to repair an accident reported on the Yale. 
Kequired four hours to repair. 

[Page 416.] 

May 27: Squadron lying to, engines stopped. Out of all formation. 
At daylight the Yale gave a line to the Merrimac and took her in tow. 
Harvard joined us at 8.45 a. m. from the eastward and left at noon to 
the southward. Noon position, latitude 19° 34' north, longitude 76° 
01' west. At 3.40 p. m. started ahead, column natural order, course 
west (magnetic). At 7.15 p. m. squadron stopped and lay to. The 
Texas and Marblehead coaled from the Merrimac during the night. 

May 28: Lay to with engines stopped until 1.10 p. in., when formed 
column, heading E4N, speed 6 knots, Merrimac and Vixen steaming on 
starboard hand, Marblehead and Minneajwlis on port hand, the former 
being about 2 miles inshore. Lay to off Santiago at 7.40 p. in. Small 
vessels sent inside as pickets. At about 10 p. m. saw search light to 
the southward, which later proved to be that of the St. Paul. Several 
signal lights seen on the shore near the batteries. 

May 29: Off the entrance to Santiago Harbor; squadron steamed to 
and fro before entrance. The St. Paul sighted at 7 a. in., coming from 
the eastward. At daybreak made out a man-of-war lying at anchor 
inside the harbor entrance, and later a second uian-of war and two 
smaller vessels. Coaled ship from the Merrimac; received 183 tons. 
At 8.50 p. m. the Vixen, at right of extrance, made signal signifying 
"enemy's torpedo-boat sighted," and the squadron went to quarters. 
The Massachusetts fired several 6-pounders and secured at 10.15 p. m. 



16 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

Learned later that the supposed torpedo-boat was a narrow-gauge 
railroad train that runs close to the beacli and crosses a bridge at 
Agnadores. 

May 30: Collier Merrimac sighted at daylight steaming toward the 
squadron; Beet in column, following movements of flagship; Marble- 
In ml and Vixen scouting off fcbe port. During forenoon H. M. S. Inde- 
fatigable came up, lier commanding officer visiting the flagship, and 
soon alter she steamed off to the southward again. At 12.45 p. in. the 
New Orleans came in from the eastward, and at 1.40 p. m. the Sterling 
arrived. The tng Triton came in, but left soon after, steaming to the 
southward. Enemy still in sight in the entrance. Flagship and Iowa 
engaged in coaling. The Massachusetts, New Orleans, and Texas in 
column on the blockade. 

May 31: At 6.30 a. m. the liar rani came in from the southward. The 
Massachusetts, New Orleans, and lon-a in column, holding blockade 
about miles off entrance. The Brooklyn and Marblehcad coaled from 
the Merrimac and Texas coaled from the Sterling. The commander in 
chief left the Brooklyn, hoisted his flag on the Vixen, and at 10.30 a. m. 
came on board the Massachusetts and hoisted his flag on this vessel. 
He was accompanied by his personal staff — Lieutenant Sears, Lieut. 
B. Wells, and Ensign McCauley. At 11.10 a. m. the following signal 
was sent from this vessel: "The Massachusetts, New Orleans, and Iowa 
will go in after dinner to a distance of 7,000 yards and fire at the 
Cristobal Colon with 8, 12, and 13 inch guns. Speed about 10 knots." 
At 1.30 ]). m. the Massachusetts, leading the New Orleans and Iowa, 
steamed in to about 8,000 yards, then turned to the eastward, passed 

[Page 417.] ^ 

the entrance, and open 3d fire with the port 8-inch and the 13-inch 
guns, the range used increasing from 7,500 to 9,500 yards. At D 
2.05 p. m. the column turned to the southward, headed west, and 
opened fire at 2.10 p. m. with the starboard battery. Hauled off at 
2.13 p. m., total time of firing being seven minutes thirty five seconds. 
Five 13 inch and nine 8-inch were fired from the Massachusetts, all being 
good line shots, but range generally short. Some damage was done to 
the enemy, several casualties being reported the following day by the 
Cubans. The enemy returned our fire almost immediately from ships 
and batteries, but witliout any effect. Toward the latter part of the 
engagement they seemed to obtain our range, and several shots came 
close to or passed over the ship. The Spaniards kept up a desultory 
lire after the fleet had withdrawn. There were no casualties iu the fleet. 
The mechanism of the guns and turrets worked very satisfactorily. 
Accompanying sketch of the harbor entrance gives the position of the 
enemy's ships as they were thought to be located. The sea was calm; 
light airs from the southward. 

Very respectfully, Francis J. Higginson, 

Cajdain, U. S. N., Commanding. 
The Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Force, 

North Atlantic Station. 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 



17 




A, A, A, probably Cristobal Colon, Vizcaya, and Almirante Oquendo. 
t, t, probably Furor and Pluton. 

Tbese positions correspond closely with that taken from the log book of the Colon. 
Note.— The foregoing report mentions only two large vessels. Commodore Schley's report (page 
404), however, mentions three. 



137163. 



No. 134.1 



[Page 423.] 
[Report on operation of Marblehead from May 19 to June 1.] 



No. 16. 



U. S. S. Marblehead, 3d Rate, 

Guantanamo, Cuba, July 26, 1898. 
Sir : In obedience to the order of the 22d instant, to report upon the 
operations of the vessels under my command from May 19 to June 1 
last, I have the honor to submit the following narrative: 

In compliance with your instructions of the 19th of May last, 
to proceed to Cienfuegos with the division then under my com- A 
maud and report to Commodore Schley, the Marblehead, Vixen, 
and Eagle sailed from Key West at 5 p. m. on the 21st of May. 

[Page 424.] 

Between meridian and 4 p. m. of the 23d of May the British steamer 
Specialist was boarded ; she was from San Juan, Porto Rico, in ballast 
for Mobile, and the statements of her captain are embodied in my No. 1, 
of May 23, addressed to Commodore Schley. 



18 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

At .~>.30 a. m. of the 24th of May the squadron of Commodore Schley 
was sighted oil' Cienfnegos, and at 8 a. m. I reported in person on 
board the flagship Brooklyn. I asked permission to communicate B 
with the Cuban force located 13 miles west of Colorodos Point, 
with whom I had established relations on the 15th of May, stating to 
Commodore Schley, who then believed Admiral Cervera's squadron 
to be in Cienfuegos, that I could ascertain detinitely what ships were 
then in the harbor of Cienfuegos. 

Alter obtaining the desired permission from the commodore and 
transferring a draft of sixty men to the loira, the Marblehead and Eagle 
steamed toward the Cuban camp, arriving off the landing cove at 1U. 10 
p. m. After landing clothes, stoics, ammunition, ritles, some dynamite, 
with a battery and bombs, and ascertaining that Admiral Cervera's 
ships were not in Cienfnegos, the Marblehead and Eagle, at 1.45 p.m., 
started on their return to the flagship Brooklyn. As the Eagle could 
steam faster than the Marblehead, 1 directed her commanding officer to 
proceed at once to the Brooklyn, in order to acquaint Commodore Schley 
with the fact that the Spanish squadron was not in Cienfuegos Harbor. 
At 3.i'5 p. in. the Marblehead was abreast the flagship Brooklyn, and I 
repaired on board. Alter informing Commodore Schley that Admiral 
Cervera's squadron was not in Cienfuegos, I requested and received his 
approval of the issue of provisions and clothing which I had made to 
the Cuban force from the ship's stores. 

The following is an extract from the log of the Marblehead for Tues- 
day, May 24, bearing upon this subject: 

Found out from Cuban force, 13 miles west from the entrance to Cienfuegos, that 
the ships of Admiral Cervera were not in Cienfuegos, but that only the ships were 
inside which had been there at the time of the last visit of the Marblehead to Cien- 
fuegos (May 8 to 16), viz, the Gallicia. a second gunboat, and half a dozen armed 
launches. So soon as the provisions, arms, and clothing were landed for the Cubans 
the Eagle was sent on in advance of the Marblehead to give Commodore Schley the 
information in regard to Cervera's squadron. This information was confirmed on 
the arrival of the Marblehead within hail of the Brooklyn. 

After reporting to Commodore Schley, the division which I had com- 
manded was merged into his force. 

While I was on the Brooklyn the executive officer of the Marblehead 
erroneously signaled that his ship had but five and a half days' coal, 
whereas according to my estimate she had seven days', and I so informed 
Commodore Schley verbally. 

At 5.15 p. m. the Brooklyn signaled to the fleet " Form column ;" at 5.45 

Marblehead started ahead on course SSW. to take position; at 5.50 

Brooklyn made "Course S. by E.;" at 6, "Steam at slow speed;" 

C at 0.05 started ahead on course S. by E. (psc). At 7.02 Brooklyn 
signaled "Stop;" at 7.15 p. m. Brooklyn signaled "We are bound 
for Santiago," and at 7.25, "In case of separation rendezvous at Gona- 
ives Bay, ilayti, outside of marine limit j" at 7.30 changed course to 
SB., and at 7.50 changed course to SE. \ S. (psc). At 7.55 Brooklyn 
made "Form line, inverted order," and at 8 p. m. Marblehead went ahead 
slow on course SE. JJ S. (psc). 

At 8.15 p.m. flagship made "Take distance" and wigwagged "We 
are going to use our masthead light for speed." Coal at noon 199§ tons. 

During Mav 2."> the Marblehead, in squadron, steered on courses SE. 
I S., SE. by E. £ E., SE. by E. § E., and ESE. i E. all (psc). At noon 

[Page 425.] 

the position by observation was lat. 20° 29' 58" N., long. 79° 17' 02" W. 
At 8 p. m. the latitude by 1). I!, was 20° 04' 00" N., and the longitude 
by afternoon observation 78° 29' 58" W. 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 19 

Nothing of moment occurred, the weather being overcast with squalls, 
rough and moderate sea, fresh to stiff breezes, with wind from EKE, 
hauling to SE. by S. at 11 o'clock p. m. The average speed was from 
6 to 7 knots. Coal at noon, 167.5 tons. 

Thursday, May 26, the course of the ship until 5 o'clock was between 
SE. by E. | E. to E. f N. 

The position at uoon by observation, lat. 10° 31' 20" K, long. 75° 39' 54" 
W. The position at 8 o'clock p. m. was by D. R. lat. 19° 31' 32" N., 
the long., by p. m. observation, 75° 48' 02" W. 

The speed varied from 7 to 9 knots. At 1.15 p. m. the Eagle came 
within hail, and her commanding officer stated that he was directed to 
go to Port Antonio for coal, and from that port to Key West, after which 
he left the squadron. At 5.05 p. m. we sighted three vessels ahead, 
which fact was sigualed to the flagship Brooklyn. At 5.10 p. m. flag- 
ship made "Clear for action;" at 5.12, ''Steam at half speed" and 
" Follow the motions of commander in chief," and " Speed 12 knots." 
At 5.30 p. m., "Discontinue present exercise," and 5.33, " Stop." 

The three ships proved to be the Minneapolis, Yale, and St. Paul. 
At 5.50 p. m. flagship Brooklyn made wigwag general signal " Show no 
lights except taffrail light in thick weather." 

At 6.30 p. m. Brooklyn made general signal " Disregard motions of 
commander in chief," and at 7.45 p. m., " Destination Key West via 
south side of Cuba, Yucatan Channel, as soon as collier is ready; speed 
9 knots." At 9 p. m. Brooklyn made " Form column " course W.; 9.15, 
" Speed 9 knots ; " at 9.20, " Use truck liyht for speed ; " at 9.45, " You 
are not to use truck light except in slowing, stopping, or backing." 
During the 6 to 8 p. m. watch the Minneapolis was directed to take the 
Marblehead in tow, and the Yale to take the collier Merrimac in tow. 
The Minneapolis replied that her machinery was out of order. Coal at 
noon, 137 tons. 

Friday, May 27 : Position at noon by observation, lat. 19° 33' 5" K, 
long. 76° 3' 25" W. Position at 8 p. in., lat., by D. E., 19° 34' 15" K, 
longitude, by afternoon observation of the sun, 76° 27' 30" W. 

At 8.55 a. m. sighted a steamer to north and east and signaled fact 
to flagship. She proved to be the Harvard. At 10.55 a. m. Brooklyn 
signaled "Can you fetch into the anchorage or port, Key West, with 
coal remaining?" An affirmative answer was made to this signal. 
Coal at noon, 117 tons. At 7.25 p. m. the Brooklyn sigualed, " Can you 
coal to-night?" Answered "Yes; if collier stops." At 9 p. m. stopped 
near collier and began coaling ship. 

Saturday, May 28: Position at noon by observation, lat. 19° 30' 45" 
M., long. 76° 30' 48" W. Continued to coal ship until 10 a. m. At 
10.30 a. m. Brooklyn signaled to Marblehead, "Rendezvous same place, 
Guareny Bay." At 11.50 a. m. " In case of disaster or separation fleet 
will rendezvous at place which will be designated by signal." At 1.18 
p. m. Brooklyn sigualed " Form column, course E. £ K," and at 1.20 
p. m. " Speed 6 knots," course 1STE. by N. (psc). At" 2.19 p. m., course 
E. | N. (psc). 

The squadron was in column in natural order, the Marblehead being 
2 miles off the port beam of the Brooklyn and inside. At 2.40 p. m. 
Brooklyn signaled "I have no news of importance;" at 3.45, "Have 
requested coal vessels to be sent to Gonaives. Will remain off Santi- 
ago de Cuba until further orders while coal remaining leaves enough 

[Page 426.] 

to reach coast of Haiti." At 4.25 p. m. flagship made signal, "While 
off Santiago general meeting place will be 25 miles distant, south of 



20 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

place;" and at 4.55 p. m. wigwagged, "The fleet will stop after dark 
and try to keep our formation." "The Marblehead will scout inside 
the fleet about 2 miles ; keep a good lookout, and be in readiness." 

At 5.15 p.m. Brooklyn signaled to squadron, "Load main battery." 

At 5.2;! p. m. Marblehead signaled to flagship, "Sighted strange 
vessel bearing south." 

This ship's guns had been loaded since leaving Key West. 

Between 4 and 5 p. m. "Sighted the Morro of Santiago de Cuba on 
port bow." At G.15 p. m. Marblehead signaled to flagship, "Sighted 
strange vessel bearing SE. by S." 

From (! to 8 p. in. Marblehead was steaming in squadron on port beam 
of Brooklyn, 2 miles inshore. 

"Began blockading Santiago de Cuba" between 6 to 8 p. m. From 
8 p. m. until midnight standing east and west in front of harbor of 
Santiago uutil 9.45, when Marblehead stopped. 

The position at 8 p. m. " Santiago de Cuba light-house north-northeast, 
10 miles distant." 

May 2!>, "Lying off entrance to Santiago de Cuba until 1.30 a. m., 
then cruising up and down at half speed." 

[Extract from log.] 

4 to 8 a.m.: At 6.30 flagship signaled, "Follow motions of commander in chief," 
and stood in about (U miles to entrance of Santiago de Cuba. Sighted two large 
cruisers and torpedo boal at entrance to harbor, one cruiser Cristobal Colon. Kept 
about 1,500 yards inshore of flagship. At 7 flagship signaled M. 63 V. 05; at 7 sig- 
naled to flagship, "Same two cruisers at entrance of harbor." At 7.15 signaled, 
"Sighted strange vessel bearing N. I W." 

8 a. in. to meridian : At 8.05 flagship made, "Let the people go to breakfast;" at 
8.07 flagship made wigwag, "Come closer;" stood toward flagship. 

At 8.30, flagship to squadron, "Stop;" at 8.40, flagship to squadron, "Commanding 
officers repair on board flagship." "Send mail to this vessel." 

Commodore Schley explained to the commanding officers that in case the Spanish 
ships came out he wished to concentrate the batteries of all of our ships on a portion 
of those of the enemy. This was not explained as a tactical concentration of our 
whole force on a part of the enemy, but as a division of our whole tire on several of 
the enemy's ships. 

During the time the commanding officer was on board the flagship Captain Evans 
asked Commodore Schley if it were his intention to steam at the enemy's ships in case 
they should start to come out. Commodore Schley answered, "Certainly," and added 
words indicative of his intentions to attack them as tbey came out of the narrow defile. 

At 9 a. m., F. to L. : "What is the height of Cristobal Colon's top?" L. to F. : 
"844; feet." "Sighted two cruisers and destroyer in harbor." 

Lying with fleet off port, engines stopped. 

Meridian to 4 p. m. : Lying to off Santiago entrance, about 5,000 yards inshore of 
flagship, until 3.45; went ahead slow, with helm hard starboard. Sighted armored 
cruiser at mouth of harbor. 4 to 6 p. m. : Lying off entrance to Santiago harbor. 
At 5.20 p. m. Brooklyn signaled, "Take your positions in column at 6 p. m.," and at 
5.30, "Slow speed;" at (5, *. 6 to 8 p. m. : Lying off Santiago de Cuba. 

8 p. m. to midnight: Lying to about 6 miles off entrance to Santiago de Cuba. 
"During this watch Marblehead steamed to eastward of Morro Castle on account of 
signal made from the Vixen that a torpedo boat had come out; but it proved to be a 
light on a locomotive running along the beach." 

At midnight Marblehead was lying to about 6 miles off entrance. 

May 30: During the mid and morning watches the Marblehead was steaming or 
stopped off the entrance to Santiago de Cuba. At 5.50 a. m. Vixen came within 
bail and informed us by megaphone, "I saw three vessels in the harbor, two of 
the Vizcaya class and the Cristobal Colon. The Cristobal Colon was nearest the 
entrance." 

From 8 a. m. to midnight Marblehead was lying off the entrance to Santiago do 
Cuba or steaming slowly to and fro inside the heavier ships. Between meridian 

[Page 427.] 

and 1 p. m. sighted Cristobal Colon and a merchant steamer at entrance to harbor. 
At 7 p. in. signaled to flagship, "Sighted strange vessel bearing E.SE." 

.May 31: Marblehead was lying to oil' the entrance to Santiago do Cuba. About 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 21 

6 a. m. Marblehead went alongside collier Merrimae and coaled until 4.30 p. m. After 
this stood in toward the Mono and remained off Santiago until midnight. 

June 1 : Blockading off Santiago de Cuba until 4.45 a. m., when smoke was sighted 
to the eastward, which proved to he the New York, Oregon, and Mayflower. 

Very respectfully, 

B. H. McCalla, 
Commander, U. S. N., Commanding. 
The Commander in Chief, 

North Atlantic Station. 



[Page 402.] No. 17 

117822. 

Flying Squadron, IT. S. Flagship Brooklyn, 

Off Santiago de Cuba, May 30, 1898. 
Sir : I have the honor to report that the squadron sailed from Key 
West on the morning of the 19th instant for Cienfuegos, Cuba, in obe- 
dience to orders from Rear- Admiral Sampson. In company with the 
flagship were the Massachusetts, Texas, and Scorpion. En route, passed 
the Marblehead, Nashville, and Wasp, communicating with the last- 
named vessel. Off Cape San Antonio communicated with the Cincin- 
nati and Vesuvius, scouting. 

2. On the morning of the 22d instant the squadron stood in for the 
entrance of Cienfuegos llarbor to recounoiter, and later in the day 
passed the entrance twice close in. As I had heard the firing of guns 
on the previous afternoon in the direction of the port, and as there was 
considerable smoke observed in tue harbor, I was led to believe that 
the Spanish squadron might have arrived there. That day the Dupont 
joined me with dispatches from Admiral Sampson, directing that the 
blockade of Cienfuegos be preserved and that the Scorpion be sent to 
communicate with the Minneapolis and Harvard, off Santiago. Also 
on this day the Ioica joined the squadron. 

3. A line of blockade was established about 4 miles offshore, and at 
night an inshore line was maintained, consisting variously of the Scor- 
pion, Dupont, and Castine, the last-named vessel arriving on the 23d, 
convoying the Merrimae. 

4. Also, on the 23d instant the HawTc arrived with dispatches A 
from Admiral Sampson, directing me to move eastward with the 
squadron to Santiago, if satisfied that the enemy's vessels were not in 
Cienfuegos. Not being satisfied at this time that they were not there, I 
held my position, being further strengthened in my opinion by the fact 
that I was informed by the captain of the British steamer Adula that 
when he left Kingston a cablegram had been received, on the Thursday 
preceding my arrival off Cienfuegos, stating that the Spanish squadron 
had sailed from Santiago. 

5. The Iowa, Castine, and Dupont took coal from the collier on that 
day, the Iowa particularly needing coal, as she had sailed from Key 
West to join this squadron before completly coaling, and consequently 
was considerably short. 

6. On the 24th instant the Marblehead, Vixen, and Eagle B 

[Page 403.] 

joined the squadron, and the Marblehead and Eagle were imme- 
diately sent to communicate with the insurgents to the westward of 
Cienfuegos, and to furnish them with ammunition, clothing, and dyna- 



22 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

inite. Upon Commander McCalla's return, in the course of the afternoon, 
he reported to me that he had obtained information that the Spanish 
squadron was not in Cienfuegos. Dispatches were at once sent by the 
Jhipont to Admiral Sampson and to Commodore Kemey for the Depart- 
ment indicating that this squadron would move toward Santiago de 
Cuba. 

7. Great difficulty has been experienced in coaling the Texas, on 
account other projecting sponsons, in any seaway whatever, and only 
under the most favorable conditions can she go alongside a collier. In 
any tiling more unfavorable than absolutely smooth water there is great 
danger of injury either to the Texas herself or to the collier. In this 
connection the advantage of a tumblehome to the side is very marked, 
insuring great freedom from accidents due to projections on the ship's 
side. 

8. Alter dark on the evening of the 21th, the squadron stood C 
to sea, to the eastward, with the Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Iowa, 

and the Texas in column natural order; the Marblehead, Vixen, and 
Eagle on the outer think and the collier inshore of the battle ships. 
The Ga&tine was left at Cienfuegos to notify the /Scorpion on her return, 
should she not be sighted by us, to proceed to Key West in company. 

!>. The run to Santiago was marked by raiu and rough weather to 
such an extent that the Eagle was unable to keep up a speed of 7.5 to 
8.5 knots, and fell behind so much as to seriously delay the squadron, 
which was forced to slow to a speed of from 4 to 5 knots for her 
to regain and hold her position. As this rough head sea con tin- D 
ued, with no apparent prospect of abating, and as the Eagle's coal 
supply was becoming dangerously low, she was sent to Port Antonio, 
Jamaica, for coal, with directions to make the best of her way back to 
Key West. 

10. On arriving off Santiago de Cuba, the collier Merrimac was dis- 
abled by the breaking of her intermediate pressure valve stem and the 
cracking of the stuffing box. This served as a further embarrassment 
to the squadron and a source of considerable anxiety, as, with the 
weather conditions that had prevailed since leaving Cienfuegos, it 
appeared absolutely necessary to abandon the position off Santiago 
and seek a place where the vessels could be coaled and the collier's 
machinery repaired. 

11. Off Santiago the St. Paul, Yale, and Minneapolis were E 
sighted and communicated with. The Minneapolis reported 

that she only had sufficient coal to reach Key West, and that her 
machinery was in bad condition. The coal supply of the other two 
scouts was also much reduced. Arrangements were at once made 
whereby the Yale was to tow the collier, and, as the prospect did not 
seem favorable for replenishing the meager coal supply of the other 
vessels, the squadron stood to the westward, towing the collier. The 
operation of taking the collier in tow proved to be quite difficult, owing 
to the size and weight of the two ships and the repeated parting of the 
tow lines. Finally, however, after twenty-four hours' unremitting exer- 
tions, the collier's chain cable was gotten to the Yale and the 
squadron proceeded. The St. Paul was ordered to remain off K 
Santiago until her coal supply would no longer permit of further 
delay. 

L2. After standing to the westward for about three hours, or 
about 25 miles, the conditions became less unfavorable and the T 
squadron stopped. The Texas and Marblehead were sent along- 
side the collier, whose injury had been temporarily repaired, and coaled 
during the night. 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 23 

[Page 404.] 

13. Inasmuch as it was known that, in case the Spanish squadron 
hud reached Santiago, Admiral Sampson was able to block any move- 
ment of the enemy through the Bahama Channel, my intention in stand- 
ing to the westward was, should it become necessary, to bar any effort 
of the enemy to reach Havana by a dash through the Yucatan Passage. 

14. On the 28th instant continued coaling the Texas and Mar- 
hlehead and later the Vixen. In the afternoon, having managed Gr 
to get sufficient coal into these vessels to enable them to remain 

with the squadron, shaped course for Santiago, off' which port we arrived 
about dusk. Established an inner picket line consisting of the Vixen 
and Marblehead, the remainder of the squadron lying-to off the entrance 
of the port, about 4 to 5 miles out. 

15. The next morning, 29th instant, steamed in to examine the 
entrance to the harbor, and sighted the Cristobal Colon appar- 
ently moored, head and stern, across the western channel around H 
Cay Smith; also one of the vessels of the Vizcaya or Infanta 
Maria Teresa class moored in the eastern channel, and two small tor- 
pedo boats. Later in the day made out the military tops of a third 
vessel farther up the harbor. 

16. A close blockade of the harbor has been maintained, and no ves- 
sels have entered or left since our arrival. Yesterday morning H. M. S. 
Indefatigable came up to the line of blockade and made signal " Eequest 
permission to communicate with the commodore," which was of course 
granted. A boarding officer came on board the flagship with a letter 
from the commanding officer, Capt. L. A. Primrose, requesting per- 
mission for his vessel to pass the line of blockade in order to communi- 
cate with H. M. consul at this port. My reply was that there could not 
be the slightest objection to his doing so. Instead, however, of avail- 
ing himself of the permission, the Indefatigable at once steamed off' in 
the direction from whence she came, signaling "No harm done for 
courtesy." It may have been that his learning that the Spanish fleet 
was in this port was of more importance than H. M. consul, and he may 
have desired first to communicate with his Government from Jamaica. 

17. On the 30th instant the New Orleans arrived, convoying the collier 
Sterling. 

18. Concerning the coaling of a large fleet of vessels, I would partic- 
ularly call the Department's attention to the necessity for heavy bags 
holding about 800 pounds, in addition to buckets, which have not proved 
of much use. They should also be provided with at least 6 cotton bales 
or heavy wooden camels to 8 feet broad to be used as fenders to take 
the thrust of the ships and to permit coaling in rougher weather than 
is now possible with the means at our disposal. At present we are 
coaling on all favorable occasions in plain sight of the enemy's fleet. 

Yery respectfully, 

W. S. Schley, 
Commodore, U. 8. JY, Commander in Chief Flying Squadron. 



[Page 473-474.] No. 18. 

M. 43.] Off Cienfuegos, May 23, 1898. 

Sir : In reply to your letter No, 8, I would state that I am by no 
means satisfied that the Spanish squadron is not at Cienfuegos. The 
large amount of smoke seen in the harbor would indicate the presence 



24 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

of a number of vessels, and under such circumstances it would seem tc 
be extremely unwise to cbase up a probability at Santiago de Cuba 
reported via Havana, no doubt as a ruse. 

I shall therefore remain off this port with this squadron, availing 
myself of every opportunity for coaling, and keeping it ready for any 
emergency. 

Regarding the inclosed information from Commander McCalla, I 
would state that I went twice yesterday close in to the mouth of the 
harbor, the first time about 2,000 yards, and thesecondtime within about 
1,400 yards, but saw no evidence of any masked batteries near the 
entrance. Well up the river, across their torpedo-mine fields, now laid 
across the mouth of the harbor, there is a new battery constructed, 
hardly within range from the mouth of the river. 

The Castine, Merriment, and Hawk arrived this morning, and I send 
the HairJ{ back with these dispatches. 

Last night I sent the Scorpion east to Santiago de Cuba to commu- 
nicate with the scouts off that port, with instructions if they were not 
there to return at once to me here, and I expect her back day after 
tomorrow. 

1 am furfchei satisfied that the destination of the Spanish squadron is 
either Cienfuegos or Havana. This point, being in communication with 
Havana, would be better for their purposes if it was left exposed, and 
I think that we ought to be very careful how we receive information 
from Havana, which is no doubt sent out for the purpose of mislead- 
ing us. 

The Iowa is coaling to-day, having reached this station with only 
about half of her coal supply. 

Very respectfully, W. S. Schley, 

Commodore, U. S. N., Commander in Chief Flying Squadron. 

[Page 474.] No. 19. 

M. 44.] Off Cienfuegos, May 23, 1898. 

Sir: Steamer Adula, chartered by Consul Dent, with proper papers 
from United States State Department to carry neutrals from Cienfue- 
gos, was stopped off this port this morning. She had no cargo and 
was permitted to enter. 

She reports that she left Santiago de Cuba at 4.30 p. m. May 18, and 
that night she saw the lights of seven vessels 70 miles to the southward 
of Santiago. Next day, Thursday, May 19, at Kingston, cable reported 
Spanish fleet at Santiago. Friday, May 20, the fleet was reported to 
have left Santiago. 

Now, on Saturday, May 21, when about 40 miles southwest of this 
port, 1 heard, from the bridge of this vessel, firing of guns toward 
Cienfuegos, which I interpreted as a welcome to the Spanish fleet, and 
the news this morning by the Adula convinces me that the fleet is here. 

Latest was bulletin from Jamaica, received this morning, asserts that 
the fleet had left Santiago. I think I have them here almost to a 
certainty. 

Very respectfully, W. S. Schley, 

Commodore, TJ. S. N., Commander in Chief, etc. 

[Page 402.] No. 20. 

[Map opposite.] 




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ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 25 

[Page 424.] No 21. 

137163. 

[Report on operation of Marblehead from May 19 to June 1.] 

No. 134.] U. S. S. Marblehead, 3d Rate, 

Guantanamo, Cuba, July 26, 1898. 
Sir: 

# ####** 

At 5.30 a. m. of the 24th of May the squadron of Commodore Schley 
was sighted off Cieufuegos, and at 8 a. m. I reported in person on 
board the flagship Brooklyn. 1 asked permission to communicate with 
the Cuban force located 13 miles west of Colorodos Point, with whom I 
had established relations on the 15th of May, stating to Commodore 
Schley, who then believed Admiral Cervera's squadron to be in Cieu- 
fuegos, that I could ascertain definitely what ships were then in the 
harbor of Cieufuegos. 

After obtaining the desired permission from the commodore and 
transferring a draft of sixty men to the Iowa, the Marblehead and Eagle 
steamed toward the Cuban camp, arriving off the landing cove at 12.10 
p. m. After lauding clothes, stores, ammunition, rifles, some dynamite, 
with a battery and bombs, and ascertaining that Admiral Cervera's 
ships were not in Cienfuegos, the Marblehead and Eagle at 1.45 p. m. 
started on their return to the flagship Brooklyn. As the Eagle could 
steam faster than the Marblehead, I directed her commanding officer to 
proceed at once to the Brooklyn, in order to acquaint Commodore Schley 
with the fact that the Spanish squadron was not iu Cienfuegos 
harbor. At 3.25 p. m. the Marblehead was abreast the flagship A 
Brooklyn and 1 repaired on board. After informing Commodore 
Schley that Admiral Cervera's squadron was not in Cienfuegos, I 
requested and received his approval of the issue of provisions and 
clothing which I had made to the Cuban force from the ship's stores. 

The following is an extract from the log of the Marblehead for Tues- 
day, May 24, beariug upon this subject: 

Found out from Cuban force, 13 miles west from the entrance to Cienfuegos, that 
the ships of Admiral Cervera were not in Cienfuegos, but that only the ships were 
inside which had been there at the time of the last visit of the Marblehead to Cien- 
fuegos (May 8 to 16), viz, the (lallicia, a second gunboat, and half a dozen armed 
launches. So soon as the provisions, arms, and clothing were landed for the Cubans 
the Eagle was sent on in advance of the Marblehead to give Commodore Schley the 
information in regard to Cervera's squadron. This information was confirmed on 
the arrival of the Marblehead within hail of the Brooklyn. 

# # # # # # # 

B. H. McCalla, 
Commander, TJ. 8. 2V., Commanding. 

The Commander in Chief, North Atlantic Station. 



Sir: 



No. 22. 

U. S. S. Eagle, Key West, Fla., August 6, 1898. 



When this work was finished the Eagle was called within hail, and 
Commander McCalla directed me to proceed, full speed, to the Brooklyn 



26 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

and report to Commodore Schley that Cervera's fleet had not been in 
Cienfuegos harbor, the only vessels then there being the Galicia, Balbao, 
and nine canoneros, and also that he would report in person as soon as 
the Marblehead could join. 

W. H. H. SOUTHERLAND, 

Lieutenant, U. 8. X., Commanding. 
The Commander in Chief of U. S. Naval Forces. 



[Page 418.] No. 23. 

137154. 

[Report of campaign beginning May 19, 1898.] 

IT. S. S. Iowa, 
Guantanamo, Cuba, July 24, 1898. 

Sir: In obedience to your order of the 22d instant (No. 14), I have 
the honor to make the following report: 

This ship left Key West (Sand Key anchorage) at 11 a. m. May 20, 
and reached the blockade off Havana at G.40 p. m., when the course 
was at once changed to the westward and the ship started for Cienfue- 
gos. The light on Morro was lost at 9 o'clock. 

At 9.30 a. m. of May 21 sighted the Buyout and gave her bearing 
and distance of Cape San Antonio. At 10.30 exchanged numbers with 
Cincinnati, cruising to westward of us. At 12.45 rounded Cape San 
Antonio. 

On May 22, just before noon, sighted the squadron under command of 
Commodore Schley lying off Cienfuegos. At 1.30 joined the squadron 
and saluted the Commodore's pennant with 11 guns. At 5.45 site of 
light-house (entrance to Cienfuegos) bore (magnetic) N. 10° E., distant 
about 5 miles. 

On May 23 the Hawk, Casline, and Merrimac joined. Began coaling 
at 10 a. m. from Merrimac. An Atlas liner came in from southward, 
and after communicating with flagship entered harbor of Cienfuegos. 
At 4, site of light house (entrance to Cienfuegos) bore NE. by E. h E. 
(magnetic), distant about 3.5 miles. At 0.30 stopped coaling, having 
received 255 tons of coal on board during the day. 

May 24: On Cienfuegos blockade. Cleared for action by signal from 
flag at 0.30 a. m. and secured at 0.45 a. m. Three vessels coining in 
from southward, which proved to be the Marblehead, Eagle, and Vixen. 
At 7..'i() Marblehead saluted the Commodore's pennant with 11 guns. 
Received a draft of men from Marblehead. About 5.05 p. m. a small 
Spanish gunboat appeared at mouth of channel leading to Cienfuegos 
1 1 arbor, distant 4,900 yards, and stood back into harbor at 5.10. Coaled 
Dupont from this ship. At 7.55 squadron got under way and stood 
southward and eastward, column open order. 

May 25: Weather overcast. Squally and rainy. Long sea from east- 
southeast. Standing along Cuban coast to southward and eastward, 
making passage from Cienfuegos to Santiago. Squadron slowed at 
times, to permit Eagle to keep station. Maximum speed about 8 knots. 
A three-masted schooner passed through the fleet about 10 p. in., stand- 
ing to westward. 

Slay 2G : Weather, rainy. Making passage from Cienfuegos to San- 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 27 

tiago de Cuba. At 5 a. m. increased speed from about 7 knots to 9 
(following flag), and changed course from SE. f E. to E. | K (by stand- 
ard). Standing to eastward. At 1.30 p. m. Eagle left fleet and stood 
to southward. At 4.41 p. m. sighted three vessels to eastward. At 5.10 
cleared for action in obedience to signal from flagship and went ahead 
full speed. At 5.25 secured and stopped. Vessels proved to be St. 
Paul, Yale, and Minneapolis. Stopped until 9 p. m., when began to 
form column of vessels, and at 9.50 headed course W. £ S. (magnetic), 
St. Paul, Minneapolis, and Marblehead on left flank, Yale, with Merrimac 
in tow, and Vixen on right flank. At 11.20 p. m. stopped. 

May 27: Clondy, with showers until 8 a. in., when it cleared. Fleet 
stopped. Yale making effort to get collier Merrimac in tow. At 9 a. m. 
Harvard joined squadron, and at noon stood off to southward. At 3.30 
p. m. Yale got line fast to collier Merrimac. At 3.50 p. m. formed col- 

[Page 419.] 

iimn on flagship and went ahead 7 knots, course west (magnetic). 
The St. Paul left the squadron between 4 and 6 p. in., and stood to 
southward. At 7.20 p. m. stopped. Texas and Marblehead went along- 
side collier Merrimac for coal. Moving engines occasionally during 
night to keep distance from flagship. 

May 28 : Weather clear and pleasant. Fleet lying off southern coast 
of Cuba. Renewed certain packing in starboard engine. At 8.30 a. in. 
Minneapolis stood off to westward and Yale to southward. At 10 a. m. 
Marblehead left collier and Vixen went alongside. At 11.50 a. m. Texas 
left collier. At 1.10 p. m. Vixen cast off from collier. At 1.30 p. m. 
formed column, natural order, and stopped. At 2 p. m. went ahead, 
course E. £ N. (magnetic); stopped at 2.45 p. m., and went ahead 
again at 3 p. m. Standing to eastward. Works at entrance to Santi- 
ago de Cuba Harbor in plain sight latter part of first dogwatch. At 
7.40 p. m. stopped, following motions of flagship. Lying off Santiago 
de Cuba, keeping station in column. 

May 29 : Fair and warm. Lying off harbor of Santiago de Cuba. At 
0.10 sighted St. Paul coming in from eastward. Moving engines 
occasionally to maintain position. At 7.40 a. m. sighted a man-of-war in 
entrance to harbor of Santiago de Cuba, probably the Spanish ship 
Cristobal Colon. During forenoon watch made out in Santiago E 
Harbor the Spanish war vessels Cristobal Colon and two vessels of 
Vizcaya class. During forenoon the commanding officers of the fleet 
went on board flagship in obedience to signal. St. Paul stood off to 
eastward, carrying mail. Vixen and Massachusetts went alongside col- 
lier. During first dogwatch sighted enemy's torpedo boat in entrance 
to harbor, towing boats. During night fleet steaming slowly back and 
forth before harbor of Santiago. About 9 p. m. Vixen made signal that 
enemy's torpedo boat was in sight. Went to general quarters by signal 
from flagship. Vixen afterwards spoke us and said she had probably 
made a mistake. 

May 30: Clear and warm. Standing slowly to and fro in front of 
Santiago Harbor. Marblehead and Vixen patrolling inshore. Went 
alongside collier Merrimac at 0.30 and began coaling at 7.45. H. B. 
M. S. Indefatigable came in from southward and communicated with 
flagship. New Orleans and collier Sterling joined squadron. Received 
357 tons of coal by 6 p. m., when cast off collier. Steaming to and fro 
before entrance to Santiago Harbor during night. 



28 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

May 31: Off entrance to Santiago. Harvard joined squadron at 
daybreak, from southward. Flagship Texas and MarbUhead went 
alongside colliers. At 10.30 Commodore Schley transferred bis pen- 
nant to Massachusetts. At 12.45, in obedience to signal from flagship, 
began to clear ship for action. At 1.15 went to general quarters. The 
Massachusetts (carrying broad pennant of Commodore Schley) led the 
attacking force, followed in column at double distance by the New 
Orleans and Iowa, and heading about east by north. Began steaming 
in column at about 10 knots. When the Cristobal Colon came into 
view the Massachusetts opened lire (time, 1.50). The New Orleans 
opened at 1.51 and the lou-a at 1.56. The range at which our guns 
fired was 8,500 yards, but the shots fell short. The range (setting of 
the sights) was gradually increased to 0,000 yards during this run. At 
2.01 the Iowa ceased tiring, the other Spanish ship (one of the Vizcaya 
class) being no longer visible. The Massachusetts had already turned 
with a port helm and headed about west. At 2.05 the Massachusetts 
reopened lire, followed by the New Orleans at 2.06 and the Iowa at 
2.08. During the second passage the speed was decreased. The sights 

[Page 420.] 

were set first at 9,500 yards, gradually increased to 11,000 yards. 
Nearly all shots fell slightly short, but as they all appeared to G- 
burst or graze it is likely the enemy was struck by many frag- 
ments and possibly by some shell. At 2.10 Ioica ceased firing. The 
flagship stopped before this vessel was out of range, and several shells 
fell near us after we stopped tiring — one close aboard. At 2.50 secured 
the battery. At same time Commodore Schley transferred his flag to the 
Vixen and thence to the Brooklyn. At 3.10 the vessels and forts of the 
enemy ceased firing. During night steaming to and fro before entrance 
to Santiago. 

Appended is a list of "Important signals from May 19, 1898, to June 
1, 1898;" also, "The positions of the U. S. S. Ioica from May 19, 1898, 
to June 1, 1898." 

Very respectfully, E. D. Evans, 

Captain, TJ. 8. A 7 "., Commanding. 

Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Force, 

North Atlantic Station. 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 



29 



[Page 420.] 
Important signals from May 19, 1898, to June 1, 1898. 



Date. 


From. 


To. 


Signal. 


May 19 : 




New York 


Coal on hand, 462; coaling from Saturn. 


May 20 


New York 


Stop coaling in time to reach Havana before dark. 
Permission to get under way; granted. 


New York 


May 21 : 




Exchanged numbers (dist. pennants) with TJ. S. T. B. 








Dupont. 
Exchanged numbers with TJ. S. S. Cincinnati. 

Exchanged numbers with U. S. F. S. Brooklyn. 


May 22 : 






1.35 p.m... 


Brooklyn 

do 




Take position astern of Massachusetts, distance 400 


Squadron 

do 


yards. 
Follow motions of commander in chief, column, 




do 


slow speed. 
Speed, 5 knots. 


6.07 p.m... 
6.30 p. m . . . 


do 

do 


do 

do 

do 


Increase distance at dark to 600 yards. Keep bright 
lookout, several gun vessels reported inside ; the 
Dupont will patrol inside the squadron. 

Stop. 


May 23 : 


...do 






...do 


do 


Stop. 






Brooklyn 


3 steamers sighted bearing SW. by S. 




do 


Shall we prepare to receive collier alongside? 




Brooklyn 

do 

do 




Yes. 


9.15 a. m ... 
9.15 a. m .. 


.... do 

Squadron 


Coal Dupont when she gets alongside. 
Strange vessel sighted bearing SE. by E. 


11 22 a m 


do 


Situation unchanged ; rumor Spanish fleet is at San- 


12 m 


Brooklyn 

Squadron 

do 


tiago, but not believed. 


12.30 p.m.. 
1.45 p. m ... 


do 

Brooklyn 

do 


Strange vessel sighted bearing SSW. 

News from Jamaica reports tiie Spanish fleet arrived 
at Santiago Thursday and left Friday ; think they 
are at Cienfuegos now, as I heard heavy guns firing 
on Saturday about 4.30 o'clock, 30 miles west from 
here. I interpreted it as a welcome to the fleet. 

In case of separation, rendezvous lat. 21° 30' north; 




do 


do 


long. 80° 19' west, 13 miles east of Jagua Bank, 
Slow speed ; Iowa excused. 
Stop. 




do 


do 




. . do 






do 


Squadron 


Slow speed ; course SSE. 


May 24 : 


do 


At 7 stop and keep position. 

Slow speed. 
Stop. 


do 


do 




do 


do 









30 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 



[Page 421.] 
Important signals from May 19, 189S, to June 1, 189S — Continued. 



Date. 



From. 



Signal. 



May .4: 

"0.18 a. m . 
6.20 a. in . 
6.30 a. in . 
6.35 a. in . 
6 a. in . 
6.50 a in . 
6.55 a. in . 
6.57 a. in . 



8.15 a. in . 
9.20 a. in . 
12 ill 

1.30 p. in . 

•J. in p. m 
;:.::5 p. in 



4 p. in 

5.15 p, in . 
5.25 p. in . 

5.50 p. in . 

5.51 p. in . 
5.53 p. in - 
6.58 p. m . 
7.07 p.m. 



Io-NV.1 

Brooklyn — 

ilo '. 

....do 

....do 

....do 

... .1.. 

....do 



Iowa 

Brooklj ii 
Iowa ...., 
Brooklyn 

do.... 

... do .... 



7.40 p. m . 
7.48 p. in . 
7.53 p. in . 

8 p. in 

8.05 p. m . 
8 50 p. m . 
9.10 ]>. in . 
May 25 : 

T.iu a.m . 

8.33 a. m . 
8.50 a. in . 
9.30 a. m . 

12 in 

1.30 p.m. 

6.55 p. in . 

8.58 p. m . 

May 26: 

10.15 a. in 
10.20 a. m 
10.30 a. in 



....do 
....do 
....do 
10.35 a.m do 



Iowa 

Brooklyn . 

Iowa 

Brooklyn 

— do — 

do.... 

do.... 

do.... 



....do.., 

do... 

do... 

....do... 

do... 

do... 

Iowa 



Brooklyn 



do .... 

do .... 

do .... 

Iowa 

Brooklyn 

do 

do ... 



10. 15 a. in do 

12 in Iowa 

12.25 p. m . . Brooklyn . 

1 p. in do 

1.15 p. m do — 

2 p. m do — 

4.45 p. in ... Iowa 

1.57 p. m ... Brooklyn . 

5 p. m do 

5.10 p.m ... Iowa 

5.15 ]>. m ... Brooklyn 
5.20 p. m do 



5.28 p.m 

5.29 p. in 

5.30 p. in 

7.50 p. m . 



9 p.m 

9.10 p.m ... 
11 .'JO p.m.. 
.May 27: 

10.05 a. in .. 



10.30 a. m . . 
10.35 a.m.. 
i" 10 a. in . 

11 a. in 



..do 
.do 
.do 

.do 



.do 
.do 

.do 

.do 



Tale 

Merrimac. 

Iowa 

Brooklyn . 



Brooklyn Ilave sighted 3 steamers bearing about S. by W. 

Squadron The strange sail is suspicious. 

do Clear ship for action. 

do Form column. 

do Steam at 12 knots. 

do ' Slow speed. 

do Discontn present exercise. 

Iowa Send for draft of men from the Marblehead as soon 

as sin- arrives. 
Brooklyn Gunboat standing out of harbor. 



low a 

Brooklj n . 

low a 

Squadron. 
Iowa 



Brooklyn . 
Squadron. 
Brooklyn . 



Squadron .... Coarse E. by S 
do Slow speed 



Coal the Dupont. 

Coal on hand. 956; expended, 33. 

Stand out from shore. 

Keep safe working distance from shore. 

Report atonce how much coal you have aboard for 10 

knots: how many days I 
Can do in knots mi about 100 tons a day; 9 days. 
Form column on F. 
Torpedo vessel is approaching. 



.do Take double distance. 

do Stop. 

... .do We are bound to Santiago. In case of separa- A 

tion rendezvous at Gonaives Bay, Haiti, out- 
side marine limit. 

....do Course SE. 

do Course SE. 1/2 S. 

do Slow speed. 

...do Form column, open order. 

do Speed. 11 knots. 

do Casti ne remains here. 

Brooklyn Several lights hearing east. 

Squadron I We will slow down, making 7 knots, to wait for the 

Eagle. 

do Stop. 

do Keep under steerage way only. 

do Sliced. G knots. 

Brooklyn Coal on hand, 891 ; expended, 65. 

Squadron Course, SE. by E. A E. 

do Speed, 6 knots. 

do Speed, 7 knots. 



.do 
.do 
.do 



Stop. 

Speed, 9 knots. 

Stop, 
do Must stop for 20 minutes to let Merrimac make re- 
pairs. 

do Speed, 9 knots. 

Brooklyn Coal on hand, 820 tons; expended, 71. 

Squadron E.J N. 

do Slow speed. 

do 9 knots. 

do East. 

Brooklyn 2 of our cruisers bearing NX W. Tale and St. Louis. 

Squadron Column left. 

do Follow nmt ions of Commander in Chief. 

Brooklyn Steamer hearing north. Supposed to be Minneapolis. 

Squadron , Clear ship for action. 

do Speed, 12 knots. 

Discontinue present exercise. 

Steam at standard speed. 

Stop. 

Destination, Key West, via south side of Cuba B 
and Yucatan Channel, as soon as collier is 
ready; speed, 9 knots. 

Form column, natural order; course, west. 

Speed, 9 knots. 

Stop. 

Ask Merrimac how soon chief engineer will finish 

his examination. 
I am ready to go ahead. 
Have finished. 
i lompleted 
Can you fetch into the port of Key West with coal 

remaining 1 Report by Bignal. 



do 

do 

do 

do 



.do .. 
.do., 
.do .. 



Iowa 



Brooklyn . 

low a 

Brooklyn 
Squadron . 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 



31 



[Page 422.] 
Important signals from May 19, 1S98, to June 1, 1898— Continued. 



May 27 : 

11.05 a. m . 

12 m 

lp.m 

3.45 p.m.. 

7.15 p. m .. 

8.15 p. m . . 
May 28 : 

11.15 a. m . 

11. 30 a. m . 



12m 

1.12 p. m .. 
1.25 p.m.. 
2.30 p. m . . 



4.05 p.m. 
4.30 p.m. 



5.20 p.m .. 

6.10 p.m.. 

6.45 p. m . . 
May 29: 

'6.10 a. m . . 

6.30 a. m . . 

8.10 a. m .. 

8.35 a. m .. 

12m 

12 m 

5 p. m 

5.57 p. m . . 

6.15 p.m. 

6.40 p. m . , 
May 30 : 

5.20 a. m . 



From. 



10.30 a. m . 
11.15 a. m 
11.30 a. m 



12 m 

3.25 p.m .. 
6.20 p. m . . 
6.30 p. m . . 

May 31: 

8.50 a. m ., 
10.50 a. m 

11.20 a. m 



12 m. 



Iowa 

....do 

Marblehead 
Brooklyn . . . 

do 

Iowa 



Brooklyn . 
do — 



Iowa 

Brooklyn . 

do 

do.... 



12.45 p.m. 
1.25 p.m., 
1.29 p.m.. 
1.31 p.m.. 
1.33 p.m., 

1.40 p.m . 
2.05 p. m . 
2.16 p.m. 



.do 

.do, 



....do.... 

Iowa 

Brooklyn . 



Iowa 

Brooklyn . 
....do.... 

....do.... 

Iowa 

Texas 
Brooklyn 
.. .do..., 
....do... 
....do... 



.do 



Iowa 

Brooklyn , 
....do 



Iowa 

...do... 
Brooklyn . 
....do..., 



....do, 

Iowa . 



Brooklyn . 
do 

... do.... 
Squadron. 

do 

Brooklyn . 



Iowa 

Squadron . 



Brooklyn . 
Squadron . 

do 

do.... 



Iowa 

Squadron. 



....do .... 

Brooklyn . 
Squadron. 



Signal. 



Affirmative. 

Coal on hand, 762 ; expended, 58. 

Strange vessel, bearing ENE. 

Form column on F; course west; speed, 7 knots. 

Stop. 

Light sighted, bearing N. by W. 

Rendezvous in Gonaives Bay. 

In case of separation fleet will rendezvous at 
place which will be designated by signal; O 
lat. 19° 24' N. ; long. 73° 03' W. 

Coal on hand, 726; expended, 36. 

Form column on F, natural order; course E. J N. 

Speed, 6 knots. 

I have no news of importance. Have requested coal 
vessels to be sent to Gonaives. Will remain off 
Santiago de Cuba till further orders while coal 
remaining leaves enough to reach coast of Haiti. 

While oft' Santiago the general meeting place D 
will be 25 miles south of that place. 

We will stop a little after dark and will endeavor to 
maintain our formation. The Marblehead will go 
inside fleet about 2 miles. Keep a sharp lookout 
and readiness. 

Load main battery. 

Steamer, bearing SE. by S. 

Vessel sighted, bearing W. J N. 



Brooklyn Stranger sighted, bearing east. 

Squadron i Form column. 

do Let the people go to breakfast. 

do Commanding officers repair on board the flagship. 

Brooklyn i Coal on hand, 686; expended, 40. 



.do 
Squadron . 

do .... 

do .... 

do .... 



Massachusetts 
(flagship) 



Iowa 



Brooklyn 

do ... 

do .... 

do... 

do... 



.do 

.do 
.do 



Coal on hand, 595; expended, 40. 

Take your position in column at 6 p.m. 

Take double distance. 

Slow speed. 

Speed as slow as possible. 



Iowa Leave formation and coal up as soon as collier gets 

nearer. 

Brooklyn Strange vessel sighted, bearing E. by N. 

Squadron Strange vessel is a man-of-war. 

do Cruiser Indefatigable asked and received permission 

to enter; can not understand why she did not avail 
of it, 

Brooklyn Coal on hand, 791 ; expended, 34. 

do Strange vessel, bearing ENE. 

Squadron Form column. 

.do | Order in column: Brooklyn, Massachusetts, New 

Orleans, Iowa, Texas. 



....do 

Massachusetts 

(flagship). 
Squadron 



Massachusetts 

(flagship.) 
Squadron .. 

do 

do 

do 

do 



.do 
.do 
.do 



Clear ship for action. 

Strange vessel sighted, bearing SE. 

The Massachusetts and New Orleans and Iowa will 
go in after dinner to a distance of 7,000 yards and 
tire at Cristobal Colon with 8 and 12 and 13 inch 
guns. Speed, about 10 knots. 

Coal on hand, 967; expended, 41. 

Clear ship for action. F 

Massachusetts, New Orleans, Iowa, form column. 
Speed, 10 knots. 
Will indicate range. 

Following Massachusetts, use heavy guns on Cris- 
tobal Colon. 
Fire steadily and with greatest practicable precision. 
Do not go in any closer. 
Cease firing. 



32 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 



[Page 423.] 
Position of U. S. S. Iou-a from May 19, 1S98, to June 1, 1898. 



Date. 



Position. 



May 18. 

Mav 'JO. 

"1>U. 

Max 21. 

Do. 

Do. 
May 22. 
May 23. 
May 24 
Max 25. 

Do 

Ma-. 28 

Do 
Do 

Mas 27. 

Do. 

Do. 
May 28. 

Do 
May 2a 

Max 30. 
.Max 31. 



At anchor, Key "West, Fla. 
8p.m.,lat.23?13' X. ; long. 82° 42' W. 
8 am., lat. 22° 35' 30" N. ; long. 84° 47' "W. 
Noon, lat. 21° 49' 45" N.; long. 85° 03' 15" W. 
8 i>. in., lat. 21 : 25' N. ; long, 83° 43' W. 
8 a. in., lat. 21 20' N.; long. 81° 21' "W. 
Noon, lat. 21° 46' N. ; long. 80° 44' W. 
Oil' Cienfuegos, Cuba. 

Do. 
8 a. in., lat. 20° 42' N. ; long. 79^ 22' 30" W. 

.\ l, lat. 20 30 15" N.; long. 79° 16' W. 

8 i>. m., lat. 20° 03' 30"N. ; long. 78° 36' 15" W. 
8 a. in., lat. 1!) 29' 30" K.j long. 77 08' 45" W. 
Noon, lat. Ill :;<»' r><>" X.; lon-i. 7«- :w w. 
8 p. in., lat. 19 C 27' N.; long. 75° 40 W. 
8 a. m., lat. 19 30' N. ; long. 76° W. 
Noon, lat. 19 35' 24" X. ; long. 70 02' W. 
8 p. in., lat. 19° 35' 30" N. ; long. 70° 30' W. 
8 a. in., lat. 19° 40' X.; long. 70 ' 29' 45" W. 
Noon, lat. 19 "■' 37' 34" N.; long. 70° 29' "W. 
( )H Santiago de Cuba. 

Do. 

Do. 



POSITIONS OF (J. $.5. IOWA. MAY Z6'-* -29'-", 
WHEN ATTACHED TO THE FLYING SQUADRON. 
FROM H. Q. CHART, NS 946. 



Noon, 
MsySS 






SANTIAGO de CUBA. 




76'.30 W. 



7S,130'W. 



SlE: 



[Page 411.] No. 24. 

U. S. S. St. Paul, 
Off Santiago de Cuba, May 29, 1898—10 a. m. 



On the 20th I boarded a British steamer, which showed no desire to 
escape us. She proved to be the Jason, bound from Jamaica to New 
York with fruit and produce. She brought me two letters from Consul 
Lewis A. Dent, of Kingston, Jamaica, and two Cubans, one of whom 
was an interpreter who had lately been a clerk in the consulate at San- 
tiago, and the other a colored pilot, said to have been recently a coast 
pilot for the Spanish navy at Santiago. Their names were respectively 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 33 

Louis M. Preval aud Ecluardo Nunez. The clearance papers of this 
British vessel did not bear the consular seal of the United States con- 
sul, nor did the letters. I took the men on board, and later on the 
same day, when Commodore Schley arrived off Santiago from the east- 
ward, I transferred them to the flagship. 

******* 

0. D. SlGSBEE, 

Captain, TJ. S. N., Commanding. 
The Secretary of the Navy, 

Washington, D. C. 



[Page 414-415.] No. 25. 

137154. 

[Dnty performed by Texas from May 19 to May 31, 1898.] 

U. S. S. Texas, 1st Bate, 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, July 23, 1898. 

Sir : In obedience to your order, I respectfully submit the following : 

May 19: Got under way off Key West at 7.55 a. m. and left with the 
Flying Squadron, bound to the southward and westward. Noon posi- 
tion, 24° 8' 45" N., 82o 20' 30" W. 

May 20: Steaming in column, flagship leading. Noon position, 22° 
10' 50" N., 85° 13' W. 

May 21 : Steaming in column. Noon position, 21° 12' 55" N., 81° 
45' W. 

May 22: At 12.05 stopped and at 5.05 went ahead again, standing in 
for the land. Noon position, 21° 57' N., 80° 32' W. 

May 23 and 24 : Off Cienfuegos, Cuba, varying distances from entrance. 
At 8 p. m. went ahead in column. Course, SE. £ S. 

May 25: Steaming in column to southward and eastward. Noon 
position, 20° 29' N., 79° 13' W. 

May 26: At 5 changed course to E. % N. At 7 sighted high land on 
port beam. Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Yale joined squadron 
about 5.30 p. m. At 6.35 signal 162 from flag; at 7.45 signal A. 
"Destination, Key West via south side of Cuba and Yucatan 
Channel as soon as collier is ready. Speed 9 knots." Course, west- 
southwest. Noon position, 19° 31' 45" N., 76° 36' W. 

May 27 : Lying to and drifting; coaled ship at night. Noon position, 
19° 35' 22" N., 76° 00' 45" W. 

May 28 : Lying to and drifting. Noon position, 19° 40' N., 76° 30' W. 
At 1.20 formed column and started ahead. Course, east by south. 

May 29: Off Santiago; steaming; circle off entrance, following flag. 
Made out three vessels in entrance, inside of forts. Noon position, 
19° 50' N., 75° 52' W. 

May 30: Lying to and steaming back and forth off entrance to San- 
tiago, following the movements of the flagship. Noon position, 19° 54' 
N., 75° 54' W. 

May 31 : Coaling ship from Sterling. In the afternoon at 2.20 the 
Massachusetts, Ioiva, and New Orleans opened fire on ships inside, pass- 
ing twice in front of entrance. Noon position, 19° 54' N., 75° 54' W. 
Very respectfully, 

J. W. Philip, 
Captain, Commanding. 

The Commander in Chief, 

North Atlantic Station. 



34 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

[Page 406.] No. 26. 

[Extract from report of commanding officer of tlio U. S. S. Harvard, at sea, lat. 24° 16' N., long. 74° 36' 

W., dated June 4, 1898.] 

U. S. S. Harvard, 
At Sea, Lat. 24° 16' N., Long. 74° 36' W., June 4, 1898. 

Sir: 

* * * * * * # 

As sooii as I could communicate with Captaiu Wise, U. S. N., com- 
manding the Yale, and who would be left as senior officer off Santiago 
de Cuba, I left for St. Nicolas Mole, arriving there on the morning of 
May 25, where 1 sent cipher cablegrams to, and received them from, 
the Department, the last one, received at 8.30 a. in., May 26, being an 
important one for the information of Commodore Schley. After the 
translation of the latter and the preparation of two cipher dis- 
patches, oue to the Department and one to Admiral Sampson, I left 
St. .Nicolas Mole and returned to off Santiago de Cuba, reaching there 
on the morning of May 27, where 1 found Commodore Schley with his 
squadron, and to whom I delivered the dispatches received by me 
for him. 

C. S. Cotton, 
Captain, TJ. S. N., Commanding. 
The Secretary of the Navy, 

Navy Department, Washington, D. C. 



[Page 395.] No. 27. 

Washington, May 25, 1898. 
Harvard, St. Nicholas Mole, Haiti: 

Proceed at once and inform Schley, and also the senior officer pres- 
eut off Santiago, as follows: All Department's information indicates 
Spanish division is still at Santiago. The Department looks to you to 
ascertain facts, and that the enemy, if therein, does not leave without 
a decisive action. Cubans familiar with Santiago say that there are 
landing places 5 or nautical miles west from the mouth of harbor, 
and that there insurgents probably will be found, and not the Span- 
ish. From the surrounding heights can see every vessel in port. As 
soon as ascertained, notify the Department whether enemy is 
there. Could not squadron and also the Harvard coal from A 
Merrimac leeward of Cape Cruz, Gonaives Channel or Mole, B 
Haiti? The Department will send coal immediately to Mole, 
lieport without delay situation at Santiago de Cuba. 

Long. 



[Page 397.] No. 28. 

Kingston, May 28, 1898. 
Secretary of the Navy, Washington: 

The receipt of telegram of May 26* is acknowledged. Deliv- A 
ered by Harvard off Santiago de Cuba. Merrimac engines dis- 
abled; is heavy; am obliged to have towed to Key West. Have been 
unable absolutely to coal the Texas, Marblehead, Vixen, Brooklyn from 

* Date of receipt at Mole : Sent from Washington May 25. 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 35 

collier, all owing to very rough sea. Bad weather since leaving Key 
West. The Brooklyn alone has more than sufficient coal to proceed to 
Key West; can not remain off Santiago present state squadron coal 
account. Impossible to coal leeward Cape Cruz in the summer, all 
owing to southwesterly winds. Harvard reports coal sufficient for 
Jamaica; leaves to-day for Kingston; reports only small vessels could 
coal at Gonaives or Mole. Minneapolis only coaled for Key West; also 
Yale, which tows Merrimac. Much to be regretted, can not obey orders 
of Department. Have striven earnestly; forced to proceed for coal to 
Key West by way of Yucatan passage. Can not ascertain anything 
respecting enemy positive. Obliged to send Eagle — admitted no delay 
— to Port Antonio, Jamaica; had only 25 tons of coal. Will leave 
St. Paul off Santiago de Cuba. Will require 10,000 tons of coal at Key 
West. Very difficult to tow collier to get cable to hold. 

Schley. 

This telegram repeated to Admiral Sampson at Key West, May 29. 

No. 29. 

Extracts from logs of vessels for May 27. 

Massachusetts : Tons 

Coal remaining on hand at noon 789 

Texas : 

Coal remaining on hand at noon 394 

Brooklyn : 

Coal remaining on hand at noon „ 940 

Marblehead : 

Coal remaining on hand at noon 116 

Iowa: 

Coal remaining on hand at noon 762 

Merrimac : 

Coal at noon, on hand 4,300 

Extract from log of Eagle for May 26. 

Tons. 
Coal at noon, on hand. 27 



[Page 427.] No. 30. 

118974. 

Flying Squadron, U. S. Flagship Brooklyn, 

Off Santiago de Cuba, June 1, 1898. 
Sir: 1. 1 have the honor to make the following detailed report con- 
cerning the reconnaissance of the 30th ultimo. 

2. As the Brooklyn, Texas, and Marblehead were coaling E shifted 
my broad pennant to the Massachusetts, and, together with the Iowa 
and New Orleans, steamed in from a position about 5 miles southwest 
of the entrance. At 12.45 made signal, " Clear for action," and at 1.05 
the signal for " General quarters." The speed was set at 10 knots, with 
the three vessels in column at distance, the Massachusetts leading and 
the Iowa following the New Orleans. 

3. Stood in with port helm heading gradually to about N. E., then 
easing to E. NE. The distance having decreased to about 7,000 yards, 
headed east, and at 2, the Colon having been opened out in the 
entrance, commenced firing with our port batteries, using the guns of 
greatest range on the Colon and the smaller ones against the fortifica- 
tions. 



36 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

4. Our fire was at once returned by the ships inside the harbor (firing 
at random over the land) and by the forts to the eastward and west- 
ward of the entrance and on Cay Smith; also by the Colon. At 2.10 
(•cased firing, turned with port helm to W. by S., and slowed. Headed 
off shore at 2.l'3 and stood out of range. The shore batteries and the 
Colon continued firing until about 3 p. m. 

5. .None of our vessels were struck, although the shots fell over and 
around them. 1 have learned from insurgent sources that the Reina 
Mercedes was struck by a shell and 8 men were killed; also that a 
number of shots struck the Morro. 

6. The reconnaissance developed the fact that the Spanish vessels are 
in the harbor and that the fortifications are well provided with long- 
range guns of large caliber. They used smokeless powder almost 
exclusively, with the exception of the batteries to the westward of the 
entrance. 

Very respectfully, 

W. S. Schley, 
Commodore, U. 8. N., Commander in Chief Flying Squadron. 
The Hon. Secretary of the Navy, 

Navy Department, Washington D. G, 



No. 31. 

REPORT OF OPERATIONS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC FLEET. 






142722. 

[Report of operations of North Atlantic Fleet.] 

U. S. Flagship New York, 1st Rate, 

Ouantanamo Bay, August 3, 1898. 

Sir: I have the houor to submit the following report, covering the 
conduct of the fleet under my command in its operations ending with 
the destruction of the Spanish squadron under Admiral Cervera. 

Information being received of the sailing, April 29, of Admiral Cer- 
vera's squadron from the Cape Verde Islands it was decided with the 
concurrence of the Department that a squadron should go into the 
Windward Passage for the purpose of observation, with a view to 
going farther east if thought advisable, making en route Cape Haitieu 
a place of call for dispatches. 

May 4.— The flagship left Key West at 5.45 a. m. of May 4, having 
appointed a rendezvous of the several ships which were selected to 
form the squadron off Cruz del Padre light, Nicholas Channel, at 6 
p. in. of that day. 

The flagship calling off Havana proceeded to the rendezvous in com- 
pany with the Iowa, Indiana, aud Detroit. The Terror, Amphitrite, 
Montgomery, Porter, Wompatuck, and the collier Niagara, were already 
there. The squadron at once stood eastward, the monitors being taken 
in tow. 

This was the beginning of our experience with the inefficiency of the 
monitors. Their coal supply was so small that it was at once evident 
that they must either frequently coal or they must be towed. Therefore 
the New York took one of the monitors in tow, and the other was towed 
by the Iowa. There resulted endless trouble aud delay from the break- 
ing of towlines, etc. At the first opportunity, when the sea was suffi- 
cently smooth, the monitors were given coal from the Niagara, aud 
again taken in tow. Had the sea been rough, or had the enemy 
appeared at this juncture, the squadron would have been in a much 
better position for an engagement had the monitors been elsewhere. 
Subsequently, when engaging the batteries of San Juan, it Avas evident 
that their shooting was very bad. Owing to the quick rolling of these 
vessels, even in a very moderate sea, they were unable to fire with any 
degree of accuracy. 

May 6. — At 4.30 p. m. of the 6th the Montgomery was sent ahead to 
call at Cape Uaitien for telegrams. The squadron arrived at a point 
20 miles to the northward of Cape Haitien and communicated with the 
Montgomery, which came out of Cape Haitien at 11.40 p. m. of the 7th. 

May 7. — The following telegrams were received : 

Washington, D. C, May 6. 
Do not risk or cripple your vessels against fortificatious as to prevent from soon 
afterwards successfully fighting Spanish fleet composed of Pelayo, Carlos V, Oquendo, 
Vizcaya, Maria Teresa, Cristobal Colon, four deep-sea torpedo boats, if they should 
appear on this side. 



Long. 
37 



38 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

Washington, May 6. 
American Line steamer New York, St. Louis keep a lookout for Spanish fleet about 
80 nautical miles bo the east of Martinique Island, Guadeloupe Island. Paris cruis- 
ing around Porto Rico for that purpose. He will inform you if he gets any reliable 
information. 

Long. 

Washington, May 6. 
li is reported that several vessels with coal, Spanish fleet, are to be near Pointe a 
Pitre, Guadeloupe; possibly contingent supply. 

Long. 

Washington, May 6. 
Reports to-day Spanish vessel(s) coaling and loading ammunition at St. Thomas, 
West Indies, and Spanish men-of-war patrolling outside harbor. 

Long. 

Washington, May 6. 
Ambulance steamer Solace will leave May 7 for Cape Ilaitien; leave orders to follow 

you. 

Long. 

May 8. — All the commanding officers were called aboard the flagship 
in the middle watch, and a consultation regarding the situation was 
held. I decided to stand on to the eastward as far as San Juan, Porto 
Rico, on the chance of finding the Spanish squadron in that port, where, 
if we were not successful in destroying it, it could at least be closely 
blockaded and held. 

May 9. — The squadron had been stopped 20 miles north of Cape 
Ilaitien, and the afternoon of the 8th and the morning of the 9th were 
spent in coaling the Terror, Amphitrite, Montgomery, and Detroit. 

At 11.15, the following being received from Cape Haitien, the squadron 
stood eastward: 

Washington, May 8. 
The receipt of telegram of 8th is acknowledged. Pelayo, Carlos J', one deep-sea 
torpedo boat can not leave Cadiz, Spain, two weeks, Oquendo, Vizcaya, Maria Teresa, 
C. Colon, two deep-sea torpedo vessels, published in the newspapers, were seen yes- 
terday night near Martinique. Completion of course American Line steamer off 
Windward Passage May 10, off Porto Pico May 13. I order them to St. Thomas to 
await instructions from you. Blockade of Cuba and Key West will be endangered 
if stripped by you You should be quick in your operation at 

Porto Rico. In everything the Department has utmost confidence in your discre- 
tion, and the Department does not wish to hamper you. 

May 12. — The squadron arrived off San Juan the morning of the 12th, 
and the bombardment of that place ensued, beginning at 5.10 and end- 
ing at 7.45. It was soon seen that Admiral Cervera's squadron was not 
in the port. It was clear to my own mind that the squadron would not 
have any great difficulty in forcing the surrender of the place, but the 
fact that w r e should be held several days in completing arrangements 
for holding it; that part of our force would have to be left to await the 
arrival of troops to garrison it; that the movements ot the Spanish 
squadron, our main objective, were still unknown: that the Flying 
Squadron was still north, and not in a position to render any aid; that 
Havana, Cervera's natural objective, was thus open to entry by such a 
force as his, while we were a thousand miles distant, made our immedi- 
ate movement toward Havana imperative. 

I thus reluctantly gave up the project against San Juan and stood 
westward for Havana. 

The Montgomery was sent into St. Thomas to send dispatches and 
bring any information possible, with rendezvous off Cape Ilaitien. 

May 13. — On the night of the 13th , out of Key West, was 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 39 

spoken, standing eastward, and word was received that an Associated 
Press dispatch was current at Key West that Admiral Cervera's squad- 
ron had returned to Cadiz. This was also received from a press boat. 
May 14.— The squadron was stopped and the torpedo boat Porter sent 
into Puerto Plata with the following telegrams : 

May 14. 
Secretary of the Navy, Washington: 

Is it true Spanish ships are at Cadiz, Spain? If so, send to San Juan, Porto Eico, 
collier from Key West or elsewhere. 

May 14. 
Eemey, Key West : 

Send without delay Vesuvius to San Juan, Porto Eico, if the Department confirms 
the arrival of the Spanish fleet at Cadiz. 

These telegrams had in view to return and capture San Juan, the 
leisure to do so and occupy the place being assured in the event of 
Admiral Cervera's failure to cross the Atlantic. 

May 15.— The Porter returned at 3.30 a. m. of the 15th with the fol- 
lowing telegrams : 

Flying Squadron will sail to-day for Charleston, S. C. Eeady to reinforce Cuban 
blockade or Key West, if necessary. The Minneapolis leaves to-day to watch between 
Monte Christi and Caicos Banks, Bahamas, and the St. Paul to watch between Morant 
Point, Jamaica, and west end of Haiti. Very important that your fast cruisers keep 
touch with Spanish squadron. 

Later : 

The Spanish fleet front Cape Verde Islands off Curacoa, West Indies, May 14. Fly- 
ing Squadron en route to Key West, Fla. Proceed with all possible dispatch to Key 
West. 

Also: 

The Spanish torpedo boat, deep-sea class, Terror, remains at Fort de France, Mar- 
tinique; only Spanish man-of-war observed May 13. The St. Louis reports, having 
arrived from St. Thomas. Captain Goodrich reports having cut a cable between St. 
Thomas and San Juan. 

The squadron in the meantime, awaiting these telegrams, had remained 
in position. I gave orders to the St. Louis, which had arrived at 2.15 
a. m. May 15 from the eastward, to proceed to Santiago and cut cables 
there; also Guantanamo; thence to Ponce, Porto Rico, and cut cables; 
thence to St. Thomas and await orders. Orders were to the Harvard 
and Yale, to St. Thomas: 

Take all coal permitted at St. Thomas and await additional instructions. Tele- 
graph any news to Cape Haitien. 

1 sent the following telegram to Commodore Pemey, Key West: 
Have all coal lighters filled with coal for ships in my squadron on 18th. 

and proceeded westward with the squadron, sending the Porter to 
Puerto Plato with the above mentioned dispatches and also to ask if 
the Spanish ships were at Curacoa; and if so, what ships. The Porter, 
after sending these dispatches, was to proceed to Cape Haitien to 
receive replies. The squadron then proceeded westward, the tiagship 
arranging a rendezvous with the Porter off Cape Haitien. 

May 16. — At 1l\30 a. m. May 16 the Porter arrived at the rendezvous 
with dispatches from Curacoa, as follows: 

Maria Teresa and Vizcaya in harbor coaling, arrived Saturday; Oquendo, Cristobal 
Colon, Terror, and Pluton outside ; only two admitted at time. Short of coal and pro- 
visions; dirty bottom. 



40 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

and from Cape Haitian : 

Inform Admiral Sampson Spanish squadron will leave 6 post-meridian; destination 
unknown. 

and from the Department: 

Five ve-.sels, supposed to be men-of-war, observed off Fort de France, Martinique, 
Maj 14. afternoon. 

Spanish lleet from Cape de Verde off Curacoa on May 14. Vizcaya and Maria 
Teresa entered into porl as reported, and to leave Curacoa on May 15. Department 
heard from London, 10th instant, colliers would probably meet them north coast of 
Venezuela. Flying Squadron sailed May 13 for Key West. 

I at once telegraphed Commodore liemey, Key West, sending the 
Porter into Cape Haitien for this purpose: 

[nform at once vessels blockading at Cienfuegos the Spanish fleet may appear at 
any time on south coast of Cuba, 

and to the Department: 

Auxiliary cruisers are ordered to cruise as follows: Yale to assist St. Paul between 
Morant Point, Jamaica, .Nicholas Mole, and Cuba; Harvard, Mona Passage and on 
north side of Porto Rico Island; St. Louis, cutting cables at Santiago and at Guan- 
tanamo, Cuba, then at Porto Rico, thence to St. Thomas about May 19, to await 
orders. United States squadron proceeding at best speed, 7 knots, to Key West, and 
will arrive early May 19. Solace and Supply joined squadron. 

to the commanding officer Harvard: 

Four Spanish cruisers, two torpedo-boat destroyers now at Curacoa; to leave 6 p.m. 
May 15. Probably small supply of coal. Destination unknown; probably Santiago 
de Cuba or San Juan, Porto Rico. St. Louis will destroy cables at Santiago, Guau- 
tanamo, May 16; then Ponce, Porto Rico; arrive St. Thomas about May 19. Cruise 
as follows: Yale to assist St. Paul between Morant Point, Jamaica, Nicholas Mole, 
and Cuba; Harvard, Mona Passage and north side of Porto Rico; St. Louis to await 
orders at St. Thomas. 

The Montgomery, which on the 12th had been sent to St. Thomas to 
obtain news, rejoined the flagship, and with her later rejoined the squad- 
ron, which had been standing westward, and whose speed had been but 
8 knots, on account of the necessity of towing the monitors. 

May 17. — At 11.30 a. m. May 17, being then in the Bahama Channel, 
the flagship left the squadron and proceeded with all speed to Key 
West, instructions being left with the senior officer (commanding officer 
of the Iowa) to follow with the squadron at best speed possible. 

At (J p. m. the J)upont, from Key West, met the flagship with the 
following copy of a dispatch to him from the Department: 

Naval force on North Atlantic Station is due May 17, 1898, in the vicinity of Lobas 
Cay. Send immediately your fastest vessel to inform him that Department has just 
heard that Spanish fleet have munitions of war essential to the defense of Havana, 
and the order of the Spanish lleet is imperative to reach Havana, Cuba, Cienfuegos, 
or a railroad port connected with Havana, at all hazards, and as Cienfuegos appears 
to be the only port fulfilling the conditions, Schley, with the Brooklyn, Massachu- 
setts, and Texas, to arrive Key West morning of the 18th, will be sent to Cienfuegos 
as soon as possible, so Admiral Sampson take or send his most suitable armored ship 
(on<i to join Schley, and hurry with remainder of his heavy ships to Havana block- 
ade. Acknowledge this by telegraph, reporting action taken. 

Commodore liemey inclosed to me the following copies of telegrams: 

Washington, May 16. 
Previous plans for the St. Paul are changed, and she must coal immediately and 
proceed with all possible dispatch to Venezuela Gulf, South America, where it is 
considered the Spanish lleet from Cape Verde Islands will coal. He must find and 
keep iii communication with enemy, exercising the utmost can- to avoid being cap- 
tured. More vessels will be sent to, join her, probably Harvard. Key West and the 
Department must be kept advised of important movement and plans of enemy. 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 41 

Washington, May 14. 

On account of the presence of Spanish fleet near Curacoa, send with all possible 
dispatch swift vessel to direct all excepting smallest blockading vessel oft" Cien- 
fuegos to return to Key West. Warn the blockading vessels oft' north coast of Cuba, 
but do not remove any of them. 

Washington, May 14. 

Spanish fleet, with torpedo boats, reported sighted off Curacao morning 14th May. 
Are prob. o1 dy fleet which was at Martinique ou May 12. Keep a close lookout for 
Yucatan Channel, as the enemy may round Cape San Antonio or enter Gulf Mexico. 
Keep very efficient dispatch service to these lookout ships. St. Paul will probably 
join you early morning 17th May. Enemy may appear at point on south side of Cuba. 

May 18 : 

Washington, May 17. 

Armored vessels and monitors, the naval force on the North Atlantic Station, and 
Flying Squadron must be coaled immediately upon arrival at Key West ; also four 
gunboats of the force of the Marblehead. Flying Squadron, after being increased by 
the armored vessels commander in chief North Atlantic Station considers most suit- 
able, proceed with dispatch (utmost) off Cienfuegos, accompanied by the smaller 
vessels above mentioned and such torpedo boats, if any, as the commander in chief 
will choose to send. The remainder of the naval force on the North Atlantic Station 
and the monitors will blockade Havana closely, remembering the importance of hav- 
ing current in their favor. Sampson have choice the command off Havana or at 
Cienfuegos, Schley in either case to remain with his own squadron. Commander in 
chief is authorized to make such changes of detail in this plan as he may think 
proper. In general, the object is to engage and capture the enemy off Cienfuegos if 
possible, or otherwise blockade him in that port. 

Martinique, May 17. 
In obedience to your orders May 15, will leave to-morrow. Detained on account 
of twenty-four hours' notice. Terror remains at Fort de France. Coal eight days 
15 knots an hour, eleven days 12 knots per hour. 

Cotton. 

Commodore Tterney bad added: "Hornet sent to Cienfuegos May 14." 
"Uncas sent to north coast 2 a. m. May 15." 

I arrived at Key West about 1 p. m. May 18, and found Commodore 
Schley with the Brooklyn, Massachusetts, and Texas, and the St. Paul 
anchored in tbe outer roads. 

The following telegrams were received at Key West: 

Order St. Paul proceed with all dispatch to Cape Haitien and there communicate. 
If he meets Yale Windward Passage, Cuba, take Yale with him, but he must not 
delay in order to And her. Further instructions at Cape Haitien. 

Tbe St. Paul asked permission to proceed and carry out orders, which 
was granted. 
Tbe following telegram was received from the Department: 

Send as soon as possible one fast cruiser about 2,000 or 3,000 tons to keep close 
lookout for Spanish fleet off Cienfuegos, Cuba. 

This was answered : 

Have none available larger than Casiine. 

The following telegram was received from the Department: 

Owing to the absence of your armored vessels, Flying Squadron was coaled and sent 
oft' Havana, Cuba; therefore, you will coal your ships and carry out Department's 
telegraphic orders of 17th, addressed to Naval Station, Key West, and beginning with 
the cipher words "Bapposcam Ecumenical."^ Leave a suitable defense for Key West 
and use utmost dispatch to get the force off Cienfuegos, Cuba. The Oregon arrived 
at Barbados; all well on board. 

and the following telegram was received for the Flying Squadron, 
through commandant : 

Proceed with all possible dispatch to Havana, Cuba, to support blockade until 
arrival of naval force on North Atlantic Station. Puritan and Miantonomoh to 
defend Key West. 



42 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

The following was received from Cape Haitieu, dated May 17 : 

The following from St. Thomas: " Will sail immediately, according to the follow- 
ing instructions from the Department: The Spanish iieet off Curacao May 14. All 
vessels at St. Thomas proceed at once to Key West, touching at Cape Haitieu to 
communicate with the Department. Acknowledge telegram. The following from 
Curacao: "American Consul, Cape Haitieu: Squadron left Sunday 6 p. m. ; course, 
west; small supply coal. Smith, Consul." 

Livingston, Consul. 

The following telegram was received from the Department: 

Commander Met alia to telegraph what force and character of ships would, in his 
opinion, be necessary for destroying the; battery at Cienfuegos, and what army 
force would be necessary to capture and hold entrance and make it safe for our ves- 
sels to lie inside; also what practicable landing for troops in immediate vicinity. 

Answer was made that Commander McCalla had not arrived; and I 
also telegraphed the Department: 

Schley will leave Thursday morning, 19th, for Cienfuegos with Brooklyn, Massa- 
chusetts, Texas, and two cruisers "ind two torpedo boats. Iowa will leave as soon as 
coaled. 

The Iowa arrived at Key West about dark, being overhauled by the 
Porto; from Cape Haitien, with the following telegram, received at 
Cape Haitien, from the Department to the Supply: 

Cruise between Caicos Bank and Monte Christi until you fall in with the Minne- 
apolis, due there 16th or 17th, and transmit to her commander the following cipher 
message, after which proceed to Key West, distributing supplies en route: "The 
Spanish squadron, oil' Curacao on May 15, is believed going to Venezuela Gulf, South 
America, to coal. Proceed with all dispatch to that vicinity ; get and keep touch 
(Spanish squadron) ; care must be taken to avoid * Harvard and 67. Paul 

have been ordered upon this duty. If not able to find enemy, communicate by 
telegraph by nearest station." 

May 19. — Coaling of all ships was proceeded with with all dispatch, 
and about 9 a. m. of the 19th Commodore Schley sailed with the Brook- 
lyn, Texas, and Massachusetts, and Scorpion for Cienfuegos, with instruc- 
tions, as follows: 

No. 5.] U. S. Flagship New York, 1st Rate, 

Key West, Fla., May 19, 1S9S. 
Sin : I send you a copy of a telegram received last night from Secretary Long con- 
cerning a vessel which was to sail on the 15th and carrying a large amount of specie, 
and is supposed to be going to land it at Trinidad or to the east of Cienfuegos. 
This may be a blind, however, and the vessel may be bound for Cienfuegos, or even 
Havana. 

The two cruisers will be sent out to-day, and with the two torpedo boats following 
them. As soon as the Iowa is coaled she will follow you. 

It is unnecessary for me to say that you should establish a blockade at Cienfuegos 
with the hast possible delay, and that it should be maintained as close as possible. 
should the Spanish vessels show themselves in that vicinity, and finding you on 
the lookout, attempt to come around the island, either ea -t or west, please send me 
notice by the best vessel you have for that purpose as to their direction, that I may 
be prepared lor them at Havana. 

I will try and increase the number of light vessels at your disposal, in order that 
you may have them to send with messages to me in case you desire to do so. 

After I have the situation more iu hand 1 will write you and give you any 
information that suggests itself. 

Very respectfully, W. T Sampson, 

Rear-Admiral, Commando- in Chief U. S. Xaral Force, 

North Atlantic Station. 
Commanding Offn kr, 

Flying Squadron. 

The Eagle and Marblehead, from Cienfuegos, and the remainder of the 
squadron from San Juan, the Terror, Montgomery, Amphitrite, Indiana, 
and collier Niagara, arrived. 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 43 

The following telegram was received from the Department: 

* * * Cape Haitien says that telegram from Port a Paix, Haiti, on May 17, 
reports two Spanish ships cruising off Mole every night two weeks. Report 

confidentially (the) Spanish (man) men-of-war (plural) see(n) May 17, apparently 
heading for West Indies, French. 

The Puritan and Miantonomoh, on reporting ready, were ordered to 
proceed at once to the blockade off Havana. 

The Niagara was ordered to discharge and proceed to Hampton Roads. 

The Ioiva and collier Merrimac were ordered to Cienfuegos, though 
the Iowa had not yet taken her full supply of coal. 

The following memorandum, by Commander McCalla, at Cienfuegos, 
was sent to Commodore Schley: 

A good landing place for troops has been found 13£ miles west of Savanilla Point. 
The Spanish force about Cienfuegos is reported, on good authority, to he between 
4,000 and 5,000 men. The Cubans need arms for 2,000 men, and ammunition for 
the whole number. I was informed that the Cubans had perfect knowledge of 
what was going on within Cienfuegos, and that a force of our men could be taken 
into Cienfuegos without the knowledge of the Spanish force within that city. About 
1,500 men are said to be kept within the vicinity of the castle. The only battery 
which fired on .the ships at all was made of the old guns in the castle. They have 
modern 6 and 8 inch, I am told, but not mounted five days ago. An emplacement for 
guns is being built on the hill above the castle. A line passing through the new 
emplacement and the castle leads down the middle of the river to the sea. There 
was working a force of men on the ground immediately below the castle, and I was 
told a new water battery was being erected there. It is possible that since the 
attempt to cut the cables a masked battery of small caliber is being erected on Colo- 
rados Point. The insurgents want dynamite to destroy the railway. I asked them 
to devote their efforts to cutting telegraph communication between Havana and 
Cienfuegos. They report the inland wires are repaired as fast as destroyed, while 
the railroad is intact. The Cuban forces in the San Juan Mountains control the 
railway between Cienfuegos and Trinidad, so provisions can not be sent between 
these places. I have Spanish charts of Cienfuegos and vicinity. Troops must be 
prepared for rain every day. No resources in the country : all destroyed. Fair road 
from landing point to Cienfuegos. 

May 20. — The Ioiva got under way at 11.20 May 20, and with the 
Castine and Merrimac sailed for Cienfuegos. 

The Puritan and Miantonomoh sailed for Havana. 

1 informed Commodore lieiney of my intention, and requested him to 
expedite as much as possible the sailing of the ships at the Key West 
station. 

I sent the following telegram to the Secretary: 

Urgently request Department to send me without delay Neva Orleans. The small 
auxiliaries can blockade in the absence of enemy — are useless for repelling attacks 
of armored cruisers; for difficult task of holding both sides of Cuba against Spanish 
squadron you should put at my disposal all your fighting force. 

and received the following: 

Send some light ships to blockade Cienfuegos; if necessary, the Department 
advises a couple fast unarmored cruisers to be sent to join Schley, going east on north 
side of Cuba to help against torpedo destroyers. 

On the night of May 20 I sent the following telegram to the Depart- 
ment : 

Replying to Department's telegram of the 20th, after duly considering the infor- 
mation therein contained, I have decided to follow the plan already adopted to hold 
position Cieufugoes, with Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Texas, and the Iowa, Marblehead, 
( aatine, and Ditpont, and two auxiliary. There remain Neiv York, Indiana aud moni- 
tors for Havana. The latter very inefficient and should not be sent from base. 
Have directed Schley to communicate with auxiliaries at Santiago and direct one of 
them to report to Department from Mole or Capt Haitien. Then to return to San- 
tiago and further report at Cienfuegos or Havana, as he thinks best. Plan may be 
changed when it becomes certain that Spanish ships are at Santiago. 



44 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

The following telegram was received from the Department : 

The report of the Spanish tleet being at Santiago tie Cuba might very well be 
correct; so the Department strongly advises that you semi immediately, by the Iowa, 
to Schley to proceed off Santiago de Cuba with his whole command, leaving one 
small vessel off Cienfuegos. And meanwhile the Department will send the Minneap- 
olis, now at St. Thomas. Auxiliary No. 461 proceed at once off Santiago to .join 
Schley, who should keep up communication via Mole, Haiti. 01 Cape Haitien, Haiti. 
If the Iowa has gone, send order to Schley by the fastest dispatch vessel. 

and also: 

Army expect to have within a lew days about thirty transport steamers at Tampa, 
Flu. : phase take such means as you think proper for guarding them. 

The following letter was written to Commodore Reiuey: 

No. 4.] U. s. Flagship New York, 1st Rate, 

Key West, Flu., May 20, 1808. 

My Dear COMMODORE: I feel thai I must take my station on the Cuban blockade 
a^ Boon as possible, and 1 will therefore leave here for Havana some time during the 
evening. 

I desire that all the vessels that can be spared for the purpose be sent to me at 
Havana as fast as repairing can be completed. After looking into the matter 1 rind 
that the monitors Terror and Aniphitrite will require several days to put their 
machinery in a serviceable condition. Will you therefore hasten the repairs on the 
Amphitritt , and semi her to me as soon as completed. 

I believe that the Department wishes some vessels to be retained here for the pro- 
tection of Key West. You can use the Terror for that purpose while she is under 
repairs. 

I have directed the Niagara to discharge the coal which she still has onboard after 
coaling the Indiana, and to proceed north to Lamberts Point for another cargo. 

The Dupont has been sent to the south side of Cuba with copies of recent dispatches 
from the Department regarding the movements of the Spanish ships, and she has 
been directed to remain under Commodore Schley's command, unless he iinds it 
necessary to send her back with information. The Iowa has also been sent to 
Commodore Schley. 

I have given direction that the Marblehead and the Eagle shall sail to-night for the 
same direction. The Merrimac and the Castine sailed in company this morning, also 
to .join the squadron under Commodore Schley. 

I shall myself take station at Havana on board the flagship New York. If you have 
occasion to communicate with me, I shall probably be found [at] that point. 
Very respectfully, 

W. T. Sampson, 
Rear-Admiral, etc. 

Commodore Geo. C. Remey, U. S. N., 

U. S. S. Suwanee, Key West, Fla. 

May 21. — On the 21st the following instructions were written for Com- 
modore Schley, and sent them at 3 a. m. to the Marblehead to be deliv- 
ered with all dispatch : 

No. 8.] U. S. Flagship New York, 1st Rate, 

Key West, Fla., May 21, 1S9S. 

Sir: Spanish squadron probably at Santiago de Cuba — 4 ships and 3 torpedo-boat 
destroyers. It' you are satisfied that they are not at Cienfuegos, proceed with all dis- 
patch, but cautiously, to Santiago de Cuba, and if the enemy is there blockade him 
in port. Von will probably find it necessary to establish communication with some 
of the inhabitants— fishermen or others — to learn definitely that the ships are in port, 
it being impossible to see into it from the outside. 

When the instructions sent by the Iowa and Dupont (duplicates) were written, I 
Bupposed that two fast scouts would be in the vicinity of Jamaica, but I have since 
hained that they have been ordered by the Department to get touch with the Span- 
ish fleet on the north coast of Venezuela. I have just telegraphed them to report for 
orders at Nicholas .Mole. 

Report from Nicholas Mole. 

Very respectfully, W. T. Sampson, 

Hear- Admiral, etc. 

The < lOMMODORE, 

U. S. Flying Squadron, 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 45 

The following telegram was sent to the Yale, at Cape Haitien : 

Spanish squadron is reported at Santiago de Cuba. Flying Squadron will be at 
Santiago the 24th. Cruise in Bahama Channel and join Schley at Santiago May 24. 

and having received a telegram from the St. Louis: 

Have destroyed one submarine cable to Jamaica, although it is possible both, under 
the fire of the battery at Santiago. If second cable is now in working order I shall 
require deep-sea outfit. At Guantanamo, Thursday, was driven away ; superior Span- 
ish force. I will attempt French submarine telegraph elsewhere, then proceed to 
Ponce, Porto Rico. Request orders at St. Thomas proceed to New York for coal and 
stores. 

answered it: 
Proceed, selecting whichever point will give greatest dispatch. Report here. 

I arrived with the flagship off Havana at 11 a. m. on the 21st; found 
there Commodore Watson and his broad pennant in the Dolphin, the 
Indiana, which had left Key West the night previous, the Puritan, 
VicTcsburg, Mayflower, and three other of the blockading ships. 

Feeling much concern as to the early delivery of the orders (No. 8) to 
Commodore Schley of the Flying Squadron, by the Marblehead, I ordered 
the Hawk to carry a duplicate of these orders, with an additional memo- 
randum, as follows: 

[Memorandum.] 

U. S. Flagship New York, 1st Rate, 

Off Havana, May 21, 189S. 

It is thought that the inclosed instructions will reach you by 2 o'clock a. m., May 
23. This will enable you to leave before daylight (regarded very important), so that 
your direction may not be noticed, and be at Santiago a. m. May 24. 

It is thought that the Spanish squadron would probably be still at Santiago, as 
they must have some repairs to make and coal to take. 

The St. Paul and Minneapolis have been telegraphed to scout off Santiago, and if 
the Spanish squadron goes westward, one is to keep touch and one is to go west and 
attempt to meet you; if the Spanish squadron goes east, one will keep in touch and 
the other go into Nicholas Mole to telegraph me at Key West. I shall be off Cay 
Frances, 200 miles east of Havana. If you arrive off Santiago, and no scout meets 
you, send a vessel to call at Nicholas Mole and get information to be left there by 
scout as to direction taken by Spanish in case they may have left Santiago de Cuba. 

The Yale has been ordered to cruise in the Bahama Channel until May 24. It is 
thought possible that the Spanish, hearing of your departure from Cienfuegos, may 
attempt to go there. 

If this word does not reach you before daylight, it is suggested to mask your real 
direction as much as possible. Follow the Spanish squadron, whichever direction 
they take. 

W. T. Sampson, 
Bear-Admiral, U. S. N. f etc. 

The Commodore Flying Squadron. 

and also the following: 

Instructions were sent iu the St. Paul and Minneapolis, at Nicholas Mole, to scout 
oft Santiago, and if the Spanish squadron moves west the scouts to communicate 
with Schley, who is expected at Santiago from Cienfuegos May 24. If the Spanish 
go east the scouts are to telegraph the Admiral at Key West from Nicholas Mole and 
leave a letter for Schley, then go off Santiago to meet him. The Admiral will go 
with the squadron to Cay Frances. Should two scouts be available, one is to keep 
touch with the Spanish squadron. 

The orders for the HawJc were as follows : 

U. S. Flagship New York, 1st Rate, 

Havana, May 21, 1898. 
Sir: You will proceed with the utmost dispatch with the accompanying orders, 
which are to be delivered to Commodore Schley, off Cienfuegos, at the earliest pos- 
sible moment. When this duty shall have been completed return to your station off 
Havana. 

In case you meet with the Vesuvius in going, and she can make better speed than 



46 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 



yourself, transfer the papers to her, with this memorandum, with the direction that, 
after delivery, she is to return and report to the Commander in Chief off Havana. 

In case you fall in with the Vesuvius, either coming or going, au order to report off 
Havana is to he given her. 

Very respectfully, W. T. Sampson, lUar- Admiral, etc. 

Commanding Officer, U. S. S. Hawk, 

During the night the flagship signaled the following vessels : Indiana, 
TTeicport, Vicksburg, Mayflower, Machias, Rodgers, Foote, and Montgomery, 
as they were picked up on the blockade. 

Join flagship at early daylight to-morrow at a point 10 miles northeast of Morro. 
Prepare t" proceed 200 miles to the eastward to a point northeast of Cay Frances. 

The Puritan and Miantonomoh were directed to go in advance of the 
squadron, and left about midnight. 

May 22. — On May 22 the following telegrams were received by the 
dispatch boat: 

Washington, May 21. 

Telegraph details of coal supply taken by Schley with his vessels. The Depart- 
ment has ordered four auxiliaries, cruisers, and the Minneapolxx off Santiago de Cuba 
to keep informed of movements of Spanish lleet. The Department also suggests for 
consideration possible advantages lee Cape Cruz, Cuba, as a coaling station, and that 
in case Cervera has landed stores for Blanco, Cape Cruz, Cuba, would be critical point 
for coasters carrying them to the west. Orders are being sent placing Schley under 
your command while in the West Indies. 

Commodore Remey had replied to the above that the Ioica left yes- 
terday with collier Merrimac 4,500 tons for Flying Squadron. I also 
received word from him that the New Orleans had arrived at Key West 
0.30 p. in. May 21, needs 200 tons of coal, and water, and that the Viz- 
caya, Oquendo, Maria Teresa, Colon, one destroyer, and transport A 1/onso 
XIII were at Santiago de Cuba this morning. 

May 21. — The following telegram was received from Washington: 

Washington, May 21. 
The following telegram of May 21 has been received from St. Thomas, West Indies: 
"Reliably informed that Spanish fleet is expected to arrive at San Juan, Porto Rico, 
too, soon. Preparations for coaling; supply food is very important before attacking; 
the American coal is declared. 

" Fonna." 
Schley should have this information. If he finds that the Spanish fleet has left San- 
tiago, he should follow. Report is current to the effect that the Spanish destroyer(s) 
are not at Santiago. 

May 23. — In the morning watch of the 23d of May the captains of all 
the ships present came on board to receive their instructions and a copy 
of order of cruising, first order of battle and second order of battle, and 
order of battle, of which the following are copies: 



Montgomery ( ) 1,200 yards. 
( ) 800 yards. 10 Newport. 



Foote. 



() 
11 



() 

1 1 Mayflower. 

() 

12 Vicksburg. 



ORDER OF CRUISING. 

( ) Wasp. 
13 
1,600 yards. 



( ) 1,200 yards. 
1 New York. 



() 
15 



Rodgers. 



() 

2 Indiana. 



O 

3 Puritan. 

() 
I Miantonomoh. 



() 



New Orleans. 
800 yards. () 
Detroit. 5 



() 

7 Machias. 

() 

8 Wilmington. 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 



47 



FIRST ORDER OF BATTLE. 



Interval — 400 yards. 



1 ( 


) New York. 


2 ( 


) Indiana. 


3 ( 


) Puritan. 


4 ( 


) Miantonomoh. 


5 ( 


) New Orleans. 




() Foote. 14 


6 ( 


) Detroit. 


7 ( 


() Rodgers. 
) Machias. 


8 ( 


) Wilmington. 


9 ( 

10 ( 

11 ( 

12 ( 

13 ( 


) Montgomery. 
) Newport. 
) Mayflower. 
) Vicksburg. 
) Wasp. 



15 



U. S. Flagship New York, 1st Rate, 

Off Havana, Cuba, May 22, 1898. 



SECOND ORDER OF BATTLE. 



Indiana. 

Miantonomah. 

Detroit. 

Wi/mindton. 

Newport. 

yic/fsourg. 



f 
I 



\ 



Spanish Ships. 
I 



I 

Is 

I 



\ 

I 



/ I New YorK. 

•3 | Puritan. 

5 \ New Orleans. 

7 I Machias. 

9 | Montgomery. 

ii | Mayflower. 

13 1 Wasp. 



In case the Spanish ships are found to be approaching in line, signal will be made 
to form double column, which will be done by the even-numbered ships obliquing to 
the left until the interval between columns is sufficient to allow the columns to pass 
through the second and third intervals between the Spanish ships, counting from 
the left of their line. 

After the heads of columns have passed through the Spanish line they will turn as 
follows : The head of the starboard column will turn with the port helm ; the head 
of the port column will turn with the starboard helm; each column will thus double 
on the Spanish ships. 

This is indicated in the diagram when five Spanish ships are shown. 

N. B. — The following signals will be provisionally employed : 

Signal : Order of cruising. 

Signal : First order of battle. 

Signal : Second order of battle. 

As prescribed. 

W. T. Sampson, 
Bear-Admiral, U. S. N., 
Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station 



48 ADVANCEMENTS IX THE NAVY. 

ORDER OP BATTLE. 

U. S. Flagship New York, 1st Rate, 

Off Havana, Cuba, May .'.', 1S9S. 

It is possible that the vessels of this squadron now off Havana will meet the 
Spanish Bhips, consisting of the Cristobal Colon, Vizcaya, Oquendo. Maria Teresa, and 
one torpedo-boat destroyer. These vessels are supposed to he now in Santiago de 
Cuba, where they are taking coal and provisions. The squadron of Commodore 
Schley will probably leave Ci&nfuegos to-morrow morning, bound east, in pursuit 
of the Spanish Bhips, and it is anticipated that they will lea\ e Santiago de Cuba on 
the same day thai Commodore Schley leaves Cienfuegos or reach Havana by the 
north coast oi'( una. in \\ Inch case the blockading squadron off Havana will attempt 
to intercept them by going east about 200 miles beyond the junction of Santareu and 
Nicholas channels. It appears to be possible that if these ships come toward Havana 
from that direction they can he intercepted and brought to action. 

The order of battle will he as follows, subject to such modilications as may appear 
advantageous at the time: 

Owing to the superior speed of the Spanish vessels, I have decided to form the 
ships in one column, heading to the eastward, on the assumption that the enemy 
will be proceeding to the westward in column. The Neto York, Indiana, Puritan, 
and Miantonomoh will he the four leading ve-sels. These will he followed by the 
cruisers of the blockading squadron, the idea being that the heavy ships should first 
meet the enemy and tin' fire of the cruisers he brought into play after the damage 
inflicted by the larger ships. 

The armored ships, after passing t he rear of the Spanish squadron, will turn in 
succession by using the starboard or port helm, as the case may require, turning 
toward the enemy. It is believed that the lire of the cruisers, following that of the 
armored ships, will so embarrass the Spanish vessels that the armored" vessels can 
turn, as before stated, and double on the enemy's rear. 

The ships designated will assemble V2 miles northeast oi the Mono at early day- 
light, Monday, the 23d instant; thence they will proceed in three columns to the 
eastward in the order id' cruising designated. (See Plan I, fust order of cruising.) 

The New Orleans will act as scout on the starboard hand, the Montgomery on the 
port, the Wasp ahead. 

When the enemy heaves in sight, the vessels will proceed to the eastward to meet 
them. While so doing they will be formed in column. (First order of battle.) 

The attention of commanding officers is called to the necessity of stopping these 
vessels. 

In the first order of battle the two torpedo boats will take station on the offside 
of the New Orleans, Detroit, and, if there he a third, it will take its place on the 
offside of the Machias. They will take advantage of any opportunity to torpedo an 
enemy's ship. 

While the Vizcaya, Maria Teresa, and Oquendo have strong protection on barbettes 
and water line, they have no protection elsewhere, and are vulnerable to even 
6-pounders. Fire should be concentrated on the center part of these ships just 
above water line. In case of Cristobal Colon, her belt and barbette armor is inferior 
to that of the other ships, hut her protection elsewhere extends over a larger area. 
None of this armor is face-hardened. 

W. T. Sampson, 
Bear- Admiral, Commander in Chief. 

May 23. — At 8 a. m. on the 23d the squadron started to the eastward 
at low speed, the vessels in the formation being - as follows: New York, 
Indiana, Newport, Vicksburg, Mayflower, Machias, Bodgers, and Foote. 
The object in view was to occupy the Nicholas Channel in such manner 
as to prevent the approach of the Spanish squadron from the east 
toward Havana, but not to go so far to the eastward as to make it 
impossible to fall back to Havana in case of their approach from the 
westward being signaled. This latter movement was thought possible, 
as by a southerly course it would have been well within the bounds of 
possibility for them to pass to the westward without its being known 
to Commodore Schley's squadron, which was supposed to be on its way 
to Santiago. 

About 5 p. m. the Netr Orleans joined and was sent to station olf the 
starboard beam, distance 2,000 yards. 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 49 

At night tlie Ken- Orleans and Mayflower were sent ahead as scouts, 
I received the following telegram from Washington: 

Washington, May 22. 
Where is St. Louis? What is [s]he doing? A message was sent from her to Griscoa< 
through Mole, Haiti, on May 20. No communication from commander of the auxil 
iary to the Department. 

Long. 
Commodore Eemey had replied as follows: 

Lieutenant Staunton says that St. Louis prohahly bound for northern port to coal. 
Latest cable address, St. Thomas. 

May 24. — During May 24 squadron was cruising very slowly to the 
eastward, covering the entrance to Santaren Channel, and in the fore- 
noon picked up the monitors. 

The Supply joined from the eastward, and her captain gave the follow- 
ing information: 

Saw Minneapolis and Harvard Sunday at noon. Parted with them about 4. Sig- 
nal, "Am I to proceed?" Minneapolis said " Yes." All at once they put their helm 
to starboard and went round west end of Tortuga. Have been cruising on a north 
and south line between Caicos and Monte Christi. Was off Inagua (Great) at 10 p. m. 
Sunday. Passed Lobos this (Tuesday) morning at 7. Sighted the light at 4 a.m., 
having stopped during the night on account of thick weather. A gunboat came out 
of Caj Romane, but was lost in a squall of rain. 

About 1 p. ui. the Montgomery, which had gone into Key West, with 
Commodore Watson on board, to get the latest information, returned. 
She brought the following telegrams: 

Washington, May 23. 
Notify the Admiral the Department leaves at his discretion the question of watch- 
ing Yucatan Channel and Gulf of Mexico. 

Allen. 

Washington, May 23. 
The information of the Department all goes to indicate that the principal aim of 
the Spanish Meet and Government is to introduce a supply of munitions of war and 
of food to Blanco by Havana and Cienfuegos. This is for your information. 

Allen. 

Washington, May 23. 
The Department desires you to station vessels of your squadron as you may con- 
sider best for the blockade of north coast of Cuba and for watching Yucatan Chan- 
nel, if you deem the latter necessary. Information has been received a supply of 
corn being shipped from Mexico to Cuba. Until further instructions division under 
Schley not to be diminished, as the Spanish division at Santiago must, if possible, 
be prevented from escaping. 

Allen. 

Commodore Watson also brought the following memorandum: 

Telegraphic information, believed to be reliable, received 
on day evening, 23d instant, states Spanish licet had notle 
ation was sent. 

and the following was received from the St. Louis: 

St. Thomas, May 23. 
Have cut cables to Guantanamo and will proceed at once to New York City. 

The Was}) joined about dark. 

[Memorandum No. 10, regarding light at night.] 

U. S. Flagship New York, 1st Rate, 

At Sea, May 't, 1898. 
Sir: While cruising off Cay Frances in expectation of meeting the enemy, great 
care will be taken to screen all liuhts and to see that none are accidentally shown. 
No night signals will be made unless unavoidable, and then only by the flagship 

4 



Telegraphic information, believed to be reliable, received about 6 o'clock or later 
Monday evening, 23d instant, states Spanish licet had not left Santiago at time infor- 
mation was sent. 



50 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 



and in reply to her. No Yery's light will under any circumstances, except that of 
the discovery of the enemy, be made. 

No running lights will be used except the red oil lantern over the taftrail screened 
to show only through tour points, viz, two points on each side from right astern. 

No whistle helm signals will be made; hut as the helm is put over a second red 
liuht, screened like tin- first, will be shown astern if the ship's course is changed to 
starboard, and a white light if the course be changed to port, and will remain shown 
until the ship is steadied on her new course, when it will he withdrawn. 

The squadron will generally cruise to the eastward during the daytime, and to 
the westward during the night. It will change direction hy countermarching. 
Vessels must therefore be on the lookout for this countermarch. If in double column 
the flagship will show her red truck light when she countermarches as a signal to 
the leader of the second division. The countermarching will always he to the right. 

The. formation will he column or douhle column at distance of 400 yards or less. 

Commanding officers will enjoin officers of the deck to keep touch without fail of 
the next ahead. They must keep mar enough to follow her motions with or without 
lights, and whether thick or clear. 

Scouts will upon the discovery of the enemy fire two red Very's lights in succes- 
sion, and as they fall hack upon the fleet will repeat this signal at intervals until it 
i> answered by a single red Very from the flagship. 

Should a scout be captured she will, before surrendering, fire two green Verys in 
succession. 

Very respectfully. W. T. Sampson, 

Hear- Admiral, ('. 8. N., 
Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station. 

The Commanding Officer, 

U. S. S. . 



< 1,500 yards. > 

t 



TIIIKI> ORDER OF BATTLE. 

() 
() 

Spanish ( ) ships. 

( ) 
( ) 
I 



< 1,500 yards. > 



() 

O 



( ) 



3,000 yards. 



> 

s 



Montgomery, 7 
New Orleans, 8 
Detroit, 9 

Cincinnati, 10 
Mayflower, 11. ( ) 
< 

Provisional signal for third order of battle, . 

Interval between columns for cruising, 3,000 yards. 

V{( ) 14. Vicksburg. 
Interval between each column and the enemy, 1,500 yards, q 

( ) 15. Newport. 

( ) 16. Wasp. 



> 



( ) 1. New York. 

( ) 2. Indiana. 

( ) 3. Miautonomoh. 

( ) 4. Puritan. 

( ) 5. Terror. 

X ) 6. Amphitrite. 
(( ) 12. Wilmington. 
( ) 13. Machias. 



This formation will also he used as an order of cruising 
w i t li the same signal. 



W. T. SAMP80X, 
Bear-Admiral, Commander in chief. 

U. 8. Flagship New York, 1st Kate, 

Off Ca;i I'ranees, Cuba, Mai) ,14, 1S9S. 

May 25. — During the night of May 24 the squadron cruised slowly to 
the eastward in the above-mentioned order, countermarching at 4 a. m. 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 51 

The Vesuvius and Cincinnati joiued at daylight, and at noon the 
Panther arrived, towing the Amphitrite. 

In the forenoon the Vesuvius was sent back to Key West for dis- 
patches. 

The collier Stirling arrived. 
. The following instructions were given at noon to the New Orleans: 

Go 50 miles eastward of this point. Scout in that vicinity, leaving there in time 
to he off xMatanzas at 10 a. m. to-morrow. If squadron not arrived await us 15 miles 
north of Matanzas. 

In the afternoon the Hornet arrived with the following dispatches: 

Washington, May 24. 
Be prepared to convoy and guard about 30,000 United States troops in about 40 
transports from Tampa', Fla. You require some armored vessels to attack batteries 
to clear a landing. More details to-morrow. 

Long. 

and from the commodore commanding the naval base, copy of Depart- 
ment's telegram, as follows: 

Washington, May 24. 

Send following to all commanding officers south coast blockade and inform Samp- 
son it has been done. If Spanish fleet bringing ammunition and other munitions of 
war for heavy guns, perhaps they will land them at Santiago with the intention of 
coasting them close along shore around Cape Cruz and inside reef to Cienfuegos, and 
thence by rail to Havana. Therefore you are recommended to blockade close to 
the shore off Cape Cruz and to the westward, especially at night, and stop the 
transportation. 

Long. 

About 7 p. m. the Hornet returned to Key West, bearing the follow- 
ing telegram to the Department: 

Schley ought to have arrived at Santiago May 24. The force at my command 
occupied Bahama Channel last night, but not having any information from Schley, 
and as Spanish squadron may have avoided him at Santiago and attempted to reach 
Havana by Cape San Antonio, I have moved westward to provide against this con- 
tingency. I shall attempt to cover Havana from both directions. I will be, Thurs- 
day morning, May 26, at the west end of Nicholas Channel, Cuba, where I expect 
information from Schley via Key West. Movements are greatly hampered by moni- 
tors constituting the principal force under my command. I can not dispatch 
armored vessels until movements Spanish squadron thoroughly known. 

May 26. — The squadron stood slowly to the westward during the 
forenoon of May 26, the monitors Puritan and Miantonomoh being sent 
with the collier Stirling under Cay Piedras to coal. 

About 11 o'clock in the morning the Vesuvius arrived from Key West 
with the following dispatch from the Flying Squadron : 

Arrived May 21 off Cienfuegos, Cuba. Standing in to-day (this morning), May 22, 
within 4,000 yards entrance, found them busily mining; can not say whether Span- 
ish fleet in port or not; the anchorage not visible from entrance. Iowa and torpedo 
boat Dupont arrived to-day. Expect difficulty here will be to coal from colliers in 
the constant heavy swell. Other problem easy compared with this one, so far from 
the base. 

Schley. 

From the U. S. S. Harvard, Mole St. Mcholas : 

Mole St. Nicholas, Haiti, May 25, 1898. 
Sampson, Key West: 

Sent by Schley here with official dispatches. Left at Santiago de Cuba, May 24, 
Tale and' St. Paul. Minneapolis left yesterday for Cienfuegos to report Schley. Yale 
reconnoitered Santiago de Cuba on the 21st May. He reports strongly fortified; saw 
nothing in harbor. 1 have not seen Spanish fleet; have not ascertained anything 
respecting recent movements Spanish fleet. Proceed for coal to Key West May 26. 
I have only 1,250 tons of coal. The Minneapolis must coal within the next few days. 
Yale, early next week. Schley directs me inform the Department Sampson decided 
to have the command of Schley stationed at Cienfuegos and his own off Havana. 
Minneapolis reconnoitered San Juan May 21. Spanish fleet was not there. 

Cotton. 



52 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

At 1 p. m. the Vesuvius was sent to Key West with the following 
dispatches for the commanding officers of the Yale, Minneapolis, and 
St. Paul; 

Spanish squadron is at Santiago. If Schley has not arrived there, go Cienfuegos 
and inform him. 

About dark sent Foote into Cay Piedras to coal and send the moni- 
tors out at once to take their station in the formation. 

At 9.30 p. m. of this day, May 26, the Dolphin came alongside with dis- 
patches, and reported that Commodore Schley had the Spanish squadron 
bottled up in Cienfuegos. The reason for believing this to be the case is 
contained in the following letters from Commodore Schley, off Cienfuegos, 
May 23 : 

M. 43.] Off Cienfuegos, May 23, 1898. 

Siu : In reply to yonr letter No. 8, I would state that I am by no means satisfied 
that the Spanish squadron is not at Cienfuegos. The large amount of smoke seen in 
the harbor would indicate the presence of a number of vessels, and under such cir- 
cumstances it would seem to l>e extremely unwise to chase up a probability at Santiago 
de Cuba reported via Havana, no doubt as a ruse. 

I shall therefore remain off this port with this squadron, availing myself of every 
opportunity for coaling and keeping it ready for r/iy emergency. 

Regarding the inclosed information from Commander McCalla, I would state that 
I went twice yesterday close in to the mouth of the harbor, the first time about 
2,000 yards and the second time within about 1,400 yards, but saw no evidence of 
any masked batteries near the entrance. Well up the river, across their torpedo- 
mine fields, now laid across the mouth of the harbor, there is a new battery con- 
structed, hardly within range from the mouth of the river. 

The Castine, Merrimac, and Hawk arrived this morning, and I send the Haul- back 
with these dispatches. 

Last night I sent the Scorpion east to Santiago de Cuba to communicate with the 
scouts off that port, with instructions if they were not there to return at once to me 
here, and I expect her back day after to-morrow. 

I am further satisfied that the destination of the Spanish squadron is either Cien- 
fuegos or Havana. This point, being in communication with Havana, would be bet- 
ter for their purposes if it was left exposed, and I think that we ought to be very 
careful how we receive information from Havana, which is no doubt sent out for the 
purpose of misleading us. 

The Iowa is coaling to-day, having reached this station with only about half of her 
coal supply. 

Very respectfully, W. S. Schley, 

Commodore, U. S. N., Commander in Chief Flying Squadron. 

M. 44.] Ovv Cienfuegos, May 23, 1898. 

Sir: Steamer Adula, chartered by Consul Dent, with proper papers from United 
Stales State Department to carry neutrals from Cienfuegos, was stopped oft' this port 
this morning. She had no cargo, and was permitted to enter. 

She reports that she left Santiago de Cuba at 4.30 p m. May IS, and that night 
she saw the lights of seven vessels 70 miles to the southward of Santiago. Next 
day, Thursday. .May 19, at Kingston, cablo reported Spanish fleet at Santiago. Friday, 
May 20, the fleet Avas reported to havo left Santiago. 

Now, on Saturday, May 21, when about 40 miles southwest of this port, I heard, 
from the bridge of this vessel, firing of guns toward Cienfuegos, which I inter- 
preted as a welcome to the Spanish fleet, and the news this morning by the Adula 
convinces me that the fleet is here. 

Latest was bulletin from Jamaica, received this morning; asserts that the fleet had 
left Santiago. I think I have them here almost to a certainty. 
Very respectfully, 

W. S. Schley, 
Commodore, U. S. N., Commander in Chief, etc. 

[Memorandum from the Dolphin, dated May 25.] 

The Haul- has just reported from Cienfuegos with dispatches from Commodore 
Schley. Hood says a good number of officers do not believe the Spaniards are there 
at all. although they can only surmise. 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 53 

The Dolphin had received these instructions from the HawTc at 10 a. m. 
May 25, and stood to the eastward in search of the admiral, who it was 
believed was off Cay Frances light. She had gone to the eastward 
until 8.25 a. m., when she returned to the westward. 

The following is a copy of notes brought on board the Dolphin by 
Lieutenant Hood, commanding the Hatclc : 

Off Cienfuegos, May 23, 1898. 

Boarded British steamship Adula, of Atlas Line, Capt. W. Walker, bound from 
Kingston, Jamaica, to Cienfuegos, under orders of United States Consul Louis A. Dent, 
at Kingston, to bring away Hoffren, a seaman of the Niagara, in hospital with a broken 
leg, and such other Americans and neutrals as wish to leave. 

The original letter, dated May 7, 1898, in first trip made, leaving Cienfuegos May 
10, 1898, with 327 passengers — 4 Americans and 323 neutrals. 

This trip being made under countersign of original orders, dated May 21, by 
Consul Dent. 

In original letter Lombard, clerk in the consulate, was mentioned, but he had left 
before Adula arrived at Cienfuegos. 

Left Kingston May 21 and came here direct, having seen nothing en route. On 
last trip from here stopped at Santiago. While there two American men-of-war 
came off the port and were bombarded by the forts from 12 noon until 1.30 p. m. 
Could not learn if these ships were hit. City rumor that they had been driven off. 

When Adula left Santiago the same afternoon, she saw nothing of the American 
ships nor marks of shell on the forts. She don't know the ships, as they were never 
in sight from the inner harbor. 

At midnight on the 18th sighted the lights of seven ships about 70 miles south 
one-half west of Santiago. The next afternoon, the 19th, while at Kingston, it was 
reported there that the Spanish fleet had arrived at Santiago. 

Information : Santiago Harbor is mined with 21 electric mines, to be fired from a 
samll thatched house on west side of entrance, well inside (about 300 yards) the 
entrance. 

Know of no contact mines. 

Harbor of Cienfuegos is mined. Electric mines were put down, but did not work, 
so they have been changed to contact mines. Don't know the number or situation 
of mines. 

When last in Cienfuegos, May 10, 1898, there were two little gunboats and one 
torpedo gunboat in port. The former are a little larger than tugs and not very 
formidable. The latter is the one the Eagle had a fight with, hitting one of her 
smoke pipes. She has two smoke pipes, two masts, and is painted lead color. 

Note. — The Adula has a passenger, a British subject, P. H. Baxter, who represents 
the Atlas Line and is an interpreter. 

May 27. — The Wasp was at once sent to Cape San Antonio to Com- 
modore Schley with instructions as follows: 

No. 1.] U. S. Flagship New York, 1st Rate, 

St. Nicholas Channel, May 27, 1898. 
Sir : Proceed oft' Cienfuegos with greatest possible dispatch via Cape San Antonio. 
If you find Commodore Schley oft' that port, deliver to him the inclosed dispatch 
and return to Key West. 

Return to Key West at once in case you assure yourself that he is not in that 
vicinity. 

Very respectfully, W. T. Sampson, 

Hear- Admiral, U. S. N., etc. 
Commanding Officer, 

U. S. S. Wasp. 

No. 10.] U. S. Flagship New York, 1st Rate, 

St. Nicholas Channel, May 27, 187S. 
Sir : Every report, and particularly daily confidential reports, received at Key 
West from Havana state Spanish squadron has been in Santiago deCuba from the 
19th to the 25th instant, inclusive, the 25th being the date of the last report received. 
You will please proceed with all possible dispatch to Santiago to blockade that 
port. If, on arrival there, you receive positive information of the Spanish ships hav- 
ing left you will follow them in pursuit. 

Very respectfully, W. T. Sampson, 

Bear- Admiral, etc. 
Commodore Schley. 



54 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

The Dolphin was sent in to Key West with the following dispatch and 
to coal. 

Secretary of the Navy: 

Have received information from Schley via Cape San Antonio, Cuba, dated May 
23, stating he is not satisfied the Spanish Bquadron is not in Cienfuegos, and states 
lie will remain off Cienfuegos, keeping squadron all ready for an emergency, lie 
reports the Bteamer Adula entered into Cienfhegos May 23 ; he probably Learned from 
hex as >he left if the Spanish Bquadron was in port. I thiuk that he has probably 
gone to Santiago. To assure this I sent the Wasp to Cienfuegos to-night. If he has 
not left, this will enable him to reach Santiago de Cuba before I could do so. 

1 also wrote to Commodore Keiney to hasten the departure of the 
Oregon, and informed him that on reporting of Oregon in the squadron 
I would send monitors to Havana and Key West. 

At 1 p. m. the Vesuvius arrived from Key West with dispatches as 
follows: 

May 26. 
From Harvard at St. Nicholas Mole: The Department instructs me to communi- 
cate immediately with Schley. 1 leave immediately. 

i lonvoy steamer Adria to Santiago de Cuba and direct senior ollicer at Santiago to 
furnish Captain Allen, Signal Corps, such assistance as may he practicable. 

Long. 

Upon arrival of the Yankee send Minneapolis to Lamberts Point for coal. 

Long. 

and from the Commandant Naval Base copies of two telegrams from 
Commodore Schley to the Department as follows (sent from Key West 
May 26 under date of May 24 from Commodore Schley): 

Coaling off Cienfuegos, Cuba, is very uncertain. One collier not sufficient for the 
work when it is possible to coal. In great need of two more for this squadron, 
thoroughly equipped with hoisting engines, buckets, etc., for utmost dispatch. The 
Sterling, not having hoisting engine, would not be useful. Recommend that she dis- 
charge car<;o at Key West. I would suggest quality must equal to best Pocahontas 
coal for this work. Every collier should carry several thousand gallons of oil, also 
three or four compressed bales as fenders, to prevent accidents. I have communi- 
cated with insurgents today and have supplied ammunition and dynamite, also 
clothing. Have ascertained that the Spanish fleet is not here and I will move east- 
ward tomorrow, communicating with you from Nicholas Mole. On account of short 
coal supply in ships, can not blockade them if in Santiago. 

I shall proceed tomorrow (25th) off Santiago, being embarrassed, however, by the 
Texas' 8 short coal supply, and her inability to coal iu the open sea. I shall not be 
able to remain off that port on account of general short coal supply of squadron, so 
will proceed to the vicinity of Nicholas Mole, where the water is smooth and I can 
coal Texas and other ships what may remain in collier. Will communicate with you 
from Nicholas Mole. 

I at once decided to go to Key West, coal, and, if authorized by the 
Department, proceed to Santiago. 

The New Orleans was given orders to proceed with best dispatch to 
Santiago with collier Sterling, w T ith the following orders : 

No. 2.] U. S. Flagship New York, 

St. Nicholas Channel, May 27, 1898. 

Sir: You will proceed to Santiago do Cuba to convoy the collier Sterling. 

Vou will communicate with Commodore Schley and direct him to remain on the 
blockade hi Santiago at all hazards, assuming that the Spanish vessels are in that 
port. 

Tell him that I desire that he should use the collier Sterling to obstruct the channel 
at its narrowest part leading into this harbor. Inform him that I believe that it 
would be perfectly practicable to steam this vessel into position and drop all her 
anchors, allow hei to swing across the channel, then sink her either by opening the 
valves 01 whatever means may be best in his judgment. 

Inform < lommodore Schley thai the details of tins plan are left to his judgment. 
In the meantime he must exercise the utmost care that none of the vessels already in 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 55 

the port are allowed to escape, arid say to the commodore that I have the utmost 
confidence in his ability to carry this plan to a successful conclusion, and earnestly 
wish him good luck. 

Very respectfully, W. T. Sampson, 

Bear- Admiral, U. S. N., Commander in Chief, 

U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station. 
Commanding Officer, 

U. 8. S. Neio Orleans. 

May 28. — I arrived at Key West at 2 a. m., May 28, and found the 
Oregon in the harbor outer anchorage. 
The following telegram was sent in cipher to Commodore Schley : 

The Neio Orleans will meet you off Santiago May 29 with important dispatches. 
The Spanish squadron must be blockaded at all hazards. Immediate communication 
with persons on shore must be entered upon. You must be sure of the Spanish 
squadron being in port. I suggest communicating with Spanish American Company 
pier at Daiquiri Bay, at a distance of 15 miles east of Santiago de Cuba. One collier 
for you left yesterday ; shall send as soon as possible another. If Spanish squadron 
has left Santiago immediate pursuit must be made. 

The following was sent to the Department: 

Referring to telegram, Bisca orders to go Santiago; is satisfied Spanish squadron 
was not in port; were sent in Marblehead, and duplicate, with explanatory memo- 
randum later on 21st by Hawk, to make sure of early arrival ; copies of these dis- 
patches are forwarded by mail. Schley, not being satisfied that Spanish squadron 
was not in port, did not go. The Department has bis dispatch dated May 24, sent 
through Remey, stating his intention of leaving May 25. I do not understand this 
delay until next day. Cipher message will follow. 

About 8 a. m. I received the following telegram from the Department: 

If the Spanish division is proved to be in Santiago de Cuba it is the intention of 
the Department to make descent immediately upon that port with 10,000 men, United 
States troops, lauding 8 nautical miles east of that port. You will be expected to 
convoy transports, probably 15 or 20, going in person and taking with you the New 
York and Indiana and the Oregon, and as many smaller vessels with good batteries 
as can possibly be gathered, to guard against possible attack by Spanish torpedo 
boat destroyers, etc. The blockade oft' Havana will be sufficiently provided for 
during the movement with the monitors and some small vessels. After arrival off 
Santiago de Cuba every small vessel that can be spared will be returned to north 
coastofCuba. This early notice enables you to prepare details at once for imme- 
diate execution when order is issued. At the request of the War Department, and 
by approval of this Department, movement will be on the north side of Cuba, and 
Windward Passage. 

Long. 

The following telegram was received by Commodore Eemey from 
Department May 26, and answer thereto was sent same day : 

Telegram of May 24 from Schley conveys no information. What vessel brought 
it? What vessel took orders from Sampson to Schley on night of May 20, or morn- 
ing of May 21, directing him to proceed Santiago de Cuba? Direct "commander of 
vessel that brought telegram just received to report intentions of Schley so far as 
known, stating definitely whether Schley had gone to Santiago de Cuba or intended 
to go there, and when. 

Long. 
and answered as follows: 

Cipher bicoca received. Vessel referred to is Dupont in both cases. The com- 
mander was not informed of the intentions of Schley. From a letter of Schley of 
May 24 I am informed that Schley would proceed from Cienfuegos to Santiago de 
Cuba on May 25. He would not be able to remain off that port, on account of gen- 
eral short coal supply. Would proceed to vicinity of Mole, Haiti, to coal in smooth 
water and communicate. 

Remey. 

At 4 p. m. I sent to the Navy Department the following dispatch, in 
cipher, beginning with the word "Regen water:" 

I received yesterday, May 27, at 2 p. m., a copy of a dispatch from Schley dated 
May 24 to Department, reporting his movements. I dispatched immediately the 



56 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

New Ctrl tan* to convoy collier Sterling through Bahama Channel and then, leaving 
collier, go with all dispatch to Santiago with orders to Schley to blockade Spanish 
squadron at all hazards and take every action necessary to prevent their egress. 
Shall send immediately another collier. Have ad\ ised Schley to use Spanish-Ameri- 
can Company's property as coaling station. Notwithstanding apparent uncertainty 
of Schley's movements, I believed Spanish squadron still in port, and I came here 
immediately to be in better communication, and telegraphed Schley to Mole St. 
Nicholas same orders conveyed by New Orleans, hoping to reach him earlier. He 
undoubtedly has sufficient coal aboard ship to still keep the sea some time, as all 
except Iowa left here full. My orders to Schley by New Orleans included sinking of 
the Sterling collier across the entrance to Santiago. The channel is hut 300 feet 
broad, and if this be properly done the port will be (dosed until steamer is raised. 
The details of the operation were left to Schley, with verbal explanation, through 
Captain Folger, of my own views. It is for this reason additional coal has been 
6ent. The importance of absolutely preventing the escape of the Spanish squadron is 
so paramount that the promptest and most elliciont use of every means is demanded. 

About midnight the following - telegram was received from the 
Department : 

Schley telegraphs from Santiago de Cuba he goes to Key West with his squadron 
for coal, though lie has 4,000 tons of coal with him in a broken down collier. How 
soon alter arrival of Schley at Key West could yon reach Santiago de Cuba with the 
New York and the Oregon, the Indiana and some lighter i f and how long 

could you blockade there, sending your vessels singly to coal from our colliers at 
Gonaives, Haiti, Channel, Mole, llavti, Nipe, Port, Cuba, or elsewhere? There is 
one collier en route to Mole Haiti, from Norfolk, and another one has been ordered 
there from Key West, and other(s) will be sent immediately. Consider if you could 
seize Guantanamo and occupy as coaling station. Schley has not ascertained whether 
Spanish division is at Santiago. All information here seems to show that it is there. 

The Oregon left Key West for Havana blockade, Commodore Wat- 
son was directed to send the Indiana into Key West for coal. 

May 29. — About 3 a. m. I sent the following telegram to the Secre- 
tary of the Navy : 

Answering telegram Gozais Endiometer answering first question three days. I can 
blockade indefinitely. Think that can occupy Guautanamo. Would like to start at 
once with the New York and the Oreijon, arriving in two days. Do not quite under- 
stand as to the necessity of waiting the arrival of Schley, but would propose meet- 
ing and turning back the principal part of the force under his command if he has 
left. Try to hold him by telegraph. Watson will be in charge of everything atioat. 
Does the Department approve proposed action ? 

About noon the following telegram was sent to the Secretary of the 
Navy: 

Referring to my telegram of this date, fifty cipher words Misionar Jiguilete I urge 
immediate reply to my last paragraph. Failure of Schley to continue blockade 
must be remedied at once if possible. There can be no doubt of presence of Span- 
ish squadron at Santiago. 

Received the following telegram from Commodore Schley (136 cipher 
words, beginning Abborderei) : 

Collier now has been repaired temporarily, and able to make 6 or 7 knots per hour. 
Shall I endeavor to coal the Marblehead and the Texas in the open sea and retain 
position off Santiago until coal supply larger vessels has given up know 

what safe limit, shall go then to Gonaives, Haiti, or coast near, or near Port an 
Prince, Haiti, to coal f occurring yesterday the Marblehead and Texas took 

a quantity of coal at a distance of about 25 miles west of Santiago, which enables 
me to hold place until coal has been reduced force nie over to Haiti to 

replenish ' collier well equipped to report at Gonaives, Haiti, urgently 

needed to coal vessel when chance occurs. Need another auxiliary for 

picket duty and communication. I send Minneapolis and Yale to Key West. St. 
/'an! off Santiago still. Repairs of the Merrimae machinery completed by the Brook- 
lyn. St. Paul, May 26, captured British collier bound in with coal, evidently for 
fleet, collier having touched San Juan and Curacao. 

and received from the Secretary of the Navy telegram containing sub- 
Btance of the above telegram. 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 57 

The following telegram was sent to the Secretary of the Navy: 

Telegram just received from (Gozais Ecuraassiez) Schley shows he is to-day block- 
ading off Santiago de Cuba and will continue to do so until coal supply has been 
reduced to safe limit for large ships. Yesterday Auxiliary No. 557 captured collier 
bound to Santiago de Cuba, cargo of coal. The Indiana and the Minneapolis and 
Auxiliary No. 591 will arrive at Key West for coal. The New York is ready to start 
to Santiago as soon as authorized to do so by the Department. 

The following telegram was sent to Commodore Schley to both Port 
Antonio, Jamaica, and Mole St. Nicholas: 

Congratulate you on success. Maintain close blockade at all hazards, especially at 
night; very little to fear from torpedo-boat destroyers. Coal in open sea whenever 
conditions permit. Seud a ship to examine Guantanamo with view of occupying it 
as base, coaling one heavy ship at a time. Appraise captured coal, use it if desired, 
and afterwards send ship in as prize. 

The following telegrams from the Secretary of the Navy were 
received : 

Your telegram May 29 received. Department thinks it very desirable that St. Paul, 
now off Santiago de Cuba, and Yankee starts to-day and St. Louis to-morrow after- 
noon, both from New York for Santiago, touching Nicholas Mole. 

You carry out recommendations to go yourself with two ships to Santiago de 
Cuba. Act at your discretion with the object of blockading Spanish division as 
soon as possible. Goodrich reports Guantanamo, Cuba, very weak. The seizure of 
immediately is recommended. 

May 30. — At 11 p. m. the New York left Key West for Santiago, 
going first to a point where Commodore Watson could be spoken. I 
spoke the Montgomery, Commodore Watson's flagship, at 6.55 a. m.; 
he came aboard the New York; instructions were given, leaving him 
in command, and at 9.07, signal being made to the Oregon, Mayflower, 
and Porter, to form column on the New York, stood eastward at a speed 
of 13 knots. 

At 7 p. m. the St. Paul and Yale were met standing westward under 
orders for Key West for coal. I modified these orders, sending the 
Yale to Hampton Eoads and the St. Paul to New York. 

The commanding officer of the St. Paul left with me the following 
copies of despatches : 

[From Sigsbee to Secretary of the Navy. Sent from St. Nicholas Mole at 10.30 p.m. on May 29.] 

Ciphers here read by me. Find in them no reason to prevent me from proceeding 
immediately according to the cable sent you through me this evening. Will indorse 
ciphers and leave them for next visiting United States man-of-war. 

Sigsbee. 

[From Schley to Sampson. Off Santiago de Cuba, 10 a. m., May 29. Sent to Sampson at 7 p. m. same 
day. Same to Secretary of the Navy.] 

Enemy in port; recognize Cristobal Colon and Infanta Maria Teresa and two tor- 
pedo boats moored inside Mono, behind point. Doubtless the others are here. We 
are short of coal; using every effort to get coal in. Vixen blew out manhole gasket; 
have sent boilermaker on board to repair. Colliers repaired; machinery being put 
together. Have about 3,000 tons of coal in collier, but not easy to get on board here. 
If no engagement in next two or three days, Sampson's squadron could relieve this 
one to coal at Gonaives or vicinity of Port au Prince. Hasten me dispatch boats for 
picket work. Brooklyn, Ioiva, Massachusetts, Texas; Marblehead, Vixen, and collier 
compose squadron here. 

Schley. 

[Secretary of the Navy to Schley. Eeceived at cable office, Mole St. Nicholas, May 27, 1898. Read by 
Sigsbee May 29 and sealed under cover for delivery to next visiting United States man-of-war.] 

The most absolutely urgent thing now is to know positively whether the Spanish 
division is in Santiago de Cuba Harbor, as if so immediate movement against it and 
the town will be made by the Navy and division of about 10,000 men of the Ameri- 
can troops which are ready to embark. You must surmount difficulty regarding 



58 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

coaling by your ingenuity and perseverance. This is a crucial time, and the Depart- 
ment relies upon you to give information quickly as to the presence of Cervera 
to be reach for concerted action with the army. Two colliers have been 
ordered Mole. Haiti. Your vessels may coal singly there or in Gonaives, Haiti 
Channel, or leeward Cape Cruz, Cuba. Sampson coming around Windward Passage. 
Orders have been issued to the commander of the Yankee (?) to report to you, and 
the Minneapolis will go north. Cervera must not he allowed to escape. 

Long. 

[Secretary of the Navy to Sohley. Received at the mole, May 29. 1898, opened by C. D. Sigsbee, cap- 
tain U.S. N.. and addressed to next visiting United States man-of-war.] 

It is your duty to ascertain immediately the Spanish fleet, if they be at Santiago 
de Cnba, and report. Would be discreditable to the Navy if that fact was not ascer- 
tained immediately. All naval and military movements depend on that point. 

Long. 
May 31. — At 5 p. m. of the 31st I sent the Porter in to Mole St. 
Nicholas with the following dispatch to the Secretary of the Navy: 

Shall arrive Santiago 1 a. m. June 1 with New York, On-yon, Mayflower, and Porter. 
Last night met St. Paul and Yah. Ordered St. Paul to New York and Yale to Hamp- 
ton Roads for coal. Please have preparations made for coaling immediately. Will 
telegraph situation at Santiago on arrival. 

June 1. — At 6 a. in. I arrived off Santiago de Cnba, and found Com- 
modore Schley's squadron in column to the westward of the mouth of 
the harbor. The squadron was composed of the following vessels: 
Brooklyn, hunt. Massachusetts, Texas, New Orleans, Marbtehead, Har- 
vard, Vixen, Merrimac, and Stirling. 

At 11 a. m. the Porter arrived from Mole St. Nicholas with the follow- 
ing dispatches: 

Washington, May 30. 

Schley has seen and recognized two armored cruisers and two torpedo-boat 
destroyers, the Spanish division at Santiago de Cuba. (Proceed) to Santiago 
with the New York and Oregon and such other vessel you may desire; leave orders 
concerning army convoy, senior officer present. The Spanish torpedo destroyer 
Terror reported at San Juan, Porto Rico, damaged. 

Long. 

Washington, May 30. 

General Miles states if you can communicate with Cuban insurgents request 
Garcia to assemble his force at (or in) the rear of Santiago de Cuba, and our Army 
division will take with them to Santiago de Cuba 5,000 stand of arms and ammunition 
for Cubans. 

Long. 
Washington, May 31. 

It is essential to know if all the four Spanish armored cruisers at Sautiagode Cuba, 
as our military expedition must wait lor out of information. Report as soon as 
possible. 

The army now embarking at Tampa, Fla., estimate 25,000 men, to proceed to San- 
tiago de Cuba as soon as you inform me whole Spanish fleet iu harbor. Will be 
accompanied by cavalry, siege guns, mortars. It is suggested that you select places 
suitable for landing infantry as near as possible to Santiago deCuba'and be prepared 
t<> advise regarding landing guns and cavalry; of first importance to secure bridge 
Sail Juan River, the pier at Daiquiri, and others. Department expects you will 
assist, of course, landing the army to utmost of your power, but desires you shall not 
risk by operation on shore or in landing crews of the armored vessels or those needed 
in case of a naval engagement. Will not Guantanamo, Cuba, be the best place for 
landing cavalry .' Auxiliary No. 592 {Yankee) must be available, also auxiliary No. 
556 St. Louis calling at Mole, Haiti; several colliers on way to Mole, Haiti. 

Long. 

The following are copies of telegrams received by Commodore Schley 
June 1 : 

Mole St. Nicholas, May 30. 
General Miles states that if you can communicate with Cuban insurgents, request 
Garcia to assemble his force at the rear of Santiago de Cuba and our army division 
will take with them to Santiago 5,00U stand of arms and ammunition for Cuban(s). 

Long. 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 59 

Mole St. Nicholas, May 31. 
It has been suggested that an alternative line of communication could be opened 
with General Garcia as follows: Landing Maceo Inlet about 30 nautical miles west 
of Santiago de Cuba, uot far from Jucaro anchorage, a message would find the 
neighboring country in possession of insurgent(s), and Garcia would probably be 
found at Bairo, 33 miles to the northward over the mountains. An outpost of 
Garcia's force would probably be found at the northern foot of the mountains and 
about half way from the sea to Baire. The highest point on the road is Navanjo, 
from where there are two paths on to Matias auras, Fors Negros; the other by 
Banes Calientes and Oja de Agua. Our army wishes Garcia to close down on 
the land side of Santiago de Cuba, as previously telegraphed. 

Long. 

Peceived the following copy of a dispatch sent by Commodore Schley 
to the Commander in Chief, May 31 : 

The New Orleans and the Sterling arrived ; send as early as practicable picket boat; 
I mediate between them very badly." Has (have) seen one more vessel Vizcaya 
class in port. Smooth sea now. I am coaling the Iowa and Brooklyn. 

About 5 p.m. the Dolphin arrived, convoying the cable steamer Adria. 

Immediately on arrival I steamed down past the entrance to Santiago 
Harbor and saw lying close within the Cristobal Colon and one of the 
Vizcaya class. Both of these got up steam and moved up into the 
harbor out of sight. 

Preparations were at once made for sinking the collier Merrimac in 
the entrance, the port watch of the New York being sent on board. The 
night of this day was particularly favorable for the enterprise, the tide, 
the time of setting of the moon, etc., all conjoining most favorably. 

In consulting Assistant Naval Constructor Hobson as to the best 
means of sinking the vessel, he showed himself so interested, worked 
to such a degree in the preparation, and entreated so strongly that he 
might be allowed to take the ship in, that I consented, though several 
hundred officers and men had volunteered and many begged hard to go. 

The crew finally selected was as follows: 

Naval Constructor E. P. Hobson; D. Montague, chief master at arms, 
New York; gunner's mate, third class, George Charette,Ae<r York; Cock- 
swain P. Clausen, New York; Machinist First Class G. F. Phillips, Merri- 
mac; Water Tender F. Kelly, Merrimac; Coxswain O. Deignan, Merrimac, 
and Coxswain J. F. Murphy, Iowa. 

Assistant Constructor Hobson had formerly been a line officer, and 
was for some time assistant navigator of the Chicago, so that he was 
qualified to conduct the ship. 

June ~\ — Unfortunately the preparations were not completed before 
daylight of the 2d, and the expedition had to be postponed to the next 
night, when, at 3.30 a. m. June 3, she went in and was sunk. As we 
now know, she did not sink until she was much higher in the channel 
than was intended. This was owing to the failure of her steering gear, 
and to a partial failure of the torpedoes arranged along her side to 
explode. 

On June 2 the following order of battle was issued: 

ORDER OF BATTLE. 

U. S. Flagship New York, 1st Rate, 

Off Santiago de Cuba, June 2, 1898. 
The fleet off Santiago de Cuba will be organized during the operations against 
that port and the Spanish squadron as follows : 

First squadron (under the personal command of the commander in chief). — New 
York, Iowa, Oregon, New Orleans, Mayflower, Porter. 

Second squadron (Commodore Schley). — Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Texas, Marblehead, 
Vixen. 



* Sent : " I need them very badly." 



60 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 



Vessels joining subsequently will be assigned by tbe commander in chief. The 
vessels will blockade Santiago de Cuba closely, keeping about 6 miles from the Morro 
in the daytime, and closing iu at night, the lighter vessels well in shore. The iirst 
squadron will blockade on the cast .side of the port, and the second squadron on the 
west side. If the enemj tries to escape, the ships must close and engage as soon as 
possible, and endeavor to sink his vessels or force them to run ashore in the channel. 
It is not considered that the shore batteries are of sufficient power to do any mate- 
rial injury to battle ships. 

In smooth weather the vessels will coal on station. If withdrawn to coal else- 
where, or for other duty, the blockading vessels on either side will cover the angle 
thus left vacant. 

I>AY AND NIGHT FORMATION. 

[T<> accompany order of battle dated June 2. 1898.] 

U. S. Flagship New York, 1st Rate, 

Off Santiago de Cuba, June 3, 1898. 




», I4ew Orleans. |/ 

/ 



N | Brooklyn. 



\ 



^ | Texas. 
\ 



\ Porter. 1/ 

\ / 

New YorH. \ i ' 



'v| Mass. 






Oregon. |^ 



Iowa. 



June 3. — On June 3 the St. Louis, Yankee, and collier Justin arrived. 

The following dispatches were received from Mole St. Nicholas by 
the St. Louis: 

Washington, June 2. 

Cable house is reported on the point of Cape Cruz, Cuba, presumably near the 
water, and a branch from the loop connecting Manzanillo to Santiago do Cuba comes 
ashore there, as also a branch from the cable connecting Cienfuegos to Santiago de 
Cuba. This report is from a person who states he helped to lay cable on the south 
side of Cuba. Auxiliary No. 510 (Resolute) sailed May 31, Mole, Haiti, en route to 
squadron. 

Allen, Acting Secretary. 

Washington, June 2. 
The United States consul at Kingston, Jamaica, telegraphs .June 1: Am informed 
that Puri88ima Conception going Cape Cruz, Cuba, west of Santiago de Cuba, and 
will coast inside key, making either .Manzanillo, Trinidad deCuba, Cienfuegos, or go 
direct to Batabano. Has objected to colonial government. 

ALLEN, Acting Secretary. 

Washington, June 2. 
General Shatter wires expects to start from Tampa, Fla., on June 1 with 18,000. 
The chief engineer, Boston naval station, 20,000 men, including ten batteries of 
artillery and some cavalry. Commodore No. 8 will attend to convoy. 

Alxex, Acting Secretary. 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 61 

Washington, June 1. 
Spanish torpedo destroyer Terror is reported greatly damaged at San Juan, Porto 
Rico. It is suggested you have her carefully watched by a sufficient force to prevent 
possible interference with convoy in transit. ArTii'Tsr A f <? / 

About 3 p. m. the Spanish tug Colon came out of Santiago Harbor 
flying a flag of truce, and the Vixen was sent to meet her. The Span- 
ish fleet captain, Bustamente, came on board with a letter from Admiral 
Cervera to Admiral Sampson announcing the safety of the Merrimac's 
crew. 

Toward midnight the Mayflower left for Key West, via Mole St. 
Nicholas, taking the following telegrams : 

The Secretary of the Navy: 

Succeeded in sinking auxiliary Herrimac in the channel of Santiago de Cuba to-day, 
4 a. m., June 3. This was carried out most gallantly under the command Naval Con- 
structor Hobson and seven men. By flag of truce from the Spanish admiral, Cervera, 
sent in recognition of their bravery, am informed all are prisoners of war, two slightly 
wounded. Request authority to arrange exchange, if possible, between these and 
prisoners Atlanta Beg troops move with all possible celerity; of paramount impor- 
tance. Six ships Spanish squadron in the harbor of Santiago unable to avoid being 
captured or destroyed. 

Secretary of the Navy: 

Some observations made to-day by a reliable Cuban, in accordance with my instruc- 
tions, makes four Spanish armored vessels and two Spanish torpedo destroyers in 
Santiago at that time. Repairs and more coal needed by them. „ 

Secretary of the Navy: 

Have received reliable information from Cuban officers the Spanish force in this 
vicinity of Santiago consists of 7,000 men, intrenched in Juraguacito and Daiquiri; 
5,000 men in Santiago de Cuba; in Monro de Cuba, 400 men ; at other points in the 
bay, 100 men, with small rapid-tire gun and submarine mines at various points. With 
superior force and insurgent force, which is ready, though mostly needing arms, 
Santiago de Cuba must fall, with ships in port, which can not be entered against 
obstructions and mines. Samphov 

Commodore Watson : 

Channel to Santiago obstructed by auxiliary Merrimac this morning; all Spanish 
ships inside. I am sending Mayflower to Key West for repairs and Dolphin for block- 
ade. I will return north side as soon as I learn intentions of army. 

Sampson. 

June 4. — The following battle order was issued : 

ORDER of battle. 

U. S. Flagship New York, 1st Rate, 

Off Santiago de Cuba, June 4, 1898. 

The Texas, Massachusetts, Iowa, and the Oregon will take positions 4,000 yards from 
Estrella Point and opposite the entrance to the port of Santiago in the order named 
from west to east in such position as to be able to observe the wreck of the Merrimac, 
and will tire upon any parties which may be seen working about it. If the fire be 
opened by the batteries it will be returned and an endeavor made to destroy them. 

The senior officer of the above-named ships will have charge of carrying out these 
instructions. 

In case of opening fire upon the batteries, the Brooklyn, Marblehead, and the Vixen 
will take an enfilading position 4,000 yards to the westward of the entrance and well 
inshore, and the New York, Xew Orleans, and the Yankee a similar position to the east- 
ward and will engage the batteries at the same time with the battle ships. 

Firing directly upon Morro Castle will be avoided, as our men from the Merrimac 
are confined there. 

The battle ships will take the above positions when signaled to do so by the com- 
mander in chief and will occupy them until signaled to withdraw, when blockading 
stations will be resumed. 

The following signals will be provisionally employed : 

18. Battle ships take positions assigned above. 

19. Battle ships withdraw and resume blockading stations. 

W. T. Sampson. 
Bear- Admiral, U. S. N, 
Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station. 



62 ADVANCEMENTS IX THE NAVY. 

June 5. — The following dispatches were sent by the St. Louis, which 
went to Mole St. Nicholas for that purpose. She will wait till 10 a. m., 
June 0, for replies: 

Si ( i ; i ; iaiiy OB the Navy: 

Very important I should know immediately whether the array expedition has 
Bailed for Santiago and its number. Vessels IT. S.N. are supplied sufficiently with 
men. Send 100,000 pounds of fresh beef and vegetables by each of the auxiliaries 
Harvard, St. Paul, Yale, for immediate use, when they sail, 

Commodore Rkmey : 

Send t<> Santiago, ;is supply ship has not been exhausted, and i.eud her also 

to Santiago. Send ammunition for 4-inch and 5-inch rapid lire. 

Commodore Remey: 

I am Bending Resolute for battalion marines. Have ready battalion to embark upon 
arrival, and send immediately here. 

Commodore REMEY: 
Send Vesuvius to Santiago. 

The Suwanee arrived. The St. Louis left for Mole St. Nicholas and 

the lu solute left for Key West, the Resolute to get the marine battalion. 

Issued battle order and plan for proposed attack on batteries June 0. 

ORDER <)F BATTLE. 

U. S. Flagship New York, 1st Rate, 

Off Santiago de Cuba, June 5, 1S98. 

Preparations will be made to engage the batteries Monday morning, June C, at 7 
o"cloek. The men should be given their breakfast at 5.30, and the divisions ready 
to form at li o'clock. 

When preparatory signal is made ships will form south of the Morro as follows: 

Hester)! column (heading north). — Brooklyn, Marblehead, Texas, Massachusetts. 

Eastern column (heading north). — New York, Yankee, New Orleans, Oregon, Iowa. 

When signal of execution, 18, is made the columns will move ahead. The com- 
mander of each division will make such signals as may be necessary to bring his 
division into position marked on the accompanying drawing, forming circles drawn 
at 3.000 yards from the eastern and western batteries, one column heading in a 
northwesterly and the other in a northeasterly direction. This will be best accom- 
plished by changing direction of columns, the easterly column to the northeastward 
and the westerly column to the northwestward, running in thepe directions until 
south of the indicated positions, then heading all vessels of the division north 
simultaneously, turning again into column when the distance of 3,000 yards has 
been reached. Vessels will be 400 yards apart and will retain their positions, the 
westerly column using the starboard battery and the easterly column the port 
battery. 

On signal from the commander in chief both columns will open lire, or fire will be 
opened in case the enemy begins. 

Bearings will be taken carefully, and distances obtained with all practicable 
accuracy. 

The Dolphin will take position to the eastward and the Suwanee and Vixen to the 
westward, as shown on the plan, for the purpose of looking after any musketry fire 
from shore. 

The lire will be deliberate, and continued until the batteries are silenced or an 
order to cease firing has been made. 

Very respectfully, W. T. Sampson, 

Rear- Admiral, U. S. X., 
Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station. 

June f>. — About G.30 a. m. vessels formed two columns, as per order of 
battle issued previous date. At G.43 called to general quarters, ships 
standing in toward the batteries. At 7.38 made signal " Commence 
lii ing." At 7.41 opened lire, this ship aiming at the battery east of the 
Morro at (5,000 yards. At 8.05 hoisted "Cease firing," when general 
firing was discontinued, but individual firing at slower rate of speed 
was continued until 9.40. The New York had worked in to within 2,000 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 63 

yards of the Morro batteries and engaged in deliberate firing. At 
10.0S made signal "resume blockading station." At 10.20 flagship 
sounded " secure." 

In the afternoon sent tbe following dispatch to the Secretary of the 
Navy by one of the newspaper tugs going to St. Nicholas Mole: 

Bombarded forts at Santiago to-day at 7.30 a. m. to 10 a. m., and have silenced 
works quickly without injury of any kind, though stationed within 2,000 yards. If 
10,000 men were here city and fleet would be ours within forty-eight hours. Every 
consideration demands immediate army movement; if delayed city will be defended 
more strongly by guns taken from fleet. 

About 10.30 p. m. tbe St. Louis arrived from St. Nicholas Mole with 
the following dispatches: 

Washington, June 4. 

Three telegrams of June 3 received; your action, as thus far reported, approved. 
Will give every attention to your recommendation. 

Allen. 

Washington, June 4. 

Do you consider that you need more small vessels picket duty? 

Allen. 

Washington, June 6. 

St. Pierre, Martinique, reports by telegraph the British steamer Twickenham, 

4,000 tons of coal consigned to the Spanish consul having been refused permission 
to land coal at St. Pierre, Martinique, sailed about June 5 from St. Pierre, Martinique, 

for Jamaica. 

Allen. 

Washington, June 6. 
I shall exchange for Hobson and party First Lieut. Gastainiuza, 1 sergeant, and 6 
privates. The War Department has been requested to send to Key West. 

Allen. 

Washington, June 4. 
Department highly appreciates heroic conduct Hobson and associates. Send names 
and rates of them all, and what you recommend for them. 

Long. 

About midnight the Marblehead and Yankee left for Guantanamo. 
June 7. — About 7 a. m. the collier Kingtor arrived and brought the 
following dispatch from St. Nicholas Mole: 

Washington, June 6. 
The prisoners of war at Atlanta are First Lieut. Puis Giner Gastaminza, sixth bat- 
talion lower peninsula, 7 second lieutenants, a sergeant, and 9 privates. You are 
authorized to make such arrangements with Admiral Cervera as may be necessary to 
secure our officer and men now prisoners at Santiago. 

Allen. 

The following memorandum was issued regarding methods of block- 
ade: 

[Memorandum No. 13.] 

After careful consideration of the various schemes of maintaining an effective 
blockade of Santiago de Cuba at night which have been advanced, I have decided 
upon the following, which will be maintained until further orders: 

The weather permitting, three (3) picket launches, detailed from the ships of the 
squadron each evening, will occupy position 1 mile from the Morro — one to the east- 
ward, one to the westward, and one to the southward of the harbor entrance. On 
a circle drawn with a radius of 2 miles from the Morro will be stationed three vessels, 
the Vixen to the westward, from one-half mile to 1 mile from the shore, the Suwanee 
south of the Morro, and the Dolphin to the eastward, between one-half mile and 1 
mile from the shore. The remaining vessels will retain the positions already occu- 
pied, but they will take especial care to keep within a 4-mile circle. 



64 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

All vessels may turn their engines whenever desirable to keep them in readiness 
for immediate use, and while so doing may turn in a small circle, but without losing 
propei bearing or distance. 

The signal for an enemy will be . If the enemy is a torpedo boat, these 

will be followed by . 

I again call attention to the absolute necessity of a close blockade of this port, 
especially at night and in bad weather. In the daytime, if clear, the distance shall 
not be greater than ti miles; at night, or in thick weather, not more than 4 miles. 
The end to be attained justifies the risk of torpedo attack, and that risk must be 
taken. '1'he escape of th" Spanish vessels at this juncture would be a serious blow 
to our prestige and to a speedy end of the war. 

Attention is called to the provisional signals established by General Order, No. 9. 
Very respeetfullv, 

W. T. Sampson, 
Rear-Admiral, U. S. X., 
Commander in Chief U. S. Xaral Force, North Atlantic Station. 

June 8. — On the 8th issued memorandum No. 14 regarding the use of 
search lights. This was undoubtedly one of the most important ele- 
ments in making the blockade successful, in tbat it made it impossible, 
as was stated on board the New York by the captain of the Colon, for 
the Spanish squadron to leave at night. The entrance was by this 
means brilliantly lighted, so that the movements of the smallest boat 
could be seen within. A later modification kept a second battle ship 
close to the illuminating ship, so that the first of these two should be 
able to use her guns without disturbing the illumination. 

I regard the outcome of this memorandum as being thoroughly 
successful. 

[Memorandum No. 14.] 

U. S. S. Flagship New York, 1st Rate, 

Off Santiago de Cuba, June 8, 1S9S. 

During the dark hours of the night search lights will be used as follows: 

The Iowa, Oregon, and the Massachusetts will take turns of two hours each — i. e., 
from dark to 8 p. m., from 8 p. m. to 10 p. m. — in keeping one search light directly on 
the harbor entrance, maintaining carefully during that time their blockading posi- 
tions. Should a vessel's lights fail, the next in order will at once take up the duty. 

The picket launch and vidette stationed south of the Morro will move to one side 
or the other sufficiently to get clear of the beam of light. 

The vessel on each Hank, the Brooklyn and the Texas on the western side, the New 
York and New Orleans on the eastern side, will take two-hour turns in using one 
search light from time to time on the coast line, swinging it toward the Morro, but 
avoiding the illumination of the flanking videttes on the inside line. The light 
should never be turned off more than five minutes at a time. From time to time 
the horizon outside should be swept. 

Attention is called to bad and careless handling of search lights. Last night some 
of the lights were kept high in the air and were again swept rapidly from side to 
side. Under such circumstances a search light is worse than useless. 

The beams must be directed to the horizon and must be moved very steadily and 
slowly. Not less than three minutes should be employed in sweeping through an 
are of 90 degrees. 

The best way to discover a torpedo boat is by its smoke, and even this will not be 
seen unless the light is very w r ell handled. 

Very respectfully, YV. T. Sampson, 

Rear-Admiral, I'. 8. X., 
Commander in Chief I'. S. Xaral Force, North Atlantic Station. 

The following copies of telegrams received by Commodore Kemey 
were received from the Gloucester : 

Washington, June 1. 
Notify Watson when convoy is about to start, and direct to scour blockade coast 
most diligently, to prevent interference by Spanish gun vessels with our convoy. 

ALLEN, Acting Secretary. 

Washington, June 1. 
Deliver the following to ('apt. II. C.Taylor, commander of convoy: The following 
scheme has been discussed somewhat, but what action the War Department proposes 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 65 

to take, if any, is unknown. Railroad bridge over San Juan River, about 2 nau- 
tical miles east of Morro of Santiago de Cuba, and probably sheltered from its 
fire, is close to the sea, spans a deep ravine, and its possession would facilitate the 
operation of our army; but it is said to be mined and guarded by about 30 Spanish 
soldiers. It has been suggested to send a detachment of troops some hours before 
the main, to land daybreak near bridge and carry by surprise, holding position until 
supported from the main body. The landing near bridge is said to be good for boats, 
and water in the vicinity good for light vessels, though we have not absolute knowl- 
edge on these points. If the attempt is to be made by the army it will probably ask 
you to assist the landing with the boats of your convoy and to cover the attempt 
with some of your small vessels, which may be done, exercising due caution; but the 
Department has declined to use the seamen of the fleet to make the attack on shore. 
If the attempt is to be made, send ahead to inform the commander in chief of naval 
force on North Atlantic Station. 

Long. 

Washington, June 1. 
Inform commanding officer of convoy New York Herald, June 1, says that there are 
in the bay of Port Nipe, Cuba, gun vessels Jorge Juan and Ligera. There are others 
in other coast ports. Keep a lookout for them. 

Allen, Acting Secretary. 

Washington, June 2. 
General Shafter wires Washington War Department, June 1, he was progressing 
rapidly with loading transports, and expects to be able to start Saturday morning. 
Some American troops to join from Mobile, making, in all, about 18,000 or 20,000 men. 
Ho does not state the number of transports. Inform Captain Taylor ; cooperate with 
army, adding such vessels to convoy as you see tit. 

Washington, June 3. 
You are directed to prevent any press boat leaving Key West to accompany the 
expedition about to leave Tampa. If necessary, you will place marine guard on 
board to insure compliance. You will also give the commander of convoy order, 
directing him, if any such boats succeed in accompanying the fleet, to take posses- 
sion of and compel them to remain in his company throughout the voyage and until 
such time as the senior officer present off Santiago de Cuba shall direct release. 

Allen. 

Tampa, June 3. 
Boat capacity of transports average about 110 persons. No steam launches. Gen- 
eral Shafter informed me that two large steam lighters are to be taken along. Con- 
voy ships should bring all their boats. Navy expected to assist. Army will not 
embark before Sunday. 

Hunker. 

[Memorandum from Commodore Kemey.] 

The Annapolis, Helena, Castine, and Hornet have been at Tampa several days. The 
commanding officer of the Annapolis has had instructions about organizing the trans- 
port fleet. When all are ready the fleet will proceed to a rendezvous to westward of 
Dry Tortugas. Information will be received here when the fleet is to arrive off Tor- 
tugas. The following vessels will then proceed to the rendezvous, and the command- 
ing officer of the Indiana will take charge, viz : Indiana, Detroit, Bancroft, Vesuvius, 
Osceola, Wompaiuck, Wasp, Scorpion, and Manning. The Eagle has gone with dis- 
patches to Commodore Watson. She has orders to report to commanding officer of 
convoy for duty. This will make fourteen vessels in the convoy all ready June 4. 
It is not known yet what day the transports will be ready to start. The Indiana has 
six or seven divers at work, which will continue until the fleet is ready to move. It 
is thought she will then be in good condition. The Minneapolis was to have gone 
with convoy, but will not bo ready in time. 

The following letter dated June G was received from the United States 
consul at Kingston, Jamaica: 

The Department of State, having been informed that a steamer of the French line, 
a sister ship of the Lafauette, was bringing over a cargo of Canet quick-firing guns, 
directed me to report the arrival of such vessel at this port. I have accordingly 
just reported the arrival of the T'crsailles, which comes from Corunna via St. Thomas, 
with 128 passengers and 1,000 tons cargo. Up to the sending of this letter I have 
been unable to ascertain contents of her cargo, but I take opportunity to notify you 
of these facts for such use as you may deem proper. The vessel leaves here to- 
morrow morning at 8 o'clock, clearing for her regular port of Vera Cruz. 
5 



66 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

The Yankee was sent to St. Nicholas Mole with the following dis- 
patches to the Secretary of the Navy: 

Yesterday morning sent from the blockade the Marblehead and the Yankee to 
arrive at Guantanamo early daylight. They entered harbor, taking possession of 
lower bay immediately after their arrival, and small gnnboat defending position 
retreated without delay to the upper bay, which is connected with the lower bay by 
a narrow passage defended by 11 mines. Their instructions were not to enter the 
upper portion of the bay. Imt to hold lower bay for the accommodation of our ships, 
and this was successfully accomplished. The crew of cable steamer Adria spent 
several days searching tor Jamaica cable from Bautiago and destroyed second cable, 
the St. Louis haviog cut first. l!ut the crew of the Adria has refused to do any more 
work on grounds that work requiri d of them is illegal. Therefore cable from San- 
tiago to Cienfuegos has not been cut. hut all communication between Cuba and out- 
side world has been cut oil'. As there is some doubt that both Jamaica cables have 
been cut. suggest t hit I department make inquiry into this subject, I suggest further 
that as the crew of tin- Adria has failed in their contract, they should not receive 
coinpensali"ii after the tune at which they refused to do duty. As soon as possible 
I hope to have communication by telegraph between Guantanamo and the United 
States through French cables, and will inform the Department as soon as it has been 
established. Under these circumstances, again I urge upon the Department to expe- 
dite the arrival of troops for Santiago de Cuba, the difficulty of blockading the 
Spanish ships daily increasing; and as dark and stormy nights approach, difficulty 
must be increased greal \ . Army should be here now. The Spanish force on north 
side of Cuba is insignificant absolutely, and can oiler no impediment whatever. One 
cruiser could look after the whole. Fanfccewill wait until one for answers. The 
Marblehead will remain at (Juantanamo. 

Request that you send Vesuvius at ouce to Santiago. 

June 9. — About 1 p. in. the Dolphin returned from Mole St. Nicholas 
with the following dispatch: 

Key West, June S. 

Tuesday, 9 p. m., 15 nautical miles north one-half east Bahia de Cadiz Light, 
Eagle sighted north-northwest. Signal exchanged among * * *. Pursued about 
3 nautical miles without bringing vessels in sight. At 9.45 p. m. sighted stern light 
armored cruiser N. $ E. Showed private signal twice. Armored cruiser flashed 
truck light. Protected vessel, two torpedo destroyers, fleet formation answered. 
luigle scouted abreast until character Spanish vessels was ascertained. Communi- 
cated immediately with Lebanon, at Piedraz Cay, suggesting to her captain to send 
this news to fleet off Havana. Eagle then proceeded with all dispatch to Key West. 
One deep-sea torpedo vessel chased Eagle for a short time. Except stern light and 
occasional signal, four vessels total darkness. 1'anther left last night to join Yosemite, 
oil' Havana, for convoy. Nashville, with Watson, left here about same time; sup- 
posed they know the news. Resolute confirms it. 

I placed no confidence whatever in this information, though so specific. 
During the next morning the Yosemite, Panther, Armeria, Scorpion, and 
Supply arrived, the Panther bringing the First Marine Battalion and 
the Armeria a supply of ammunition. The Yankee also arrived from 
Mole St. Nicholas, and reported having passed a squadron of eight 
vessels, one of which was a battle shin. 

The arrival of the ships mentioned explained the squadron seen by 
the Yankee The Yankee had been observed by them, and the Scorpion, 
which was acting as convoy to the Armeria and Supply, had tired upon 
her, talcing her for a torpedo boat, but the Yankee was so distant that 
these reports had not been heard, and the Hashes were taken for signals. 
This still further convinced me of the error of the Ua</le\s report, and 
shows how easily the most experienced may be deceived at night at sea. 

June 10. — The following dispatches were received: 

Washington, June S. 

I'lie Spanish armored cruiser, first-class, torpedo destroyers are reported by Eagle 

and Resoluh ye8terday and last night, and therefore the army expedition is stopped 

temporarily ; convoy is distributed to scour the straits and reenforce t lie blockade of 

Cuba; sent two <>i' your most fast armored vessels to search through Nicholas Chan- 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 67 

nel, Cuba. * * * at Key West, and thence reenforce convoy, too. We mean to 
start this as soon as convoy is strong enough, the delay being only temporary. 
Are you sure all four Spanish armored cruisers are at Santiago? Six hundred 
marines, Panther, started for you last evening, convoyed by auxiliary No. 596 

(Yosemite). 

Allen, Acting Secretary. 

Washington June 9. 
It is expected that armored vessel (s)— two are dispatching to reenforce convoy- 
will arrive Sunday morning, June 12, at Key West, and will be coaled immediately. 
Commodore No. 8 is ordered to have convoy ready for sea at the same time; the 
Army will be notified and expedition get away without reference to Spanish. 

Allen, Acting Secretary. 

Washington, June 9. 
Picket vessel Dorothea probably will leave to-day to join you. Fishhawk will sail 
this week; two more purchased; shall (will) take two weeks to prepare. 

Allen, Acting Secretary. 

Washington, June 9. 
The Vesuvius is now seeing through design stranger. Shall send to Santiago as 
soon as possible. 



Allen, Acting Secretary. 



The following memorandum was issued : 

[Memorandum No. 15.] 



U. S. Flagship New York, 1st Rate, 

Off Santiago de Cuba, June 10, 1S9S. 
The use of the search lights during the dark hours of last night clearly indicates 
that the lights can be used with the greatest efficiency if sufficient care is taken for 
this purpose. It is absolutely necessary that the beam of light should be held 
steadily up the channel into the harbor. 

Under these circumstances it is believed to be practically impossible for a vessel 
to escape detectiou in any attempt to come out. I therefore enjoiu the commanding 
officers of the Iowa, the Oreaon, and the Massachusetts to move forward into their 
positions, not more than 2 miles from the entrance, with the entrance bearing north 
by east; the Iowa arriving first, at 7.30, and will place her light squarely up the 
entrance into the harbor and hold it steadily, except during the time required to 
change from one search light to another, as may be required. At the end of two 
hours from 7.30 p. m. she will be relieved by the Massachusetts, each of these vessels 
going back to her blockading position, 3 miles from the entrance. 

It is most important that the lights should be held as nearly stationary as possible 
and that no discrimination be lelt to the person manipulating the light. It is believed 
that this method of using the search light will prove to be all that is necessary or 
advantageous in blockading the harbor. 

Very respectfully, W. T. Sampson, 

Bear-Admiral, U. S. N., 
Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station. 

The Yankee went to St. Nicholas with the followiug dispatch: 

Have no confidence in the report of Eagle as to nationality or character of the ves- 
sels and consider very unwise to suspend operations on this account; but even if it 
is found correct there is sufficient force to furnish convoy. Armored vessel was 
probably Talbot, which was sighted Thursday at 9 a. m. by the Scorpion standing to 
the east ; am confident no large ship could have escaped from here. Am endeavoring 
to obtain information from Santiago as to what vessels are inside to-day. Delay 
seems to me most unfortunate. Marine battalion arrived this morning and will land 
at Guantanamo to-day 

The Panther was sent to day to Guantanamo in compauy with the 
Yosemite. The marine battalion was there landed and established in 
camp. 

June 11. — The St. Louis arrived with the British steamer Twickenham 
(collier), which she captured off Jamaica. The Tivickenham was sent 
into Key West. 



68 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

The following dispatches were sent to St. Nicholas Mole by the St. 

Louis : 

The Secretary of the Navy: 

Upon receiving Department's authority to exchange prisoners, sent immediately 
these proposals under Sag of truce to the Spanish admiral: To exchange for Hobson 
and his seven men First l.ieut. Pius Giner Gastaminza, of Sixth Battalion Lower 
Peninsular, one second Lieutenant, Dame unknown, one sergeant, live privates. The 
Spanish admiral informed me Hobson and his men have been delivered to general 
commanding the territorial division of Cuba, at Santiago, and that the latter had 
reported the case to general in chief, resident at Havana, and therefore all arrange- 
ments in case must be dealt witb through latter. Therefore request that Department 
take the necessary steps to effect this directly through authorities at Havana, as 
desired results can probably be effected more quickly than to have negotiations car- 
ried on from Santiago. My letter to the Spanish admiral proposed exchange should 
bo accomplished after an agreement by delivering prisoners confined at Atlanta, Ga., 
to the Spanish authorities at Havana, and that wo would receive Hobson and his 
associates from them at Santiago. Department would perhaps do well to follow 
same plan of exchange in these negotiations. Seven men referred to are D. Mon- 
tague, chief master arms; George Charette, gunner's mate, third class; K. Clausen, 
coxswain, from the New York; G. F. Phillips, machinist, first class; F. Kelly, water 
tender; O. Deignan, coxswain, from the Merrimac; J. E. Murphy, coxswain, from 
the Iowa. 

Secretary ok the Navy: 

The following is a resume of a letter from General Garcia to Miles, which I send 
thus as the only means of its reaching him. Miles's letter received through Colonel 
Hernandez on dune (i. Garcia regards his wishes and suggestions as orders, and will 
immediately take measures to concentrate forces at the point indicated, but can not 
do so as early as desired on account of his expedition to Port Banes, Cuba, but he 
will march without delay. All his subordinates are ordered to assist to disembark 
the United States troops and to place themselves under orders. Santiago well forti- 
fied with advanced intrenchments, but he believes positions for artillery can be taken 
as .Miles desires, approximately, 12,000 regulars and 3,000 militia, between Santiago 
and Guantanamo. He has sent forces in order to prevent aid getting to Santiago 
from Holquin. Repeats every assurance of good will and desire to second plans. 

Secretary of the Navy: 

The vessels seen by the Eagle were the Armaria, Scorpion, and Supply. They were 
in just that position at time named. The number is unimportant, as the Yankee, 
coming from Mole, Haiti, Thursday at lip. m., mistook the live vessels arriving yes- 
terday for eight or nine vessels under convoy battleship. In the morning the battle 
ship resolved itself into the Scorpion. General Rabi at Acerraderos with 500 men; 
Garcia expected there to-day. 

Commodore Remey: 
The presence of Vesuvius at Santiago is of paramount importance. 
The following memorandum was issued: 

[Memorandum.] 

U. S. Flagship New York, 1st Rate, 

Santiago <lc Cuba, June 11, 1S98. 

Until further orders the battle ships loiva, Oregon, and the Massachusetts will 
employ their search lights in the manner so successfully employed during the last 
two nights. Care will be taken, however, to go in (dose enough to make the light 
wholly effective for the purpose desired. The picket boats report that the Lights at 
limes are too weak because of Hie distance of the ships. The lights will bo 
employed from 7.30till daylight as follows: 

The sequence of ships will be Iowa, Oregon, Massachusetts. To-night, dune 11, the 
Massachusetts will begin at 7.30 and continue until it. 30, the Iowa from 9.30 to 11.30, 
the Oregon from 11.30 to 1.30, the Massachusetts from 1.30 to 3.30, and the Iowa from 
3.30 to daylight. 

On dune L2 the Iowa will begin at 7.30, on June 13 the Oregon, and on June 14 the 
Massachusetts again, and so on. 

The vessel using the light shall keep the entrance of the harbor bearing north by 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 69 

east. The instructions of my memorandum No. 15 of June 10, 1898, will be 
followed. 

Regard must be bad for tbe state of tbe atmosphere. If it is hazy, an effective 
illumination of the harbor entrance will require a closer approach. 
Very respectfully, 

"W. T. Sampson, 
Bear-Admiral, U. S. Navy, 
Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station. 

June 12. — The torpedo boat Porter arrived from Guantanamo and 
brought the following* report from Commander McCalla: 

No. 86.] Ij. S. S. Marblehead, 3d Rate, 

Guantanamo, Cuba, June 12, 1898. 

Sir: I have the honor to report that yesterday a scouting party of one sergeant 
and two privates from the marine camp were killed and their remains mutilated by 
a party of regular Spanish soldiery or guerrillas in their employ. 

The names of those killed are Sergeant Smith, privates Dunphy and McColgan. 

Dr. Gibbs was killed about 1 a. m. this morning in the camp, and Corporal Glass 
accidently shot himself through the hand. 

It is possible that Dr. Gibbs may have been killed accidentally by one of our own 
men during the lire which took place about that time. 

I would respectfully suggest that P. A. Surg. Arnold, now at Key West, be ordered 
hero for duty with the marine command. 

I venture to suggest for your consideration the practicability of reenforcing Col- 
onel Huntington with 100 'marines from the fleet, with such tents and camp gear as 
may be on the ships. 

I transmit herewith a copy of the order which I found necessary to give the com- 
manding officer of the U. S. S. Panther in order to relieve the fighting force. 

U. S, S. Marblehead, June 12, 1898. 
Sir: Break out immediately and land with the crew of the Panther 50,000 rounds 
of 6-millimeter ammunition. 

In future do not require Colonel Huntington to break out or land his stores or 
ammunition with members of his command. 

Use your own officers and crew for this purpose and supply the commanding officer 
of marines promptly with anything he may require. 
Very respectfully, 

B. H. McCalla, 
Commander, U. S. N., Commanding. 
Commanding Officer, 

U. S. S. Panther. 

I have the honor to transmit herewith two communications which I received to-day. 
Very respectfully, 

B. H. McCalla, 
Commander, U. S. N, Commanding. 
The Commander in Chief, 

North Atlantic Station. 

The Yankee was sent to Cienfuegos and the Yosemite to the west end 
of Jamaica to look for the Spanish steamer Purissima Conception. 

June 13. — The Vesuvius arrived on this date from scouting in the Old 
Bahama Channel, the St. Paul from New York, and the St. Louis from 
Mole St. Nicholas with dispatches, whither she at once returned. The 
collier Scindia arrived at Guantanamo Bay. 

Beceived the following dispatches: 

Washington, June 10. 

On accouut of the army expedition it is most essential to know positively if all 
of Cervera's armored vessels are actually at Santiago de Cuba. Inform the Depart- 
ment as soon as possible. 

Allen, Acting Secretary. 

Washington, June 10. 
After you have a suitable base on shore could we authorize to allow the repair and 
operation of the French cable between your base and Mole, Haiti? Inform Colonel 
Allen, U. S. A., if this is done. 

Allen, Acting. 



70 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

Washington, June 10. 
The Department considers you should have u cruiser oft' San Juan, Porto Rico, 
to observe the port. 

Allen, Acting. 

Key West, June 10. 
Unable to comply with your cipher dispatches (send immediately) and (you see, 
seize, Bend I vessels are not here or else held hack lor the expedition of the army, 
then 1 can send two first-class topudo boats towed. 

Remey. 



Washington, June 1.'. 
Army expedition starts this afternoon from Tampa, Fla., for Santiago de Cuba. 

Allen, Acting. 
The following dispatch was sent by the St. Louis: 

Secretary of the Navy: 

Lieutenant Mine has just returned, altera detour of 70 miles to observe inside 
Santiago Harbor; reports Spanish squadron all there. Spanish made vigorous attack 
on Gnantanamo camp. An outpost of four marines killed and their bodies were 
most barbarously mutilated. Surgeon Gibbs killed, apparently accidentally, by our 
own men. 

(The report of mutilation arose from the effect of the Mauser bullets, and was later 
corrected.) 

June 14. — During the night the Vesuvius went in close to shore and 
fired three shots — two at the western battery and one into the channel 
between Cay Smith and the mainland. 

During the morning watch, just after daylight, the Keio Orleans was 
ordered in and engaged the battery to the east of the Morro, with the 
idea of preventing a continuation of work and the replacing of guns 
which might have been dismounted. She soon became actively engaged 
with both batteries, and hied with accuracy and effectiveness for about 
twenty minutes. Though a number of shell fell near the Netv Orleans 
and flagship, neither was struck. 

Preparations have been made to open a telegraph office at Guantanamo; it is 
hoped it will be in operation on the 14th, so that dispatches may go via Mole St. 
Nicholas. 

The tiring at Guantanamo has been much less to-day. The total losses have been: 
Surgeon Gibbs and four marines killed on the 11th, and two yesterday — Sergeant- 
Ma j or Good and Private Taurman, the latter by falling over a cliff. Six marines 
have been wounded. 

Sixty officers and men of the Cuban forces at Guantanamo have received arms, 
clothing, and food, and have been of great service. Five hundred more are 
expected. 

About noon the St. Louis arrived with the following dispatches: 

Washington, June 13. 
Austrian gunboat Maria Teresa in the West Indies is thought to regulate to visit 
various blockade to see if effective. Upon the arrival of our troops send without 
delay as many as consider necessary of the convoy to Commodore No. 10 off Cienfde- 
gos, Cuba, and as there is some similarity between Austrian and Spanish flags cau- 
tion your ships against possible mistakes. 

Allen, Acting. 

Washington, June IS. 
Convoy French cable ship ready Wednesday from Mole to Caimauera; also aid 
establishment; French staff will operate under Colonel Allen's censorship. 

Long. 

Washington, June 13. 
Referring to cipher telegram beginning Appret Marsdensa, Austrian minister 
advises Marin Teresa at Martinica desires to enter blockaded ports; permission 
granted, same as to other powers. 

Allen, Acting. 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 71 

Sent the following dispatch by the Gloucester, with orders to send it 
from Guautanaino if possible; if not, from Mole St. Nicholas: 

The Secretary of the Navy: 

Affairs at Guantaiiamo much more satisfactory. Our forces have been reinforced 
by 50 Cubans, who are reported by Commander McCalla as of greatest assistance. 
Five hundred more are expected, who need Springfield rifles. Fleet will supply 
clothiug and food as far as possible. Fleet needs supply of both. 

June 15. — On the 14th a force of marines and Cubans attacked the 
enemy, who was routed. Forty bodies were found. One lieutenant, 
1 corporal, and 15 privates captured. The blockhouse was partially 
destroyed, the well from which they got their supply of water destroyed, 
and the heliograph apparatus captured. Our loss was 2 Cubans killed 
aud 4 wounded, 2 marines wounded. Twenty-three marines were over- 
come by heat, but all recovered. The Dolphin accompanied the force 
on the sea front aud shelled the enemy. The force of the enemy was 
stated by the lieutenant captured at 200, by the privates at about 450. 
The enemy was reinforced by troops from Caimauera, and the Texas 
and Suicanee were consequently sent to destroy the fort and capture 
the gunboat used in transporting men. 

The following order of battle was issued; also memorandum Ko. 20 
and addendum to order of battle of June 15 : 

ORDER OF BATTLE. 

U. S. Flagship New York, 1st Rate, 

Santiago de Cuba, June 15, 1S9S. 

An examination indicates that the Spaniards have been adding to the defenses to 
the east and west of the entrance. Apparently there are mounted on the left of the 
western battery two ship's guns, and on the right hand of the same battery two or 
three old guns. On the eastern battery, to the right of the light-house, are mounted 
three old guns and possibly several smaller rapid-fire guns. 

The squadron will be prepared to-morrow morning at early daylight to shell both 
of these batteries. 

There will be no special formation for this purpose, but vessels will at early dawn 
carefully adjust their positions and blockading distances of 3 miles, and go quietly 
to general quarters, the men having been called early enough to have had their early 
coffee. The New York and the New Orleans will exchange blockading positions. 

When signal 18 is made vessels will move toward the harbor entrance at a speed 
of 5 knots. Arrived at a distance of 3,000 yards, each ship will stop and turn to pre- 
sent her broadside, the New York, New Orleans, Oregon, and Iowa turning with port 
helm, and the Brooklyn, Texas, and the Massachusetts with starboard helm. This 
stopping and turning will be done without signal, but all vessels should endeavor 
to arrive on the firing line at the same moment. After turning, distance should be 
closed to 400 yards, using the engines again if needed. The vessels will retain the 
positions thus taken as nearly as possible, moving in closer, if necessary, in order 
to see their targets and render their lire effective. 

On signal from the commander in chief, all vessels will open fire, or fire will be 
opened in case the enemy begins. 

Bearings will be taken carefully and distances obtained with all practicable 
accuracy. 

The Vixen will take position inshore on the western side and the Scorpion on the 
eastern side and look out for the musketry fire from shore. They will be slightly 
outside the flank ship, and where they can enfilade any infantry fire directed upon 
the ships. 

The fire will be deliberate, and, after the batteries are silenced, will be carefully 
directed to their destruction. Ammunition will not be thrown away. Careful 
instructions will be given to gun captains not to tire unless they can see their mark, 
which in this case will be the enemy's guns. 

The J'esuvins and the Porter will remain on the east side out of range of the 
batteries. 

At signal — ■ the vessels will resume their day blockading stations. 
Very respectfully, 

W. T. Sampson, 
Bear- Admiral, U. S. N., 
Commander in Chief U. S. Xaval Force, North Atlantic Station. 



72 ADVANCEMENTS TN THE NAVY. 

[Memorandum No. 20.] 

U. S. Flagship New York, 
Off Santiago de Cuba, June 15, 1S9S. 
Sir: The commander in chief desires again to call the attention of commanding 
officers to the positions occupied by the blockading lleet, especially during the day 
time, and it is now directed that all ships keep within a distance of the entrance tc 
Santiago of 4 miles, and this distance must not he exceeded. 

If the vessel is coaling or is otherwise restricted in her movements, she musl 
ne\ ertheless keep within this distance. 

If at any time the Bagship makes signal which is not visihlo to any vessel, such 
vessel must at once approach the flagship or repeating vessel to a point where she 
can read the Bignal. 

Disregard of the directions which have already been given on this head has led tc 
endless confusion. Many times (luring the day the lleet is so scattered that it would 
he perfectly possible for the enemy to come out of the harbor and meet with very 
little opposition. 
The Commander in Chief hopes that strict attention will bo given this order. 
Very respectfully, 

W. T. Sampson, Hear- Admiral, U. S. X. 

Addendum to order of battle of June 15, 1S9S. 

II. S. Flagship New York, First-Rate, 

Off Santiago, June 15, 1S9S. 
Reduced charges will be used in all guns of 8-inch caliber and above, with the 
corresponding si.n'ht marks to increase the angle of fall of the projectiles and the' 
probability of destroying the batteries. 

June 15. — The fort in Guantanamo Bay was destroyed today by the 
Texas and Marblehead and Suwanee. The channel to Caiman era is to 
be dragged for torpedoes. One torpedo was picked up by the Marble- 
head's crew. There was no serious lighting reported ashore during 
the 14th. 

June Kl. — Following the order of battle of the 15th, the batteries 
were bombarded at early dawn. They were quickly silenced and the 
lire was continued half an hour and probably did much damage, as no 
shots were fired at the ships as they withdrew. 

June 17. — The following telegrams were received via Mole St. Nicho- 
las : 

Key West, June 14. 
The Vesuvius left Caysal, Cuba, for Santiago de Cuba on June 11. Army to leave 
Dry Tortugas, Fla., on June 15, morning. Two or more first-class torpedo boats 
and Ilesolu te with ammunition accompanying expedition. Vessels have provisions 
for three months sent from New York. 

Y. 

Washington, June 14. 
Celtic left Hampton Roads to join you Sunday, convoyed by Dixie. Send Supply to 
New York. 

Long. 

Washington, June 14. 
ce to maintain full 
d once some auxil 
fhis matter verv ii 
ably hostile report Austrian gun vessel. 



\\ asiiington, June 14. 
Department attaches utmost importance to maintain full strength of the blockade 
of Cuba and desires you send there at once some auxiliaries and other cruisers, 
unless you can't possibly spare them. This matter very important in view of prob- 



LONG. 

Washington, June 14. 
From very rr liable source is learned that live small Spanish unprotected vessels 
and one armed transport at San Juan, Puerto Rico, no more ( ?). Army supply is nearly 
out of provisions. Twenty-two thousand tons of coal there and only three hours' 
supply of shell at their fort, but would he well not to trust too much statement 
about shell. Department advises you blockade at once cruiser and transport at 
San Juan, Puerto Rico, and prevent escape. Is Terror one of them .' Our army and 
convoy are leaving Tampa, Fla. 

Long. 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 73 

Washington, June 15. 
The American consul, Kingston, Jamaica, telegraphs: "Spanish troops and bat- 
tery removing from Manzanillo to Cieufnegos, coasting vessel carrying on Saturday 
weekly." If the Spanish foresee defeat at Santiago (he) (they) may attempt to 
■withdraw part of the garrison and field artillery by above route. 

Long. 

Washington, June 15. 
Fowarded per Gloucester. Universal horror barbarous mutilation American dead. 
American people watching your operations anxiously but with greatest confidence. 
Having troops soon relieved. Kindly acknowledge. 

Long. 

Washington, June 15. 
The American consul at Kingston, Jamaica, sends the following: "Will you permit 
me to urge unobserved blockade, well-armed auxiliary to cover channel Key leading 
to Manzanillo, Cuba, and channel westward of Isle of Pines, West Indies. At least 
eight vessels preparing to take cargo of provisions for Cuba. Purisima Conception 
gets the British nag, but questions granting clearance referred to London, England. 
Strenuously working for the principle involved. The vessel comparatively unim- 
portant consideration. 

Long. 

The following telegram was sent via Mole St. Nicholas by the 
Scorpion : 

The Secretary of the Navy: 

Bombarded the batteries on June 16 for forty-two minutes ; firing very accurate. 
The batteries were silenced completely. Fleet not injured. We are providing 
Cubans as far as possible with clothing, food, arms. These and supplies of all kinds 
much needed by fleet. Cubans much assistance at Gnantanamo, where everything is 
now reported quiet. Intercepted letter from Gnantanamo to Spanish commanding 
army officer at Santiago reports there is only a small quantity of food, not more than 
sufficient for this month, luilf rations. Deserter Reina Mercedes states Merrimac does 
not block up channel, she is too far in the harbor. There is no possibility, how- 
ever, of anything coming out without our knowledge, a battleship is every night 
at a distance of 1 mile from entrance, illuminating the channel most clearly. I again 
urge earnestly army move with all possible celerity. Fine weather may end any day. 

The following is the copy of a translation of General Pareja's letter 
referred to: 

Excellent Sir : The seventh day, at dawn, brought seven ships before the port 
of Caimanera. They fired grapeshot and all kinds of projectiles on the Playa del 
Este and Cayo Toro until they set tire to the fort on the Playa Este and burning the 
houses of the pilots 'which the detachment occupied. This lasted, cannonading with 
more or less intensity, until 5 o'clock in the afternoon. 

As the Playa del Este had only two muzzle-loading guns and sand intrenchments, 
the detachments could do nothing before six ships tiring on them from all sides. 
They retired into Manigua and to the Cuzco Hill, where they remain to-day making 
sallies on the beach. 

From that day 150 men occupy Punta Caracolas observing the movements of ships 
which occupy all the outer port with a transport of war and a variable number of 
armed ships and other vessels of war and armed merchant ships, total never less 
than four. 

I have also taken Enanto Passes and the vigilant Magne, which is disposed to fall 
on them where damage can be done. 

I remain in Caimanera and will only come to the Enanto when I think it neces- 
sary, as to-day. I have not been able to antagonize the American ships with rifle 
fire, no known ground being at hand. Yesterday the captain of engineers ordered 
to make safe protections that would impede and to make them low. The ground of 
Playa Este is better for this purpose. I refer solely to disembarkation. Dia F. San- 
doval and Cayo Toro flrcd with their artillery, being impeded with their short 
range, when the ships retired to the center of the channel and took positions in the 
middle of the bay, or they would not have stopped answering the fire which the 
enemy's ships were keeping up with impunity. Sandoval has not over seven dis- 
charges of piercing projectiles, and Caimanera battery did not fire, reserving fire 



74 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

until the ships entered the channel, which is where their guns reached. I am told 
that the insurgent forces at Baraoao have come down to Siguabos, their increased 
happiness being noticed, and I'alainar, and 1 do not know more. 

The American squadron, in possession of the outer bay, has taken it as if for a har- 
bor of rest; they nave anchored as Lf in one of their own ports since the 7th, the 
day i hey cut the cables, in the entrance and center of the harbor. I not being aide 
to reach them, they have not again molested me, except with two cannon shots on 
the 8th. [t appears from the work that is being done that they are preparing to 
plant the harbor with mines, or place their ships for disembarkation at Playadel 
Este, their favorite place. If it is the first, I call your attention to it in case that 
some time our squadron should come here. The ibices of the brigade are in good 
spirits. I continue serving oul half rations of everything, and in that way I expect 
to reach only the end of the month, above all in bread, as I have no Hour of any 
kind, as I said, and no way of getting any on account of there having been no corn 
for some time. Quinine for the hospitals the same. In hard straits! have taken 
private drug stores, and will have enough until the end of the month. Town in 
needful circumstances, lirst need since the 2d ultimo. On the 7th we had only two 
wounded atCayo Toro. The cable house, riddled with shell, still stands, and if 
Americans abandon port, which I doubt, everything possible will be done to 
reestablish communication, to which end I have everything ready. 

To-daj there is in the harbor a large armored vessel and seven more vessels, with 
a Large transport that appears to be a storeship. They patrol Playa del Este with 
armed launches, I have just been informed. 

I return to ( 'aimanera on seeing the carrier of this start out, he meriting confidence 
as a trusty of the brigade, having rendered me good services up to date. By sea I 
have ready a youth that served in the navy and who offered himself spontaneously. 
I actively recommend him to vour excellency should he arrive. 

Enanto, 10th Juue, 1898. 

Felix Paeeja. 

His Excellency General Commanding Division of Cuba. 

(There is a seal reading "EjorcitodeOperacionesenCuba, E. M. Division deCuba, 
2a Bgde.") 

June 19. — Received the following dispatch via Mole St. Nicholas : 

Convoying consists of the Indiana, the Detroit, the Bancroft, the Helena, the Annap- 
olis, the Wasp, the Eagle, the Hornet, Osceola, Manning, and the Ericsson. As soon 
as possible after arrival you will send every vessel that can be spared from the opera- 
tions at Santiago to reen force the blockade, which is suffering for want of vessels. It 
is the intention of the President to establish blockade to cover the ports of Cuba, 
Batabano to Cape Cruz, as soon as can be maintained effectively. Notify the Depart- 
ment what date will be ready with your force to enforce it, in order the proclamation 
may be issued. Department depends upon you solely from that time * * the 

blockade, but you may intrust to Commodore Watson particular disposition of the 
vessels on any part of the blockade that you * * * 

Long. 

Washington, June 16. 
Spanish steamer Pitrissima < 'oiicrption, recently ostensibly transferred to the British 
flag, will leave about June lb' lor Kingston, Jamaica, for Manzanillo, Cuba, or 
Batabano, Cuba, with supplies. Capture vessel if possible if you have code. 

Long. 

Washington, June 16. 
The American consul at Vera Cruz, Mexico, telegraphs the Spanish steamer lilla- 
rertle sailed June 17 from Vera Cruz, Mexico. Cleared for San Domingo City, San 
1 )omingo. Took 2 boxes of rifles, 30 men, and 2 guns. 

Long. 

Sent the following telegram to the Secretary of the Navy: 

Cienfuegos blockaded already by Yankee, Cape Cruz and vicinity by Dixie. When 
some of the light-draft vessels promised, according to your letter of .June 6, arrive, 
they will be sent to cruise iu the vicinity of Manzanillo, Cuba, and Isle of Pines. 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 75 

The President may declare immediately the blockade of whole southern coast. Aux- 
iliaries Nos. 557, 596 are on the way to blockade San Juan, Porto Rico. Will send 
hack to north coast of Cuba all vessels constituting convoy as soon as they arrive. 
A part will go by Cape Maysi and part Cape San Antonio, so as to temporarily block- 
ade the whole coast of Cuba. Pities enough. Request 500,000 rounds of Springfield 
ritle ammunition, .45 caliber. All foreign cables have been cut by Goodrich; last 
one on 18th. Recommend that isolation be made complete between Key West and 
Havana. Any communication sure to furnish Blanco information. 

My chief of staff went down to Aserraderos in the Vixen to examine 
the facilities for landing at that point and the points between there and 
Santiago de Cuba. He returned, bringing with him Gen. Calixto Gar- 
cia, General of Division Lora, and several officers of their staff'. Gen- 
eral Garcia has about 4,000 men back in the country, probably 45 miles 
by road from Santiago de Cuba — two days' march. He left behind him 
3,000 men, who are engaged in observing the Spanish forces, number- 
ing about 8,000 or 10,000, at Holguin, in order to prevent their moving 
south to the relief of Santiago. All of these 7,000 men are well armed 
and supplied with ammunition, the Florida expedition which landed at 
Banes having supplied all deficiencies. 

June 20. — The fleet of transports of the Fifth Army Corps and its 
convoys arrived at a point 15 miles to the southward at noon of June 
20. I at once sent my chief of staff in the Gloucester to communicate 
with General Sbafter. The general came up to the blockading line in 
the Segurcmca and I proceeded with him to Aserraderos, where we had 
an interview with General Garcia, and a landing was arranged for at 
Daiquiri, 3,000 of Garcia's troops to be brought up from Aserraderos 
(which is 15 miles to the westward of Santiago) and landed as soon as 
possible. 

June 21. — The cable atGuantanamo was connected with that at Mole 
St. Nicholas, and an office opened there for general telegraphic use. 

Issued the following order of battle: 

U. S. Flagship New York, 1st Rate, 

Off Santiago de Cuba, June 21, 1S98. 

The army corps will land to-morrow morning, the entire force landing at Daiquiri. 
The landing will begin at daylight, or as soon thereafter as practicable. General 
Castillo, with 1,000 men, coming from the eastward of Daiquiri, will assist in clearing 
the way for an unopposed landing by Hanking out the Spanish forces at that point. 

Simultaneously with the shelling of the beach and blockhouses at Daiquiri, the 
Ensenada de los Altares and Aguadores, both to the eastward of Santiago, and the 
small bay of Cabanas, about 2i miles to the westward of Santiago, will be shelled by 
the ships stationed there for the purpose. 

A feint in force of landing at Cabanas will be made, about ten of the transports, 
the last to disembark their forces at Daiquiri, remaining during the day or greater 
part of the day about 2 miles to the southward of Cabanas, lowering boats and 
making apparent preparations for disembarking a large body of troops. At the 
same time General Rabi, with 500 Cuban troops, will make a demonstration on the 
west side of Cabanas. 

The following vessels are assigned to bombard the four points mentioned above: 

At Cabanas, the Scorpion, Vixen, and Texas. 

At Aguadores, the Eagle and Gloucester. 

At Ensenada de los Altares, the Hornet, Helena, and Bancroft. 

At Daiquiri, the Detroit, Castine, Wasp, and New Orleans — the Detroit and Castine 
on the western dank, the Wasp and New Orleans on the eastern flank. 

All the vessels named will be in their position at daylight. 

Great care will be taken to avoid the wasteful expenditure of ammunition. The 
firing at Daiquiri will begin on signal from the New Orleans. 

At Cabanas it is probable that after a few minutes, unless the firing is returned, 
occasional dropping of shots from the smaller vessels will be sufficient, but the sem- 
blance of covering a landing should be maintained, the ships keeping close in. 

At Aguadores and Ensenada de los Altares the same rule should prevail. At Dai- 
quiri, the point of actual lauding, vessels will, of course, use their artillery until 



76 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

they have reason to believe that the landing is clear. They will take care to make 
t lie firing deliberate and effective. As General Castillo's column, approaching from 
the eastward, is likely to come within range of the guns, sharp-eyed quartermasters 
with good glasses will be stationed to look out for the Cuban flag, and care will be 
taken not to direct the fire toward any point where that flag is shown. 

The Texas and Brooklyn will exchange blockading stations, the Texas goingr inside, 
to be near Cabanas. The Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Iowa, and Oregon will retain their 
blockading positions, and will keep a vigilant watch on the harbor mouth. The 
Indiana will take the New Orleans' position in the blockading line cast of Santiago 
and between the flagship New York and the shore. This is only temporary assign- 
unit for the Tndiana to strengthen the blockading line during the landing and avoid 
any possibility of the enemy breaking through should he attempt to get out of the 
port. 

The Suwanee, Osceola, and WompaluckwiYL be prepared to tow boats. Each will be 
provided with two ."> or t> inch lines, one on each quarter, each long enough to take 
in tow a dozen or more boats. 

These vessels will report at the New Fork at 3 a. m. on June 22 prepared to take in 
tow the ship's boats, which are to assist in the lauding of troops, and convey them 
to I taiquiri. 

The Texas, Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Iowa, Oregon, New York, and Indiana will send 
all their steam cutters and all their pulling boats, with the exception of one retained 
on board each ship, to assist in the landing. These boats will report at the New 
York at 3 a. in. 

Each boat, whaloboat, and cutter will have 3 men; each launch 5 men, and each 
steam cutter its full crew and an officer for their own management. In addition to 
these men each boat will cany 5 men, including one man capable of acting as cos- 
swain, to manage and direct the transports' boats. Each steam launch will be in 
charge of an officer who will report to Captain Goodrich. Care will betaken in the 
selection of boat keepers and coxswains to take no men who are gun-pointers or who 
occupy positions of special importance at the battery. 

I'liuecessary oars and impedimenta should be removed from the pulling boats for 
the greater convenience of the transportation of troops, but each boat should retain 
its anchor and chain. 

Capt. C. F. Goodrich, commandir g the St. Louis, will have, on the part of the Navy, 
general charge of the landing 

The New Orleans will send her boats to report to Captain Goodrich upon her arrival 
at Daiquiri. 

The attention of commanding officers of all vessels engaged in blockading Santiago 
de Cuba is earnestly called to the necessity of the utmost vigilance from this time 
forward, both as to maintaining stations and readiness for action, and as to keeping 
a close watch upon the harbor mouth. If the Spanish admiral ever intends to 
attempt to escape, that attempt will be made soon. 

W. T. Sampson, 
Bear- Admiral, U. S. X., 
Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station. 

June 22. — I received the following letter from General Shafter : 

Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, 
On board S. S. Seguranca, at Sea, June ;?.', 1S9S. 
Sir: I shall commence landing this morning. It is my intention to proceed from 
Daiquiri to Santiago as rapidly as I can and take some of my laud transportation. 
The animals are in absolute need of some rest, and for that reason I may not get very 
far to-day. 

I request you to keep in touch during the advance and be prepared to receive any 
message 1 may wish to transmit from along the bluffs, or any of the small towns, 
and to render any assistance necessary. 

Very respectfully, W. R. Shafter, 

Major-General, U. S. Y., Commanding. 
Admiral SAMPSON, 

Commanding U. S. Fleet off Santiago de Cuba. 

Captain Goodrich, commanding the auxiliary cruiser St. Louis, was 
put in charge of the landing, and some 50 steam launches and cutters 
were furnished from the ships of the squadron, and the landing began 
during the forenoon. 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 77 

I had sent the New Orleans, Gastine, Detroit, and Wasp to cover the 
lauding, as it was thought that the Spaniards would make some resist- 
ance. When the first detachment of boats was ready to go ashore, a 
brisk fire was opened against Daiquiri, but there was no return. The 
Spanish troops evacuated the place and fell back without, so far as 
known, firing a shot. 

During the landing at Daiquiri there was a feint made at Cabanas 
and at points west. The Texas, lying off Cabanas, engaged the Socapa 
battery during a period of about two hours. She was struck by one 
shell, 1 man being killed and 8 wounded. 

About 7,000 men were landed during the day. 

Siboney was also occupied by our forces. We began disembarking 
troops there also. 

Much difficulty was experienced on account of the wandering pro- 
clivities of some of the transports, which had to be looked up. 

Sent the following telegram to the Secretary of the Navy: 

Landing the army progressing favorably Daiqniri. There was little if any resist- 
ance. The New Orleans, Detroit, and the Castine, auxiliaries Nos. 580 (Wasp), 560 
(Suwanee) shelled vicinity before landing. Made a demonstration at Cabanas, to 
engage attention of the enemy. Texas engaged west battery for some hours. She 
had 1 man killed. Ten submarine mines have been recovered from the channel of 
Guantanamo. Connection by telegraph has been established at Guantanamo. 

The following dispatches were received via Guantanamo: 

Washington. 
You are authorized to ascertain from the Spanish authorities at Santiago whether 
Hobson, with his men, are imprisoned in the Morro or other fort exposed to your 
lire, and, if so, to inform Cervera and commanding army officer he shall be held respon- 
sible by the United States Government for the personal safety of our officer and men 
above mentioned, and that you hold equal number Spanish prisoners subject to same 
treatment. 

Washington. 
When the Spanish give up hope at Santiago they may attempt to escape via Man- 
zanillo, Cuba. As understood here they receive supplies now via Manzanillo, Cuba. 

Long. 

Washington. 
It is proposed to proclaim the blockade on the east side from Cape Cruz, Cuba, to 
Capo Frances, Cuba. When will you be ready ? 

Long. 

The following letter was written to the Secretary of the Navy: 

No. 131.] United States Flagship New York, 1st Eate, 

Off Santiago de Cuba, June 22, 1S9S. 

Sir: On the morning of Juno 16 the batteries at the entrance of Santiago de Cuba 
were subjected to a severe bombardment by the fieet, the ships occupying approxi- 
mately the same positions as during the bombardment of June 7. A nearer range 
than that used can not be used to advantage on account of the height of the cliffs. 
The firing was deliberate and, in general, most excellent. The batteries were quickly 
silenced, and after tiring with deliberation for some forty minutes the fieet returned 
to its blockading positions without any shot whatever from the batteries following 
this movement. This fact undoubtedly shows the efficiency of our fire. I inclose a 
copy of the order of battle. 

On the day previous to this, namely, June 15, the Texas had been sent to Guan- 
tanamo for the purpose of assisting the Marblehead in the destruction of a fort at 
Guantanamo. The fort was severely bombarded by these ships and the Suwanee. 
Both the Texas and Marblehead had a narrow escape from torpedoes, one being picked 
up by the Alarbleltead's screw and the other being dislodged by the Texas. Since 



78 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

then there have been eij^lit others recovered, seven on the 21st instant, making ten 
out of the total eleven reported. Theoomplete accounts of the engagements at this 
point will 1m- forwarded in the reports of the several vessels engaged. 

The Yankee had been Bent toCienfuegos to intercept the Purissima Conception from 
Kingston, Jamaica, returning on the loth instant. She had, while off Cienfuegos, 
an engagement with a Spanish gunboal and the batteries ashore, under whose pro- 
tection the gnnboat ran. < >ne man was wounded. The gunboat unfortunately 
escaped, chiefly on account of the fire being interrupted by the smoke. The Yost-mite 
had been sent also with reference to the possibility of intercepting the Puriesima 
Conception near the western end of Jamaica. She returned on the 19th instant, 
having called in the meantime at Kingston. 

The necessity of an active blockade at Cienfuegos is so great that I at once had 
the Yosemih coaled at Guantanamo and ordered her again off that port, and on the 
arrival of the Dixie, the 19th of .June, sent herto cruise oft' Cane Cruz. The force at 
botli these points will be at once strengthened by the Helena and Osceola as soon as 
coaled, and by others as soon as p( Bsible. I dispatched the St. Paul and Yosemite 
off San Juan, Porto Rico — the St. Paul by the south coast of San Domingo and the 
Yosemite l»y the north coast. 

I inclose a copy of a translation of a letter captured by the Cubans, addressed to 
the General Commanding the Division of Cuba (Santiago de). It will be seen by 
this letter that the Spanish forces in the vicinity of Guantanamo are in great straits 
for food, and I have every reason to believe that this is also true of those in Santiago. 

During the past week wo were actively engaged in examining the various points 
of landing possible, and on the 17th an attempt was made at early daylight to 
examine Cabanas Bay, the forces being under the charge of Lieutenant Harlow, 
and consisting of two steam cutters — one from the New York in charge of Naval 
Cadet Powell and one from the Massachusetts in charge of Naval Cadet Hart. The 
entrance is extremely narrow, leading into a small bay. The launches were, how- 
ever, subjected to so heavy and continued a lire at short range that they were 
obliged to retreat. Much of the fire was from within 50 yards, and though the two 
boats were struck seventeen times no one, fortunately, was injured. Lieutenant 
Harlow, iu his report, particularly praises the conduct of Cadets Hart and Powell 
and Coxswains O'Donnell and Iiloin. 

On the 19th General Garcia and his start" paid a visit to the ship, having arrived 
that morning at General Rabi's camp at Aserraderos. He had left 4,000 of his men, 
whom he had advanced to within two days' march of Santiago, and had come to the 
coast for the purpose of consultation. Three thousand troops were left behind near 
Holguin, to observe some ten thousand Spanish troops which are now concentrated 
there, and to prevent their passage in the direction of Santiago. 

My impressions of General Garcia are of the most pleasant character. He is a 
large, handsome man, of most frank and engaging manners, and of most soldierly 
appearance. He remained some time on board, though, unfortunately, so seasick 
that he was obliged to lie down during the whole of his visit. 

The lleet has, by my direction, furnished arms, clothing, and food to the extent of 
its ability to the Cuban forces both east and west of Santiago. Much has been done 
in this direction by our ships at Guantanamo, and Commander McCalla there has 
been most energetic in rendering them all assistance possible. I believe that the 
returns for the aid rendered will be good. We have the best evidence of this in the 
activity and courage shown by the Cubans at Guantanamo, and Commander McCalla 
is most eulogistic in reference to their conduct. 

The forces available may be placed as 600, under General Perez, near Guan- 
tanamo Bay; 600 under General Castillo, near Point Sigua, some few miles east 
of Daiquiri; 1,100 under General Rabi at Acerraderos, and 7,000 under General 
Garcia, distributed as 1 have mentioned above. 

On the morning of the 20th 1 had the pleasure of receiving by the JVompatiick a 
letter from Captain Taylor. of the Indiana, stating that the transports convoying the 
army would arrive dm Lug the day. I sent Captain Chadwick, my chief of stall', on 
board the Gloucester to meet tin' Beet and convey my compliments to General Shafter, 
with the request 1 hat he would come in the Seyurama to the blockade line. 

On the arrival of General Shafter, about noon, I went on board, and shortly after 
we steamed to Acerraderos, is miles to the west, and we together paid a visit to 
Generals Garcia and Rabi. General Castillo had previously been sent for from Point 
Sigua. Arrangements were then made with reference to our future operations. It 
was regarded that the arm j should be debarked at Daiquiri on the morning of the 
22d, that 500 of General Rabi's men should he transported from Acerraderos to a 
point (Cajobabo) 5 miles west of La Sigua, to join there the forces under General 
Castillo, this whole force then to assist in the landing of the army by assaulting on 
the flank the Spanish force at Daiquiri, and that during the landing at Daiquiri a 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 79 

feint should be made to the westward of the entrance to the harbor to Santiago by 
men-of-war and transports, assisted by 500 men under General Rabi. This was ail 
carried out. It was further arranged that General Garcia's forces, now two days 
from Santiago, should be diverted to Acerraderos, and should he there embarked on 
the 24th, to join our troops lauded at Daiquiri. I inclose a copy of the battle order 
for the day, which explains in detail these arrangements. 

The Texas engaged, or lired upon, the vicinity to the entrance of Cabanas bay, and 
during the forenoon was more or less engaged with the western battery. She did 
excellent firing at some 4,000 yards' range. She was struck by one shell", and 1 man 
was killed and 8 wounded. At the time of writing I have not received a detailed 
report of the character of the injuries of the wounded. 

At 10 30 I left the blockade and went to the eastward to observe tbe progress of 
our attempt at disembarkation. Our vessels, stationed as per order of battle, were 
actively firing at Aguadores and Ensenada de los Altares, known locally as Siboney, 
and Baiquira. Our fire, however, at Daiquiri I found was simply preparatory to 
the actual landing of our troops, as practically no resistance was made. The Spaniards 
apparently at ouco retreated from this point, as also from Siboney. 

The progress of disembarkation was rendered somewhat difficult by a heavy sea, 
the heaviest which we have had during the three weeks the fleet has been stationed 
here, owing to a stiff blow off the coast of Jamaica. When I left however, at 3 in 
the afternoon, some 4,000 men were already ashore, one of the steamers had gone 
alongside the pier, and there was every prospect of the work proceeding with much 
greater rapidity. 

The pier itself was not injured, nor was the piping conveying the water supply, 
this last being a most fortunate thing for us in every respect. 

I shall order the convoying vessels to the blockade on the north side as soon as 
possible, reserving the Helena and Osceola for strengthening that of the south coast, 
but shall keep the Indiana for a few days in order to send each of our heavy ships 
successively to Guantanamo to complete their coaling; heretofore they have been 
sent only in the morning, to return to the blockade at night. As soon as this shall 
have been accomplished I expect to return her to the nortli side. 

The Vesuvius has done almost nightly firing since she has been here. There is no 
doubt that the explosion of shells of this character has a very important effect. 

I inclose copies of the Squadron Bulletin, now issued daily, which may be found 
of some interest. 

Very respectfully, 

W. T. Sampson, 
Rear -Admiral, etc. 

Secretary of the Navy. 

June 23. — Sent the following dispatches via Guantanamo: 

The Secretary op the Navy: 

I have sent to their blockading stations, via Cape Antonio, the Castine, Eagle, and 
Wasp; via Cape Maysi, the Dolphin, Annapolis, Bancroft, Hornet, Manning, and Wom- 
patiick. I am holding on southern blockade the Helena and Osceola, and retaining 
temporarily at Santiago the Detroit and Indiana and torpedo boats, first class. 

The Secretary of the Navy: 

Under flag of truce I learned to-day Hobson and his men all well and now confined 
in the city of Santiago, at a distance of 4 miles from Morro. 

Referring to your cipher telegram, received to-day, such convoys will occur fre- 
quently, and so reduce the available ships for blockade as to make it quite impossi- 
ble to maintain strict blockade on the whole of Cuba. Vessels ruuning blockade 
are smaller in size but greatly increased in number. I request most urgently such 
vessels as the Newark, Prairie, Columbia, and Minneapolis be sent here for duty with 
the blockade. 

Eeceived the following telegram : 

The following received from correspondent aboard steamer Montserrat, loading at 
Cadiz for Cuba: Considerable coal going from Cadiz, presumably to Canary Islands. 
Spanish fleet at Cartagena, Spain ; movement probably made to satisfy people. 
This information probably reliable. The French steamer Versailles, at Kingston, 
Jamaica, receiving pistols and cartridges, is bound to St. Thomas [from] Corunna, 
Spain; probably expects touch at Porto Rico. It is reported from Cardiff, Wales, 



80 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

Spanish steamer, under convoy cruiser, is duo about June 23 at Cuba. Commodore 
NO. 8 has been informed. 

Long. 

June 24.— Received the following dispatches via Playa: 

Washington. 

Have received definite information an expedition about 25,000 men to be directed 

soon at Porto Rico, and as yon shall be probably called upon for cooperation and 

less or more convoy, it is desirable thai yon connive at. If yon shall need any more 

coal an. 1 supplies accumulated to the east'; and it so, in what place and what quantity ? 

Long. 

Washington. 
The United States consul at Kingston, Jamaica, says that under secretary of the 
Captain-General of Cuba, (the) Spanish naval officer(s) Virgilio, Lopez, Chaves, 
came aboard Adula with, it is supposed, $250,000 to purchase provisions to be taken 
to Manzanillo for Cervera. Chaves is going to Manzanillo to negotiate with Maceo. 
Extensive preparations being made for shipping provisions to Cuba. 

Washington. 

Reports constantly received of provisions reaching Spanish forces via southern 

port of Cuba, and of preparation at Mexico, Jamaica, to forward further supplies; 

therefore the Department desires greatly to keep all blockade effective, to establish 

blockade from Cape Cruz, Cuba, to Cape Frances, Cuba. When shall you be ready 

for the latter to be proclaimed? 

Long. 

June 25.— Sent the following telegrams: 

Secretary of the Navy: 

Following is list of casualties on Texas, June 22: Frank I. Blakely, apprentice 
first class, killed ; Raymond Russell, apprentice second class, George Francis Mullen, 
apprentice second class, seriously wounded; Rudolph Earl Engel, seaman; Hugh 
Amos Lee, apprentice second class; John Emory Lively, landsman ; John Edward 
Nelson, apprentice second class; John J. Simonson, seaman; Aroid Sjoquist, slightly 
wounded. 

The Secretary of the Navy: 

The Detroit, Hornet, and Yankton ordered to proceed for the blockade between 
Cape Cruz, Cuba, and Cape Frances, Cuba. The Helena and Osceola, after coaling, 
will sail immediately. 

A force was sent by Commander McCalla this morning to determine 
whether the enemy still occupied the extremities of Punta del Jicacal, 
Guaiitanamo Bay. 

The force under Colonel Huntington, U. S. M. C, consisted of two 
companies of marines and two-thirds of the force of Cubans under 
Colonel Thomas, in all about 240 men. 

The lauding flotilla consisted of boats from the various ships, towed 
by the steam launches of the Helena, Annapolis, and Bancroft, which 
left their ships at 2 a. m. for the marine camp, under the command of 
Commander Eaton. The Eagle took station for the night off Jicacal 
Point, and at 4 a. m. the Marblehead and Helena moved into position 
close to the beach to south and westward of highlands of Jicacal Point, 
to cover the landing. The boats advanced in three columns and the 
troops were landed quietly and quickly, and a thorough reconnoissance 
was made of the point. The enemy was not seen. The men reembarked 
about 8. 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 81 

A picket line of Spaniards was seen from the ships, one or two men 
at a time, across the dry lagoon a couple of miles to north and westward. 

The Marblehead then proceeded to the channel between Jicacal and 
Cayo del Hospital to drag for mines. Four mines were found and suc- 
cessfully raised. This makes thirteen mines in all raised in the channel. 

June 26. — Sent the following dispatch: 

The Secretary of the Navy: 

As the Department may not fully understand the situation here, I send the follow- 
ing: Nine vessels of convoying squadron are coaling at Guantanamo; the New York, 
off Santiago, and the others must he coaled. The Yankee is at Cienfuegos, the 
Dixie is at Cape Cruz. The Helena and Hornet left yesterday for these stations. 
The Detroit and the Eagle, follow. The St. Paul and Yosemite are at San Juan, 
Porto Rico. In smooth water ships can coal off Santiago with some difficulty. I 
regard it essential not to reduce this force too much for some few days, in view of 
the fact that the weather may compel us to coal at Guantanamo. Channel was not 
obstructed by the Merrimac, and we must he prepared to meet the Spanish fleet 
if they attempt to escape. I am preparing torpedo attack in order to hasten their 
destruction. Regret to resort to this method because of its difficulties and small 
chance of success, topedo boats beiug subject to small arms and rapid-fire guns 
from the shore for a long distance. I should not do this were present force to be 
kept here, as it now insures a capture which I believe will terminate the war. Shall 
ships named, the Oregon, the Iowa, Yankee, etc., be collected here for the proposed 
move! 

The above telegram was sent with reference to the proposed detach- 
ment of some of our heavy ships for service abroad. 
June 28. — Received the following dispatches: 

Washington. 
You are authorized to detain the Oregon and the Iowa until the other United States 
armored vessels are coaled fully, so as to be able to hold our position at Santiago de 
Cuba, but you will hurry this to the utmost possible, as the Department desires to 
get this (these) vessel(s) to the East via Spain. Watson with Newark leaves to-day 
to join you to command division for Spain. You assemble at same time cruisers 
Yosemite, Dixie, and Yankee, and coal them for same service. 

Long. 

Washington, June 26. 
As soon as Sampson gives the order you shall sail with the Iowa and the Oregon, 
the Newark, Yosemite, Yankee, aud Dixit for St. Michael, Azores, for orders, en route 
to Tangiers, Morocco. Colliers ordered to join you Saint Michael. If they have 
not arrived when you have reached there, leave a cruiser to convoy them and to fol- 
low. Shift your flag to Iowa. 

Long. 

Washington, June 28. 
Commodore Howell has been ordered to report to you with his squadron. Distrib- 
ute the vessels to the blockade and give to Commodore Howell the command that 
Commodore Watson held. 

Long. 

June 30. — Received the following communication from the command- 
ing general of the army : 

Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, 

Vamp near San Juan River, June SO, 189S. 
Sir: I expect to attack Santiago to-morrow morning. I wish you would bombard 
the forts at Aguadores in support of a regiment of infantry which I shall send there 
early to-morrow, and also make such demonstration as you think proper at the mouth 
of the harbor, so as to keep as many of the enemy there as possible. 
Very truly, yours, 

W. R. Shafter, 
Major-General , U. S. ¥., Commanding. 

6 



82 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

July 1. — On July 1, in accordance with the preceding request made 
by General Shatter, the New York, Suwanee, and Gloucester took posi- 
tion off Agnadores at <> a. m., and awaited the arrival of the troops, 
which came by rail to within a mile and a half of this point; which did 
not arrive, however, antil 9.20. On their arrival the vicinity of Agua- 
dores was shelled by the three ships mentioned. 

There were two rifle pits on the hill above the railway bridge, at which 
a few men had shown themselves, numbering at various times from 16 
to 20. These disappeared as the firing began. A corner of the fort was 
knocked off, and the flagstaff was knocked down by the Suwanee. 

Desultory firing was kept up by the Spanish from the wood adjoining 
the rifle pits, and about noon a small fieldpiece was brought down the 
gorge, which tired four or five times. The New York, on observing this, 
enfiladed the gorge, tiring several 8-inch shell and a number of 4 inch. 
No tiring by the enemy was observed after this. The troops then 
returned to the railway train in which they had come, and left for 
Siboney at 12.30. The New York and Oregon then took up position and 
tired a number of 8-inch shell over the hills in the direction of Santiago 
and the ships in the bay, using a range of from 3£ to 4 miles. 

July 2. — I received on the 2d the following communication from; 
General Shafter: 

Ka.io, July 1, 189S. 
Admiral SAMPSON, Siboney: 

General shatter's compliments to Admiral Sampson. Wishes him to keep up his 
fire on Santiago on the water front. Enemy has 6-inch guns there, annoying ns very 
much in our moves. Our troops watching within a hundred yards of city on the east 
side. Will assault at daylight to-morrow morning. 

July 1. 

Admiral Sampson, Siboney: 

A few shells of large size fell some distance behind our lines to-day. It is hardly 
possible that they come from your ships, but I can not account for them unless they 
come from the enemy's navy. 

W. R. Shafter, Hajor-General. 

In accordance with the request of General Shafter, the batteries at 
the entrance of the harbor and that of Punta Gorda were heavily bom- 
barded from 5.49 to 7.45 this a. m. 

I received the following from General Shafter: 

July 2. 
Terrible fight yesterday, but my line is now strongly intrenched about three-fourths 
of a mile from town. I urge that you make effort immediately to force the entrance 
to avoid future losses among my men, which are already very heavy. You can now 
operate with less loss of life than 1 can. Please telephone answer. 

W. R. Shafter, Major-General. 

And the following was telephoned to him: 

General SHATTER: 

Admiral Sampson has this morning bombarded forts at entrance of Santiago, and 
also Punta 'inula Battery inside, silencing their tire. Do you wish further firing on 
his part? lie began at 5.30, linished at 7.30. Your message to him here. Impossible 
to force entrance until we can clear channel of mines — a work of some time after 
forts are taken possession ofby your troops. Nothingin this direct ion accomplished 
yesterday by the advance on Aguadores. 

Lieutenant Staunton. 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 83 

To which reply was made as follows: 

July 2. 
It is impossible for me to say when I can take batteries at entrance to harbor. If 
they are as difficult to take as those which we have been pitted against, it will be 
some time and a great loss of life. I am at a loss to see why the Navy can not work 
under a destructive fire as well as the Army. My loss yesterday was over 500 men. 
By all moans keep up fire on everything in sight of you until demolished. I expect, 
however, in time and with sufficient men, to capture the forts along the bay. 

Shafter. 

I wrote General Shafter the following* letter, aud began making prepa- 
rations to countermine, and, with the object of arranging an attack upon 
the batteries at the entrance, a visit was arranged to General Shafter, 
so that the matter might be thoroughly discussed, and combined action 
take place. I had in view the employment of the marines for an assault 
on either the Morro or Socapa battery, Avhile at the same time assault- 
ing the defenses at the entrance with the fleet. 

No. 7.] U. S. Flagship New York, 1st Rate, 

Off Santiago de Cuba, July 2, 1898. 

My Dear General: I have your note of this morning — just received at 11.30. 

An officer of my staff has already reported to you the firing which we did this 
morning, but I must say in addition to what he told you that the forts which we 
silenced were not tbe forts which would give you any inconvenience in capturing 
the city, as they can not fire except to seaward. They can not even prevent our 
entrance into tbe harbor of Santiago. Our trouble from the first has been that tbe 
channel to the harbor is well strewn with observation mines, which would certainly 
result in the sinking of one or more of our ships if we attempted to enter the harbor, 
and by the sinking of a ship the object of the attempt to enter the harbor would be 
defeated by the preventing of further progress on our part. 

It was my hope that an attack on your part of these shore batteries, from the rear, 
would leave us at liberty to drag the channel for torpedoes. 

If it is your earnest desire that we should force our entrance, I will at once pre- 
pare to undertake it. I think, however, that our position and yours would be made 
more difficult if, as is possible, we fail in our attempt. 

We have in our outfit at Guantanamo 40 countermining mines, which I will bring 
here witli as little delay as possible, and if we can succeed in freeing the entrance 
of mines by their use, I will enter the harbor. 

This work, which is unfamiliar to us, will require considerable time. 

It is not so much the loss of men as it is the loss of sbips which has until now 
deterred mo from making a direct attack upon the ships within the port. 
Very truly, 

W. T. Sampson, 
Bear-Admiral, U. S. N., 
Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station. 

Maj. Gen. W. R. Shafter, U. S. V. 

July 3. — The sortie of Admiral Cervera's squadron and its destruction 
has been made the subject of a separate paper, and need not be repeated 
here. 

This event closes the purely naval campaign, crowning with complete 
success the anxious work of almost exactly two months. 
Very respectfully, 

W. T. Sampson, 
Bear- Admiral, U. S. Wavy, 
Commander in Chief U. 8. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station. 
The Secretary of the Navy, 

Navy Department, Washington, D. C. 



84 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

[Page 592.] No. 32. 

[Beporl of a board appointed by Bear-Admiral W. T. Sampson, CT. S. N., commander in chief United 
States naval lone on North Atlantic Station, "to plot the positions of the ships of Admiral Cer- 
vera'e squadron and those of the United States fleet in the battle of July 3, 1898, off Santiago de 
Cuba," a chart showing positions to accompany.] 

U. S. Flagship New York, 1st Rate, 
Wavy- Yard, New York, N. Y., September 2, 1898, 
Sirs: You are hereby appointed a board, to plot the positions of the 
ships of Admiral Cervera's squadron and tho.e of the United States 
fleel in the battle of July 3, 1898, off Santiago de Cuba. 

You are empowered to call for such data from any ship concerned as 
may l>c necessary, forwarding a copy of this letter as authority. 

It will be your duty to reconcile, as far as possible, all discrepancies 
in the data so obtained. 

The board, in submitting the chart with the plotted positions, will 
report fully their reasons for locating the positions as they have. 
Very respectfully, 

W. T. Sampson, 
Rear -Admiral, U. S. N, 
Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Squadron. 

Lieut. S. P. Comley, U. S. 1ST. 
Lieut. Lewis C. Ueilner, U. S. N. 
Lieut. Wm. H. Schuetze, U. S. N. 
Lieut. Albon C. Hodgson, U. S. N. 
Lieut. W. II. Allen, U. S. N. 
Lieut. B. E. Capehart, U. S. N. 
Lieut. Harry P. Huse, U. S. N. 



[Page 593.] 

U. S. Flagship New York, 1st Eate, 
Navy-Yard, New York, N. Y, October 8, 1S98. 

Sir: In obedience to your order of September 2, 1898, appointing us 
a board to plot the positions of the ships of Admiral Cervera's squad 
ron and those of the United States fleet in the battle of July 3, 1898 
off Santiago de Cuba, we have the honor to submit the following report 
accompanied by a chart showing the positions of the ships at sevei 
different times. 

These times, as taken by the United States ships engaged, with th< 
incidents noted, are as follows: 

No. 1, 9.35 a. m. Maria Teresa came out of the harbor. 

No. 2, 9.59 a. m. Pluton came out. 

No. 3, 10.15 a. m. Maria Teresa turned to run ashore. 

No. 4, 19.20 a. in. Oquendo turned to run ashore. 

No. 5, 10.30 a. m. Furor blew up and Pluton turned to run ashore. 

No. G, 11.05 a. m. Yiscaya turned to run ashore. 

No. 7, 1.15 \). m. Colon surrendered. 

The chait selected by the board for plotting is Ilydrogrnphic Otitic 
Chart No. 710, 1S85, West Indies, eastern part of Bahama Islands, wit) 
part of Cuba and north coast of San Domingo. This selection wa 




^ at * S 



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ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 85 

made after a careful comparison with all other charts at hand, as the 
positions of the principal headlands and inlets and the distances 
between them on it agree more nearly with the observation of mem- 
bers of the board than those given by any other. 

The positions of the United States ships were established by known 
bearings and distances from the Morro at No. 1, with the exception of 
the New York, whose position is plotted by the revolutions of her en- 
gines during a run of forty-five minutes east from her position, SE. i S. 
of the Morro, 6,000 yards. 

Position at 2 is plotted by all ships according to their relative bear- 
ings from each other, the operations of their engines from 0.35 to 0.50, 
the evidence of the officers on board them, and the ranges used in 
firing at the Spanish ships. 

Position No. 3 is plotted from observations of the officers of the 
United States ships with regard to their nearness to each other and 
relative bearings of themselves from the Teresa, with ranges in use at 
the time, the performance of the engines, and general heading of the 
ships. 

Position No. 4 same as No. 3, substituting Oquendo for Teresa. 

Positions No. 5, 6, and 7 are plotted on the same general plan. 

Before plotting these positions the board took each ship separately 
and discussed her data for the position under consideration, this data 
being obtained from the report of the commanding officers, notes taken 
during the action, and the evidence of the members of the board. 

In reconciling differences of opinion in regard to distances, bearings, 
ranges, etc., full liberty was given to the representative of the ship 
under discussion to bring in any argument or data he considered neces- 
sary, and the board submits this report with a feeling that, under the 
circumstances, it is as nearly correct as is possible so long after the 
engagement. 

Very respectfully, 

KlCHARD WAINWRIGHT, 

Lieutenant-Commander, U. 8. N., Senior Member. 

S. P. COMLEY, 

Lieutenant, U. 8. N. 
L. C. Hellner, 

Lieutenant, U. 8. N. 
W. H. Schuetze, 

Lieutenant, TJ. 8. N. 
A. C. Hodgson, 

Lieutenant, TJ. S. N. 
W. H. Allen, 

Lieutenant, TJ. 8. N. 
Edward E. Oapehart, 



The Commander in Chief. 



Lieutenant, TJ. 8. N. 



Note.— Lient. H. P. Hnse, U. S. N., whose name appears in the order of the com- 
mander in chief as a member of the board, attended but one meeting, that of Sep- 
tember 8, the first one, and therefore, as he has not been present at any of the 
meetings where different ships have been under discussion and important questions 
have been decided, his name does not appear in the signed report of the board. 

Edward E. Capehart, 

Lieutenant, U. S. N. Recorder. 



No. 33. 

REPORTS OF BATTLE OF JULY 3, 1898. 

1— Page 545. D— Page 580. G— Page 552. K— Pages 511-517, indu- 

B Page 524. E— Page 517. II— Page 547. sive. 

t'— Page 517. F— Page 520. L— Page 511. 



131408. 

[Report ol battle with Spanish fleet.] 

No. 212.] U. S. Flagship New York, 1st Eate, 

Off Santiago de Cuba, Cuba, July 15, 1898. 

Sir : I have the honor to make the following report upon the battle 
with and the destruction of the Spanish squadron commanded by 
Admiral Cervera, off Santiago de Cuba, on Sunday, July 3, 1898: 

The enemy's vessels came out of the harbor between 9.35 and 10 
a. in., the head of the column appearing around Cay Smith at 9.31 
and emerging from the channel five or six minutes later. 

The positions of the vessels of my command off Santiago at that 
moment were as follows: The flagship New York was 4 miles east of 
her blockading station and about 7 miles from the harbor entrance. 
She had started for Siboney, where I intended to land, accompanied 
by several of my staff, and go to the front to consult with General 
Shatter. A discussion of the situation and a more definite understand 
iug between us of the operations proposed had been rendered neces- 
sary by the unexpectedly strong resistance of the Spanish garrison of 
Santiago. 1 had sent my chief of staff on shore the day before to 
arrange an interview with General Shafter, who had been suffering 
from heat prostration. I made arrangements to go to his headquarters, 
and my flagship was in the position mentioned above when the Span- 
ish squadron appeared in the channel. The remaining vessels were in 
or near their usual blockading positions, distributed in a semicircle 
about the harbor entrance, counting from the eastward to the west- 
ward, in the following order: The Indiana about a mile and a half 
from shore, the Oregon — the New York's place being between these two — 
the Iowa, Texas, and Brooklyn, the latter _J miles from the shore west 
of Santiago. The distance of the vessels from the harbor entrance 
was from 2i to 4 miles, the latter being the limit of day blockading 
distance. The length of the arc formed by the ships was about 8 
miles. The Massachusetts had left at 4 a. m. for Guantanamo for coal. 
Her station was between the Iowa and Texas. The auxiliaries Glouces- 
ter and \1xch lay close to the land and nearer the harbor entrance 
than the large vessels, the Gloucester to the eastward and the Vixen 
to the westward. The torpedo boat Ericsson was in company with the 
flagship and remained with her during the chase until ordered to dis- 
continue, when she rendered very efficient service in rescuing prison- 
ers from the burning Vizcaya. I inclose a diagram showing approxi- 
mately the positions of the vessels as described above. 

The Spanish vessels came rapidly out of the harbor, at a speed 
estimated at from 8 to 10 knots, and in the following order: Infanta 
Maria Tcn.sa (flagship), Vizcaya, Cristobal Colon, and the Almirante 
Oquendo. The distance between these ships was about 800 yards, which 
means that from the time the first one became visible in the upper reach 
86 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 87 

of the channel until the last one was out of the harbor an interval of 
only about twelve minutes elapsed. Following the Oquendo, at a dis- 
tance of about 1,200 yards, came the torpedo-boat destroyer Pluton, 
and after her the Furor. The armored cruisers, as rapidly as they 
could bring their guns to bear, opened a vigorous fire upon tbe block- 
ading vessels, and emerged from the channel shrouded in the smoke 
irom their guns. 

Tbe men of our ships in front of the port were at Sunday "quarters 
for inspection." Tbe signal was made simultaneously from several ves- 
sels, " Enemy ships escaping," and general quarters was sounded. The 
men cheered as they sprang to their guns, and fire was opened probably 
within eight minutes by the vessels whose guns commanded theentrauce. 
The New York turned about and steamed for the escaping fleet, flying 
the signal, "Close in toward harbor entrance and attack vessels," and 
gradually increasing speed, until toward the end of the chase she was 
making lGi knots, and was rapidly closing on the Cristobal Colon. She 
was not, at any time, within the range of the heavy Spanish ships, and 
her only part in the firing was to receive the undivided fire from the 
forts in passing the harbor entrance, and to fire a few shots at one of 
the destroyers, thought for the moment to be attempting to escape from 
the Gloucester. 

The Spanish vessels, upon clearing the harbor, turned to the west- 
ward in column, increasing their speed to the full power of their engines. 
The heavy blockading vessels, which had closed in toward the Morro 
at the instant of the enemy's appearance, and at their best speed, 
delivered a rapid fire, well sustained and destructive, which speedily 
overwhelmed and silenced the Spanish fire. The initial speed of the 
Spaniards carried them rapidly past the blockading vessels, and the 
battle developed into a chase in which the Brooklyn and Texas had, at 
the start, the advantage of position. The Brooklyn maintained this 
lead. The Oregon, steaming with amazing speed from the commence- 
ment of the action, took first place. The Iotca and the Indiana having 
done good work, and not having the speed of the other ships, were 
directed by me, in succession, at about the time the Vizcaya was 
beached, to drop out of the chase and resume blockading stations. 
These vessels rescued many prisoners. The Vixen, finding that the 
rush of the Spanish ships would put her between two fires, ran outside 
of our own column and remained there during the battle and chase. 

The skillful handling and gallant fighting of the Gloucester excited 
the admiration of everyone who witnessed it, and merits the commen- 
dation of the Navy Department. She is a fast and entirely unprotected 
auxiliary vessel— the yacht Corsair— and has a good battery of light 
rapid-fire guns. She was lying about 2 miles from the harbor entrance, 
to the southward and eastward, and immediately steamed in, opening 
fire upon the large ships. Anticipating the appearance of the Pluton 
and Furor, the Gloucester was slowed, thereby gaining more rapidly a 
high pressure of steam, and when the destroyers came out she steamed 
for them at full speed, and was able to close to short range, while her 
fire was accurate, deadly, and of great volume. During this fight the 
Gloucester was under the fire of the Socapa Battery. Within twenty 
minutes from the time they emerged from Santiago Harbor the careers 
of the Furor and the Pluton were ended, and two-thirds of their people 
killed. The Furor was beached and sunk in the surf; the Pluton sank 
in deep water a few minutes later. The destroyers probably suffered 
much injury from the fire of the secondary batteries of the battle ships 
Iowa, Indiana, and the Texas, yet I think a very considerable factor in 
their speedy destruction was the fire, at close range, of the Gloucester s 



88 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

battery. After rescuing the survivors of the destroyers, the Gloucester 
did excellent service in lauding and securing the crew of the Infanta 
Maria Teresa. 

The method of escape attempted by the Spaniards, all steering in the 
same direction, and iu formation, removed all tactical doubts or diffi- 
cult ies, and made plain the duty of every United States vessel to close 
in. immediately engage, and pursue. This was promptly and effectively 
done. As already stated, the first rush of the Spanish squadron car- 
ried it past a number of the blockading ships which could not imme- 
diately work up to their best speed; but they suffered heavily in pass- 
ing, and the Infanta Maria Teresa and the Oquendo were probably set 
on lire by shells fired during the first fifteen minutes of the engagement. 
It was afterwards learned that the Infanta Maria Teresa's fire main had 
been cut by one of our first shots, and that she was unable to extinguish 
fire. With large volumes of smoke rising from their lower decks aft, 
these vessels gave up both fight and flight, and ran in on the beach — 
the Infanta Maria Teresa at about 10.15 a. m. at aSTima Nima, 0i miles 
from Santiago TT arbor entrance, and the Almirante Oquendo at about 
L0.30 a. in. at Juan Gonzales, 7 miles from the port. 

The Vizcaya was still under the fire of the leading vessels; the Cris- 
tobal Colon had drawn ahead, leading the chase, and soon passed 
beyond the range of the guns of the leading American ships. The Viz- 
caya was soon set on fire, and, at 11.15, she turned inshore and was 
beached at Aserraderos, 15 miles from Santiago, burning fiercely, and 
with her reserves of ammunition on deck already beginning to explode. 
When about 10 miles west of Santiago the Indiana had been signaled 
to go back to the harbor entrance, and at Aserraderos the Iowa was 
signaled to "Resume blockading station." The Iowa, assisted by the 
Ericsson and the Hist, took off the crew of the Vizcaya, while the Har- 
vard and the Gloucester rescued those of the Infanta Maria Teresa and 
the Almirante Oquendo. Thisrescueof prisoners, includingthe wounded, 
from the burning Spanish vessels was the occasion of some of the most 
daring and gallant conduct of the day. The ships were burning fore 
and aft, their guns and reserve ammunition were exploding, and it was 
not known at what moment the fire would reach the main magazines. 
In addition to tliie a heavy surf was running just inside of the Spanish 
ships. But no risk deterred our officers and men until their work of 
humanity was complete. 

There remained now of the Spanish ships only the Cristobal Colon — 
but she was their best and fastest vessel. Forced by the situation to 
hug the Cuban coast, her only chance of escape was by superior and 
sustained speed. When theVizcaya went ashore, the Colon was about 
miles ahead of the Brooklyn and the Oregon; but her spurt was fin- 
ished, and the American ships were now gaining upon her. Behind 
the Brooklyn and the Oregon came the Texas, Vixen, and New York. 
It was evident from the bridge of the Neio York that all the American 
ships were gradually overhauling the chase, and that she had no chance 
of escape. At 12.50 the Brooklyn and the Oregon opened fire and got 
her range — the Oregon's heavy shell striking beyond her — and at 1.20 
she gave up without firing another shot, hauled down her colors, and 
ran ashore at Bio Torquino, 18 miles from Santiago. Captain Cook, of 
the Brooklyn, Avent on board to receive the surrender. While his boat 
was alongside 1 came up in the New York, received his report, and 
placed the Oregon in charge of the wreck to save her, if possible, and 
directed tin; prisoners to be transferred to the Resolute, which had fol- 
lowed t he chase. Commodore Schley, whose chief of staff had gone on 
board to receive the surrender, had directed that all their personal 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 89 

effects should be retained by the officers. This order I did not modify. 
The Cristobal Colon was not injured by our firing and probably is not 
much injured by beaching, though she ran ashore at high speed. The 
beach was so steep that she came off by the working of the sea. But 
her sea valves were opened and broken, treacherously, I am sure, after 
her surrender, and despite all efforts she sank. When it became evi- 
dent that she could not be kept afloat, she was pushed by the New 
York bodily up on the beach, the JVew YorWs stem being placed against 
her for this purpose — the ship being handled by Captain Chad wick with 
admirable judgment — and sank in shoal water and may be saved. 11 ad 
this not been done she would have gone down in deep water and would 
have been, to a certainty, a total loss. 

I regard this complete and important victory over the Spanish forces 
as the successful finish of several weeks of arduous and close blockade, 
so stringent and effective during the night that the enemy was deterred 
from making the attempt to escape at night, and deliberately elected to 
make the attempt in daylight. That this was the case I was informed 
by the commanding officer of the Cristobal Colon. 

It seems proper to briefly describe here the manner in which this was 
accomplished. The harbor of Santiago is naturally easy to blockade, 
there being but one entrance, and that a narrow one, and the deep 
water extending close up to the shore line presenting no difficulties of 
navigation outside of the entrance. At the time of my arrival before 
the port — June 1 — the moon was at its full, and there was sufficient 
light during the night to enable any movement outside of the entrance 
to be detected; but with the waning of the moon and the coming of 
dark nights there was opportunity for the enemy to escape, or for his 
torpedo boats to make an attack upon the blockading vessels. It was 
ascertained with fair conclusiveness that the Merrimac, so gallantly 
taken into the channel on June 3, did not obstruct it. I therefore main- 
tained the blockade as follows : To the battle ships was assigned the 
duty, in turn, of lighting the channel. Moving up to the port, at a dis- 
tance of from 1 to 2 miles from the Morro — dependent upon the condi- 
tion of the atmosphere — they threw a search-light beam directly up the 
channel, and held it steadily there. This lighted up the entire breadth 
of the channel for half a mile inside of the entrance so brilliantly that 
the movement of small boats could be detected. Why the batteries 
never opened fire upon the search-light ship was always a matter of 
surprise to me; but they never did. Stationed close to the entrance of 
the port were three picket launches and, at a little distance farther out, 
three small picket vessels — usually covered yachts — and, when they 
were available, one or two of our torpedo boats. With this arrange- 
ment there was at least a certainty that nothing could get out of the 
harbor undetected. After the arrival of the army, when the situation 
forced upon the Spanish admiral a decision, our vigilance increased. 
The night blockading distance was reduced to 2 miles for all vessels, 
and a battle ship was placed alongside the search-light ship, with her 
broadside trained upon the channel in readiness to fire the instant a 
Spanish ship should appear. The commanding officers merit the great- 
est praise for the perfect manner in which they entered into this plan 
and' put it into excution. The Massachusetts, wh[ich], according to 
routine, was sent that morning to coal at Guantanamo, like the others, 
had spent weary nights upon this work, and deserved a better fate than 
to be absent that morning. 

I inclose, for the information of the Department, copies of orders and 
memorandums issued from time to time, relating to the manner of main- 
taining the blockade. 



90 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

When all the work was done so well it is difficult to discriminate in 
praise. The object of the blockade of Cervera's squadron was fully 
accomplished, and each individual bore well his part in it — the commo- 
dore in command on tlie second division, the captains of ships, their 
officers, and men. The fire of the battle ships was powerful and de- 
structive, and the resistance of the Spanish squadron was, in great part, 
broken almost before they had got beyond the range of their own forts. 
The fine speed of the Oregon enabled her to take a front position in the 
chase, and the Cristobal Colon did not give up until the Oregon had 
thrown a 13-inch shell beyond her. This performance adds to the 
already brilliant record of this fine battle ship, and speaks highly of the 
skill and care with which her admirable efficiency has been maintained 
during a service unprecedented in the history of vessels of her class. 
The Brooklyn's westerly blockading position gave her an advantage in 
the chase which she maintained to the end, and she employed her fine 
battery with telling effect. The Texas and the New York were gaining 
on the chase during the last hour, and had any accident befallen the 
Brooklyn or the Oregon, would have speedily overhauled the Cristobal 
Colon. From the moment the Spanish vessel exhausted her first burst 
of speed the result was never in doubt. She fell, in fact, far below 
what might reasonably have been expected of her. Careful measure- 
ments of time and distance give her an average speed, from the time 
she cleared the harbor mouth until the time she was run on shore at 
Rio Tarquino, of 13.7 knots. Neither the New York nor the Brooklyn 
stopped to couple up their forward engines, but ran out the chase with 
one pair, getting steam, of course, as rapidly as possible on all boilers. 
To stop to couple up the forward engines would have meant a delay of 
fifteen minutes, or 4 miles in the chase. 

Several of the ships were struck — the Brooklyn more often than the 
others— but very slight material injury was done, the greatest being 
aboard the Iowa. Oar loss was 1 man killed and 1 wounded, both on 
the Brooklyn. It is difficult to explain this immunity from loss of life 
or injury to ships in a combat with modern vessels of the best type, 
but Spanish gunnery is poor at the best, and the superior weight and 
accuracy of our fire speedily drove the men from their guns and silenced 
their fire. This is borne out by the statements of prisoners and by 
observation. The Spanish vessels, as they dashed out of the harbor, 
were covered with the smoke from their own guns, but this speedily 
diminished in volume and soon almost disappeared. The fire from the 
rapid-fire batteries of the battle ships appears to have been remarkably 
destructive. An examination of the stranded vessels shows that the 
Almirante Oquendo especially had suffered terribly from this fire. Iler 
sides are everywhere pierced and her decks were strewn with the 
charred remains of those who had fallen. 

The reports of Commodore W. S. Schley and of the commanding 
officers are inclosed. 

A board, appointed by me several days ago, has made a critical 
examination of the stranded vessels, both with a view of reporting 
upon the result of our fire and the military features involved and of 
reporting upon the chance of saving any of them and of wrecking the 
remainder. The report of the board will be speedily forwarded. 
Very respectfully, 

W. T. Sampson, 
Rear- Admiral, United States Navy, 
Commander in Chief JJ. 8. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station. 
The Secretary of the Navy, 

Nary Department, Washington, I). C. 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 91 

K — and to page 517. 

ORDER OF BATTLE. 

U. S. Flagship New York, 1st Eate. 

Off Santiago de Cuba, Cuba, June 2, 1S9S. 

The fleet off Santiago de Cuba will be organized during the operations against 
that port and the Spanish squadron, ns follows: 

First Squadron (under the personal command of the commander in chief) — New 
York, Iowa, Oregon, Neiv Orleans, Mayflower, Porter. 

Second Squadron (Commodore Schley)— Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Texas, Marblehead, 
Vixen. 

Vessels joining subsequently will be assigned by the commander in chief. The 
vessels will blockade Santiago de Cuba closely, keeping about 6 miles from the 
Morro in the daytime and closiug in at night, the lighter vessels well inshore. The 
first squadron will blockade on the east side of the port, and the second squadron 
on the west side. If the enemy tries to escape the ships must close and engage 
as soon as possible, and endeavor to sink his vessels or force them to run L 
ashore in the channel. It is not considered that the shore batteries are of 
sufficient power to do any material injury to battle ships. 

In smooth weather the vessels will coal on station. If withdrawn to coal else- 
where or for other duty, the blockading vessels on either side will cover the angle 
thus left vacant. 

order of battle. 

U. S. Flagship New York, 1st Rate, 
Off Santiago de Cuba, Cuba, June 4, 1898. 
The Texas, Massachusetts, Iowa, and the Oregon will take positions 4,000 yards from 
Estrella Point and opposite the entrance to the port of Santiago in the order named, 
from west to east, in such position as to be able to observe the wreck of the Merri- 
mac, and will tire upon any parties which may bo seen working about it. If fire be 
opened by the batteries it will be returned and an endeavor made to destroy them. 

The senior officer of the above-named ships will have charge of carrying out these 
instructions. 

In case of opening lire upon the batteries, the Brooklyn, Marblehead, and the Vixen 
will take an enfilading position 4,000 yards to the westward of the entrance and 
well inshore, and the New York, New Orleans, and the Yankee a similar position to 
the eastward, and will engage the batteries at the same time with the battle ships. 
Firing directly upon Morro Castle will be avoided, as our men from the Mtrrimac 
are confined there. 

The battle ships will take the above positions when signaled to do so by the com- 
mander in chief, and will occupy them until signaled to withdraw, when blockading 
stations will be resumed. 

The following signals will be provisionally employed: 
18: "Battle ships take positions assigned above." 
19: "Battle ships withdraw and resume blockading station." 
Very respectfully, 

W. T. Sampson, 
Rear- Admiral, United States Navy,- 
Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station. 
The Commanding Officer. 

[Memorandum No. 11.] 

U. S. Flagship New York, 1st Rate, 

Off Santiago de Cuba, June 5, 1898. 
Sir : A steam launch will be supplied for picket duty this evening by each of the 
following ships: Massachusetts, Oregon, New York. 

Each launch will be supplied with its 1-pounder gun, a crew of 4 marines and the 
boat's crew, and an officer in charge. 

The launches will report alongside the flagship at 7.30 p. m. 

Very's signals will he supplied, and one white lantern arranged so that it can be 
quickly covered and uncovered. 

The night signal of the launch will be a white light shown three times in succes- 
sion by uncovering and covering this light. 
On sighting the enemy, they will fire the usual Very's signals prescribed. 

W. T. Sampson, 
Bear-Admiral, United States Navy, 
Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station. 
The Commanding Officer, 

U. S. S. . 



92 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

[Memorandum No. 13.] 

U. S. Flagship New York, 1st Rate, 

Off Santiago de Cuba, Cuba, June 7, 1S98. 
After careful consideration of the various schemes of maintaining an effective 
blockade of Santiago <lc Cuba at night which have been advanced, 1 have decided 
upon the following, which will be maintained until further orders: 

The weather permitting, three picket launches, detailed from the ships of the 
Bqnadron each evening, will occupy positions 1 mile from the Morro, one to the east- 
ward, one to the westward, and one south of the harbor entrance. On a circle drawn 
with a radius of2 miles from tho .Mono will be stationed three vessels — the Vixen to 
the westward, from one-half mile to 1 mile from the shore, the Suwanee south of 
Mono, and the Dolphin to tho eastward, between one-half mile and 1 mile from the 
shore. The remaining vessels will retain (ho positions already occupied; but they 
will take especial care to keep within a 4-mile circle. 

All vessels may turn their engines whenever desirable, to keep them in readiness 
for immediate use, and while so doing may turn in a small circle, but without losing 
propel bearing or distance. 

The signal for an enemy will be two red Very Lights tired n rapid succession. If 

the enemy is a torpedo boat, these two red lights will be followed by a green light. 

I again call attention to the absolute ueeessity of a close blockade of this port — 

especially at night and in bad weather. In the daytime, if clear, the distance shall 

not be greater than (> miles; at night, or in thick weather, not more than 4 miles. 

Tho end to be attained justifies the risk of torpedo attack, and that risk must be 

taken. The escape of the Spanish vessels at this juncture would be a serious blow 

to our prestige and to a speedy end of the war. 

Attention is called to the provisional signals established by General Order, No. 9. 

Very respectfully, 

W. T. Sampson, 
Rear-Admiral, United States Navy, 
Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station. 



[Memorandum No. 14.] 

U. S. Flagship New York, 1st Rate, 
Off Santiago de Cuba, Cuba, June S, 1898. 

During the dark hours of the night search lights will be used as follows: 

The Iowa, Oregon, and the Massachusetts will take turns of two hours each — i. e., 
from dark to <S p. in., from8 p. m. to lOp m., etc.— in keeping one search light directly 
on the harbor entrance, maintaining carefully during that time their blockading 
positions. Should a vessel's lights fail, the next in order will at once take up the 
duty. 

The picket launch and vedette stationed south of the Morro will move to one 
side or the other sufficiently to get clear of the beam of light. 

The vessels on each flank — the Brooklyn and the Texas on the western side, the 
New York and New Orleans on the eastern side — will take two-hour turns in using one 
search light from time to time on the coast line, swinging it toward the Morro, but 
avoiding the illumination of the Hanking vedettes on the inside line. The light 
should never bo turned off more than five minutes at a time. From time to time 
the horizon outside will be swept. 

Attention is called to bad and careless handling of search lights. Last night some 
of the lights were kept high in tho air, anil were again swept rapidly from side to 
side. Under such circumstances a search light is worse than useless. 

The beams must be directed to the horizon, and must be moved very steadily and 
slowly. Not less than three minutes should be employed in sweeping through an 
arc of 90 degrees. 

The best way to discover a torpedo boat is by its smoke, and even this will not be 
seen unless the light is very well handled. 

Very respectfully, W. T. SAMPSON, 

"Rear-Admiral, United states Navy, 
Commander in Chief U. S, Naval lom. North Atlantic Station. 



[Memorandum No. lli.] 

U. S. Flagship New York, 1st Rate, 

Off Santiago d< Cuba, June 11,1S9S. 

Until further orders tho battle ships Iowa, Oregon, and tho Massachusetts will 

employ their search lights in the manner so successfully employed during the last 

two nights, tare will be taken, however, to go in cl086 enough to make the light 

wholly effective for tho purpose desired. The picket boats report that the lights at 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 93 

times are too weak because of the distance of tlio ships. The lights will be employed 
from 7.30 till daylight, as follows : 

The sequence of ships will bo the Iowa, Oregon, Massachusetts. To-night, June 11, 
the Massachusetts will begin at 7.30 and continue until 9.30, the Iowa from 9.30 to 
11.30 the Oregon from 11.30 to 1.30, the Massachusetts from 1.30 to 3.30, and the Iowa 
from 3.30 to daylight. 

On June 12 the Iowa will begin at 7.30; on June 13 the Oregon; on June 14 the 
Massachusetts again, and so on. 

The vessels using the lights shall keep the entrance of this harbor bearing north 
by east. The instructions of my memorandum No. 15, of June 10, 1898, will bo 
followed. 

Regard must be had for the state of the atmosphere. If it is hazy, an effective 
illumination of the harbor entrance will require a closer approach. 
Very respectfully, 

W. T. Sampson, 
Bear-Admiral, United States Navy, 
Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station. 
The Commanding Officer, 

U. S. S. . 



[Memorandum No. 17.] 

U, S. Flagship New York, 1st Rate, 
Off Santiago de Cuba, Cuba, June 11, 1892. 
Sir : When on the blockade, vessels will, unless for some special temporary reason 
for the contrary, habitually head toward the land, instead of away from it. 
Very respectfully, 

W. T. Sampson, 
Rear- Admiral, United States Navy, 
Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station. 
The Commanding Officer, 

U. S, S. . 



[Memorandum No. 18.] 

U. S. Flagship New York, 1st Rate, 
Off Santiago de Cuba, Cuba, June 12, 1S9S. 
Sir: While blockading the Spanish fleet in Santiago de Cuba vessels will here- 
after maintain a blockading distance of 4 miles during the daytime. 

This distance will not be exceeded except by permission or under special circum- 
stances. 

Very respectfully, W. T. Sampson, 

Bear-Admiral, United States Navy, 
Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Statiom. 
The Commanding Officer, 

U. S. S. . 



[Memorandum No. 20.] 

U. S. Flagship New York, 1st Rate, 
Off Santiago de Cuba, Cuba, June 15, 189S. 
Sir: The commander in chief desires again to call the attention of commanding 
officers to the positions occupied by the blockading tleet, especially during the day- 
time, and it is now directed that all ships keep within a distance of the entrance to 
Santiago of 4 miles, and this distance must not be exceeded. 

If the vessel is coaling or is otherwise restricted in her movements, she must 
nevertheless keep within this distance. 

If at any time the flagship make signal which is not visible to any vessel, such 
vessel must at once approach the ilagship or repeating vessel to a point where she 
can read the signal. 

Disregard of the directions which have already been given on this head has led 
to endless confusion. Many times during the day the fleet is so scattered that it 
would be perfectly possible for the enemy to come out of the harbor and meet with 
very little opposition. 
The commander in chief hopes that strict attention will be given this order 
Very respectfully, 

W. T. Sampson, 
Bear- Admiral , United Mates Navy, 
Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Staiton. 
The Commanding Officer, 

U. S. S. . 



04 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

ORDER OF BATTLE. 

U. S. PYagsiiip New York, 
Santiago de Cuba, Cuba, June 15, 1898. 

An examination indicates thai the Spaniards have been adding to the defenses to 
the east and weal of the entrance. Apparently there are mounted on the left of the 
western battery two ship's guns and on the right hand of the same battery two or 
three old »uns. <>n the eastern battery, to the right of the light-house, are mounted 
throe old guns and possibly several smaller rapid-fire guns. 

The squadron will be prepared to-morrow morning at early daylight to shell both 
of these batteries. 

There will ho no special formation for this purpose, but vessels will, at early 
daw n, carefully adjust their positions and blockading distances of 3 miles and go 
quietly to general quarters, the nun having been called early enough to have had 
their early coffee. The New York and the .New Orleans will exchange blockading 
positions. 

When Bignal 18 is made vessels will move toward the harbor entrance at a speed 
of 5 knots. Arrived at a distance of 3,000 yards, each ship will stop and turn to 
present her broadside, the New York, New Orleans, Oregon, and Iowa turning with 
port helm, and the Brooklyn, Texas, and the Massachusetts with starboard helm! This 
Stopping and turning will be done without signal, but all vessels should endeavor 
to arrive on the tiring line at the same moment. After turning, distance should be 
closedto LOO yards, using the engines again if needed. The vessels will retain the 
positions thus taken as nearly as possible, moving in closer, if necessary, in order 
to see their targets and render their lire effective. 

On signal from the commander in chief all vessels will open fire, or fire will he 
opened in case the enemy begins. 

Bearings will be taken carefully and distances obtained with all practicable 
accuracy. 

The Vixen will take position inshore on the western side and the Scorpion on the 
eastern side, and look out for the musketry fire from shore. They will be slightly 
outside the flank ship and where they can enfilade any infantry fire directed upon 
the ships. 

The lire will be deliberate, and, after the batteries are silenced, will be carefully 
directed to their destruction. Ammunition will not he thrown away. Careful 
instructions will he given to gun captains not to fire unless they can see their mark, 
which in this case will be the enemy's guns. 

The Vesuvius aud the Porter will remain on the east side, out of range of the 
batteries. 

At signal 19 the vessels will resume their day blockading stations. 
Aery respectfully, 

AY. T. Sampson, 
Bear- Admiral, United States Navy, 
Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station. 

The Commanding Officer, 

U. S. S. . 



order of battle. 

North Atlantic Station, 
U. S. Flagship New' York, 1st Rate, 
Off Santiago de Cuba, Cuba, June 21, 1S9S. 

The army corps will land to-morrow morning, the entire force landing at Daiquiri. 
The landing will begin at daylight, or as soon thereafter as practicable. General 
Castillo, with 1,000 men coming from the eastward of Daiquiri, will assist in clearing 
the way for an unopposed landing, by Hanking out the Spanish forces at that point. 

Simultaneously with the shelling of the beach and hlockhouses at Daiquiri, the 
Ensenada de los Altares and Aguadores, both to the eastward of Santiago, and the 
small bay of Cabanas, about 2i miles to the westward of Santiago, will be shelled by 
the ships stationed there for that purpose. 

A feint in force of landing at Cabanas will be made, about ten of the transports, 
the last to disembark their forces at Daiquiri, remaining during the day or greater 
part of the day, about 2 miles to the southward of Cabanas, lowering boats, and 
making apparent preparations for disembarking a large body of troops; at the same 
time General Rabi, with 500 Cuban troops, will make a demonstration on the west 
side of ( alianas. 

The following vessels arc assigned to bombard the four points mentioned above: 

At Cabanas, the Scorpion, Vixen, and Texas. 

At Aguadores, the Eagle and Gloucester. 

At Ensenada de 1 b Altares, the Hornet, Helena, and Bancroft. 

At Daiquiri, the Detroit, Castine, Wasp, and New Orleans — the Detroit and Castineou 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 



95 



the western flank, the Was}) and New Orleans on the eastern flank. All the vessels 
named will he in their position at daylight. 

Great care will he taken to avoid the wasteful expenditure of ammunition. The 
firing at Daiquiri will begin on signal from the New Orleans. 

At Cabanas it is probable that, after a few minutes, unless the firing is returned, 
occasional dropping shots from the smaller vessels will be sufficient, but the sem- 
blance of covering a landing should be maintained, the ships keeping close in. 

At Aguadores and Ensenada de los Altares the same rule should prevail. At Dai- 
quiri, the point of actual landing, vessels will of course use their artillery until they 
have reason to believe that the landing is clear. They will take care to make the firing 
deliberate and effective. As General Castillo's column, approaching from the east- 
ward, is likely to come within range of the guns, sharp-eyed quartermasters with 
good glasses will be stationed to look out for the Cuban flag, and. care will be taken 
not to direct the fire toward any point where that flag is shown. 

The Texas and Brooklyn will exchange blockading stations, the Texas going inside 
to be near Cabanas. The Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Iowa, and Oregon will retain their 
blockading positions, and will keep a vigilant watch on the harbor mouth. The 
Indiana will take the Neiv Orleans' position in the blockading line east of Santiago, 
and between the flagship New York and the shore. This is only a temporary assign- 
ment for the Indiana, to strengthen the blockading line during the landing and 
avoid any possibility of the enemy's breaking through should he attempt to get out 
of the port. 

The Swwanee, Osceola, and TVompatuck will be prepared to tow boats. Each will 
be provided with two 5 or 6 inch lines, one on each quarter, each long enough to 
take in tow a dozen or more boats. 

These vessels will report at the Neiv York at 3 a. m. on June 22, prepared to take 
in tow the ships' boats which are to assist in the landing of troops and convey them 
to Daiquiri. 

The Texas, Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Iowa, Oreyon, New York, and Indiana will send 
all their steam cutters and all their pulling boats, with the exception of one retained 
on board each ship, to assist in the landing. These boats will report at the View 
York at 3 a. m. 

Each whaleboat and cutter will have three men; each launch, five men, and each 
steam cutter its full crew and an officer for their own management. In addition to 
these men, each boat will carry five men, including one capable of acting as cock- 
swain to manage and direct the transports' boats. Each steam launch will be in 
charge of an officer, who will report to Captain Goodrich. Care will he taken in the 
selection ot boat keepers and cockswains, to take no men who are gun pointers or 
who occupy positions of special importance at the battery. 

Unnecessary oars and impediments should be removed from the pulling boats, for 
the greater convenience of the transportation of troops, but each boat should retain 
its anchor and chain. 

Capt. C. F. Goodrich, commanding the St. Louis, will have, on the part of the 
Navy, general charge of the landing. 

The New Orleans will send her boats to report to Captain Goodrich upon her arrival 
at Daiquiri. 

The attention of commanding officers of all vessels engaged in blockading Santi- 
ago do Cuba is earnestly called to the necessity of the utmost vigilance from this 
time forward, both as to maintaining stations and readiness for action, and as to 
keeping a close watch upon the harbor mouth. If the Spanish admiral ever intends 
to attempt to escape that attempt will be made soon. 

William T. Sampson, 
Bear- Admiral, Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Force, 

North Atlantic Station. 



r,A<30. 




Naut/cal Mites 

Chart showing positions of United States ships at the time the Spanish ships started from Santiago 
Harbor, July 3, 1898. Also positions of Spanish ships on the beach after the action. 

No. 217.] U. S. Flagship New York, 1st Kate, 

Off Santiago de Cuba, Cuba, July 17, 1898. 
Sir : I forward herewith copy of Squadron General Order No. 9, of 



96 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

Jane 7, 1898, to accompany my report No. 212 of the engagement with 
Cervera's fleet on July 3, 1898. 

Very respectfully, W. T. Sampson, 

Rear-Admiral, United States Navy, 
Commander in Chief U. 8. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station. 
The Secretary of the Navy, 

Navy Department, Washington, D. C. 



[Squadron General Order No. 9.1 

North Atlantic Station, U. S. Flagship New York, 1st Rate, 

Off Santiago de Cuba, Cuba, June 7, 1S0S. 

The following signals will be provisionally employed: 

Enemy's ships escaping — number by numeral signal follows. 

1 '. t K'n i \ 's hIi i ]>s escaping to easl ward — number by numeral signal follows. 

Enemy's ships escaping to westward — number by numeral signal follows. 

Enemy's torpedo boats escaping or coming out — number by numeral signal follows. 

Enemy's torpedo boats escaping or coming out to eastward — number by numeral 
signal follows. 

Enemy's Torpedo boats escaping or coming out to westward — number by E 
numeral signal follows. 

General chase — direction given by compass signal. 

Eastern squadron chase — direction given by compass signal. 

Western squadron chas< — direction given by compass signal. 

Vessels indicated will not join in chase, but will close in and guard harbor entrance. 

Close in toward harbor entrance and attack vessels. 

N. I!.— All officers will familiarize themselves with the "chase" signals in the 
general signal book. 

William T. Sampson, 
Rear-Admiral, Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station. 



131408. 

[Report of engagement with Spanish squadron.] 

North Atlantic Fleet, Second Squadron, 

U. S. Flagship Brooklyn, 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, July 6, 1898. 

Sir: I have the honor to make the following report of that part of 
the squadron under your command which came under my observation 
during the engagement with the Spanish lleet on July 3, 1898. 

At 9.35 a. in. Admiral Cervera, with the Infanta Maria Teresa, Vis- 
caya, Oquendo, Cristobal Colon, and two torpedo boat destroyers, cauie 
out of the harbor of Santiago de Cuba in column at distance and 
attempted to escape to the westward. Signal was made from the 
Iowa that the enemy was coming out, but his movement had been C 
discovered from this ship at the same moment. This vessel was 
the farthest west, except the Vixen, in the blockading line. Signal was 
made to the western division, as prescribed in your general orders, and 
there was immediate and rapid movement inward by your squadron 
and a general engagement at ranges beginning at 1,100 yards and vary- 
ing to 3,000 [yards] until the Vizcaya was destroyed, about 10.50 a. m. 
The concentration of the lire of the squadron upon the ships coining 
out was most furious and terrific, and great damage was done them. 

About twenty or twenty five minutes alter the engagement began 
two vessels, thought to be the Teresa and Oquendo, and since verified 
as such, took fire from the effective shell lire of the squadron and were 
forced to run on the beach some Cor 7 miles west of the harbor entrance, 
where they burned and blew up later. The torpedo boat destroyers 
were destroyed early in the action, but the smoke was so dense in their 
direction that 1 can not say to which vessel or vessels the credit 
belongs. This, doubtless, was better seen from your flagship. 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 97 

The Vizcaya and Colon, perceiving the disaster to their consorts, con- 
tinued at full speed to the westward to escape and were followed and 
engaged in a running fight with the Brooklyn, Texas, Iowa, and Oregon 
until 10.50, when the Yizcaya took fire from our shells. She put her 
helm to port and, with a heavy list to port, stood inshore and ran 
aground at Asseraderos, about 21 miles west of Santiago, on fire fore 
and aft, and where she blew up during the night. Observing that she 
had struck her colors, and that several vessels were nearing her to 
capture and save her crew, signal was made to cease firing. The 
Oregon having proved vastly faster than the other battleships, she and 
the Brooklyn, together with the Texas and another vessel which proved 
to be your flagship, continued westward in pursuit of the Colon, which 
had run close inshore, evidently seeking some good spot to beach if 
she should fail to elude her pursuers. 

This pursuit continued with increasing speed in the Brooklyn, Oregon, 
and other ships, and soon the Brooklyn and Oregon were within long- 
range of the Colon, when the Oregon opened fire with her 13-inch guns, 
landing a shell close to the Colon. A moment afterwards the Brooklyn 
opened fire with her 8-inch guns, landing a shell just ahead of her. 
Several other shells were fired at the Colon, now in range of the Brook- 
lyii's and Oregoii's guns. Her commander, seeing all chances of escape 
cut off, and destruction awaiting his ship, fired a lee gun and struck 
her flag at 1.15 p. m., and ran ashore at a point some 50 miles west of 
Santiago Harbor. Your flagship was coming up rapidly at the time, 
as was also the Texas and Vixen. A little later, after your arrival, the 
Christobal Colon, which had struck to the Brooklyn and the Oregon, was 
turned over to you as one of the trophies of this great victory of the 
squadron under your command. 

During my official visit, a little later, Commander Eaton, of the Reso- 
lute, appeared and reported to you the presence of a Spanish battle 
ship near Altares. Your orders to me were to take the Oregon and go 
eastward to meet her, and this was done by the Brooklyn, with the 
result that the vessel reported as an enemy was discovered to be the 
Austrian cruiser Infanta Maria Teresa, seeking the commander in chief. 

1 would mention, for your consideration, that the Brooklyn occupied 
the most westward blockading position, with the Vixen, and, being 
more directly in the route taken by the Spanish squadron, was exposed 
for some minutes, possibly ten, to the gun fire of three of the Spanish 
ships and the west battery, at a range of 1,500 yards from the ships and 
about 3,000 yards from the batteries, but the vessels of the entire 
squadron, closing in rapidly, soon diverted this fire and did magnificent 
work at close range. I have never before witnessed such deadly and 
fatally accurate shooting as was done by the ships of your command as 
they closed in on the Spanish squadron, and I deem it a high privilege 
to commend to you, for such action as you may deem proper, the 
g.illantry and dashing courage, the prompt decision, and the skillful 
handling of their respective vessels of Captain Philip, Captain Evans, 
Captain Clark, and especially of my chief of staff, Captain Cook, who 
was directly under my personal observation and whose coolness, 
promptness, and courage were of the highest order. The dense smoke 
of the combat shut out from my view the Indiana, and the Gloucester, 
but, as these vessels were closer to your flagship, no doubt their part in 
the conflict was under your immediate observation. 

Lieutenant Sharp, commanding the Vixen, acted with conspicuous 
courage; although unable to engage the heavier ships of the enemy 
with his light guns, nevertheless was close in to the battle line under 
heavy fire, and many of the enemy's shot passed beyond his vessel. 
7 



98 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

I beg to invite special attention to the conduct of my flag lieutentant, 
James II. Sears, and Ensign Edward McCauley, jr., aid, who were con- 
stantly at my side during the engagement and who exposed themselves 
fearlessly in discharging their duties; and also to the splendid behavior 
of my secretary, Lieut. B. W. Wells, jr., who commanded and directed 
the fighting of the fourth division with splendid eifect. 

1 would commend the highly meritorious conduct and coinage in the 
engagement of Lieut. Commander N. E. Mason, the executive officer, 
whose presence everywhere over the ship during its continuance did 
much to secure the good result of this ship's part in the victory. 

The navigator, Lieut. A. C. Hodgson, and the division officers, Lieut. 
T. 1). Griffin, Lieut. VV. R. Bash, Lieut. Edward Simpson, Lieut. J. G. 
Doyle. Ensign Charles Webster, and the junior divisional officers were 
most steady and conspicuous in every detail of duty contributing to the 
accurate firing of this ship in her part of the great victory of your forces. 

The officers of the Medical, Pay, Engineer, and Marine Corps re- 
sponded to every demand of the occasion, and were fearless in expos- 
ing themselves. The warrant officers, Boatswain William L. Hill, Car- 
penter G-. II. Warford, and Gunner P. T. Applegate, were everywhere 
exposed, in watching for damage, reports of which were promptly con- 
veyed to me. 

I have never in my life served with a braver, better, or worthier crew 
than that of the Brooklyn. During the combat, lasting from 9.35 until 
1.15 p. m., much of the time under tire, they never flagged for a moment, 
and were apparently undisturbed by the storm of projectiles passing 
ahead, astern, and over the ship. 

The result of the engagement was the destruction of the Spanish 
squadron and the capture of the admiral and some thirteen to fifteen 
hundred prisoners, with the loss of several hundred killed, estimated 
by Admiral Cervera at 600 men. 

The casualties on board this ship were: G. H. Ellis, chief yeoman, 
killed; J. Burns, fireman, first class, severely wounded. The marks 
and scars show that the ship was struck about twenty-five times, and 
she bears in all forty one scars as the result of her participation in the 
great victory of your force on July 3, 1898. The speed-cone halyards 
were shot away, and nearly all the signal halyards. The ensign at the 
main was so shattered that in hauling it down at the close of the action 
it fell in pieces. 

1 congratulate you most sincerely upon this great victory to the squad- 
ron under your command, and I am glad that I had an opportunity 
to contribute in the least to a victory that seemsbig enough for all of us. 

I have the honor to transmit herewith the report of the commanding 
officer, and a drawing, in profile, of the ship, showing the location of hits 
and scars; also a memorandum of the ammunition expended and the 
amount to fill her allowance. 

Since reaching this place and holding conversation with several of 
the captains, viz, Captain Eulate, of the Vizcaya, and the second in 
command of the Colon, Commander Contreras, 1 have learned that the 
Spanish admiral's scheme was to concentrate all fire for awhile on the 
Brooklyn and t he Vizcaya to ram her, in hopes that if they could destroy 
her the chance of escape would be increased, as it was supposed she 
was the swiftest ship of your squadron. This explains the heavy fire 
mentioned and the Vizcaya?8 action in the earlier moments of the engage- 
ment. The execution of this purpose was promply defeated by the fact 
that all the ships of the squadron advanced into close range and opened 
an irresistibly furious and terrific fire upon the enemy's squadron as it 
was coming out of the harbor. 




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ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 99 

I am glad to say that the injury supposed to be below the water line 
was due to a water valve being- opened from some unknown cause and 
flooding' the compartment. The injury to the belt is found to be only 
slight and the leak small. 

I beg to inclose a list of the officers and crew who participated in the 
combat of July 3, 1808. 

I can not close this report without mentioning in high terms of praise 
the splendid conduct and support of Capt. C. E. Clark, of the Oregon. 
Her speed was wonderful and her accurate lire splendidly destructive. 
Very respectfully, 

W. S. Schley, 
Commodore, United States Navy, 
Commanding Second Squadron, North Atlantic Fleet. 

The Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Force, 

North Atlantic Station. 



131409. 

[New York: Report of engagement with Cervera's fleet July 3, 1898.] 

U. S. Flagship New York, 1st Eate, 

Playa del Este, July 4, 1898. 

Sir : I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken 
by this ship in the action of yesterday during and following the sortie 
of Admiral Cervera's squadron. 

The ship had started at 8.50 for the army landing at Siboney, the 
commander in chief having an appointment with the general com- 
manding the army. A few minutes after the crew had been called to 
quarters for Sunday inspection, tiring was heard and a ship was seen 
leaving the harbor entrance; the helm was at once put over, the crew 
called to general quarters, signal "Close in toward harbor entrance and 
attack vessels" made, orders given to spread all fires, and the ship 
headed back for the enemy, whose ships were seen successively coming 
out at a high speed. The flagship Infanta Maria Teresa was first, then 
another armored cruiser of the same class (which turned out to be the 
Vizcaya), followed by the Cristobal Colon, an armored cruiser (Oquendo), 
and the torpedo-boat destroyers Furor and Pluton. 

The nearest ships had immediately engaged, and by the time we were 
off the entrance one, the flagship, was already afire and was soon ashore. 
The Indiana and Gloucester were actively engaged with the torpedo 
boats. This ship fired some 4-ineh shell at the one nearer the port toward 
which she was headed and seemed attempting to return, but she was 
already practically out of the fight. The boiler of the more advanced one 
had blown up, showing a vast column of condensed steam. During this 
time the batteries, whose line of fire we had crossed close to, repeatedly 
fired upon us, but without effect. No return was made to this fire. A 
shell from the west battery fell within 200 yards of the ship when we 
were over 4 miles to the westward and we had thought ourselves 
entirely out of range. This ship stood on, leaving the Gloucester, which 
had shown herself so capable, to look after the survivors in the torpedo 
boats. By this time a second cruiser was ashore and burning (the 
Almirante Oquendo), while the third, the Vizcaya, and the Cristobal 
Colon were still steaming rapidly westward. The Indiana was now 
signaled (11.26 a. in.) to return to the blockading position to look after 
anything which might be there. Very shortly the Vizcaya turned shore- 



100 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

ward, smoke began to issue from her afterpart, and by the time that 
.she was ashore on the reef at Acerraderos (15 miles west of Santiago) 
she was ablaze. The Iowa had signaled a little before that she had 
surrendered, and stopped off this place, where she gave much assistance 
in the rescue of the Vizeaya's people. 

This ship stood on in chase of the Cristobal Colon, with ahead of us 
the Brooklyn, Oregon, Texas, and Vixen, the Oregon being much nearer 
inshore of the two headmost ships, but not in gunshot. We were 
rapidly increasing our speed. 

it was evident, however, that the Colon would give us a lengthy 
chase, and at noon the crew left quarters and went to dinner. 

About 12.50 the Oregon opened fire, and some of her shell were 
observed to strike beyond the Colon. This made her capture a fore- 
gone conclusion, and shortly after 1 o'clock she turned in toward shore 
and soon struck her colors. She had been beached at a small inlet 
known as Rio Torquino. By the time we arrived a boat was along- 
side her from the Brooklyn, and Captain Cook, the boarding officer, 
came alongside this and reported. This ship then sent a boat to take 
possession, the commanding officer going in the boat. I was received 
by the commodore of the squadron, the captain, Capt. de Favio Don 
Emilio Moreu and Capt. de Navio, of the first class, Don Jose de 
Paredes y Chacon (which latter had been civil governor of Santiago 
and had only just been attached to the squadron). 1 arranged for the 
transfer of the crew and officers, a division to each ship present and 
the engineer force to be left aboard. While aboard, however, the 
Resolute arrived and it was arranged to transfer the whole number 
to her. 

I had taken with me the fleet surgeon, an engineer officer, and the 
carpenter to examine and make secure everything necessary. The 
engineer officer reported to me that she was making water aft. 1 had 
previously had soundings taken and found 8 feet at the bow and 70 at 
the stern, so that but a small portion of the ship was ashore. I 
returned as quickly as possible to the flagship to report the situation. 
The Oregon was signaled to take charge and the men were hastened on 
board, a number being sent also from this ship. Our work of closing 
water-tight doors, etc., was of no avail. A large number of sea valves 
had been treacherously opened and the valves so broken as to make it 
impossible to close them. The ship thus slowly settled. At 7.30 she 
came afloat and came out into deeper water. The officer in charge 
(Lieutenant-Commander Cogswell) had let go an anchor, but as it was 
clear that if she went down in water of the depth in which she was 
she could never be recovered, this ship's stem was placed against her 
quarter, and later, a line being taken from our own bow to hers, the 
Colon was forced inshore. It was by this time dark, but using a 
searchlight we were enabled gradually to force the ship in on the 
beach, the chain being paid out at the same time. She thus sank in a 
very moderate depth of water, and it is very probable she may be 
saved. 

At 11 p. m. the flagship returned to Santiago, leaving the Texas and 
Oregon in charge of the prize. 

Though the ship was not able to come to action with any of the 
larger ships on account of her distance to the eastward, every nerve 
was strained to do so, and all was done that could be done. Our speed 
had rapidly increased so that we were going 16 knots at the end. We 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 101 

were immediately astern while all others were considerably to seaward. 
We were thus in a position to prevent a possible doubling to the rear 
and escape to the southeast. 

The officers and crew, as they always have done, acted in the most 
enthusiastic and commendable manner. They have worked into so 
complete a system that the ship is practically instantaneously ready 
for action, and while [all] are deserving of commendation and credit, I 
think it no derogation from the deserts of others to particularly name 
Lieutenant-Commander Potter, to whom as executive officer so much 
of the ship's efficiency is due, and Chief Engineer McConnell, who has 
kept the machinery in the admirable order which has enabled us at all 
times to develop the ship's full speed. 
Very respectfully, 

F. E. Chadwick, 
Captain, U. S. -AT., Commanding. 

The Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Force, 

North Atlantic Station. 



IT. S. Flagship New York, 1st Bate, 

Guantanamo Bay, July 29, 1898. 
Sir: As supplementary to my report dated July 4 of the action of 
tli e 3d, I beg to state that at the close of the chase of the Colon our 
speed had increased to not less than 17 knots, instead of 16, as men- 
tioned in my ninth paragraph. 

We were making at the close from 104 to 108 turns. One hundred 
and four turns with a clean bottom would give 17^ knots. One hun- 
dred and eight turns with a clean bottom would give 18 knots. An 
allowance of 1 knot off for foul bottom is more than ample, as the ship 
was flying light, having in but a moderate amount of coal and very few 
stores. Under such circumstances there can be no question that this 
ship would have quickly overhauled the Colon had she continued her 
flight, and would have insured her capture had there been an accident 
of any sort to the other ships in pursuit. 
Very respectfully, 

F. E. Chadwick, 
Captain, U. 8. N., Commanding. 

The Commander in Chief. 



131409. 

[Report on battle with Spanish squadron, July 3, 1898.] 

U. S. F. S. Brooklyn, 1st Bate, 

At Anchor, Guantanamo Bay, July 7, 1898. 

Sir : At 9 a. m., July 3, 1 gave orders and arrangements were made for 

general muster at 9.30 a. m. At 9.30 a. m. the enemy were telegraphed 

by the Iowa as coming out. At the same time they were discovered by 

the quartermaster on watch, N. Anderson, of this ship, and reported to 



102 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

the officer of the deck. The executive officer, Lieutenant-Commander 
Mason, who was on deck about to execute the order for general muster, 
immediately gave the order, "Clear ship for action and general quar- 
ters.** Signal was made at the same time, "Enemy coming out — action." 
I went immediately forward, stood for the enemy, and gave orders to get 
steam on all boilers. 

We started with steam on three boilers, at about 12 knots speed. 

The head of the Spanish squadron, in column, was just outside the 
entrance of the harbor of Santiago, heading about southwest. The 
Spanish squadron consisted of the Maria Teresa (flag), Vizcaya, Oquendo, 
and Colon, and two torpedo destroyers. We opened fire on the leading 
ship in live minutes from the discovery. 

The port battery was first engaged as we stood with port helm to 
head off the leading ship, and giving them a raking fire at about 1,500 
yards range. The enemy turned to the westward to close into the land. 
We then wore around to starboard, bringing the starboard battery into 
action. The enemy hugged the shore to the westward. 

The Brooklyn, leading, was followed by the Texas, Iowa, Oregon, 
Indiana, and Gloucester. The Vixen, which had been to the westward 
of us on the blockade, ran to the southward and eastward of us, and 
kept for some time off our port side distant about 1,000 yards, evidently 
intending to guard against torpedo attack upon this ship. The shell 
passing over us fell very thick about her, some passing over her. At 
this time the firing was very fast and the whistling of shell incessant, 
and our escape with so little injury was miraculous and can only be 
attributed to bad marksmanship on the part of the enemy. The Maria 
Teresa, which had dropped astern while we were wearing, under the 
heavy fire of our fleet ran ashore, the Vizcaya, Oquendo, and Colon con- 
tinuing on and gaining in distance. 

The Brooklyn was engaged with the three leading ships of the enemy, 
which were forging ahead, the Texas, Iowa, and Indiana keeping up a 
heavy fire, but steadily dropping astern. The Oregon was keeping up 
a steady fire and was coming up in the most glorious and gallant style, 
outstripping all others. It was an inspiring sight to see this battleship, 
with a large white wave before her, and her smokestacks belching forth 
continued purls from her forced draft. We were making 14 knots at 
the time, and the Oregon came up off' our starboard quarter at about GOO 
yards and maintained her position, though we soon after increased our 
speed to 15 knots, and just before the Colon surrendered were making 
nearly 16. 

The Oquendo, soon after the falling out of the Teresa, dropped astern 
and, on fire, ran ashore. The Vizcaya and Colon continued on, under 
fire from Brooklyn and Oregon. The other vessels of our fleet were well 
astern and out of range. The Texas was evidently coming up fast. At 
about 10.53 a. in. the I izcaya was seen to be on fire, and the Colon passed 
inside of her with increased speed, took the lead, and gradually forged 
ahead. The Vizcaya soon after ran on the beach, ablaze with fire. We 
signaled the Oregon to cease firing on the Vizcaya, as her flag was down. 
Firing immediately ceased, and we both continued the chase of the 
Colon, now about 12,000 yards away. The ranges ran from 1,500 to 
3,000 yards with the Vizcaya as she kept in and out from the coast. 
We steered straight for a distant point near Cape Cruz, while the Colon 
kept close to the land, running into all the bights. She could not have 
come out without crossing our bows, and we were steadily gaining on 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 103 

her. We were getting more steam all the time, and now had four and 
one-half boilers on, and the remaining one and one-half nearly ready. 

After running for about 50 miles west from the entrance, the Colon 
ran into a bight of land, beached, fired a gun to leeward, and hauled 
down her flag. The Oregon and Brooklyn had just previously begun to 
fire upon the Colon and were landing shell close to her. 

I was sent on board by Commodore Schley to receive the surrender. 
The captain spoke English, and received me pleasantly, though natu- 
rally much depressed. He surrendered unconditionally. He was 
polite, shook bands, and said that his case was hopeless, and that he 
saw that we were too much for him. I was on board about fifteen 
minutes. As we came from the Colon the flagship New York came in 
with the Texas. I reported on board the flagship to Rear- Admiral 
Sampson. I stated to him that I believed the Colon could be gotten 
off the beach. 

During the entire action I was in constant communication with you, 
so that I was enabled to promptly execute your orders and instructions. 
The officers and crew behaved with great and unexceptionable coolness 
and bravery, so that it is difficult to discriminate. They were encour- 
aged in their best efforts by your enthusiasm, and your cheery words: 
"Fire steady, boys, and give it to them." 

The executive officer, IS". E. Mason, with his usual zeal, was continu- 
ally at the battery directing the firing and keeping me well informed of 
the exact condition of the ship, and in encouraging both officers and 
men by his example of coolness and courage. 

Lieutenant Hodgson was on tbe bridge coolly and deliberately taking 
bearings, and measuring and giving ranges. He was assisted in get- 
ting ranges and noting time by Chief Yeoman Geo. Ellis with a stadim- 
eter until Ellis was killed by a passing shell. 

The officers of the divisions, Lieuts. T. D. Griffin, W. E. Rush, E. 
Simpson, J. G. Doyle, B. W. Wells, and Ensign Webster all performed 
their full duties deliberately and efficiently. The naval cadets in 
divisions were cool and efficient, Naval Cadets Halligan, Marble, 
Abele, and Cronau having especially been noticed for good service. 
Lieut. B. W. Wells, your secretary, volunteered for command of a divi- 
sion, and was given the fourth division, thus enabling me to station a 
commissioned officer in a turret. 

Too much praise can not be given the engineer's department for the 
hard work done by all in steadily raising the steam until the speed rose 
from 12 to 10 knots. 

The marines did splendid service at the guns and at their stations. 
The orderlies carried messages quickly and effectively. Captain Mur- 
phy and Lieutenant Borden were constant in their visits to the dif- 
ferent stations to be assured of efficiency. 

Medical Inspector Paul Fitzsimons and Passed Assistant Surgeon De 
Valin were in constant attendance at the divisions and on deck to be 
ready for any emergency. 

Flag Lieut. J as. H. Sears was particularly active, standing in the 
open directing signals, reporting fall of shot and position of the enemy. 
He was cool and firm in his duty. 

Ensign McCauley attended personally to siguals while constantly 
under fire, at one time mounting the forward turret and making the 
wigwag himself. His coolness was conspicuous. 

The boatswain, Mr. Hill, was continually about the forecastle, ready 



104 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

for auy duty, and materially assisted in watching the fall of shots, and 
thus checked the ranges. 

The gunner, F. T. Applegate, rendered very valuable and conspicu- 
ous service at the battery, making repairs wherever practicable during 
the action. 

The carpenter, G-. 11. Warford, was on the alert, watching for effects 
of shell and in examining compartments, pipes, and valves. 

The signalmen, under Chief Quartermaster O'Connell, all stood in 
the open and performed their duties courageously. 

1 would call to your especial attention the valuable and conspicuous 
services rendered during the action by B. Gaynor (gunner's mate, tirst 
class), as noted in the reports of the executive officer, the divisional 
officers, and the gunner. Gaynor is a natural mechanic and a very 
intelligent man, and he went from gun to gun repairing breaks, and 
was constant in his work keeping them in condition for use. 

Chief Gunner's Mate D. F. Diggins was in all parts of the ship 
attending faithfully and coolly to the electric apparatus. 

1ST. Anderson (quartermaster, first class) is a particularly bright sea- 
man. He was at the wheel and kept the ship steadily on her course. 
He has been particularly known in this ship as a valuable man. He 
would prove very efficient as a mate, and I recommend him for such 
appointment. 

N. Morrissey (landsman) twice got out on the muzzle of a forward 
G pounder and backed out a jammed shot. Private Macneal, 0". 8. M. C, 
also went out on the muzzle of forecastle 6-pounder and cleared a jammed 
shot. 

We had but two personal casualties, George H. Ellis (chief yeoman) 
killed, and J. Burns (tiremau, first class) wounded. The ship was struck 
twenty times by whole shot and many times by pieces of bursting shell 
and from small shot of machine guns. No serious injury was done to 
the ship, and all repairs can be temporarily done by the ship's force, 
excepting to the 5-inch elevating gear. The smokestacks were hit in 
several places; the signal halyards, rigging, and flags were cut in 
many places. The flag at the main was destroyed, being much cut by 
shot and flying pieces of shell. The 8-inch guns worked satisfactorily; 
some trouble and delay was caused by jamming of locks. The turrets 
worked well. The 5 inch battery gave great trouble with the eleva- 
ting gear. At the end several were rendered useless for battle. Two 
are bulged at the muzzle. This ship should have new elevating gear 
for 5-inch as soon as practicable. We fired 100 rounds of 8-inch, 473 
of 5-inch, 1,200 of 0-pounder, and 200 of 1 -pounder ammunition. 
Very respectfully, 

F. A. Cook, 
Captain, U. 8. X., Commanding. 

The Commander in Chief Second Squadron, 

U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station. 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 105 

131408. 

[Supplement to report of battle of July 3, 1808.] 

U. S. Flagship Brooklyn, 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, August 10, 1898. 

Sir : I request to supplement my report of the battle of the 3d of 
July, and that it be filed with that report made ou July 7. 

The splended aud efficient work done in the engine and fire rooms 
was largely due to the zeal and intelligence of P. A. Engineer Carter, 
who went immediately to his station in the engine rooms and was unre- 
mitting throughout the action in his efforts to get the best speed. He 
was ably assisted in the fire rooms by P. A. Engineer J. B. Patten and 
Asst. Engineer E. T. Fitzgerald. 

Naval Cadets U. S. Macy and J . H. Woodward were stationed at the 
battery and were cool and efficient in duty. 

Naval Cadet J. A. Hand was at the central station and conveyed all 
orders and instructions deliberately and well. 

Naval Cadets J. W. L. Clement, R. W. Vincent, J. T. Bowers, and 
C. W. Forinan were stationed in the powder division and did effective 
duty. 

Pay Clerk O. I. Hancock volunteered for a station and did excellent 
work in the powder division. 

Very respectfully, F. A. Cook, 

Captain, Commanding. 

The Commander in Chief Second Squadron. 



131408. 

[Oregon: Report of battle at Santiago, July 3, 1898.] 
[This report has been revised in compliance with the request of Captain Clark of July 28, 1898.] 

TJ. S. S. Oregon, 1st Kate, 

Off Santiago de Cuba, July d, 1898. 

Sir : I have the honor to report that at 9.30 a. m., yesterday, the 
Spanish fleet was discovered standing out of the harbor of Santiago 
de Cuba. They turned to the westward and opened fire, to which our 
ships replied vigorously. For a short time there was an almost con- 
tinuous flight of projectiles over this ship, but when our line was fairly 
engaged, and the Iowa had made a swift advance as if to ram or close, 
the enemy's fire became defective in train as well as range. The ship 
was only struck three times, and at least two of them were by fragments 
of shells. We had no casualties. 

As soon as it was evident that the enemy's ships were trying to break 
through and escape to the westward we went ahead at full speed, with 
the determination of carrying out to the utmost your order: " If the 
enemy tries to escape, the ships must close and engage as soon as pos- 
sible and endeavor to sink his vessels or force them to run ashore." 
We soon passed all of our ships except the Brooklyn, bearing the broad 
pennant of Commodore Schley. At first we only used our main bat- 
tery, but when it was discovered that the enemy's torpedo boats were 



106 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

following their ships we used our rapid-fire guns, as well as the 6-inch, 
upon them with telling- effect. As we ranged up near the steruiuost 
of their ships she headed for the beach, evidently on fire. We raked 
her as we passed, pushing on for the next ahead, using our starboard 
gnus as they were brought to bear, and before we had her fairly abeam 
she too was making for the beach. The two remaining vessels were 
now some distance ahead, but our speed had increased to 10 knots and 
our fire, added to that of the Brooklyn^ soon sent another, the Vizcaya, to 
the shore in flames. The Brooklyn signaled, " Oregon, well done." Only 
the Cristobal Colon was left, and for a time it seemed as if she might 
escape; but when we opened with our forward turret guns and the 
Brooklyn followed she began to edge in toward the coast and her 
capture or destruction was assured. As she struck the beach her flag 
came down and the Brooklyn signaled, "Cease firing,' 1 following it with 
'•Congratulations for the grand victory; thanks for your spleuded 
assistance." 

The Brooklyn sent a boat to her, and when the admiral came up with 
the New York, Texas, and Vixen she was taken possession of. A prize 
crew was put on board from this ship under Lieutenant Commander 
Cogswell, the executive officer, but before 11 p. m. the ship, which had 
been filling in spite of all efforts to stop leaks, was abandoned, and just 
as the new left she went over on her side. 

I can not speak in too high terms of the bearing and conduct Of all 
on board this ship. When they found the Oregon had pushed to the 
front, and was hurrying to a succession of conflicts with the enemy's 
vessels if they could be overtaken and would engage, the enthusiasm 
was intense. 

As these vessels were so much more heavily armored thai the Brook- 
lyn they might have concentrated upon and overpowered her, and con- 
sequently I am persuaded that, but for the way the officers and men of 
the Oregon steamed and steered the ship and fought and supplied her 
batteries, the Colon and perhaps the Vizcaya would have escaped. 
Therefore I feel that they rendered meritorious service to the country; 
and while I can not mention the name of each officer and man indi- 
vidually, I am going to append a list of the officers, with the stations 
that they occupied, hoping that it may be of service to them should 
the claims of others for advancement above them ever be considered. 

J. K. Cogswell, lieutenant-commander; had general charge of the 
batteries. 

K. F. Nicholson, lieutenant ; handled the ship, placing her as I directed. 

W. H. Allen, lieutenant; in charge of ammunition supply. 

A. A. Ackerman, lieutenant; in charge of after 13-inch turret. 

E. W. Eberle, lieutenant (junior grade); in charge of forward 13-inch 
turret. 

C. M. Stone, lieutenant (junior grade); in charge of G-inch battery. 

L. A. Bostwick, ensign; aloft giving ranges till we closed, then in 
charge of torpedoes. 

C. L. Hussey, ensign; in charge of ten G-pounder H. E. F. guns. 

R. Z. Johnston, ensign; in charge of signals, and aid to eaptaiu. 

K. Dickins, captain, U. S. M. C.; in charge of marines and four 
G pounder H. It. F. 

A. R. Davis, second lieutenant, IT. S. M. O.j in charge of four 
G-pounder II. R. V. and two 1-pounder. 

11. E. Yarned, naval cadet; in charge port after 8-inch turret. 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 107 

L. M. Overstreet, naval cadet ; in charge of starboard forward 8-inch 
turret. 

G. B. Miller, naval cadet: in charge of port forward 8-inch turret. 

S. G. Magill, naval cadet; in charge of 6-inch gun. 

C. S. Keinpff, naval cadet; in charge of starboard 8-inch turret aft, 

P. B. Dungan, naval cadet; in forward 13 inch turret. 

E. J. Sadler, naval cadet; in forward chain of supplies. 

E. C. Kalbfus, naval cadet; in after 13-inch turret. 
H. L. Brinser, naval cadet; in after chain of supplies. 
C. B. Hatch, naval cadet; at secondary battery. 

C. Shackford, naval cadet; in torpedo division. 

B. W. Milligan, chief engineer; in charge of machinery. 

C. N. Offley, passed assistant engineer; in starboard engine room. 
J. M. Beeves, assistant engineer; in port engine room. 

F. Lyon, assistant engineer; in charge of fire rooms. 

H. N. Jenson, naval cadet; in after hydraulic pump room. 
W. D. Leahy, naval cadet; in forward hydraulic pump room. 
T. 0. Dunlap (acting) assistant engineer; in starboard engine room. 
P. A. Lovering, surgeon; in charge of hospital. 
W. B. Grove, assistant surgeon; transportation of wounded. 
S. B. Colhoun, paymaster; with surgeon, aid to wounded. 
J. P. Mclntyre. chaplain; with surgeon, aid to wounded. 
J. A. Murphy, pay clerk; aid to wounded in 6-inch compartment. 
John Costello, boatswain; in central station. 
A. S. Williams, gunner; in powder division. 
M. F. Boberts, carpenter ; in powder division. 
Very respectfully, 

0. E. Clark, 
Captain, U. S. A., Commanding. 

The Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Force, 

North Atlantic Station. 



131408. 

[TT. S. S. Texas : Part taken in battle July 3, 1898.] 

U. S. S. Texas, 
Off Santiago, July 4, 1898. 

Sir : In accordance with the requirements of article 437, Navy Begu- 
lations, I respectfully submit the following statement in regard to the 
part the Texas took in the engagement with the enemy yesterday. 

At daylight on the morning of the 3d the Texas stood out from 
entrance to harbor, taking day blockading position, about 3 miles from 
the Morro (the Morro bearing north-northeast). 

At 9.35, the Morro bearing N. by E. \ E., distant 5,100 yards, the 
enemy's ships were sighted standing out of the harbor. Immediately 
general signal 250 was made; this signal was followed by the lowals 
almost at the same time. 

The ship as per order was heading in toward the entrance; went 
ahead full speed, putting helm hard astarboard, and ordering forced 
draft on all boilers; the officer of the deck, Lieut. M. L. Bristol, hav- 



108 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

ing given the general alarm and beat to quarters for action at the same 
time. 

A s the leader, bearing the admiral's flag, appeared in the entrance 
she opened lire, which was, at 9.40, returned by the Texas at range of 
4,200 yards while closing in. The ship leading was of the Vizcaya class, 
and the flagship. 

Four ships came out, evidently the Vizcaya, the Oqvendo, Maria 
Teresa, and Colon, followed by two torpedo-boat destroyers. Upon 
seeing these two we immediately opened tire upon them with our sec- 
ondary battery, the main battery at the time being engaged with the 
second and third ships in line. Owing to our secondary battery, 
together with the Iowa and Gloucester, these two destroyers were forced 
to beach and sink. 

"Whilst warmly engaged with the third in line, which was abreast 
and engaging the Tents, our tire was blanketed lor a short time by the 
Oregon forging ahead and engaging the second ship. This third ship, 
after a spirited fire, sheered inshore, and at 10.35 ran up a white flag. 
We then ceased fire on the third and opened tire with our forward guns, 
at long range (6,600 yards), on the second ship (which was then engaged 
with the Oregon) until 11.05, when she (enemy's second ship) sheered 
in to the beach, on tire. 

At 11.10 she struck her colors. We ceased fire and gave chase, with 
Brooklyn and Oregon, for the leading ship until 1.20, when the Colon 
sheered in to beach and hauled down her colors, leaving them on deck 
at foot of her flagstaff. We shut off forced draft and proceeded at 
moderate speed to close up. 

I would state that during this chase the Texas was holding her own 
with the Colon, she leading us about 4 miles at the start. 

The reports of the executive officer and the surgeon are transmitted. 

I have the pleasure of stating that the entire battery of the Texas is 
in a most excellent condition and ready for any service required by the 
commander in chief, especially calling attention to the efficiency of the 
two turret guns, due to the alterations recently made by Lieut. F. J. 
Iiaeseler, of this ship. 

The bearing and performance of duty of all officers met with my 
entire approval. 

Very respectfully submitted. 

J. W. Philip, 
Captain, U. 8. N., Commanding. 

The Commander in Chief, 

North Atlantic Station. 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 109 

U. S. S. Texas, 
Off Santiago de Cuba, July 4, 1898. 
Sir: I have to report that during the engagement of yesterday a shell from the 
enemy entered through the hammock nettings and ducts for the blowers of forced- 
draft system, above main deck, coming from the direction of the starboard bow. 

It apparently exploded at the smoke-pipe casing, and made a ragged hole in the 
casing and pipe of 3A by 2} inches ; also carrying away the doors of the blower ducts 
and making eleven holes of various sizes, and cutting the drain and exhaust piping 
and otherwise damaging the gearing of the ash-hoisting apparatus. 

This can only be temporarily repaired on board, and will require the service of a 
boiler shop and shore workmen to make permanent repairs. 
Very respectfully, 

J 1 Alex. B. Bates, 

Chief Engineer, U. S. N. 

The Commanding Officer. 



131408. 

U. S. S. Texas, 1st Rate, 
Off Santiago de Cuba, July 4.1S98. 

Sir: I beg leave to make the following report on the injuries received by this 
vessel during the engagement with the Spanish fleet near Santiago de Cuba, July 3, 
1898 ■ 

A shell about 6 inches in diameter entered the starboard side above the main deck 
near top of hammock berthing immediately forward of ash hoist, angle of entrance 
being about 20 degrees forward of the beam; shell apparently exploded immediately 
after passing through the outer plating of hammock berthing, passing into the for- 
ward air shaft to forced-draft blower, destroying doors of both air shafts and the 
•adjacent bulkheads. Several pieces passed through the doorway of after shaft and 
penetrated the after bulkhead of the shaft. The mass of shell pieces passed on 
through bulkhead and casing of starboard smoke box, producing an aperture therein, 
irregular in form, measuring about 3 feet vertically, 2 feet fore and aft. The ash- 
hoist machinery was badlv damaged. 

A piece of shell struck forward jamb of starboard door of pilothouse, smashing it 
and carrying away considerable of paneling and framing, and passed out through 
after bulkhead. 

The bulkhead forming the after part of forward gun house is bulged forward about 
6 inches. This bulge extends over the entire starboard side of bulkhead. A large 
number of rivets passing through the stiffening bars and frames are shorn off or 
broken. At the base of the gun house the margin pieces of main deck have been 
lifted up and separated from the steel deck. A galley ventilator, which passed 
through berthing abaft the above-mentioned bulkhead, was destroyed. 

A number of hammocks and bedding stowed in the berthing, of which above- 
mentioned bulkhead formed the forward plating, were badly burned. 

The deck planking and frames of the after part of bridge deck over a surface 
about 6 by 12 feet have been torn up and destroyed. 

The starboard forward part of the third cutter was blown away, keel broken, 
planking and framing of port side badly damaged, leaving ituntit for repairs. 

One ladder leading to bridge deck forward was badly damaged. 

One main-hatch ladder leading to gun deck was destroyed. 

The boat covers and awning curtains used as splinter protection over the forward 
boats were blown away, burned, and destroyed. 

The hammocks, cloths, and battens, securing same to bulkheads, were carried away 
from six compartments of hammock berthing. 

The electric-wire battens and iittings were carried away in a great many places on 
main and gun decks forward. 

The starboard side of the main deck between frames 53 and 56 shows marked 
depression, beams and stanchions being bent and buckled, the crown of some of the 
beams no longer existing. 

The steel deck has in several places become separated from the beams through the 
stretching or breaking of rivets, and there are now leaks in several places. 

The rivets securing the head of midship stanchions to the web of beams of frames 
55 and 56 have been sheared off. 



110 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

The condition of starboard side of the main deck is attributed partly to the firing 
of the 12-inch turret gnus over the deck during the engagement, as mentioned in my 
report of June t>, but mainly by similar c;uises during the battle of yesterday. 

The marked increase in the injuries to the deck may be attributed not only to the 
repetition of great strains over a surface whose support was already weakened, but 
to an increase in the charge of powder; i.e., reduced charge previously used to full 
charge used daring this battle. 

I am of opinion that the framing of the deck in this ship is too light to permit the 
farther tiring of the 12-inch guns over the decks without serious injury. 
Kespectfully, 

GILES B. HARBER, 
Lieutenant-l 'ommaitdi r, U. S. N. } Executive Officer. 

The Commanding Officer. 



131409. 

[Keport of engagement witli Spanish fleet.] 

U. S. S. Indiana, 1st Kate, 

Off Santiago de Cuba, July 4, 1898. 

Sir: I have the honor to submit the following report of the opera- 
tions of the Indiana in the action of July 3 with the Spanish squadron 
oft" Santiago de Cuba. 

At 9.37 a. m., while the crew were at quarters preliminary to general 
muster, noted two guns fired from the Iowa and general signal "Ene- 
my's ships escaping" flying. At once cleared ship for action and the 
crew were at the guns in a remarkably short time, all officers and men , 
showing an alacrity that indicated clearly their pleasure at the oppor- 
tunity o tiered them. 

The Spanish squadron was seen emerging from the harbor, and in a 
few moments a general action ensued. The leading ship, which proved 
to be the Infanta Maria Teresa, flying the flag of Vice-Admiral Cer- 
vera, was followed by the other vessels of the squadron, as follows: 
Vizcaya, Cristobal Colon, Oquendo, and the torpedo boat destroyers 
Furor and Pluton. The enemy's vessels headed to the westward and 
our ships headed in the same direction, keeping as nearly abreast of 
them as possible. 

This ship fired on all of them as they came out one by one, and con- 
tinued the action later by firing principally on the Maria Teresa, 
Ot/uendo, Furor, and Pluton. Several of our shells were seen to take 
effect on these vessels. Our secondary-battery guns were directed 
principally on the destroyers, as were the 0-inch guns. The destroyers 
were sunk through the agency of our guns and those of the Gloucester, 
which vessel had come up and engaged them close aboard. 

The initial fire of the last two ships was directed at this vessel, and, 
although falling very close, only struck the ship twice, without any 
injury to ship or crew. 

Our ranges were obtained by stadimeter angles on Morro as the ships 
emerged, and then by angles on the tops of the rear ships. The 
ranges were from 4,500* to 2,000* yards, observed from the top. From 
the bridge I could see that our shooting was excellent and showed its 
effect. One of our 13-inch shells was seen to enter the Maria Teresa 
under the quarter-deck and explode, and that ship was observed on fire 
very shortly afterward. 

'These figures are changed from those in the original letter in compliance with the 
request of Captain Taylor dated July 5, 1898. 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. Ill 

About 10.15 a. in. observed the Maria Teresa and Oquendo on fire and 
heading for tbe beach, the fire from their guns having ceased. We then 
devoted our special attention to prevent the escape of the destroyers, 
which appeared more than a match for the Gloucester, she being the 
only small vessel near to engage them. They were soon seen to blow- 
up, apparently struck by our 6-inch and 6-pounders. We now fired our 
large guns at the Yizcaya, which was at long range. She made for the 
shore soon after, on fire and battery silenced. These ships hauled down 
their colors as they made for the beach. The Spanish flagship hoisted 
the white flag as she grounded. 

We now ceased firing. The Colon was observed well over the western 
horizon, closely pursued by the Brooklyn, Oregon, and Texas, offshore 
of her. The flagship New York, steaming full speed to the westward, 
as soon as the Yizcaya surrendered signaled us "Go back and guard 
entrance of harbor." Several explosions were observed on board the 
burning ships. At noon turned and stood to the eastward for our sta- 
tion, in obedience to the above signal. Observed the Harvard and 
several transports standing to the westward. 

About 12.30 the Resolute came within hail and informed us by mega- 
phone that a Spanish battleship was sighted to the eastward, standing 
toward us. Later the Harvard passed, confirming the information, 
and adding that the ship was painted white. We made out the vessel 
ahead and stood for her with our guns bearing. She proved to be the 
Austrian armored cruiser Kaiserin Maria Teresa. She sent an officer 
on board and requested permissiou to enter the harbor. I referred him 
to the commander in chief. She then stood on to the westward and 
we resumed our station. 

During this action we used no armor-piercing shell except the 
smokeless powder 6-pounders, and the good effect of the common shell 
is shown by the fires on the enemy's ships and the short time taken to 
disable them without piercing their armor, and with almost no injury 
to our ships. 

The guus and mounts worked well; only two failures of electric 
primers noted. 

During the afternoon sent boats with surgeon on shore to the burn- 
ing vessels to assist in caring for the wounded. The boats returned, 
bringing 1 wounded officer and 17 men as prisoners. 

Received also during the afternoon and night prisoners from the 
Gloucester and Hist, in all 7 officers and 217 men, which were to-day 
transferred to the St. Louis. 

The conduct of the officers and crew was in every respect commend- 
able; coolness and good discipline prevailed, coupled with a marked 
enthusiasm. This desirable condition of affairs is largely due to the 
efforts of the officers, and I desire to commend to the commander in 
chief the executive officer, Lieut. Commander John A. Rodgers, and all 
the officers of the ship for the part taken by the Indiana in bringing 
about this great victory and the complete destruction of the enemy's 
squadron. 

Very respectfully, H. C. Taylor, 

Captain, Commanding. 

The Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Force, 

North Atlantic Station. 



112 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

U. S. S. Indiana, 1st Rate, 

Off Santiago de Cuba, July 5, 1S98. 

Sib: In accordance with paragraph 525, U. S. Navy Regulations, I have the honor 
to >uliniit the following report relative to the engagement with the Spanish squadron 
off Santiago tie Cuba on the morning of the 3d instant : 

The behavior of the officers and crew while under fire was, in my opinion, excellent. 
The division officers deserve great credit for the rapid and effective lire which was 
maintained during the engagement. The guns worked well, and the supply of 
ammunition was sufficient. The divisions were commanded as follows: 

Lieut. R. Henderson, powder division. 

Lieut. Roy C. Smith, first division (forward 13-inch turret). 

Lieut. F. L. Chapin, fourth division (after 13-inch turret). 

Lieut. B. C. Decker, second division. 

Lieut. Thomas Washington, third division. 

No. 3 turret (starboard forward 8-iuch) was commanded by Ensign P. N. Olmsted. 
The 6-pounders were commanded by Capt. L. W. T. Waller, IT. s. M. C. 

The ship was struck twice by fragments of shell or projectiles of very small caliber. 
No damage was done to the ship except the wrecking of the gig by the blast of our 
own guns. 

I observed great advantage in the use of smokeless powder for the secondary bat- 
tery, and would recommend that a new supply be obtained as soon as possible, as the 
amount on hand is very small. 

Very respectfully, John A. RODGERS, 

Lieutenant-Commander, Executive Officer. 

The Commanding Officer. 



U. S. S. Indiana, 1st Kate, 

Off Santiago de Cuba, July 14, 1898. 

Sir : Fearing 1 that some mistake might occur as to the position of the 
Indiana when the Spanish squadron came out, owing to my having 
omitted it in my report, I have the honor to inclose a sketch showing 
our correct position at the time. 

There are circumstances that identify clearly this position of the 
Indiana on the sketch. One of these is that by my order the officer of 
the deck steamed out when the flagship turned to the eastward and 
took a position upon the line parallel to shore formed by the other ships 
and closed in the interval on that line. The bearing of Morro at that 
time was between NNW. £ W. and NW, by N. The distance is fixed 
by the fact that the first range given by the officer in the top, as 
obtained by vertical angle of Morro, measured by sextant and stadime- 
ter, was 4,200 yards, and at this time we had only begun to close 
in on the entrance, according to your instructions, and had barely 
gathered way. 

Our distance was therefore about 4,300 yards, with Morro bearing 
between NNW. h W. and NW. by N., the ship at the time heading west- 
northwest and stationary. 

Very respectfully, H. C. Taylor, 

Captain, Com m a nd ing. 

The Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Force, 

Sort It Atlantic Station. 



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ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 113 

U. S. S. Indiana, 1st Kate, 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, July 25, 1898. 

Sir: Fearing that some mistake might occur as to the course steered 
by the Indiana during the action of July 3 with the Spanish squadron 
off Santiago de Cuba, I have the honor to transmit herewith ;i sketch 
showin 0- the course of the ship, made from data and information relative 

thereto. 

The position of the ship at the time of the coming out of the first 
Spanish ship is known with considerable accuracy, as is also the posi- 
tion at the time of turning eastward to go back to the blockade off 
Santiago, in obedience to your signal. 

The course pursued by the ship between these points has been deter- 
mined with reasonable accuracy by the testimony of the commanding 
and other officers. 

As to the positions of the other ships before and during the action, and 
the courses pursued by them, the sketch shows them as they appeared 
to be to the best of our recollection. 

This chart is in place of the one previously sent, which only showed 
the position at the time of coming out of the Spanish ships. 
Very respectfully, 

H. C. Taylor, 
Captain, U. S. N., Commanding. 

The Commander in Chief. 

North Atlantic Station. 



133711. 
131408. 

[Regarding part taken by Indiana in engagement with Spanish fleet, July 3, 1898.] 

No 341.1 U. S. Flagship New York, 1st Rate, 

At Sea, August 18, 1898. 

Sir : I forward herewith copies of letters — one addressed to me by 
Captain Taylor, of the Indiana, the other my reply thereto. 

1 request that these two copies may be made a part of the report on 
the naval engagement of July 3 with the Spanish fieet off Santiago 
de Cuba. 

Very respectfully, 

W. T. Sampson, 
Bear- Admiral, United States N., 
Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station. 
The Secretary of the Navy, 

Navy Department, Washington, D. C. 



IT. S. S. Indiana, 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, August 0, 1898. 
Admiral: The report of Commodore Schley of the battle of July 3, 
as published, gives credit, in the seventh paragraph, to four ships, and 
mentions by name their captains, Philip, Evans, Clark and Cook, and 



114 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

adds: "The dense smoke of the combat shut out from my view the | 
Indiana and the Gloucester, but as these vessels were closer to your 
flagship no doubt their part in the conflict was under your immediate 
observation." 

In your report, as published, you make but slight mention of the 
Indiana, stating that "the Iowa and Indiana, having done good work, 
and not having the speed of the other ships, were directed by me, " etc. 

The result of these reports is that the captains of all vessels of the 
line of battle except the Indiana have received personal mention in 
the official reports before the Department, while the two smaller vessels 
have also had distinctive mention either from the commander in chief 
or the second in command. 

If the official record should be referred to in future it will appear 
from its general tone that the Indiana was less deserving than all of 
her consorts. Leaving out my personal interest in the matter, it is 
righl that I should consider the officers and crew of the ship; audi 
speak for them, as well as for myself, when I submit to you, Admiral, 
that the above combination of reports will place the ship, in the opinion 
of the Department and the country, markedly below all the other ves- 
sels of your squadron. 1 respectfully submit, sir, that this is injustice 
to the Indiana and her officers and crew. 

I can say, without disparagement of any other vessel, that during the 
first hour of the fight the Indiana's gun fire contributed to the destruc- 
tion of the Oquendo and Teresa more than that of any other single ves- 
sel of our squadron except one, and equaled hers. I do not know why 
the second in command failed to observe the Indiana during this 
period of our hottest action. I saw the Brooklyn quite plainly. 

An examination of these reports with reference to the Indiana will, I 
believe, convince you, sir, that they do produce the effect of putting the 
Indiana below all the other vessels of the squadron. If it be your 
opinion, sir, that this is the case, and that all the vessels from the 
Brooklyn to the Vixen rendered services as much more valuable than 
the Indiana's as the published reports of the commander in chief and 
the second in command taken together would indicate, then I must 
accept it for myself and the ship. If, on the contrary, that be not 
your opinion, I urge respectfully that such steps be takeu to remedy 
this injustice as may seem wise to you. 
Very respectfully, 

H. 0. Taylor, 
Captain, U. 8. N~., Commanding. 

The Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Force, 

North Atlantic Station. 



No. 15.] U. S. S. New York, 1st Rate, 

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, A ugust 8, 1898. 
Sir: I am greatly obliged that you have called my attention to what 
appears to have been an injustice to your ship, officers, and crew for 
the part which they took in the action of July 3, and also for the very 
proper manner in which you have presented it. 1 think, however, that 
you will agree with me that in submitting such a report to the Secre- 
tary of the Navy, where so many officers are vitally interested and 
justly proud of their ship, it is no easy task to do so without apparently 
bestowing praise unjustly. It requires very careful consideration of 
the report from every point of view to avoid misunderstanding. 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 115 

The position of the ships of the squadron must be carefully consid- 
ered to fully appreciate what it was poss'ble for each vessel to accom- 
plish under the circumstances in which she was placed. Those that 
were to the westward of the escaping enemy were certainly better 
placed for stopping the enemy, and also better placed for delivering 
their fire, than the vessels to the eastward, which was the blockading 
station of the Indiana. 

No distribution of the fleet could completely predict and provide 
against every variation of such a sortie, nor do I consider that any com- 
manding officer deserved either credit or blame because the ship under 
his command was faster or slower than another ship or carried a 
heavier or a lighter battery, but rather that the commanding officer was 
blameworthy when he failed to put his ship in the proper place for 
destroying the enemy just in proportion to the advantage which he 
possessed in speed, battery, or position over his neighbors. 

Each commanding officer, in my opinion, was personally responsible 
for the good use which he made of the tools with which he had to work. 
I certainly did not intend to criticise you or to bestow less praise upon 
the Indiana than was bestowed upon any other ship of the squadron. 

The fact that the commanding officer of the Indiana was signaled to 
return to blockade at the mouth of the harbor after she had so gallantly 
contributed toward the destruction of the Spanish ships was only a 
necessary precaution which the commander in chief felt obliged to take 
to prevent disaster to the large number of transports which were left 
in that vicinity when the fleet started in pursuit of the enemy. There 
were still some armed vessels remaining in the harbor of Santiago — at 
least two, and we did not know then how many more — which could 
have come out in the absence of the fleet and produced great havoc 
among the troopships, which were defenseless in the absence of an 
armed vessel. 

This explanation, together with your letter, will be sent to the Depart- 
ment, with the request that this may be attached to and form a part of 
the original report. 

Very respectfully, W. T. Sampson, 

Bear-Admiral, United States Navy, 
Commander in Chief, U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station. 

The Commanding Officer, U. S. S. Indiana, 

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 



141053. 

[Report of events witnessed on July 3, 1898.] 

U. S. S. Resolute, 
Navy-yard, New York, September 3, 1898. 

Sir: I consider it my duty to lay before you the following report of 
events witnessed by myself in the action of July 3, 1898, off Santiago. 

The Resolute, which I commanded, lay just east of the Indiana, dis- 
tant from her 1,000 feet, and about -'.6 miles from the Morro, when the 
Maria Teresa was sighted. 

The Indiana had been nearer the Morro, but about 9 o'clock circled 
to the eastward with a port helm, leaving the Resolute within the arc 
of the circle described by the fleet. The Resolute was then turned under 
a slow bell, and stopped when the Indiana was due west of us, and just 
outside the circle of fighting ships. The Gloucester was to the north- 
ward and eastward, and nearly off Aguadores. 



116 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

As the Maria Teresa appeared, the Iowa fired a <>-pounder and hoisted 
signal. Within a lew seconds of this shot (not more than five or ten) 
all the Spanish batteries opened, and at the same instant the port 
broadside of the M aria Teresa was discharged. It seemed to me then 
that all, or nearly all, of these shot and shell were fired at the Indiana, 
and, as the Resolute lay directly in line, the water around the Indiana 
and the Resolute was alive with the fall of projectiles. 

Before the Vizoaya appeared the Indiana opened fire with her heavy 
gnus, and, with screws whitening - the water astern, was heading for the 
.Mono. 

As the Vizcaya came out 1 distinctly saw one of the Indiana's heav- 
iest shell strike her abaft the funnels, and the explosion of this shell 
was followed by a burst of flame which, for the moment, obscured the 
atter part of the Vizcaya. 

The I izcaya fired her port battery apparently at the Indiana, for 
many of the shell struck about and beyond the Resolute, which was 
then heading east. 

The Cristobal Colon, as soon as she was clear of Morro Point, fired 
her lirst broadside at the Indiana. 

The Oquendo, in coming out, also fired her first broadside at the 
Indiana, and I could see some of the Indiana's shell strike the Oquendo 
as she steamed south. 

Following close astern of the Colon and the Oquendo came the destroyer 
Furor, and I distinctly saw her struck by an 8-inch or 13-inch shell from 
the Indiana, which was followed by an explosion and flames on board 
the Furor. 

During all this time the Indiana had been steaming ahead, and I 
roughly estimated that she was then about 3,0U0 yards from the Oquendo 
and the Furor. 

The Resolute was almost in line with the Indiana, and I could clearly 
follow the course of her projectiles. 

The other ships engaged, except the Oregon, and occasionally the 
Brooklyn, which showed at times to the southward of the other vessels 
(the Resolute being by this time well to the eastward) were hidden in 
smoke. 

From the position of the ships engaged it appeared to me that the 
Indiana was the first to close with the escaping enemy, and, though 
I could see the Teresa and Vizcaya sweeping across her course, it was 
apparent that the Indiana's shells were the first to reach them. 

This was due, first, to the Indiana's proximity, and, second, to the fact 
that the Indiana had a fair beam target on each ship as she came out. 

The Oregon had this in a less degree, and the other vessels engaged 
seemed to have fired their first shell when the Spanish ships were four 
points on. 

In addition to the heavier shell noted as striking the enemy, we could 
count many lighter projectiles from the secondary battery exploding on 
board, and, as the Indiana's fire was incessant, I took these to be from 
her L'uns. 

The Spanish officers who were prisoners from theGolon and the Vizcaya 
have since told me that the fire from the Indiana and the Oregon as they 
passed from the harbor was deadly in its destnictiveness, and that 
although the Colon escaped with small injury, due to her greater 
speed and being in a measure covered by other ships, the Vizcaya was 
hopelessly crippled before she had gone a mile from the Morro. 

1 have ventured to address you this letter, as I had exceptional 




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ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 117 

opportunities for observation during this part of the engagement, and 
it has seemed to me that the very important part taken by the Indiana 
iu the first part of the action should be laid before you. 
Very respectfully, 

J. G. Eaton, 
Commander, Commanding. 
Commander in Chief Naval Forces, 

North Atlantic Station. 



131408. 

[Ioiva: Engagement, with Spanish squadron July 2, 1803.] 

U. S. S. Iowa, 1st Rate, 
Off Santiago de Cuba, Cuba, July 4, 1898. 

Sir : I have the honor to make the following report of the engagement 
with the Spanish squadron off Santiago de Cuba on the 3d of July: 

On the morning of the 3d, while the crew was at quarters for Sunday 
inspection, the leading vessel of the Spanish squadron was sighted at 
9.31 coming out of the harbor at Santiago de Cuba. Signal " Enemy's 
ships coming out" was immediately hoisted and a gun fired to attract 
attention. The call to general quarters was sounded immediately, the 
battery made ready for firing, and the engines rung full speed ahead. 

The position of this vessel at the time of sighting the squadron was 
the usual blockading station off the entrance of the harbor, Morro Castle 
bearing about north and distant about 3 to 4 miles. The steam at this 
time in the boilers was sufficient for a speed of 5 knots. 

After sighting the leading vessel, the Infanta Maria Teresa (Admiral 
Cervera's flagship), it was observed that she was followed in succession 
by the remaining three vessels of the Spanish squadron, the Viscaya, 
Cristobal Colon, and Almirante Oquendo. The Spanish ships moved at 
a speed of about 8 to 10 knots, which was steadily increased as they 
cleared the harbor entrance and stood to the westward. They main- 
tained a distance of about 800 yards between vessels. The squadron 
moved with precision and stations were well kept. 

Immediately upon sighting the leading vessel fires were spread, and 
the Iowa headed toward the leading Spanish ship. About 9.40 the 
first shot was fired from this ship, at a distance of about 0,000 yards. 

The course of this vessel was so laid that the range speedily dimin- 
ished. A number of shots were fired at ranges varying between 6,000 
and 4,000 yards. The range was rapidly reduced to 2,500 yards, and 
subsequently to 2,000 and to 1,200 yards. 

When it was certain that the Maria Teresa would pass ahead of us, 
the helm was put to starboard, and the starboard broadside delivered 
at a range of 2,500 yards. The helm was then put to port and the ship 
headed across the bow of the second ship, and as she drew ahead the 
helm was again put to starboard and she received in turn the full 
weight of our starboard broadside at a range of about 1,800 yards. The 
Ioica was again headed off with port helm for the third ship, and as 
she approached the helm was put to starboard until our course was 
approximately that of the Spanish ship. In this position at a range of 
1,400 yards the fire of the entire battery, including rapid-fire guns, was 
poured into the enemy's ship. 

About 10 o'clock the enemy's torpedo-boat destroyers Furor and 
Pluton were observed to have left the harbor and to be following the 



118 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

Spanish squadron. At the time that they were observed, and in fact 
most of the time that they were under fire, they were at a distance 
varying from 4,500 to 4,000 yards. As soon as they were discovered 
the secondary buttery of this ship was turned upon them, while the 
main battery continued to engage the Vizcaya, Oquendo, and Maria 
']'< resa. 

The fire of the main battery of this ship when the range was below 
2,500 yards was most effective and destructive, and after a continuance 
of this lire for perhaps twenty minutes it was noticed that the Maria 
Teresa ami Oquendo were in tlames and were being headed for the 
beach. Their colors were struck about 10.20, and they were beached 
about 8 miles west of Santiago. 

About the same time (about 10.25) the fire of this vessel, together 
with that of the Gloucester and another smaller vessel, proved so de- 
structive that one of the torpedo-boat destroyers (Pluton) was sunk and 
the Furor was so much damaged that she was run upon the rocks. 

Alter having passed, at 10.35, the Oquendo and Maria Teresa, on fire 
and ashore, this vessel continued to chase and tire upon the Yizcaya 
until 10.36, when signal to cease firing was sounded on board, it having 
been discovered that the Vizcaya had struck her colors. 

At 11 the Iowa arrived in the vicinity of the Vizcaya, which had 
been run ashore, and, as it was evident that she could not catch the 
Cristobal ('ohm, and that the Oregon, Brooklyn, and New York would, 
two steam cutters and three cutters were immediately hoisted out and 
sent to the Vizcaya to rescue her crew. Our boats succeeded in bring- 
in,-: off a large number of officers and men of that ship's company, and 
in placing many of them on board the torpedo boat Ericsson and the 
auxiliary dispatch vessel Hist. 

About 11.30 the New York passed in chase of the Cristobal Colon, 
which was endeavoring to escape from the Oregon, Brooklyn, and 
Texas. 

^Ve received on board this vessel from the Yizcaya Captain Eulate, 
the commanding officer, and 23 officers, together with about 248 petty 
officers and men, of whom 32 were wounded. There were also received 
on board 5 dead bodies, which were immediately buried with the honors 
due to their grade. 

The battery behaved well in all respects. 

The dashpot of the forward 12-inch gun, damaged in the engagement 
of the 2d, had been replaced the same day by one of the old dashpots, 
which gave no trouble during this engagement. 

The following is an approximate statement of the ammunition ex- 
pended during the engagement. A more exact statement can not be 
given at this time: 

11' inch semi-armor-piereing shell, with full charges 31 

8-inch common shell, with full charges 35 

4-inch cartridges, common shell 251 

ti- pounder cartridges, common shell 1, 056 

1-pounder cartridges, common shell 100 

This ship was struck in the hull, on the starboard side, during the 
early part of the engagement by two projectiles of about 0-inch caliber, 
one striking the hull 2 or 3 feet above the actual water line and almost 
directly on the line of the berth deck, piercing the ship's side between 
frames 9 and 1»>, and the other piercing the side and the cofferdam 
between frames L8 and 19. 

The first projectile did not pass beyond the inner bulkhead of the 
cofferdam A 41-43. The hole made by it was large and ragged, being 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 119 

about 1G inches in a longitudinal direction and about 7 inches in a ver- 
tical direction. It struck with a slight inclination aft, and perforated 
the cofferdam partition bulkhead (A 41-43 to 45-47). It did not ex- 
plode, and remained in the cofferdam. 

The second projectile pierced the side of the ship and the cofferdam 
A 105, the upper edge of the hole being immediately below the top of 
the cofferdam on the berth deck in compartment A 104. The projectile 
broke off the hatch plate and coaming of the water-tank compartment, 
exploded, and perforated the walls of the chain locker. The explosion 
created a small fire, which was promptly extinguished. The hole in the 
side made by this projectile was about 5 feet above the water line, and 
about 2 to 3 feet above the berth deck. One fragment of this shell 
struck a link of the sheet chain wound around the G pounder ammuni- 
tion hoist, cutting the link in two. Another perforated the cofferdam 
on the port side and slightly dished the outside plating. 

These two wounds, fortunately, were not of serious importance. 

Two or three other projectiles of small caliber struck about the upper 
bridge and smokestacks, inflicting trifling damage, and four other small 
projectiles struck the hammock nettings and the side aft. 

There are no casualties among the ship's company to report. No 
officer nor man was injured during the engagement. 

After having received on board the rescued crew of the Vizcaya, this 
vessel proceeded to the eastward and resumed the blockading station 
in obedience to the signal made by the commander in chief about 11.30. 

Upon arriving on the blockading station, the Gloucester transferred 
to this vessel Rear-Admiral Cervera, his flag lieutenant, and the com- 
manding officers of the torpedo-boat destroyers Furor and Pluton, and 
also one man of the Oquendo's crew, rescued by the Gloucester. 

Naval Cadets Frank Taylor Evans and John E. Lewis and five men 
belonging to the Massachusetts were on board the Iowa when the 
enemy's ships came out. They were stationed at different points and 
rendered efficient service. 

The officers and men of this ship behaved admirably. No set of men 
could have done more gallant service. 

1 take pleasure in stating to you, sir, that the coolness and judgment 
of the executive officer, Lieut. Commander Raymond P. Rodgers, 
deserves, and will, I hope, receive a proper reward at the hands of the 
Government. The test of the executive officer's work is the conduct of 
ship and crew in battle. In this case it was simply superb. 

The coolness of the navigator, Lieut. W. H. Schuetze, and of Lieut. 
F. K. Hills, in charge of the rapid-fire guns on the upper deck, are 
worthy of the greatest commendation. 

Other officers of the ship did not come under my personal observation, 
but the result of the action shows how well they did their duty. 

I can not express my admiration for my magnificent crew. So long 
as the enemy showed his flag they fought like American seamen; but 
when the flag came down they were as gentle and tender as American 
women. 

In conclusion, sir, allow me to congratulate you on the complete vic- 
tory achieved by your fleet. 

Very respectfully, R. D. Evans, 

Captain, U. 8. N., Commanding. 

The Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Force, 

North Atlantic Station. 



120 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

131409. 

[Gloucester. Report of battle at Santiago.] 

U. S. S. Gloucester, 
Off Santiago de Cuba, Cuba, July (>, 1898. 

Sir: I have the honor to report that at the battle of Santiago on 
July 3 the officers and crew of the Gloiicester were uninjured and the 
vessel was not injured in hull or machinery, the battery only requiring 
some slight overhauling. It is now in excellent condition. 

1 inclose herewith a copy of the report of the executive officer, made 
in compliance with paragraph 525, page 110, Naval Regulations, which 
report I believe to be correct in all particulars. I also inclose copies of 
the reports of the several officers, which may prove valuable for future 
reference. 

It was the plain duty of the Gloucester to look after the destroyers, 
and she was held back, gaining steam, until they appeared at the 
entrance. The Indiana poured in a hot fire from all her secondary bat- 
tery upon the destroyers; but Captain Taylor's signal, "Gunboats close 
in," gave security that we would not be fired upon by our own ships. 
Until the leading destroyer was injured our course was converging, 
necessarily; but as soon as she slackened her speed we headed directly 
for both vessels, firing both port and starboard batteries as the occasion 
offered. 

All the officers and nearly all the men deserve my highest praise during 
the action. The escape of the Gloucester was due mainly to the accu- 
racy and rapidity of the fire. The efficiency of this fire, as well as that 
of the ship generally, was largely due to the intelligent and unremit- 
ting efforts of the executive officer, Lieut. Harry P. Huse. The result 
is more to his credit when it is remembered that a large proportion of 
the officers and men were untrained when the Gloucester was commis- 
sioned. Throughout the action he was on the bridge and carried out 
my orders with great coolness. That we were able to close in with the 
destroyers — and until we did so they were not seriously injured — was 
largely due to the skill and constant attention of P. A. Engineer George 
W. McElroy. The blowers were put on and the speed increased to 17 
knots without causing a tube to leak or a brass to heat. Lieut. Thomas 
C. Wood, Lieut. George H. Norman, jr., and Ensign John T. Edson not 
only controlled the fire of the guns in their division and prevented 
waste of ammunition, but they also did some excelleut shooting them- 
selves. Acting Asst. Surg. J. F. Bransford took charge of one of the 
guns and fired it himself occasionally. Acting Asst. Paymaster Alex- 
ander Brown had charge of the two Colt guns, firing one himself, and 
they did excellent work. Asst. Engineer A. M. Proctor carried my 
orders from the bridge and occasionally fired a gun when I found it was 
not being served quite satisfactorily. All were cool and active at a 
time when they could have had but little hope of escaping uninjured. 

Lieutenants Wood and Norman, Ensign Edson, and Assistant Engi- 
neer Proctor were in charge of the boats engaged in saving life. They 
all risked their lives repeatedly in boarding and remaining near the two 
destroyers and the two armored cruisers when their guns were being dis- 
charged by the heat and their magazines and boilers were exploding. 
They also showed great skill in landing and taking off the prisoners 
through the surf. 

Of t he men mentioned in the several reports, I would call special 
attention to John Bond, chief boatswain's mate. He would have been 
recommended to the Department for promotion prior to his gallant con- 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 121 

duct during the action of July 3. I would also recommend to your 
attention Robert P. Jennings, chief machinist, mentioned in the report 
of Mr. McElroy. I believe it would have a good effect to recognize 
the skill of the men and the danger incurred by the engineer's force. I 
would also recommend that the acting appointments of those men men- 
tioned by the officers in their reports be made permanent. 

The wounded and exhausted prisoners were well and skillfully tended 
by Assistant Surgeon Bransford, assisted by Ensign Edson, who is also 
a surgeon. 

The admiral and his officers and men were treated with all considera- 
tion and care possible. They were fed and clothed as far as our limited 
means would permit. 

Very respectfully, 

Richard Wainwright, 
Lieutenant- Commander, (J. 8. iV., Commanding. 
The Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Forces, 

North Atlantic Station. 



U. S. S. Gloucester, 
Off Santiago de Cuba, -fitly 4, IS98. 

Sir: I have the honor to submit the following report on the battle of Santiago, 
July 3, 1898: 

At 9.43 a. m. the Gloucester then being about 3,000 yards southeast of Morro, 
the officer of the deck reported that the Spanish lleet was coming out of Santi- 
ago. All hands were called to general quarters, you came on the bridge and I 
took the deck. Fire was opened at 3,500 yards from the after guns (3-pouuder 
R. F. G.) ; and, as they were brought to bear, from the bow gun (3-pounder R. F. 
G.) and the starboard guns forward (6-pounder R. F. G.). The fire-room blowers 
were started and. turning to starboard, the range was decreased to 3,000 yards. 
Four Spanish cruisers came out in column and stood to the westward close in shore. 
In the belief that the two torpedo destroyers known to be in the harbor would come 
out you directed me to slow down and wait for them, keeping up a deliberate fire on 
the cruisers from the port battery. There was no other gunboat with the fleet at 
the time and the battle ships Iowa, Indiana, Oregon, and Texas and the armored 
cruiser Brooklyn were engaged with the four Spanish vessels, Cristobal Colon, Oquendo, 
Vizcaya, and Infanta Maria Teresa (flag), all standing to the westward under full 
head of steam. The forts on shore kept np a slow fire throughout the action till it 
was evident to them that our boats were being used to rescue Spanish seamen, when 
their fire ceased. 

When the larger vessels were well clear and the rear one about 1,500 yards to 
the westward of the Morro, the destroyers Pluton and Furor came out and followed 
in their wake. At once we opened rapid fire on them from the starboard battery 
at a range of 2,500 yards, and the engines were run at full speed, the ship head- 
ing about west-northwest. Presently signal was made from the Indiana "Gun- 
boats will advance." After this signal it appeared that the fight between this 
ship and the two apparently uninjured destroyers was a thing apart from the 
battle in which the larger ships were engaged. The starboard forward guns (one 
3-pounder and two 6-pounder R. F. G.) were turned on the leading vessel, the 
Pluton, while the starboard after gun and the stern gun (both 3-pounder R. F. G.) 
were aimed at ihe Furor. The speed of the Gloucester was gradually increased 
to over 17 knots, and then we were slowly overhauling the torpedo destroyers 
and closing in toward them. The fire from both sides was vigorous, but, while 
many shots struck the water close alongside or went whistling over our heads, 
we were not hit once during the whole action. This is the more remarkable 
as the monotonous reports of an automatic gun could be heard after the 2,500- 
yard range was passed and the zone of fire could be distinctly traced by a line 
of splashes describing accurately the length of the ship and gradually approach- 
ing it. But at a distance variously estimated from 10 to 50 yards, the automatic 
fire suddenly ceased. It was afterwards found to be from a 1-pounder Maxim, and 
the execution aboard would have been terrible during the few minutes that must 
have elapsed before the ship was sunk had the fire reached us. Meanwhile the 
service of our own guns was excellent, and at a range of 1,200 yards the two 
6-millimeter automatic Colt rifles opened on the enemy. The Pluton had now 
(about 10.15) slackened her speed, showing evident signs of distress, and our fire 



122 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

was concentrated <»n the Faror. The range was decreased to 600 yards, and at 
this distance the majority <>t' shuts appeared to strike. The Pluton was run on 
the rock- aboul I miles west of Mono and blew up. Our crew cheered at the 
sight of the explosion. The Furor soon commenced to describe circles with a star- 
board helm, her fire ceased, and it became apparent that she was disabled. A 
white rag was waved from forward and we stopped tiring. Lieutenants Wood 
and Norman and Assistant Engineer Proctor wen- sent to rescue the crews and 
to see if the prizes conld be saved. These found a horrible state of affairs on the 
Furor. The vessel was a perfect shambles. As she was on lire and burning rap- 
idly, thej took off the living and then rescued all they could find in the water 
and on the beach. The Flu/on was among the rocks in the surf and could uot be 
boarded, but her crew had made their way ashore or were adrift on Life buoys and 
wreckage. These were all taken on board. I have since learned that the Netv York 
passed a number of men in the water who had doubtless jumped overboard from the 
destroyers to escape our lire. All these were probably drowned. 

While this work was going on several explosions took place on the Furor, and 
presently — at about 11.30 — she threw her bows iu the air, and turning to port slowly 
sank in deep water. 

The following were rescued from the destroyers, and are believed to be the only 
aurvi\ ors : 

Furor. — Commander Carlier, Lieutenant Arderius ( badly wounded), 3 petty officers, 
14 enlisted men : total, 19. 

Pluton. — Commander Vazquez, Lieutenant Boado, 4 petty officers, 20 enlisted men; 
total, 26. 

It was stated by Commander Carlier that the total complement of the Furor was 
til officers and enlisted men. That of the Pluton was doubtless the same. 

While one of our boats was still ashore, seeing heavy clouds of smoke behind the 
next point the ship was moved in that direction, the men being at quarters and 
everything in readiness for further action. < >n rounding the point two men-of-war 
were found on the beach burning fiercely aft, the majority of the crew being crowded 
on the forecastle and unable apparently to reach land, only 200 yards away. Our 
boats, under Lieutenant Norman and Ensign Edson, put off to the nearer vessel, 
which proved to be the flagship Infanta Maria Teresa, and rescued all on board by 
landing them on the beach through the surf. Lieutenant Norman formally received 
the surrender of the commander in chief and all his officers and men present, and 
as soon as all hands had been transferred ashore, brought on board this ship all the 
higher officers, including the admiral. Lieutenant Wood meanwhile rescued the 
remaining survivors on board the Oquendo, the second of the burning vessels. 

The Spanish officers, not feeling that the prisoners on shore were secure from attack 
by Cuban partisans, by your orders I directed Lieutenant Norman to land with a 
small force, establish a camp on shore, aud hoist the United States flag over it. He 
took with him all the rations that could be spared from the stores aboard. 

There were several incidents of interest that have aot been related in this report 
which I will refer to briefly: The colors of the Furor aud Oquendo were brought on 
board by Lieutenant Wood, and the colors of the Pluton by Mr. Proctor. 

The flagship New York while hastening from Sabone to join in the general action, 
saw the Gloucester close to her two disabled antagonists and cheered her as she went by. 

The Indiana made the general signal to the Gloucester, "Congratulations." 

During the night, the ship then being on the blockading station, the assistant 
chief of staff hailed from a torpedo boat, and after inquiring about our casualties, 
added : -'The admiral admired your splendid work." 

By order of Captain Evans, the admiral and his staff were transferred from this 
ship to the Iowa, all other unwounded prisoners were sent to the Indiana, and the 
22 wounded were taken to Sabone and put on board the army hospital steamer 
Olivette. One wounded prisoner died on board and was buried at sea ou the way 
back from Sabone. 

A comparison of the armament of the contending vessels is interesting: 

Furor, Length, 220 feet; displacement, 370 tons; armament, two 14-pounder 
R. F. G., two 6 pounder R. E.G., two 1-pounder Maxim automatic, two 14-inch tor- 
pedo tubes; complement, 67. 

Pluton. — The same. 

Gloucester (late the yacht Corsair, N.Y.Y.C.)- — Length, 241 feet; displacement, 
800 tons; armament, four 6-pounder R. F. G., four 3 pounder K. F. G., two 6-milli- 
meter colt automatic ; complement, 93. 

The action was a remarkable one. The "materiel" of the enemy was superior in 
even respect; and yet, having destroyed two vessels, either one of which would have 
been a fair match for this ship and inflicted terrible loss to their personnel, I have to 
report not one casualty. This result I attribute wholly to the accuracy and rapidity 
of our lire, which made the proper service of the guns on board the Spanish ships 
atterlj impossible. In this opinion I am borne out by the statements of our prison- 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 123 

ers, who commented on the awful destructiveness of our fire and spoke of their 
unsuccessful efforts to use their torpedoes, the crews being swept away repeatedly 
by bursting shell. They also referred to the deadly effect of the Colt automatic 
6-millimeter guns, and said that the projectiles from these passed clean through the 
vessels. 

While I may not say that any one of our officers surpassed the others in gallantry 
or efficiency, I can not refrain from enumerating them and again calling your atten- 
tion to their good services. 

Lieutenant Wood in command of the after division performed his duties in action 
with great energy and efficiency. After the action was over he bent all his efforts 
to saving life, and it is due to his efforts and those of Lieutenant Norman, Ensign 
Edson, and Assistant Engineer Proctor, ably seconded by the men under their 
commands, that over 600 officers and men were rescued from drowning 

Lieutenant Norman showed qualities during and after the action°that indicate 
unusual fitness for a naval career. It fell to this young officer to receive the sur- 
reuder of the Spanish commander in chief after having rescued him from his burning- 
flagship. 

Ensign Edson, although the greater part of his life has been spent in sedentary 
studies and pursuits, showed the result of his early training at the Naval Academy 
and in the Navy by the manner in which he fought his guns during the action. The 
skill and ability he showed in handling his boats in the surf in the work of rescue 
excited the admiration of the seamen under his command. On his return to the ship, 
Mr. Edson, who is a man of mature age and a surgeon in high standing in New York, 
turned his attention to the wounded prisoners and seconded the efforts of Assistant 
Surgeon Bransford. 

Passed Assistant Engineer McElroy did not come under my notice during the 
action, but the great speed developed by his ship when overtaking the enemy, the 
promptness with which this speed was attained from a condition of inaction, the 
intelligent response to signals from the bridge, all indicate the excellent condition 
of the discipline in his division, and of the "materiel" under his immediate charge. 
Assistant Paymaster Brown did effective service with his division of two 6 millimeter 
Colt automatic guns. The accuracy of the fire from these was testified to by our 
prisoners. 

Assistant Engineer Proctor has just joined the ship. During the battle he acted 
as your aide, and afterwards took charge of a boat with which, at great peril to him- 
self, he saved many lives from the Pluton and Furor. 

Assistant Surgeon Bransford also did double duty. He took charge of a gun in 
Mr. Edson's division and fought gallantly through the action, his services assurgeon 
not being called upon until the wounded prisoners were brought on board. 

Among the men I beg leave to call your attention to the services of John Bond, 
chief boatswain's mate, captain of No. 1 gun (3-pounder R. F. G.). The excellent 
record of this man on board ship is known to you. His remarkable marksmanship, 
perfect coolness in action, his control over men, and his force of character would 
indicate his fitness for a higher position than that he now occupies. 

William G. Bee, chief gunner's mate, also deserves special mention at this time. 
This man, an ex-apprentice, left a lucrative position on shore from a pure sense of 
duty and patriotism. His constant services on board have been almost invaluable, 
and his behavior during the action and in the work of rescue under Ensign Edson 
should, in my opinion, be recognized by a material advancement that would keep 
him in the service. 

Herman C. Green, quartermaster, first class, steered the ship through the action 
without an error, where an error could so easily be made and with disastrous results. 
His coolness and skill merit recognition. 

The division officers, whose reports to you accompany this letter, have made certain 
recommendations in which I heartily concur. 
Very respectfully, 

Harry P. Huse, 
Lieutenant, U. S. N., Executive Officer. 

The Captain. 



131409. 

[Engagement of Vixen with Spanish fleet, July 3, 1898.] 

U. S. S. Vixen, 
Guantanamo, Cuba, July 7, 1898. 
Sir : I have the honor to make the following report as to the part taken 
by the U. S. S. Vixen in the engagement with the Spanish fleet under 
the command of Admiral Cervera during the morning and afternoon 
of Sunday, July 3, 1898. 



124 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

Between !>.35 ami 9.45 a. m. the Vixen was at a point about 4 miles 
to the westward of .Mono, and at a distance of about 14 miles south of 
the shore line. At about 9.40 it was reported to me that an explosion 
had taken place in the entrance of Santiago Harbor. I went on deck 
and almost immediately sighted the leading vessel of the Spanish fleet 
standing out of the entrance. Some of the vessels of our fleet were 
closing in toward Morro and tiring. 

'flu- Vixen was heading toward the Morro. The engines were ordered 
ahead at full speed ami the helm put hard aport, the object being to 
cross ahead of the leading Spanish vessel, and thus not obstruct the 
gun lire of our own fleet, the shells from which soou began to fall about 
the position we had just left. 

The leading Spanish vessel opened fire on this vessel with her star- 
board bow guns, the projectiles from which passed over us, all being 
aimed too high. 1 estimate the number of shots fired at us at this time 
to have been between five and ten. 

As the Vixen gat lined headway her head come to about south by 
east, opening the Brooklyn up about two points on our port bow; 
steadied her and steamed on about this course until we had reached a 
position about a mile to the southward and westward of the Brooklyn, 
which was now turning with port helm and firing her guns as they bore 
on the enemy's vessels. At 9.50 hoisted signal No. 252. The course 
was then ordered changed to west-southwest, the intention being to 
steer a parallel course to that of the Spanish fleet. By some mistake 
the quartermaster steadied the helm on southwest by south, which was 
soon discovered, but not until the Vixen had increased her distance off- 
shore by perhaps another half mile. The course west-southwest was 
again ordered, and when steadied on it we were at an estimated dis- 
tance of about 5 miles from the shore. From about 10.15 the courses 
and times of changing were as follows: At 10.15 changed course to 
W. h S., at 10.56 to NW. by N., at 11.00 WNW., at 11.05 W. by N., at 
11.10 NW. by. W., at 11.15 W. by N., at 11.30 W. by S., at 1.50 W. by 
N. All these courses were by the steering compass, and the speed 
was estimated from 12 to 13£ knots per hour. Times noted are by 
deck clock, which was five minutes fast of watch time used in the notes 
inclosed. 

Seeing that the Spanish vessels were out of range of our guns while 
we were well within range of theirs, we reserved our fire. 

About 11.06, having approached within range of the Yizcaya, we 
opened fire with our starboard battery at an elevation of 5,000 yards 
for the 6-pounder guns and extreme elevation for the 1-pouuders; con- 
tinued the fire for six minutes, when, seeing that the ensign of the 
I "izvaya was not flying, at 11.12 ordered cease firing. Expended twenty- 
seven 6-pounder armor-piercing shells and eighteen 1-pounder common 
shells. 

After passing Asseraderro the course was held at from west by north 
to west by south, heading for the point on the western horizon. Average 
speed, about 12 to 1,'U knots; average number of revolutions, 105 per 
minute; average steam pressure, 122i pounds. 

The Brooklyn and Oregon bore on the port and starboard bows, respec- 
tively, and were gradually dropping the Vixen astern, as was the 
Cristobal Colon, which was running closer inshore. About 12.25 the 
Oregon opened fire on the Colon, as did also the Brooklyn, feeling their 
way up to the range, which was apparently obtained after the fourth or 
fifth shot. About 1.26 the Oregon and Brooklyn headed inshore about 
four points. About l.'2S the Texas hoisted signal. " Enemy has surren- 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 125 

dered." This signal was repeated to the New York by the Vixen. At 
2.30 Vixen stopped off Rio Tarquino, in the vicinity of the Oregon and 
Brooklyn. The Cristobal Colon was close inshore, bows on the beach, 
her colors down, lying on the deck at the foot of her staff. 

I have the honor to inclose a copy of notes taken during the chase 
by my orders upon the suggestion of Lieutenant Harlow. These notes 
were written by Assistant Paymaster Doherty. The incidents and 
times were given by Lieutenant Harlow, whose watch was five minutes 
slow of deck-clock time. The times taken after 10.30 are accurate: 
those taken before that time were estimated and may be in error a few 
minutes. 

Inclosed is a sketch showing positions of vessels at various times. 
It is taken from a chart taken from the Cristobal Colon after the sur- 
render and is enlarged four times. All courses are true. 

In conclusion, I wish to call to your attention the coolness and strict 
attention to duty of both officers and men. 
Very respectfully, 

Alex. Sharp, Jr., 
Lieutenant, Commanding. 

The Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Forces, 

North Atlantic Station. 



U. S. S. Vixen, 
Off Santiago de Cuba, July 4, 189S. 
Sir : In accordance with Article No. 525, United States Navy Regulations, I have 
the honor to report that duriDg the engagement with Admiral Cervera's fleet on 
July 3, 1898, the ordnance of this vessel worked well, with the exceptiou of the 
lever of No. 3, 1-pounder automatic, which broke, necessitating the shifting of guns 
Nos. 2 and 3 on their mounts. 

This vessel received the first fire from the advanced vessel of the enemy, and for 
an hour or more was within the zone of tire of the three leading vessels, many shells 
that passed over the Brooklyn falling about us. 

Respectfully, C. H. Harlow, 

Lieutenant, U. S. N., and Executive. 
The Commanding Officer, 

U. S. S. Vixen. 



Notes taken during the engagement with Admiral Cerrera's fleet on July 3, 1S9S. 

[These notes were written about 11 a. m. and were drawn from the recollection of events transpiring 

prior to 10.30.] 

At 9.45 a. m. reported tug coming outof harbor. Mr. Harlow examined it through 
a glass and discovered it to be a Spanish cruiser flying what was probably an 
admiral's flag. 

Notified commanding officer; called all hands to quarters and stood to south- 
ward. Brooklyn hoisted signal 250. The leading vessel had about changed course A 
to west when second vessel appeared, followed shortly afterwards by the Colon. 
The first two vessels were evidently the Vizcaya and Oquendo or Maria Teresa. Fleet 
closing in and opening fire. About 10 a. m. leading enemy's vessel had headed to 
west, full speed, followed by the others. Brooklyn at 10 was nearest vessel, and, 
standing to north, engaged leading two ships. 

At this time two leading ships were quite close together, with an interval of, per- 
haps, three-fourths of a mile between second ship and Colon. About 10.05 the Brook- 
lyn began to turn with port helm and made a complete turn to eastward, coming 
around so that when again heading west the two leading enemy's ships bore well on 
her starboard bow and the Colon on her starboard quarter. For the next fifteen 
minutes the Brooklyn sustained and returned the fire of the two leading ships, with 
an occasional shot from the Colon. 

The Vixen steered courses of various time intervals, of south, southwest by south, 
and about 10.15 was going ahead full speed W. i S. (steering compass). The shells 



126 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

that went over Brooklyn struck close ahead, astern, and on Btarboaid beam of Fixen, 
and several passed directly over, a piece of bursting shell going through tbe Hag at 
mainmast head. 

Notes taken /<</ Lieutenant Harlow during the engaf/ement with Admiral Cerreras fleet on 

July S, ISW. 

[These notes arc aeeur:ite, as viewed from t lie Vixen. The watch used was at practically the same 
reading as the deck clock of the Brooklyn. Accuracy of position is not claimed for any vessel. 
Position and bearings are relative only. Incidents recounted are accurate ] 

10.32 a.m. Colon and first boat close together, just clear of Brooklyn's bow. Colon evi- 
dent 1\ passing ahead. The th st ship thai came out of harbot stopped off Juan Gonza- 
les, undoubtedly on lire. Oregon forging ahead and firing ahead. Enemy's destroyers 
to westward of Cabanas, evidently engaged by Iowa and Texas and apparently on 
lire. Indiana a little to the westward of Morro. 

At 10.31. Colon still gaining. Ship which led before rapidly dropping behind, 
and two on tire near Juan Gonzales. Colon reserving lire. Colon commenced firing 
again at 10.37. No other United States vessels in sight. Texas and Iowa in rear of 
Oregon 5 to 6 miles. Distance between Iowa and Indiana about 4. Colon slacking up. 

At 10.40 second vessel just clear of stern of Brooklyn. Vixen distant about 5 miles. 
Oregon gaining rapidly. Colon using only smokeless powder. 

At 10. Iti Brooklyn forged ahead from our point of view. Oregon fired 13-inch from 
forward gnu. 

At 10.47 Texas considerably ahead of Iowa and gaining rapidly. 

At 10.48 shell from Brooklyn hurst apparently alongside of second vessel. Texas 
passed Juan (ion/ales at 10.49. Indiana off Cabanas at 10.49. Vixen at 10.50 veered 
inshore, heading about north-northwest. 

At L0.53 Texas gaining. Iowa off Gonzales. Yacht and Indiana olf Guyacabon. 

At 10.54 Vizcaya {.') evidently on fire and heading for beach, with a heavy list to 
port quarter. 

At 10.50 Vizcaya heading for Aserraderos. Texas coming up 5 miles distant. 
Vizcaya at 11, with colors dying, nearly ashore at Aserraderos. 

At 11.01 Vizcaya ported helm and headed about east. Texas firing forward gun. 
Iowa and New York close offshore, and torpedo boat astern of New York about 1 
mile. 

At 11.04 Vizcaya starboarded and stood close inshore. 

At 11.05 Vixen opened fire on Vizcaya and at 11.07 her colors came down and orders 
were given on board the Vixen to cease firing. 

At 11.09 sudden burst of fire from her and probably sinking. 

At 11.15 Texas and other ships reserved their tire. Iowa gaining on Massachusetts. 
Vessels in sight at 11.16, Iowa and Indiana; Indiana at least 10 miles from Colon. 
Vessel ashore at Aserraderos probably flagship. 

At 11.20 Iowa evidently had stopped. 

At 11.24 flames were seen bursting from the Vizcaya. 

At 11.26 the Vizcaya exploded, followed at 11.30 by another explosion, probably 
magazine, with large sheets of flame. Other explosions at 11.33.30, 11.35.15, 11.36.15, 
and 11.41. 

At 11.42 the position of the ships as seen from the Vixen was as follows: Tbe 
Colon close inshore, distant about 7 miles from the Vixen; the Oregon about one 
point on the starboard how, distant about 1| miles; the Brooklyn one point on star- 
board bow, distant about 3 miles; the Texas on starboard quarter, distant about 1 
mile; lon-a two points on starboard quarter, distant about 8 miles; New York one 
point on starboard quarter, distant about 10 miles; the two latter apparently off 
Bocadel Uio. No other vessels in sight. Smoke of ships destroyed off Juan Gonzales 
in sight, but hulls invisible. 

At 11.52 another explosion occurred on the Vizcaya. 

Position at noon practically the same, ex'cept Texas gaining rapidly. Vixen abreast 
of Cevilla, 30 miles west of Santiago. Texas bearing three points on starboard quar- 
ter, distant 1 mile. Oregon and Brooklyn one point on starboard and port bows, 
respectively, distant 1 and 5 miles. Colon two points on starboard bow, distant 
about 10 miles, (dose under fourth hill (see sketch) — Bayamita. Vixen shifted Nos. 
2 and 3 1 pounder guns upon their mounts at 12.03, No. 3 1-pounder being disabled. 

At 12.05 New York was in line with burning ship at Aserraderos, about 9 miles 
distant. 

At 12.15 Texas on starboard quarter, Vixen heading west by south (p. c). New York 
two points on starboard quarter and evidently gaining. Oregon one-half point on 
starboard bow. Brooklyn one point on port bow, distant 9 miles. Colon one point 
on starboard bow, distant 10 miles, ball' way between third and fourth hills. Oregon 
started bring at 12.20, her shot falling short. Fired only one shot from 13-inch gun. 

At 12.23 Oregon find again; shot struck a little ahead of Colon, and appeared to 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 127 

pass over her. Colon is almost hull down from the Vixen. Brooklyn started firing 
at 12.26; struck very short, about two-thirds of distance to Colon; second shot at 
12.26.30, about three- fourths distance to Colon; third shot at 12.27.15, about four- 
fifths distance to Colon; fourth shot about five-sixths of distance. 

At 12.29.30 Oreyon fired again; shot went over. There were thirteen seconds 
between the flash of the Brooklyn's shot and the time the shell struck the water. 
At 12.50 the Texas bore oue point forward of the starboard beam. 
At 1.15 the Brooklyn and Oregon headed in about four points. 

At 1.23 the Texas hoisted signal " Enemy has surrendered." The Colon lyingat Kio 
Turquino. Boat from Brooklyn went alongside Colon's starboard side at 2 o'clock. 
Very respectfully, 

C. H. Harlow, 

Lieutenant, U. S. X. 
The Commanding Officer, 

U. S. S. Vixen. 



131409. 

[Report of battle ofl' Santiago July 3, 1898.1 

U. S. Torpedo Boai Ericsson, 
Harbor of Guantanamo, Cuba, July 5, 1898. 

Sir: In obedience to article 437, page 98, U. S. Navy Regulations, 
1896, 1 respectfully report that on the morning of July 3, 1898, the U. S. 
torpedo boat Ericsson was proceeding under half speed on the starboard 
quarter of the U. S. flagship New York toward Siboney when the 
enemy was sighted coming out of Santiago entrauce, we being then 5 or 
6 miles to the eastward of the Morro. The vessels of our fleet were firing 
on the enemy. The helm was put hard aport at once and full power 
put on as speedily as possible, and the course directed toward the 
enemy's ship, the crews at quarters, and the vessel in all respects ready 
to deliver torpedo attack. By the time we had turned to westward 
two of the enemy's vessels were out in plain sight. They were followed 
at short intervals by the other two cruisers, and then, after a longer 
interval, by the two torpedo-boat destroyers. The fire of the shore 
batteries supported the enemy's fleet, and the fire of both fleets was 
rapid and continuous. The flagship New York had hoisted signal H, 
" Close in toward harbor entrance and attack vessels." The Ericsson 
proceeded as fast as possible, the steam pressure and speed gradually 
increasing. The shore batteries at entrance to Santiago were directing 
their fire on the Gloucester at this time, which was hotly engaged with 
the two torpedo-boat destroyers. At full speed we drew near the 
entrance, and as we passed and afterwards the fire of the shore bat- 
teries was directed on us. Several shell struck near us, short or 
beyond, and two burst overhead and over. 

The Ericsson was not struck. The Brooklyn, Texas, Oregon, Iowa, 
and Indiana were closely engaged with the Colon, Vizcaya, Oquendo, 
and Maria Teresa; the firing was furious. As we drew near the two 
torpedo-boat destroyers were seen to strike to the Gloucester, and the 
Maria Teresa and Oquendo to run ashore, strike their colors, and dis- 
play white flags. They were both on fire and clouds of steam arising 
from their hatches and ports. The Indiana remained near them, the 
Ioica directed her fire on the Vizcaya, and the Oregon joined in tbe 
chase of the Colon. The course of the Ericsson was directed toward 
the Vizcaya, prepared to deliver torpedo attack, but before Ave could 
arrive within striking distance the Vizcaya was seen to strike to tbe 
Iowa, run ashore, and burst into flames, her engines being left running 
and clouds of steam issuing from all her openings on deck and in her 
sides. The course of the Ericsson was then set for the Colon, which 



128 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

was running very last to the westward, pursued by the Brooklyn, Texas, 
and Oregon. A.s the Ericsson was hauling away from the New York in. 
the chase, signal was made, interrogatory, 2872, "Request permission 
to continue the chase." The flagship hoisted negative and by wigwag 
signal directed the Ericsson to pick up men in the water astern. 
Turned with port helm and found and picked up one man afloat on a 
piece of wreckage, and then returned to the chase, the New Voile in 
the meantime chasing fast after the Colon. As we came up with the 
Iowa, lying about '2 miles seaward of Vizcaya, the Ericsson was 
hailed and directed to go inshore and rescue the crew of the Vizcaya 
from the burning vessel. Kan close alongside the Vizcaya and sent 
small boat to her, boats from Iowa pulling in also at same time. Ex- 
plosions from the ammunition on board the Vizcaya began about this 
time, and her guns, which had been left loaded, were tired one after 
the other by the tlanies. The Vizcaya was on lire fore and aft, but the 
mass of the fire was aft, and the position of the Ericsson was perilous in 
the extreme, and only the urgency of the occasion caused her to remain. 
Rescued 11 officers and about 90 sailors and marines from the vessel, 
many of them sorely wounded. The Spanish were no sooner taken on 
board than they urged immediate withdrawal of the Ericsson, but this 
vessel remained until all alive had been taken from the Vizcaya by the 
Ericsson's small boat and the boats from the Iowa. One of the Vizcaya\s 
large cutters was also used. The Ericssons deck was then crowded with 
prisoners, most of them naked and many of them wounded, and she 
returned to the Iowa, towing the Vizcayah cutter, also tilled with pris- 
oners. These were all put on board the Iowa, and the Ericsson was by 
her directed to verify the information given by the Resolute, which came 
up from eastward, and signaled, "Enemy's ships to eastward." Spoke 
Resolute, which reported that she had made out an enemy's battle ship 
oft* Siboney; then spoke transport Comal, which had only seen the 
signal displayed by the Resolute; then spoke Harvard, which reported 
having made out an enemy's battle ship; requested Harvard to notify 
Iowa, and proceeded under full speed to eastward. Off vicinity of 
Siboney sighted Indiana and an Austrian battle ship. The Indiana 
signaled Ericsson to come within hail, and directed that we proceed 
under full speed to westward to notify our vessels of presence of Aus- 
trian battleship Infanta Maria Theresa, which, desiring to go into San- 
tiago, had been referred to the commander in chief in view of the 
existing conditions. Proceeded as directed until up with Iowa; reported 
to Iowa, and that our coal was almost gone, and that we were using salt 
feed in the boilers, the vessel only carrying two hours' fresh feed at full 
power, and the Ericsson then having been over four hours under full 
power. Received permission to return to eastward, and proceeded until 
signaled by Harvard to come within hail; by her was directed to tow 
her boats to and from the burning wrecks of the Maria Theresa and 
Oquendo. This was accordingly done until no more persons remained 
to be rescued from the vessels, the remaining prisoners being all ashore 
on the beach. Received permission from the Harvard to proceed to 
eastward. About <> p. m. spoke Iowa, and received permission to go to 
Guantanamo for coal and water, at which harbor Ericsson arrived at 
9.45 ]>. in., and reported the victory to commanding officer U. S. S. Mas- 
sachusetts, the senior officer present. 

There were no casualties on board this vessel. 

I respectfully commend the good conduct of Edward Ryan, gunner's 
mate, second class, who manned the small boat and brought oft' the offi- 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 129 

cers and men from the stern of the Vizcaya, a duty of great danger from 
the incessant explosions of ammunition on board her. 
Very respectfully, 

N. R. Usher, 
Lieutenant. JJ. S. N., Commanding. 
The Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Force, 

North Atlantic station. 



131409. 

[Part taken by Harvard in occurrences of July 3, after destruction of Spanish fleet.] 

No. 44.] U. S. S. Harvard, 

At Sea, Off Altares, Cuba, July 4, 1898. 

Sir : On Sunday the 3d instant the Harvard, under my command, 
was at Altares, Cuba, discharging the military stores brought in the 
ship with the troops from Newport News, Va. Nearly all of the boats 
and the majority of the officers of the ship were employed in this work. 
Some of the boats were away Irom the ship discharging their loads and 
others were alongside loading. 

At 10.45 a. m. the U. S. S. Resolute passed Altares at a considerable 
distance, standing to the eastward, sounding her whistle vigorously 
and flying a signal which announced that the Spanish fleet had "tied." 
With the utmost dispatch 1 recalled the boats and officers to the ship, 
hoisted the former, sent the steam launch on shore, got under way, and 
stood to the westward to join you. The ship was cleared for action. 

I had previously observed that the tieet was firing, but supposed that 
it was a bombardment of the Morro and the neighboring batteries. 
The ships of the fleet had meantime disappeared to the westward, none 
being in sight when I came out from behind the land where I could 
command an uninterrupted view of the coast west of Morro. 

I soon came up witli the wrecks on shore of two of the smaller ves- 
sels and two of the cruisers of the Spanish fleet, and shortly afterwards 
with the wreck of a third cruiser, all of the cruisers burning fiercely. 

1 had meantime passed the Indiana and one of our torpedo boats, 
standing to the eastward in search of the missing Spanish cruiser, and 
informed them that a large Spanish battle ship or cruiser was in sight 
to the eastward of Daiquiri. They immediately stood on in chase, but 
the supposed enemy was ascertained later to be the Austrian cruiser 
Maria Tehresa. 

At the most westerly of the three wrecks of the Spanish cruisers, 
the Vizcaya, I found the battle ship Iowa and communicated with her. 
Learning from Captain Evans that you, in the New York, were in chase 
of the Cristobal Colon and were probably many miles to the westward, 
I decided not to go farther in that direction. 

Shortly afterwards the Iowa and the Harvard stood to the eastward, 
and upon reaching the wrecks of the Oquendo and Maria Teresa, Cap- 
tain Evans informed me that the officers and crews of both vessels 
were on shore in great distress and suffering for want of food, and 
asked me if 1 would rescue them — a request with which I of course 
instantly complied and which would have been unnecessary had I pre- 
viously known the circumstances concerning them. 

1 took the Harvard in as near the wrecks as I deemed to be prudent, 
and at 4.40 p. m. lowered nine of our boats and sent them in to the 
shore to rescue the survivors. This work continued until 9.45 p. in., 
9 



130 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

when the last boat load of Spanish prisoners came alongside. During 
the greater part of the time the steam cutter of the Indiana rendered 
valuable assistance in towing our boats to and from the shore. We 
had the good fortune to rescue 35 officers and 037 men without accident 
to them or to our boats, notwithstanding the fact that the landing was 
through the surf, and dangerous as well from the incessant explosion 
of ammunition, both small and large, as from the surf. The boats were 
handled with skill and judgment by the officers in command of them, 
who were Lieutenants Beale, Roberts, Davis, and Bradshaw, Ensigns 
Turner and Cuming, and Cadets Noa and Bruff, whose conduct and 
that of the boats' crews was commendable. 

Anion-: the reseated were 38 sick and wounded. At 10 o'clock I 
steamed on to rejoin the ships off Santiago, reaching them at 10.55 
]>. in., with the junior medical officer of the Indiana and a lieutenant 
and a boat's crew of the U. S. S. Gloucester. 

The Spanish officers and men received every attention that it was 
possible to bestow upon them for their comfort and welfare. Some of 
them can e on board wholly nude, and many with only a shirt or trou- 
sers. As soon as possible after their arrival on board they were pro- 
vided with food and necessary clothing. About 300 working suits and 
many shoes and canvas hats were issued to them. The sick and 
wounded were attended by our own medical staff, assisted by two of 
the Spanish medical officers, who were among those rescued. 

1 transmit herewith a copy of the detailed report of Lieut. Joseph 
Beale, U. S. K, of the Harvard, who was the seuior officer in charge of 
the transportation of the Spaniards to this ship, and I beg leave to 
invite your attention to the terms in which he speaks of the highly 
commendable conduct of the officers and men associated with him in 
the successful accomplishment of an important and humane duty, and 
one not without exposure to danger. 

This forenoon 10 of the most severely wounded men were transferred 
to the U. S. hospital ship Solace. None of the Spanish officers on board 
of this ship was so seriously wounded as to require transfer to that 
vessel. 

In conclusion, I beg to be permitted the privilege in my own behalf, 
as well as that of the officers and men of the Harvard , to extend to you 
and to the people of the United States our most hearty ami sincere 
congratulations upon the brilliant victory achieved by you yesterday, 
which adds another page to the imperishable glory and renown of the 
history of our Navy. 

Very respectfully, C. S. Cotton, 

Captain, TJ. 8. iV., Commanding. 

The Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Force, 

North Atlantic Station. 



128711. 

| B< pod "i rescue of survivors of destroyed Spanish cruisers by men of Harvard.] 

U. S. S. Harvard, 
OffAltares, Cuba, July -/, 1898. 
Sir: In obedience to your verbal order I have tbe honor to call to your attention 
the < lucl of the officers and men of i Ins shi]. engaged under my charge in the res- 
cm- of i;:;7 officers and men of the Spanish cruisers Almirante Oquendo and Maria 
Teresa on the afternoon of .Inly :i. 

The first two boats were sent at L40p. m. to the Oquendo, then ashore in (iorgon- 
zalcs Bay and burning fiercely. Fifteen exhausted men were here saved, most of 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 131 

them hanging on lines from the bows to escape the fire, and. all of them in the last 
extremity from heat, smoke, and fright. In the meantime 6 more of the heavy ship's 
boats proceeded to the adjoining bay, called Praya Nima Nima, w here the Maria Teresa 
was ashore and afire, with her bow not more than 75 yards from the beach. The first 
boat in made fast to a small chain hanging from the bows of the ship and veered in 
through the surf close to the beach, sending a line ashore. The survivors were taken 
into the boat over this line and transferred to the next boat ahead, which, when 
loaded, shoved off and pulled straight for the Harvard, passing within a few yards of 
the burning ship. 

In this way most of the survivors were taken off. Two boat loads of the most 
seriously wounded were placed in a beached six-oared cutter of the Gloucester and 
taken off by her crew. The steam cutter of the Indiana was most useful in towing 
our heavy boats, and in one instance pulled one of them off the beach. A detail of 
officers and men from the Indiana and Gloucester was most useful in helping the 
Spanish to the boats and succoring the wounded. For five hours the men worked 
close to a fiercely burning ship amid the incessant explosion of stuall-arm ammuni- 
tion, at least one explosion of a more serious character taking place, and, although 
warned frequently by the Spanish officers that a great explosion forward mighttake 
place at any moment, worked coolly and steadily. 

In five hours 637 Spanish officers and men, all of them worn out and many seri- 
ously wounded, were taken from the burning Oquendo or through the surf and 
transferred to the Harvard, without accident to man or boat, by crews of men, most 
of whom had been in the service only one month. Such a happy result under such 
trying surroundings could only have been brought about by the sustained courage 
of the men and their officers. I desire particularly to call attention to the humane 
way the men handled and helped the Spanish into the boats, treating them in all 
respects as comrades in distress. The humanity displayed by our men was fully 
equal to their courage. 

Very respectfully, Joseph Beale, 

Lieutenant, United States Nary. 

The Commanding Officer, 

U. S. S. Harvard. 



131264. 

[Report of assistance rendered by Hist after battle of Santiago. ] 

U. S. S. Hist, 
Off Santiago de Cuba, July J, 1*98. 

Sin : I have to report that on July 3, at 9.30 a. in., when this vessel 
was just east of Morro Castle, following the flagship New York, the 
enemy were discovered leaving the harbor of Santiago. Immediately 
turned, with flagship, and proceeded toward *he enemy. 

Beat to general quarters at 9.45. At 10 o'clock passed two torpedo 
boats (Piuton and Furore) of enemy ashore and in flames, the Gloucester 
standing by them. Headed in a few minutes later for the Maria Theresa 
and Oquendo, which were aground and burning, for the purpose of pick- 
ing up officers and crews. The New York Herald boat, Golden Bod, ran 
alongside of us, and requested that Surgeon Simons of the Iowa, whom 
they had on board, be taken to his ship. This was done. We then 
headed inshore, and ran close to the Vizcaya, which was on a reef and 
in flames. Lowered our boats, and, in charge of Lieutenant Hunicke 
and Assistant Engineer Kellogg, they took off from the ship and beach 
142 Spanish prisoners, 15 of whom were wounded, several dangerously. 
Balance Vizcaya's crew taken on board Ericsson and Iowa. Stood by 
Vizcaya from 11 a. m. to 6. 30 p. m. Prisoners were assembled on shore 
by the Cubans, and the wounded were temporarily cared for by them. 
Lieut. Col. Juan Vaillant, commanding Cuban party, visited this ship. 

The prisoners were nearly all nude and almost starved. Provided 
them at once with food, water, and clothing, and had wounded immedi- 
ately cared for. Prisoners informed us that the Vizcaya had lost 110 
men, and Lieutenants Cheregini and Seralegga and Midshipman Ristori, 
another one of that name being unaccounted for. 

At 6.30 p. m., having taken off all remaining prisoners, headed for 



132 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

Santiago, and at o'clock signaled Indiana to send surgeon on board 
at once. At 9.30 was instructed by Iowa to transfer the prisoners, 
including wounded, on this vessel to the Indiana, which transfer was 
completed at 11.30. About midnight Brooklyn passed and sent Flag 
Lieut. J. H. Sears, U. S. N., on board with dispatches for conveyance 
to Altares. Arrived there 2.15 a. in. July 4. At -1 a. m. returned with 
Lieutenant Scars to the Brooklyn, oil" Santiago, and at o' a. ui. rejoined 
the flagship. 

Very respectfully, 

Charles W. LTazeltine, 
Lieutenant, U. 8. A., Executive officer. 
fin command during events above narrated.] 
Lieut. Lucien Young, U. S. N., 

Commanding U. 8. S. Hist. 

U. S. S. Hist, July /, 1898. 
Forwarded to commander in chief. 

Lucien Young, 
Lieutenant, U. 8. N., Commanding. 



139862. 

[Report of action of Bint in battle on" Santiago, July 3, 1898.] 

U. S. S. Hist, 

Off Santiago de Cuba, Cuba, July 4, 1898. 

Sir: I have the honor to submit the following report of the actions 
of this vessel in the battle of July 3, off Santiago de Cuba: 

At 9.35 a. in., while immediately astern of the flagship New York, 
following her to Altares, and when about 5 miles to the eastward of 
Mono Castle, the enemy was discovered leaving the harbor. 

Turned immediately with the port helm and steamed full speed to 
the westward, in wake of flagship. About 9.45 flagship made general 
signal, '-Close in to mouth of harbor and attack enemy." At 9.45 beat 
to general quarters. Speed at first 7 knots, increasing gradually to 11. 

While running past the forts the Hist was fired at six times, several 
shells striking very near. 

About 10.40 a. m. passed the Gloucester close inshore, and about 3 
miles to the westward of Morro, standing by the wrecks of the Spanish 
destroyers Pluton and Furor. 

Made out the two vessels, ashore and burning, in Juan Gonzales 
Bay, to be the Infanta Maria Teresa and Almirante Oquendo, and the 
Hist was headed inshore toward them to pick" up the survivors. 

While thus standing in, the New York Herald dispatch boat Golden 
Rod came up and hailed, requesting that we take Surgeon Simons, of 
the Iowa, who had been ashore with the Army the previous day, and 
whom they had on board, to his ship, as he feared there had been many 
casualties. 

Dr. Simons was sent on board, and the Hist was again headed to the 
westward, and steamed full speed the 9 miles to Aserraderos, where the 
Vizcaya lay beached and in flames, and oil' which lay the Iowa. About 
5 miles to westward of Juan Gonzales Bay, passed the Indiana stand- 
ing to the eastward. 

About 1 1.45, after sending Surgeon Simons on board the Iowa, I was 
directed by Captain Evans to stand inshore to the wreck of the Vizcaya, 
and assist in the rescue of her crew. 

The Vizcaya was reached at 11.55. Found the torpedo boat Ericsson 
standing by her, also a number of the loica's boats. Immediately 
lowered our four boats and sent them to the rescue. 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 133 

The first 23 picked up by our boats were placed ou board the Ericsson, 
which shortly after steamed out to the Iowa, and thence to the east- 
ward. 

The Iowa, after taking on board a number of prisoners, recalled her 
boats, and also steamed off to the eastward. 

During the next live hours the Hist lay close to the burning wreck, 
and rescued 143 more from the ship, water, and shore. Nearly all were 
nude and very hungry, claiming to have had no food for the previous 
twenty-four hours. They were immediately furnished with clothing, 
food., and drink. 

Of the 166 picked up, some 20 were wounded, 5 or 6 desperately. 
Several had been given first aid by Cubans on shore. All possible 
medical assistance was given them. 

About 2 p. m. the Resolute passed to the westward, displaying signal, 
" Enemy ship in sight;" and soon after made out a battleship flying the 
Austrian colors, and also an international signal, "D. C. J.," signifying 
"Austrian colors." 

The Cubans on shore at Acerraderos did not fire on the Spaniards. 
In fact, when our boats were taking the Spaniards from the beach, the 
Cubans rendered valuable assistance. 

Lieut. Col Juan Vailliant, commanding Cuban camp at Acerraderos, 
paid a visit to the Hist. 

About 5.30 p. m., after having taken on board the last survivor, the 
Hist was headed to the eastward, aud steamed full speed for Santiago, 
arriving off there about 7 o'clock. Reported to Captain Taylor, of the 
Indiana, and requested a surgeon, who was immediately sent. I was 
then directed to report to Captain Evaus, of the Iowa, who ordered 
that the prisoners, including the wounded, be transferred to the 
Indiana. This was accomplished by 1 1.15. 

At 11.45 p. m. the Brooklyn came up and, after hailing, sent on board 
Flag Lieutenant Sears, for immediate transportation to Altares, with 
dispatches from Commodore Schley. Landed Lieutenant Sears at 2.30 
a. m. and at 4.30 left Altares for Santiago. Placed Lieutenant Sears 
on the Brooklyn at 6 o'clock, and at 0.30 a. m., July 4, joined the flag- 
ship New York off Santiago. 

1 respectfully invite your attention to the meritorious services ren- 
dered by Lieut. (J. G.) F. H. Hunickeand Asst. Engineer E. S. Kellogg. 
These officers had charge of the boats, and for an hour or more laid 
alongside the Vizcaya, taking men from her bow, side, and stern, and 
from the water, during all of which time she was on fire fore and aft 
and the explosions on board were almost incessant, thus making this 
work exceedingly hazardous. The petty officers and entire crew took 
turns in manning the boats for this dangerous duty. 
Very respectfully, 

Charles W. Hazeltine, 
Lieutenant, V. S. N., Commanding. 

The Commander in Chief TJ. S. Naval Force, 

North Atlantic Station. 



131409. 

[Operations of Resolute on July 3, 1898.] 

U. S. S. Eesolute, 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, July 4, 1898. 
Sir : I have the honor to make the following report of the operations 
of this ship on Sunday, July 3: 

Arriving off Santiago at 6 a. m., I reported in person on board the 



134 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

flagship to the chief of stall', and from him received orders to remain in 
the vicinity until further orders. While lying to the northeast of the 
line, just to the eastward of the Indiana, we sighted the leading vessel 
of the Spanish fleet coining out. The same time the Iowa tired a shot. 

We at once headed the ship to the eastward, but had not got her 
steady on her course before a 10 inch shell struck about 40 feet from 
the Starboard side of the ship abreast the pilot house, and a minute 
later a 6 inch shell struck about 70 feet astern the ship. The next five 
minutes a number 01 projectiles struck the water beyond and about her. 

Making all the speed possible. 1 headed for Altares in order to com- 
municate with the commander in chief. Before reaching Altares I met 
the flagship New York coming to the westward, and communicated to 
her that the Spanish tleet was coming out and standing to the western 
part of the line. 

Havingthen received your orders to proceed to Gnantanamo, Iheaded 
in that direction, signaling to the Harvard as we passed Altares that 
the Spanish fleet were coming out. 

At 10.20, when off Baiquiri, sighted a large man-of-war, painted a 
dingy white, with two funnels and two military tops, standing to the 
westward. On proceeding nearer, made out what I took to be the 
Spanish flag, together with a signal which I could not read. 

Heading the ship to the southward to pass around him, the stranger 
put his helm to starboard and apparently stood after us to sea. Being 
convinced by this maneuver on his part that he was an enemy, I at 
once headed to the westward, and, running down to the fleet of army 
transports, warned them to sea. 

In repassing Altares I also signaled to the Harvard that an enemy 
was coming from the eastward. 

Continuing my course to the westward I crossed the entrance to 
Santiago Harbor, and the Socapa battery fired two shots at us; the 
first, from a large gun, passed directly over the pilot house, and the 
second, apparently a 0-inch shell, passed over the forecastle of the ship. 

Shortly after passing the southern entrance 1 sighted a wreck burn- 
ing on the beach, and a little later discovered the Gloucester standing by 
a second wreck, apparently to save her crew. These wrecks, together 
with three others that we sighted, were all blazing fiercely, and two of 
them blew up with a loud report and a large volume of smoke shortly 
after we passed them. 

At 12.45 communicated with the Indiana and told her of the man- 
of-war I had sighted off Baiquiri. Captain Taylor ordered me to pro- 
ceed at once to the commander in chief with the information. 

At 1.15 communicated with the Iowa and notified Captain Evans 
that I had sighted a Spanish man-of-war off Baiquiri, and, at his 
request, assisted in recalling some of his boats from the wreck, near by. 

1 then proceeded to the westward and found the flagship, with her 
consorts, lying off the Cristobal Colon, which was aground at the 
mouth of a small stream. Here I received 508 Spanish prisoners, of 
whom 494 were enlisted men and 14 were officers. I also received a 
guard of 25 marines and a commissioned officer to assist in guarding 
the prisoners. 

At 11 p. m. I got under way and proceeded to Guantanamo Bay, 
where 1 arrived at 7.30 a. in. to-day. The prisoners are now on board 
this ship, waiting your orders, and thus far they have given us no 
trouble. 

I desire to add that during our run to westward, while warning these 
ships and hastening to communicate with the commander in chief, the 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 135 

engines made at times 81 revolutions per minute, showing a speed in 
excess of ]G knots, which is in excess of any that she made while in 
the employ of the Old Dominion Steamship Company. I consider it 
my duty to commend to you the efficiency of the engineer force on this 
occasion. 

Congratulating you upon the complete victory won by yourself and 
the squadron under your command, 

I am, very respectfully, J. G. Eaton, 

Commander, Commanding. 
Commander in Chief, 

North Atlantic Station. 



No. 34. 
Siboney, Cuba, July 10, 1898. 
Secretary of Navy, Washington: 

Feel some mortification that the newspaper accounts of July C have 
attributed victory on July 4 almost entirely to me. Victory was 
secured* by the force under the command Commander in Chief North 
Atlantic Station, and to him the honor is due. The end of the line 
held by the Brooklyn and the Vixen were heavily assailed and had the 
honor, with the Oregon, being in the battle from the beginning to the 
end, and I do not doubt for a moment full and proper credit will be 
given all persons and all ships in the official report of the combat. 

Schley. 



[Translation. 1 

No. 36. 



Playa del Este, Cuba, July 10, 1898. 
Secretary of Navy, Washington: 

I recommend Captains Philip, Higginson, Evans, Taylor, Cook, 
Clarke, Chadwick to be advanced five numbers; Lieut. Commander 
Wain wright ten numbers; Lieutenant Commanders E. Rodgers ? Schroe- 
der, J. Rodgers, Cogswell, Potter, Harber, Mason, and Lieutenants 
Staunton and Sharp five numbers. Though the Massachusetts was not 
in the action, the destruction of the Spanish squadron was the inevita- 
ble outcome of weeks of arduous and dangerous blockade, which had 
no precedent in its method and of which that ship bore its full part. 
The recommendation regarding Lieutenant Staunton is based upon 
staff work which deserves reward. 

I prefer leaving any question of reward for Commodore Schley to 
the Department, Think his conduct during the time when Schley 
commanded the east side of Cuba, which I assume is well known to 
the Department, should be considered. 

Sampson. 



No. 35. 

U. S. Flagship New York, 1st Rate, 

Playa del Este, Cuba, July 10, 1898. 
My Dear Mr. Secretary: Referring to your telegram asking me if 
I make any recommendations regarding promotions, I have considered 
the matter carefully and beg to make the following: That each officer 

* The part of the cipher from which the word " secured" is taken was mutilated 
in transmission, and there is some doubt as to the correctness of this word. 



136 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

commanding a big ship be advanced five numbers; that the executive 
officer of these ships be advanced the same number of places; that the 
assistant chief of stall' be also advanced live numbers; that in the case 
of Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright, he be advanced ten numbers. 
The following are my reasons for these recommendations: 
W ith regard to Commodore Schley I much prefer that the Depart- 
ment should decide his case. I am unwilling to fully express my own 
opinion. His conduct when he first assumed command on the south 
coast of Cuba 1 assume to be as well known to the Department as to 
myself. Had the Commodore left his station oil' Santiago de Cuba 
at that time he probably would have been court-martialed, so A. 
plain was his duty. Were I alone in this opinion I would cer- 
tainly doubt, my .judgment, but so far as 1 know this opinion is con- 
firmed by that of other commanding officers here acquainted with the 
circumstances. This reprehensible conduct I can not separate from 
his subsequent conduct, and for this reason I ask you to do him ample 
justice on this occasion. 

The excellent conduct of all the commanding officers was so com- 
mendable, as is evidenced by the complete and prompt destruction of 
every ship of the enemy, that I recommend that all be treated alike. 

1 do not mean to say that there were not differences that were marked. 
At the same time each one was equal to all the duties the Department 
expected of him. 

I believe it to be a just and well founded naval principle that the 
executive officer is to a large degree responsible for the efficiency of a 
man-of-war, and lor this reason should participate in the honors due to 
her condition. 

Again, while differences existed in the ships, it was such as resulted 
from the natural difference in the men, one being better than another 
in some respects, while a third excelled in other particulars. I recom- 
mend that all be treated alike. 

I further recommend that Lieutenant Staunton, assistant chief of 
stall', be advanced live numbers. He has contributed not a little to the 
final results by his intelligence and zealous watchfulness over the move- 
ments of the squadron. 

Finally, 1 recommend that Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright be 
advanced ten numbers for his conspicuous bravery. As Mr. Wain- 
wright stands No. 178 on the list of officers, this does not seem out of 
proportion with the others. 

1 'lease note, Mv Secretary, that rewarding an officer, and such reward 
is very dear to his heart, is not always so in fact, for no increase in the 
actual number of officers on the list is really made. Captain Clark, 
who is now recommended for advancement because he fought the Oregon 
so superbly, was in reality put down several numbers by the officers 
who were promoted over him in consequence of the Manila fight. 
The number of officers should be increased by the number promoted. 
I will submit a general report upon the subject of the battle when 
all the reports have reached me from those who are required by regula- 
tions to submit reports on such an occasion. 

23 Philip ^ 

26 Iligginson 

37 Evans 

40 Taylor V To be advanced live numbers. 

4!» Cook 

51 Clark 

<J1 Chadwick 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 137 

167 Rodgers 

169 Schroder 

183 John Kodgers 

187 Cogswell 

196 Potter To be advanced five numbers. 

198 Harber 

202 Mason 

257 Staunton 

326 Sharp 

178 Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright — To be advanced ten 

numbers. 
Very respectfully, 

W. T. Samfson, 
Rear- Admiral, U. S. Nary, 
Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station. 

The Secretary of the Navy, 

Navy Department, Washington, D. C. 



No. 37. 

No. 314. U. S. F. S. New York, 1st Rate, 

Ouantanamo Bay, Cuba, Augu- ) 6, 1898. 
My Dear Mr. Secretary: 1 have just received your le*rto : of July 
19, with regard to the recommendation for promotions. 

2. Ere this time you will have my letter of the 22d of July, contain- 
ing my recommendations in the case of Chief Engineer Milligan. of the 
battleship Oregon. If this recommendation meets with your approval, 
and covers the case which you at that time had in mind, it would give 
me pleasure. 

3. There are perhaps four chief engiueers who were in the fight of 
July 3 who are worthy of commendation, and whose ships were in good 
condition; but I think that there is a great difference between their 
cases and that of Chief Engineer Milligan. 

4. Mr. Milligan was recommended for the excellent manner in which 
he performed his duties over a long period, which resulted in the battle 
ship Oregon being at the end of the time in such an excellent steaming 
condition. 

5. The reports of the commanding officers, without exception, show 
that both the men and officers displayed such admirable courage that 
it seems impossible to make any marked distinction between them; 
and, in order that every one participating in the tight may have some 
recognition of his valor, I would recommend that the Department, or 
Congress, should have a medal struck to commemorate the action, and 
give it to every man and officer who took part in the action. 

Very respectfully, 

W. T. Sampson, 
Bear-Admiral, U. IS. Navy, 
Commander in Chief D. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station. 
The Secretary of the Navy, 

Navy Department, Washington, D. C. 



No. 38. 

U. S. Flagship New York, 1st Rate, 

Playa del Este, Cuba, July 22,1898. 
Sir: 1 desire to recommend Robert W. Milligan, chief engineer of 
the U. S. S. Oregon, to you for some substantial recognition of his 



138 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

efficient service on board that ship. It was my pleasant duty to call 
your attention to the excellent condition of this ship, and her magnifi- 
cent performance since she left the Pacific coast to join the North 
Atlantic Squadron. In the recent battle on the 3d of July, off San- 
tiago, the performance of this vessel was conspicuously excellent 
from the start to the finish, and it is the opinion of those who have had 
the best opportunities to judge that this excellent result, as far as her 
motive power is concerned, was due to the untiring and intelligent 
efforts of her chief engineer in the performance of his duty. 

2. Excellence in this respect, I think, should be rewarded in a manner 
that will make this officer conspicuous above others who have had 
equally good opportunities. 

3. I therefore respectfully recommend that he be advanced at least 
five numbers on the list of chief engineers. 

Very respectfully, W. T. Sampson, 

Rear- Admiral, U. S. N., 
Commander in Chief V. S. Naval Forces, North Atlantic Station. 
The Secretary of the Navy, 

Navy Department, Washington, T). C. 



[Page 71.] No. 39. 

No. 240 D.] 

U. S. Naval Force on Asiatic Station, 
Flagship Olympia, Cavite, Philippine Islands, May 1, 1898. 

Sir: 

# # # # # # # 

The conduct of my personal staff was excellent. Commander B. P. 
Lamberton, chief of staff, was a volunteer for that position and gave 
me most efficient aid. Lieut. T. M. Brumby, flag lieutenant, and Ensign 
W. P. Scott, aid, performed their duties as signal officers in a highly 
creditable manner. The Olympia being short of officers for the battery, 
Ensign IJ. H. Caldwell, flag secretary, volunteered for and was assigned 
to a subdivision of the 5-inch battery. 

George Dewey, 

Commodore, U. S. N, 
Commanding U. S. Naval Force on Asiatic Station. 
The Secretary op the Navy, 

Washington, 7). C. 



No. 40. 

Received Washington, Aug. 17, 1898. 
Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C. : 

I desire to recommend strongly for promotion Flag - Lieutenant 
Brumby, who has been indefatigable in the discharge of his duty from 
the beginning. He has represented me frequently in important nego- 
tiations, and has contributed much to the success of the Olympia. Also 
Lieutenant Tappan and Cadet White, who, commanding the American 
gun vessel Callao and launch Barcelo, respectively, accompanied the 
army advancing on Manila, protecting flank under fire at short range. 
Also Ensign Caldwell, who again volunteered to command division. 
Also Ensign Scott, who did excellent work as signal officer in both 
engagements. Wildes, commander of the Boston, desires to return 
home. Will relief be sent? 

Dewey. 




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No. 41. 
REPORT OF CABLE-CUTTING OPERATIONS. 



111660. 

[Reports cutting of cables off Cienfuegos.] 

No. 26.] U. S. S. Marblehead, 3d Rate, 

Off Cienfuegos, Cuba, May 11, 1898. 

Sir: Having found out the location of the cables leading from the 
south and west into the cable house, near the light- house at the entrance 
to Cienfuegos Harbor, I prepared to cut them. 

The arrival of the collier Saturn, with the Windom, and the departure 
of the steamer Adula with refugees from Cienfuegos yesterday placed 
me in a position where I could make the attempt to cut the cable, sev- 
ering communication with Havana. 

For this purpose Lieutenant Southerland was directed to leave the 
station off Cienfuegos with the Eagle sometime last night and steam to 
the westward, where the cable is laid in shallow water near the light- 
ship off Diego Perez Key. 

He was directed to cut the cable, burn the light-ship mentioned above, 
and to destroy the light-house off Piedras Key. 

Lieut. C. McR. Wiuslow was placed in command of the steam launches 
and sailing launches from the Nashville and Marblehead, with Lieut. 
E. A. Anderson second in command. The four boats were to be used 
to drag for and to cut the cables off Cienfuegos under the protection 
of the guns of the Nashville and Marblehead. 

The details were carefully explained to Commander Maynard and 
Lieutenant Winslovv and the attempt was made this morning. 

An infantry and cavalry force posted about the cable house was 
driven from their position by the guns of the Nashville and Marblehead, 
and the four launches then dragged for and succeeded in cutting the 
cables leading to the south and to the west. The cable house was 
destroyed by the guns. 

Two cables were cut and a small one was found inshore, but before 
this could be cut the fire from the infantry with, evidently, a Maxim 
gnu, was so severe as to compel the boats to withdraw, as they were 
within 150 yards of the enemy. 

The enemy was so sheltered toward the last by the gullies and ravines 
that the tire from the ships could not keep down their tire entirely. 

The enemy, having concealed themselves in the light-house and 
opened fire on the boats, the light-house was destroyed. 

I regret very much to announce that the following officers and men 
were wounded : 

Patrick Regan, private marine, fatally, and has since died. 

Herman W. Kuchneister, private marine, shot through jaw, probably 
fatally. 

139 



140 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

Harry Henrickson, seaman, shot through liver, probably fatally. 

Ernest Suntzeuiuh, apprentice, first class, fracture of right leg. 

John J. Doran, boatswain's mate, second class, gunshot wound, right 
buttock. 

Robert Vol/, .seaman, Nashville, severely wounded. 

John Davis, gunner's mate, third class, wound, right leg. 

William I. every, apprentice, first class, wounded left leg, very slight. 

Lieutenant Winslow, slight wound of hand. 

I can not speak in too high terms of the officers and men engaged in 
the four boats in cutting the cables. Their work was performed with 
the utmost coolness and intrepidity under most trying circumstances, 
and 1 shall later have the honor to call especial attention to their 
conduct. 

1 have directed the captain of the Windom to return at the earliest 
practical moment. 

Very respectfully, 

B. H. McCalla, 
Commander, U. S. N., Commanding, and Senior Officer Present. 

The Secretary of the Navy, 

Nacy Department, Washington, D. C. 



No. 29.] U. S. S. Marblehead, 3d Rate, 

Off Cienfuegos, Cuba, May 16, 1898. 
Sir: Referring to my No. 20, of May 11, 18!)8, 1 inadvertently omitted 
to mention that Ensign Magruder had charge of the two steam launches, 
and 1 beg to add that he is entitled to share the praise given to the 
party for bravery, gallantry, and intrepidity. 
Very respectfully, 

B. H. McCalla, 
Commander, U. S. N., Commanding, and Senior Officer Present. 
The Secretary of the Navy, 

Navy Department, Washington, D. C. 



11401.}. 

[Report of cutting of cables off Cienfuegos.] 

No. 79.] U. S. S. Marblehead, 3d Rate, 

Off Cienfuegos, Cuba, May 16, 1898. 

Sir: Referring to my No. 20, of the 11th instant, addressed to the 
Secretary of the Navy, I now have the honor to transmit the detailed 
reports of the cutting of two cables off Colorados Roiut on May 11. 

The list of reports is as follows: 

Report of Lieutenant Nickels. 

Report of Lieut. E. A. Anderson. 

Report of ordnance officer on the battery. 

Report of Pay Clerk Roberts. 

Report of Commander Maynard, Nashville. 

Reporl of Lieutenant Dillingham, Nashville. 

Report of Lieutenant Winslow, Nashville. 

Report ni Assistant Surgeon Pleadwell, Nashville. 

I also forward, marked A, a copy of the written instructions issued 
to Commander Maynard with the object in view. 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 141 

Lieutenant Winslow in his report refers to additional verbal instruc- 
tions which 1 gave to him personally from the deck of the Marblehead. 

Referring to the chart which accompanies Lieutenant Winslow's 
report, I beg to state that the position of the ships on that drawing can 
only refer to the position they occupied at one time from his point of 
view, and must not be accepted as an accurate representation of the 
positions they occupied during the engagement. The fire from the 
ships was generally crossed at a right or at a large angle. 

Even in shallow water the great weight of the cables rendered them 
difficult to lift with the launches, while their great diameters, with indif- 
ferent tools for cutting, necessarily rendered the operation a very long 
one, and 1 need scarcely point out the desirability of having a vessel 
expressly fitted to drag for and to cut cables. 

I beg to call the attention of the commander in chief to the men 
who have been specified by Lieutenants Winslow and Anderson as 
having done extraordinarily well under fire, and respectfully suggest 
that they may be reported to the Department as especially worthy of 
reward, should the suggestion meet with the approval of the com- 
mander in chief. 

Very respectfully, 

B. H. McCalla, 
Commander, TJ. 8. N., Commanding, and Senior Officer Present. 

The Commander in Chief North Atlantic Station. 



114013. 

[Report of cutting of cables off Cienfuegoa.] 

U. S. S. Marblehead, 3d Rate, 

Off Cienfuego8, Cuba, May 10, 1898. 

Sir: Be pleased to be ready to send in the steam launch and work- 
ing launch at G o'clock to-morrow morning, to cooperate with the steam 
launch and working launch of the Marblehead in an attempt to cut the 
two or more cables leading to the east of the light-house to Colorados 
Point. 

The four boats will all be armed, the steam launches of each carry- 
ing 1 -pounder guns in addition. The steam launches are to cover the 
men in the working launches. 

The command of the expedition will be under Lieutenant Winslow, 
of the Nashville, who is charged with the execution of the details of the 
expedition. 

Lieutenant Anderson, of the Marblehead, will be in command of the 
boats from the Marblehead. 

An effort will be made after cutting the cables to drag them into 
deep water, cutting off as much as possible of the end. At the end, 
before casting off the cable ends, puncture the insulation at points 20 
or 30 feet from the euds with awls or sharp-pointed instruments, so as 
to destroy the insulation. 

The Nashville will take post off the light-house point so as to open 
fire on the cable (white house, east of the light-house) house and the 
bushes in the vicinity. Fire also on the soldiers 7 hut to the eastward 
of the light-house. 

It is not intended to restrict your guns to these points; use them on 
any forts or boats in the harbor should our operations be interfered 
with. 



142 ADVANCEMENTS IX THE NAVY. 

The Marblehead will take post between the two points of the river 
entrance, with the broadside facing the entrance. 
Very respectfully, 

B. H. McCalla, 
Com maniler, U. S. X., Commanding. 
Commander M \y\ \rd, 

Commanding Nash ville. 



114013. ' 

[Report of bombardment offCienfnegoa to protect work of cutting cables.] 

U. S. S. Marblehead, 3d Rate, 
Off Cienfuego8, Cuba, May 15, 1898. 

Sir: I have the honor to report as follows in regard to the bombard- 
ment off Colorados Point, near entrance to Cienfuegos Harbor, on the 
11th instant: 

The battery and ammunition worked well, with the following excep- 
tions: On B gun, No. 71 mark 4, mount, 71) mark 5, mounted on poop, 
bracket for training arm and elevating worm was bent out of shape, 
but not interfering with tiring of gun, although making it much more 
difficult to train. This was caused by the throwing down of the breech 
of the gun on the recoil. 

Firing pin of No. 9 gun, Driggs-Schroeder 6-pounder, was broken, 
and had to be replaced. 

At A gun, one 5-inch shrapnel and one 5-iuch shell jammed in load- 
ing. No. 1 5-inch gun, port, missed tire. No. 4 5-inch gun, port, one 
missfire. No. 4 5-inch gun, starboard, two missed fire. These were all 
thrown overboard, with the exception of shrapnel and shell of A gun. 

At No. 1 gun, starboard, and No. 2 gun, starboard, electric-firing 
batteries failed to work, connections between cells having worked 
loose, and spare batteries were put in use. At B gun one 5-inch shell 
missed fire on account of having percussion primer, and one missed 
fire which was discharged on second trial. 

Stocks of two 6-millimeter Lee rifles were broken; two revolvers 
were lost overboard from sailing launch. 

Damage done by B gun. — Two stanchions in captain's office on star- 
board side and two in staterooms on port side bent badly; the pitch 
and plugging knocked out of poop deck; skylight frame abaft the 
gun blown to pieces and overboard, and after compauionway badly 
damaged; the bulkheads and doors of officers' staterooms knocked 
down and broken; moldings and capping of electric light wires in 
officers' quarters were knocked off and shattered in places; stationary 
washstand in captain's bathroom broken, and one leg under bath tub 
broken. 

The damage was caused by the gun being fired directly aft and 
slightly on starboard quarter. 
Very respectfully, 

John A. H. Nickels, 
Lieutenant-Commander, U. S. A'., Executive Officer. 

The Commander. 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 143 

114013.] 

[Report of cutting of cables off Cienfuegos.] 

U. S. S. Marblehead, 
Off Cienfuegos, Cuba, May 12, 1898. 

Sir : I have to submit the following report of the work of the launches 
of this vessel while cutting the telegraph cables off the eastern side of 
Colorados Point, at the entrance to Cienfuegos Harbor, Cuba, May 
11, 1898. 

Having been placed in charge of the steam and sailing launches of 
this vessel, under the command of Lieut. Cameron McE. W inslow, U.S.N ., 
who was also in charge of the steam and sailing launches of the Nashville, 
I reported to that officer about 6.30 a. m. on the 11th instant, and was 
directed by him to keep off his starboard hand while going in. 

In the steam launch, in addition to the regular crew of five men, 
there was a crew of three men in charge of a 1-pounder Hotchkiss gun 
mounted on the forecastle; also six men of the marine guard, armed 
with rifles and selected for their proficiency in marksmanship. This 
boat was intended to cover the sailing launch while at work. 

In the sailing launch, which was used to pick up and cut the cable, 
in addition to crew of twelve men and coxswain, were the chief car- 
penter's mate and blacksmith. These men were armed with rifles and 
revolvers. I took immediate charge of this boat. 

After the beach had been shelled by the Marblehead and Nashville 
and the cable house and barracks destroyed, the boats approached the 
shore in tow of the steam launches. When opposite the cable house 
the sailing launches were cast off, and the steam launches, in charge of 
Ensign Magruder, took position about 150 to 200 yards from the beach 
and kept up a fire directed on the supposed position of the enemy. 

A 0-iucb armored cable was quickly picked up by the launch from 
this vessel, and, assisted by the Nashville's launch, was under-run out 
to 12j* fathoms of water, and there a section the length of the boat was 
cut out the cable. This cable led in about an east-southeast direction 
from the cable house. Ranges were taken and sketches made to recover 
the end of the cable if desired. 

A second 6-inch armored cable was found by the Nashville's launch 
leading in a southerly direction from the cable house. This cable was 
also picked up by our launch about 30 yards from the beach, and, after 
having been cut by us, was again cut by the Nashville's launch in about 
5£ fathoms, and the section of about 100 feet coiled down in our launch. 

While the work of cutting the second cable was going on the enemy 
opened a slow fire on us, which was returned by such men in the launch 
as were not actually engaged in cutting the cable. This fire, assisted 
by the steam launches, silenced the fire of the enemy for a time. 

A small cable was seen leading parallel and close to the second large 
cable. An effort was made while cutting the large cable to pick up the 
small one, but the grapnel fouled the bottom and was lost. 

In searching for the small cable, after cutting the second large one, 
either a third large cable or a section of the second cable nearer the 
cable house was found. This cable had been lifted within a foot of the 
rail of the stern of the launch, when the enemy, who had taken a posi- 
tion within about 150 yards of the water, opened on the boats with volley 
firing. One man in the launch was badly wounded at the first volley, 
and, having been ordered by Lieutenant Winslow to cast off, the cable 
was slipped and the launch started to return. 






144 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

The enemy, who were evidently in force, fired very rapidly at the 
boats with rilies, machine guns, and, from some shells that fell near the 
launch, I should judge with 1 -pounder guns. 

The coxswain having been wounded just as the launch got started, I 
steered the boat off and directed the erew to keep down between the 
thwarts as much as possible. In spite of this precaution, three more 
men were wounded, the bullets penetrating the sides of the boat. 
Owing to the ballet holes in the launch she was making water freely 
while going off, requiring constant bailing. 

A heavy ground swell made the work of lifting the cable difficult, 
and toward the end a fresh onshore breeze sprang up, causing the 
launch to ship sonic water after the weight of the cable came on it, and 
made the work of rowing on" very slow. 

The conduct of the men was worthy of all praise. They worked 
intelligently and cheerfully at the exhausting labor of picking up and 
cutting the heavy cables, and, when under a heavy fire and one of the 
crew badly wounded, continued to work, without confusion, uutil 
ordered to stop. Where every one did their whole duty it is difficult to 
specify particular instances, but 1 think the following worthy of men- 
tion: J. J. Doran (boatswain's mate, second class), after having received 
a very painful wound, encouraged the rest of thecrewand the wounded 
by his cheerful manner and talk. -J. II. Bennett (boatswain's mate, 
first class) and A. iSundquist (chief carpenter's mate) particularly dis- 
tinguished themselves by the intelligence and great energy they dis- 
played in the work. In the steam launch F. Gill (gunner's mate, first 
class) and L. Ohadwick (apprentice, first class) remained exposed on 
the forecastle of the launch under a very heavy fire and served the 
1 -pounder gnu until ordered by me to cease firing. 

I regret to inform you that the following-named men were wounded: 

/// the steam launch. — Patrick Regan (private marine), shot through 
head; fatally wounded. II. W. Knehneister (private marine), shot 
through neck and jaw; probably fatally wounded. • 

In sailing launch. — H. Henrickson (seaman), shotthrongh liver; prob- 
ably fatally wounded. Ernest Suntzewick (apprentice, first class), 
fracture of right leg above knee. John Davis (gunner's mate, third 
class), wound of right leg. John J. Doran (boatswain's mate, second 
class), wound of right buttock. William Severy (apprentice, first class), 
small wound of right ankle. 

The following-nained men formed the crews of the launches engaged 
in the work : 

Sailing launch. — 1. II. Bennett (chief boatswain's mate), J. R. Wilke 
(boatswain's mate, first class), John .1. Doran (boatswain's mate, second 
class), A. Sundquist (chief carpenter's mate), J. E.Carter (boatswain), 
W. Oakley (gunner's mate, second class), J. Davis (gunner's mate, third 
class), F. Williams, W. Severy (apprentices, first class), E. Suntzewick 
(apprentice, first class), H. Henrickson (seaman), H. L. Foss (seaman), 
A. Vailas (seaman). 

Steam launch. — N. Erickson (coxswain), F. (Jill (gunner's mate, first 
class), W. Hart (machinist), J. Maxwell (fireman, second class), F. Kra- 
mer (seaman i, L. Chadwick (apprentice, first class), W. H. Russell 
(landsman ), J. Meridith private), 11. YY. Knehneister (private), P. Began 
(private), \Y. S. West (private), E. Sullivan (private), D. Campbell 
(private . 

Respectfully submitted. 

E. A. Anderson, 

The Commander, Lieutenant, U.S.N. 

U. 8. 8. Marblehead. 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 145 

114013. 

[Report of cutting of cables and bombardment off Cienfuegos.] 

U. S. S. Marblehead, 
Off Cienfuegos, Cuba, May 11, 1898. 

Sir: The following - is a report of bombardment of Colorados Point, 
May 11, 1898, recorded by me : 

Called to quarters at 6.45. 

Nashville signaled "Eeady" at 0.46. 

Our answer, " Execute orders." 

We signaled Nashville go within 6 cables of light-house. Time, C.58. 

First shot tired was from A gun at cable house at 7.07. At 7.10 
opened fire from No. 1 port guu and 7-inch No. 2 port gun. At 7.14 
cable house was demolished. At 7.20 general firing from port guns on 
the woods beyond and to the left of cable house. At 7.40 firing pin 
broke ou No. — port 6-pounder gun. Was fixed and ready to fire at 
8.12. At 8.24 manned starboard battery and commenced with the 
6-ponnder guns. 

8.20 signaled to Nashville, " Keep up slow firing on the woods." 

8.40 signaled Nashville not to hit light-house. 

Commenced firing our 1 pounder guns at 8.42. 

9 o'clock signaled Nashville, " Can you haul end of cable out to deep 
water?" (Failed to get answer.) 

9.25 opened fire with starboard 5-inch guns. Steam and sailing- 
launches under hot fire. 

9.30 signaled Nashville, "Go in closer." 

9.32 signaled Nashville, "Where are they firing from!" Answer, 
"Enemy firing on slope in line with light-house. 

9.55 steam and sailing launches under hot fire and retreating. 

10.13 our boats came alongside. 10.13 Nashville signaled, "We are 
getting out of small arm fire. Captain is hurt." We signaled, " Did 
you cut cable.' 1 ' Answer, " Yes." We answered, "Congratulations." 

10.13 Nashville ceased firing. 

10.25 signaled to Nashville, "How many hurt?" Answer, "Captain, 
two menip launch, and two on ships." 

10.28 secure. 10.28 B gun so hot ceased firing it. 

10.30 signaled Nashville, "Were the wounded seriously injured?" 
Answer, " One badly. Going to the Windom." 

11 o'clock Windom came up and signaled, " Can I engage 1 ?" Answer, 
"Yes; open tire on light house, 1,300 yards." At 11.14 signaled from 
Windom, " Are engaged." Answer, " Open tire on light-house tower, 
1,350 yards." 

11.20 signaled Windom, "Cease firing." Signaled Windom, "Well 
done." 

Eespectfully, Ed H. Eoberts, 

Pay Clerk and Acting Recorder. 

The Commanding Officer, 

U. >S. S. Marblehead. 



114013. 

[Report of cutting of cables off Cienfuegos.] 

U. S. S. Nashville, 3d Eate, 
Blockade off Cienfuegos, Cuba, May 11, 1898. 
Sir : I have the honor to submit the following report on the part 
taken by this vessel in the operations of to-day, connected with the 
10 



146 ADVANCEMENTS IX THE NAVY. 

catting of the cables at Colorados Point, at eastern entrance to the 
port of Cienfuegos, Cuba: 

At 6.46 a. in the steam and sailing; launches of the Marblehead and 
Nashville, armed and prepared for grappling and cutting cables, under 
command of Lieut. C. Mcll. Winslow, V. S. N., left their respective 
ships and stood in for the reefs off Colorados Point under cover of the 
guns of the Nashville. The latter, after bringing the light-house to 
bear northwest (magnetic), headed in for the point, and, when within 
1,200 yards of the cable house to the eastward of the light house, at 
7.45 a. in. opened tire with the starboard battery on that building and 
a number of the enemy's soldiers, who were seen in a small earthwork 
near that house. 

The Marblehead took position to the westward, at the entrance of the- 
port, and opened tire, and in a few minutes the cable house was 
destroyed and the enemy's troops had disappeared, after tiring- a few 
rounds from their small arms. The Nashville continued to stand in 
toward the point until within from 000 to 800 yards from shore, firing 
continuously into the woods and bushes to the right of the light-house. 
The enemy not returning the lire, the launches proceeded in close to 
the shore and soon grappled and raised two cables, which they under- 
ran and cut. 

The Nashville continued to fire rapidly until S.18 a. m., after which 
time, as there was no response from the enemy, a slow fire from the 
rapid-fire guns was maintained. 

Considerable difficulty was experienced in keeping the ship in posi- 
tion off the cable-house point, owing- to the wind, which was blowing 
directly on shore, and also to a moderate swell. Aiming was much 
interfered with by the smoke of our guns, as it hung between the ship 
and the shore. 

At about 9.45 a. m. the enemy, evidently much reenforced, suddenly 
opened a scattering rifle tire, which increased to a heavy tire by 10 a. m., 
on our boats just as they had grappled a third cable. The enemy were 
tiring- from the light house and from cover and bluffs to the right of it. 
At 10.10 the boats retreated toward their ships, while this vessel 
steamed in between them and the enemy until they were covered by 
this ship, and at the same time opened up a rapid tire on the light- 
house and wherever else the enemy appeared to be. 

In obedience to your signal and previous order, we had been careful 
not to nit the light house, but at this time, when it was seen that the 
enemy were using- it as a cover, I directed the fire of our guns against 
it in order to drive them out. 

The boats having been secured alongside of the ship, on the side 
away from the enemy, we stood out of range, and after discharging 
boats hoisted them at 11 a. m. 

The ship was struck by many rifle bullets, but no damage was done 
except cutting some boat falls and running gear. Several persons on 
board were struck, but not seriously injured. 

In the sailing launch of this vessel Robert Volz, seaman, was seri- 
ously wouuded, and Lieutenant Winslow was shot through the fiugers 
of his left ha ml. The boats received several bullets through them, but 
were not much injured. 

I can not praise too highly the coolness and good behavior of all on 
board — officers and men. Lieut. A. C. Dillingham, the executive offi- 
cer, deserves great credit for his coolness and good judgment through- 
out the affair, and especially toward the close of the engagement, 
when the commanding oflicer being temporarily disabled by a shock, 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 147 

caused by being struck over the heart by a rifle bullet, he handled the 
ship and boats admirably. 

I inclose herewith reports from the executive, ordnance officer, and 
surgeon. 

The battery operated without difficulty and defects, with the follow- 
ing exceptions: 

(1) The starboard 1-pouuder mount started its securing bolts to the 
deck and was temporarily out of action. 

(2) The elevating arm of the after starboard 4-inch gun mount was 
cracked and slightly bent, but not injured so as to render the gun out 
of action, as 30 rounds were fired, after the bending was noticed, 
without further bending. The casting showed a flaw in the metal at 
the point of bending, evidently a blowhole which had been filled with 
lead. 

Ammunition and firing attachments worked perfectly. 
Very respectfully, 

W. Maynard, 
Commander, JJ. S. N., Commanding. 
Commander B. H. McGalla, U. S. N., 

Commanding JJ. 8. 8. Marblehead, and 

Fourth Division North Atlantic Fleet. 



114013. 

(Report of cutting of cables off Cienfuegos.] 

U. S. S. Nashville, 3d Rate, 

Off Cienfuegos, Cuba, May 11, 1898. 

Sir: I have the honor to submit the following report of the cutting 
of the ocean telegraph cables at the entrance to Cienfuegos Harbor: 

Under your verbal orders, I proceeded about 7 a. m. to-day with the 
steam cutter and sailing launch of this ship and the steam cutter and 
sailing launch of the U. S. S. Marblehead to execute the duty assigned 
me. After the ships had demolished the cable house and had appar- 
ently dislodged the enemy from the chaparral, hills, and rifle pits, I 
proceeded with the boats under my command directly for the cable 
house, opening tire from the Colt's automatic gun in the bow of the 
Nashville's steam cutter and from the 1-pounder cannon in the bow of 
the Marblehead 1 s steam cutter, also from the sharpshooters in both steam 
cutters. We cast the sailing launches off from the steam cutters when 
about 300 yards from the beach. 1 was in the sailing launch of this 
ship; Lieut. E. A. Anderson, of the Marblehead, in the Marblehead^ 
sailing launch. Ensign T. P. Magruder was left in command of both 
steam cutters, with orders to keep up a tire on the hills and chaparral. 
The fire from these two boats was kept up incessantly while we were 
engaged in the work of cutting the cables. The cable going to the east- 
ward was first grappled, and was under-run by both sailing launches, 
and a section about 24 fathoms in length was cut out of this cable, the 
sea end being cut in about 13 fathoms of water. The section of this 
cable cut out was brought to this ship on the return of the sailing 
launch. After cutting the first cable we proceeded in both sailing 
launches to the southwestward of the demolished cable house and 
grappled within 60 feet of the beach for the cable leading westward. 

After about one-half hour's work we succeeded in grappling this cable. 
Great difficulty was experienced in lifting this cable, and we were only 
able to under-run 15 fathoms of it. We cut a section out of this cable 



148 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

about 15 fathoms long and threw it overboard in deep water, leaving 
the sea end of the cable in from 6 to 10 fathoms of water. While work- 
ing with the second cable, we discovered a third cable, much smaller 
than the other two, parallel to the cable leading to the westward. After 
cutting the second cable we proceeded to grapple this third cable. 

I'p to this time the enemy had from time to time opened tire upon us, 
but we were able to silence his tire by the tire from our steam cutters 
and the continuous heavy tire maintained by the Marblehead and the 
Nashville. While grappling the third cable, the enemy apparently 
greatly increased its force and opened a deadly tire on our boats. 
Believing that we had cut the two important cables, and knowing that 
we could not endure the terrific tire of the enemy, 1 ordered the sailing 
launches to let go the third (table, and ordered the steam cutters to take 
the sailing launches in tow. We manned the oars of the sailing 
launches to keep the boats clear of the breakers until the steam cutters 
could take them in tow. 

At the same time we opened tire from the men in the sailing launches 
not at the oars, the steam cutters keeping up their fire. We continued 
tiring while in retreat, under a very heavy fire from the enemy, our men 
displaying great coolness. Shortly after my launch was taken in tow, 
while I was reaching for a fresh rifle, 1 was struck by an enemy's ball 
in my left hand, but was not crippled, and [ was able to continue in 
command. We steamed as rapidly as possible against a head sea for 
the Marblehead and the Nashville, keeping up our fire as we retreated. 
One man in my boat, Robert Volz, seaman, was shot in the head and 
badly injured. The Marblehead' 's boats, though farther from the beach 
than the Nashville's, suffered more loss. At the present time I do not 
know the extent of their loss. 

No one in the Nashville's steam cutter was injured. 

The work, owing to the heavy armored cables used, If inches in 
diameter, and the heavy swell rolling in, was extremely difficult. The 
water being clear we were able to see the cables at a great depth. Had 
it not been possible to have seen the cables, it would have been 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to have grappled them, as the 
uneven formation of the coral bottom continually caught our grapples. 

The boats were splendidly supported by the heavy fire of the Marble- 
head and the Nashville. Toward the end of the action the Nashville 
took a position to the eastward and close in on the reefs, and admirably 
covered our retreat, crossing her fire with that of the Marblehead, and 
passing quickly between our boats and the enemy. Owing to the fact 
that the enemy had excellent cover in the hills and chaparral, and to the 
fact that they used smokeless powder, it was impossible to accurately 
locate them. At the last part of the engagement, just at the comple- 
tion of our work, judging from the very hot fire, the enemy must have 
been in large force. 

I have to state that I was ably supported by Ensign T. P. Magruder, 
in command of the steam cutters, who displayed great coolness, brav- 
ery, and promptness in carrying out my orders, and in protecting his 
men. Lieut. E. A. Anderson commanded the sailing launch of the 
Marblehead, and did his work with coolness, bravery, and intelligence, 
continuing the work, regardless of the hot fire to which he was exposed, 
until ordered by me to desist. 

The following is a list of the men in the Nashville's boats: E. Krnuse, 
coxswain: T. Iloban, coxswain; A. J. Durney, blacksmith; L. Nelson, 
sailmaker's mate; 0. EL Neubert, seaman: K. Volz, seaman; H. H. 
Miller, seamain; J. J. Johansson, ordinary seaman; 13. F. Baker, cox- 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 149 

swain; A.Beyer, coxswain; W. Meyer, carpenter's mate, 3d class; H. 
Van Etten, seaman; J. Eglit, seaman; R. Blame, seaman; W. Miller, 
seaman ; D. D. Barrow, ordinary seaman ; J. P. Rilley, landsman ; G. W. 
Bright, C. P. ; P. Gaughan, first sergeant, U. S. M. C. ; F. Hill, private, 
U. S. M. C; P. Parker, private, U. S. M. C; M. Gibbons, oiler; J. J. 
Franklin, private, U. S. M. C.; O. W. Field, private, IT. S. M.C.; J. F. 
Scott, private, U. S. M. C ; M. Kearney, private, U. S. M. G. 

They all behaved with the utmost coolness and courage. While I 
do not wish to discriminate, I desire to call your attention to the zeal 
displayed and hard work done by E. Krause, coxswain; B. F. Baker, 
coxswain; T. Hobau, coxswain, and R. Blume, seaman. Ensign 
Magruder reports to me that the men and the marines in the Nashville's 
steam cutter behaved admirably, without exception. While the men 
in the MarblehecuVs boats were not under my immediate supervision, 
they executed their duty to my entire satisfaction. Lieutenant Ander- 
son, who had them under his direct command, will doubtless make 
report to you as to their courage and efficiency. The work of cutting 
cables occupied about three and one-fourth hours. 

In conclusion, I have to state that I was ordered particularly to cut 
two cables, one leading west and the other east. This was accom- 
plished. The fire of the Marblehead and Nashville completely demol- 
ished the cable house, with all its contents. Unless there are other 
cables, all communication by ocean cable with Cienfuegos must con- 
tinue interrupted until the end of the war. I do not think that the 
appliances are at hand at Cienfuegos to repair the damage. 

The loss of life to the enemy must have been very great. The fire 
from our ships was terrific. 

Very respectfully, C. McR. Winslow, 

Lieutenant, U. S. N. 
Commander B. H. McCalla, U. S. N., 

Commanding Division. 



114013. 

[Report of cutting of cables off Cienfuegos.] 

U. s. S. Nashville, 3d Rate, 

Off' Gienfui tos, Cuba, May 12, 1898. 

Sir: In obedience to article 525, United States Navy regulations, I 
have the honor to submit the following report of the action participated 
in by this vessel on the 11th instant: 

In obedience to orders from the divisional commander, we had pre- 
pared two boats (steam cutter and sailing launch), armed and equipped, 
for the purpose of cutting the cable wires at this place. These boats 
were under the command of Lieut. O. McR. Winslow, with Ensign T. P. 
Magruder assisting. Their crews were made up of the following men: 
E. Krause, coxswain; A. J. Durney, blacksmith; L. Nelson, S. M. M.; 
C. H. Neubert, seaman; J. J. Johansson, ordinary seaman; R. Volz, 
seaman; J. P. Rilley, landsman; A. Beyer, coxswain; D. D. Barrow, 
ordinary seaman; G. W. Bright, C. P.; J. J. Franklin, private, 
U. S. M. C. ; F. Hill, private, U. S. M. C. ; P. Parker, private, U. S. M. C. ; 
T. Hoban, coxswain; B. F. Baker, coxswain; W. Meyer, carpenter's 
mate, third class; H. Van Etten, seaman; J. Eglit, seaman; R. Blume, 
seaman; H. H. Miller, seaman; W. Miller, seaman; M. Gibbons, oiler; 
P. Gaughan, first sergeant, U. S. M. C; O^. W. Field, private, 
U. S. M. C; J. F. Scott, private, U. S. M. O.j M. Kearney, private, 
U. S. M. C. 



150 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

This vessel took up its position for firing about 800 yards southward 
and eastward of the light-house, and fired its first shot at about 7 a. m. 

WhiU- steaming into position I saw very distinctly about two compa- 
nies of Spanish troops in rifle pits just back of our objective point, the 
cable house. These men deployed and took cover as we approached. 

Alter clearing the locality of lire, the expedition of boats (2 steam 
cutters and 2 sailing launches) went in to their work under cover of the 
guns of this vessel and the Marblehead. 

The difficult work of our men proceeded until about 10.15 a. m., when 
there arrived reenforcemouts for the enemy, made evident by the tiring, 
which proved to be a very severe infantry fire. These reenforcements 
arrived without being seen and deployed under cover, apparently tak- 
ing excellent positions. 

The boat work had up to this time proceeded well; we had slackened 
our fire to an occasional shot into the bushes and hills, but with the 
fire of the enemy renewed the Marblehead and Nashville began again 
rapid fire. We were then about 600 yards from shore and to wind- 
ward. 

The enemy had smokeless powder and fired from the Mauser rifle, 
caliber .L'73. Here was shown one great advantage of smokeless 
powder. Although we were under a very severe fire we had no target 
but the country we saw. Close up by this time, to within 500 yards of 
the shore, not a Spaniard could be seen, with our smoke rolling down 
to leeward, obscuring the enemy. With the increasing fire our boats 
had to stop work and seek cover, but they did not start till they were 
absolutely obliged to, under a very severe small-arm fire. 

Just about this time Commander Maynard was struck in the region 
of the heart by a spent bullet and was incapacitated for command. It 
was reported to me that the captain was wounded. I at once took tem- 
porary command and ran the vessel close inshore, passing between the 
boats (now retreating) and the enemy, taking their fire. Having the 
boats under cover, steamed out of small-arm range and hoisted boats 
aboard. 

This vessel was obliged to be under severe infantry fire for some 
time, and, with the people so exposed, it is remarkable that so few were 
hit. The vessel received no serious damage; a few falls were cut; the 
boom boats have many bullet holes in them and the indications of 
heavy small-arm fire are to be seen all over the upper deck. 

Of course, the enemy could only fire into our smoke, the position of 
the Nashville surely indicated by her two very high smoke pipes tower- 
ing above all smoke. 

The men on the upper deck not actually engaged in serving the guns 
were ordered under cover, and here was displayed the good use of the 
compressed cotton which we had distributed along the rail. It proved 
efficient for it was often struck. 

I am glad to report excellent tire discipline, and that officers and men 
worked wi h coolness and intelligence. 

The work performed by the people in the boats was both hazardous 
and difficult, and too much credit- can not be given to Lieutenant Wins- 
low for his excellent judgment and consummate coolness, under most 
trying conditions of heavy sea and destructive fire of the enemy. As 
soon as Lieutenant Winslow had seen his wounded cared for, though 
wounded himself, he came to the bridge for duty. 

Lieutenant Winslow has made known to me the excellent duty per- 
formed by Ensign Magruder, as the officer having charge of the steam 
launches. 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 151 

I consider that having our upper deck flush to be a great disad- 
vantage. 

This vessel performing her tactical function may be exposed to severe 
small-arm firing. There is absolutely no protection for the people on 
the upper deck; all hands stand out most conspicuous targets for the 
enemy's fire. 

Very respectfully, A. C. Dillingham, 

Lieutenant, U. S. N., Executive Officer. 
The Commanding Officer. 



115267. 

[Destruction of light-houses and search for submarine cables.] 

U. S. S. Eagle, 

At Sea, May 12, 1898. 

Sir : I have the honor to report that the Eagle reached the light-ship 
off Diego Perez Island at 7 a. m. of the 11th instant and at once com- 
menced a search for the submarine cable connecting Batabano with 
Cienfuegos. 

A boat was sent to the light-ship and the keeper's services secured to 
aid in the search. 

Six lines were carefully run at varying depths between the light-ship 
and the point of the shoal to the eastward, now marked by a wreck, the 
bottom being visible most of the time. This vessel and two of her 
boats performed this duty, but without a satisfactory result. The 
strong wind and rough sea, the pilot's assurance that no good holding 
ground could be found for an anchorage, the evident fact that the 
chart was extremely unreliable, and the positive statement of the light- 
ship keeper that no one had overhauled the cable in that vicinity for 
over three years determined me to abandon the search at 4 p. m. as 
fruitless, it being more than probable that the cable was buried deep 
in the sand of the reefs. 

In accordance with your order, the light-ship was then set on fire and 
was burning fiercely when this vessel left. Her keeper expressing a 
desire to go to Cienfuegos, took him on board this vessel with his per- 
sonal effects and his own small boat, and will drop him off Cienfuegos 
when you so direct. 

This action on my part was principally due to the fact that the sea 
was too rough for him to get ashore unaided. He states that he is a 
Cuban and has not received his salary from the Government for the 
last seven months. 

We reached Piedras Cay at sunset. Sent an armed crew on shore 
and destroyed the lighting apparatus and what pertained thereto. 
Two men were in charge of the light and with them a small boy. These 
we found in a starving condition, in consequence of which it became 
necessary to bring them on board for removal from the island. They 
had been eight months without pay, three weeks without any commu- 
nication with the outside, and five days without food. 
Very respectfully, 

W. H. H. SOUTHERLAND, 

Lieutenant, V. S. N., Commanding. 

Commander B. H. McCalla, U. S. N., 

Commanding Division. 



152 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

No 42. 
[Page 220.] 

L24057. 

[Blockade of San Joan and engagement with T<>ror.] 

U. S. S. St. Paul, 
.1/ Sea, Lot. 20 35' X.. Long. ;v 45' W., June 28, 1898. 
Sir: 1 have the honor to report the recent movements and operations 
of the St. Paul, including an engagement with the enemy off San Juan, 

Porto Rico. 

On June 1!) the St. Paid, having transferred many of her own stores 
and some arms and ammunition to other vessels, parted company with 
onr quad on off Santiago <le Cuba. Under orders from the com- 
mander in chief, I proceeded to San Juan, Porto Rico, to institute a 
blockade of that port. My orders included the information that the 
Yosemite, Commander W. B. Emory, would soon join the St. Paul off 
San Juan, thus enablingmeto proceed to New York for coal, the neces- 
sity lor which would soon arise. The St. Paul, with a view of inter- 
cepting Spanish vessels, proceeded at a moderate speed by the route 
south of Haiti and through the Mona Passage. She was unsuccessful 
in her search, and arrived off San Juan at 8 a. in., Wednesday, June22, 
at which time the weather was clear, a strong trade wind was blowing, 
and the sea was moderately rough. 

At 12.40 p. m. of that day our emergency signal for manning the 
guns was sounded by direction of the officer of the deck, Lieut. J. A. 
Pattson. 1 went at once to the bridge, where I was shown a bark 

[Page 221.] 

rigged Spanish cruiser making slowly out of the entrance of San Juan 
with her head to the eastward. She was either the Infanta Isabel or 
Isabel II, which are sister ships of the Don Juan de A n,stri<t, sunk at 
Manila. The St. Paul was lying without headway, head to the wind, 
which was east. She held her position, while the Spanish cruiser 
steamed slowly seaward, maneuvered, and opened tire at long range, 
under close protection of the shore batteries, which mount a large num- 
ber of modern 8 inch and 10-inch guns. None of the Spaniard's shot 
reached us on direct lire, although several may have passed over us on 
ricochet. The Xt. Paul replied only by an occasional shell to test the 
range; nevertheless, the Spanish cruiser continued her ineffective fire. 
At 1 p. m. a torpedo boat destroyer, having the characteristic marks 
of the Terror and believed to be that vessel, came out of the harbor and 
steamed around the Morro to the eastward. The St. Paul then steamed 
very slowly to the eastward, parallel to the shore line of the city, keep- 
ing the Terror on such a bearing that in making a dash at the St. Paul 
she would be obliged to proceed in the trough of the sea. Our maneuver 
had the further object of throwing the Spanish cruiser completely out 
of range to the southward and westward while we engaged the Terror. 
About 1.20 p. m. the Terror, then nearly in reach of our heavier guns, 
the fire of which I was reserving, suddenly opened fire and steamed for 
us at high speed, with the evident intention of making a dash to torpedo 
the St. I'n ill The St. Pn nl held her position practically without head- 
way, head to the eastward, and awaited the attack. When the Terror 
was 5,400 yards distant, the St. Paul opened fire, the accuracy and 
volume of which were admirable. Although the distance was great, it 
was apparent that our heavier shell were falling rapidly around the 
Terror and close to her. Suddenly that vessel headed up into the wind, 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 153 

broadside to the St. Paul, as if injured, but kept up a fire from her 
battery, her shot falling short. I was looking at her from the upper 
bridge with binocular glasses of great power, and at this time I saw a 
shell explode, apparently against her hull abaft the after smokestack. 
She immediately turned with port helm and stood in for the harbor at 
considerable speed, her behavior giving evidence of damage. Instead 
of standing in through the channel close to the Morro, whence she 
had issued to begin her attack, she fell a long distance to leeward. 
When down toward Cabras Island she rouuded to and stood to the 
southward and eastward toward the harbor, apparently not under 
good management. The Spanish cruiser showed concern by standing 
in after her. 

I have since been informed from different sources that the Terror 
was taken in tow by two tugs on her arrival in the harbor, and that she 
was in a sinking condition. One informant said that she was grounded 
for safety and her crew sent ashore and punips sent to her assistance. 
All accounts agree that she was struck three times, and that one of 
her engineers and one of her crew were killed. I have also been 
informed that others of her crew were wounded, that much damage was 
done, and that repairs were immediately begun and were continuing 
day and night. One shot is said to have raked her deck and another 
to have gone through her side into her after engine room. Her rudder 
or steering gear is said to have been injured. Although my informa- 
tion comes from persons who saw the exterior of the vessel after her 
return to the harbor, I have naturally not been able to get a technical 
description of her internal injuries. A large number of people were 
assembled on the high bluff of San Juan to see the engagement. 

After the Terror had reached the harbor the cruiser reappeared 

[Page 222.] 

outside, accompanied by a gunboat. Both stood round the Morro and 
continued slowly for a considerable distance to the eastward, well 
inshore and far beyond the range of the St. PauVs guns. So well within 
the range of tbe San Juan batteries were they that I could see no reason 
for their maneuver except to decoy the St. Paul within fire of the bat- 
teries. At this time the St. Paul was heading west, practically in her 
former position, but occasionally gathering slight headway to maintain 
the wind and sea directly astern. At 4.45 p. m. the St. Paul was turned 
and headed east, on a course nearly parallel to that which the Spanish 
vessels were apparently steering. Those vessels immediately turned 
and then retired to the harbor. During the entire affair the St. Paul 
maintained her position near the city. She was not hit. 

The Yosemite arrived off San Juan on the afternoon of the 25th. 
I had intended to leave the blockade on the night of the 27th to pro- 
ceed to New York for coal, but, believing the blockade should be 
strengthened, I decided to so inform the Commander in Chief promptly 
while the Terror was repairing. Had I proceeded directly to New York, 
as intended, there would have been a long delay before the Yosemite 
could be reenforced off San Juan. I therefore left San Juan on the 
2ith, a day earlier than intended, and, with the coal thus reserved, pro- 
ceeded to the Mole, Haiti, and communicated my recommendation by 
cable to the Department and to the Commander in Chief. The St. Paul 
arrived at the Mole at 2.50 p. m. on the 27th. No reply having been 

k received by me at 8 a. m. on the 28th, and, having been informed by the 
operator of the cable line at the Mole that no reply had been received 



154 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

in New York up to 8 o'clock, I put to sea and proceeded north for coal 
and supplies according - to my orders from the Commander in Thief. 

The rapid and accurate fire brought to bear on the Terror hy the 
St. Paul, whose crew has been under drill less than one month and a 
half against adverse conditions, reflects great credit on the executive 
officer, Lieut. Commander Win. 11. Driggs, and on the divisional offi- 
cers, Lieuts. .1. M. Foyer. \l. Osborn, (Jeo. Young, II. Dixon, and 
Ensigns 0. S. Bookwalter. \V. Y. N. Powelson, and A. L. Cowell. The 
St. Paul, by reason of her great complexity of arrangement and the 
remoteness of many of her parts from the bridge, is a difficult and 
trying command in her present sphere of action. It therefore gratifies 
me greatly to find that her discipline and skill have been demonstrated 
to be good in emergency. 
Very respectfully, 

C D. Sigsbee, 
Captain, U. S. N., Commanding. 

The Secretary of the Navy. 



125792. 

[Report of trip inland of Lieut. Victor Blue to acquire information in regard to enemy's ships.] 

No. 144.] U. S. Flagship New York, 1st Kate, 

Off Santiago de Cuba, Cuba, June 27, 1898. 
Sir: I desire to recommend to your consideration the excellent con- 
duct of Lieut. Victor Blue, U. S. N., attached to the U. S. S. Suwanee, 
who has on two occasions, at my request, undertaken to locate the 
positions of the Spanish fleet in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba. To 
accomplish this, it has been necessary to travel on one occasion over a 
distance of 7.'3 miles, and on another a distance of 60 miles, mostly 
through territory occupied by the intrenchments of the Spanish army. 
I think the manner in which he has accomplished these tasks is 
deserving of promotion, and I respectfully recommend that he be 
advanced ten numbers. 

Very respectfully, W. T. Samson, 

Rear- Admiral, U. S N., 
Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station. 
The Secretary of the Navy, 

Navy Department, Washington, D. C. 



125792. 

[Report of communication with insurgents.] 

U. S. S. SUWANEE, 
Off Santiago de Cuba, June 13, 1898. 
Sir: In compliance with your verbal order of the 10th instant forme 
to communicate with the insurgent forces in this vicinity and to obtain 
through them positive information concerning the presence of the 

[Page 444.] 

enemy's ships in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, I have to report that, 
in order to furnish you absolutely reliable information, I sent Lieut. 
Victor lilue. of this vessel, on the morning of the 11th instant, to Cen- 
eral Cebreco, requesting him to furnish Lieutenant Blue with guides 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 155 

and horses that he might proceed to the hills north of Santiago de 
Cuba to make the desired observations. Lieutenant Blue wore his 
uniform and side arms. 

On the morning- of the 13th instant, by previous arrangement, I met 
Lieutenant Blue at Asseraderos, he having performed the duty assigned 
him most creditably. As it was connected with considerable personal 
danger, I would commend him to your favorable consideration. 
I herewith inclose Lieutenant Blue's report. 
Very respectfully, 

D. Delehanty, 
Lieutenant-Commander, U. 8. A., Commanding. 
Rear- Admiral W. T. Sampson, U. S. N., 

Commander in Chief North Atlantic Fleet. 



TJ. S. S. Suwanee, 
Off Santiago de Cuba, June 13, 1898. 

Sir: In obedience to your verbal order of the 11th instant, I left the 
ship off Aserraderos Point and proceeded to the camp of the insur- 
gent forces about 1 mile inland, finding General Rabi in command. 
On explaining to him that I was under orders from you to proceed to 
a good point of observation near the Bay of Santiago de Cuba for the 
purpose of observing unmistakably the enemy's fleet, he gladly fur- 
nished me with a trustworthy guide and a good mule. In company 
witli the guide, Maj. Francisco H. Masaba y Reyes, I left the camp 
about 10.30 a. m. of the 11th instant, and taking generally a northerly 
course, arrived late in the afternoon at a Cuban outpost, about 1~> or 
20 miles to the northward and westward of Santiago. The commander 
of this outpost furnished me with three additional guides to take me 
through the Spanish lines. After going through the Spanish lines and 
traveling an hour after nightfall, the guides concluded that it was 
dangerous to proceed any farther until next morning, whereupon we 
camped at the house of a Cuban sympathizer. The next morning we 
proceeded about 12 miles farther to a point on a hilltop a little to the 
westward of the north end of the bay and about 3 miles distant from 
it. From this point 1 had an almost unobstructed view of the entire 
bay except the part south of Smith Cay. In the bay I counted five 
large vessels that were unmistakably men-of-war. Three of these 
answered the descriptions of vessels of Admiral Cervera's squadron. 
One could not be seen sufficiently well to describe definitely anything 
more about her than that she was a large vessel and had one smoke 
pipe. The fifth was a large white vessel anchored near the city and 
was said by the Cubaus to be old and useless. Another large vessel 
was anchored near the city, but whether a man-of-war or merchant 
vessel 1 was unable to make out on account of the poor background. 

Anchored near the city were also three smaller men-of-war, one of 
about 1,500 tons displacement, one of about 800, and the last was what 
I made out to be a small gunboat. 

Near the entrance to the bay was a vessel underway which, judging 
from her relative dimensions, I took to be a destroyer. Two other 

[Page 445.] 

vessels resembled torpedo boats, but I am unable to state positively 
their character. 

Two launches and a larger vessel were in the channel near the posi 
tion of the Merrimac. 



156 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

The relative positions of all these vessels were included in my sketch, 
which I submitted to you and the admiral immediately after my return. 

I remained at the place of observation about an hour and a half and 
then started back on tbe return trip. I was fully satisfied from my own 
knowledge that the vessels I saw were those of Cervera's squadron. 

The point of observation was in plain view of a Spanish garrison 
about 1.000 to 1,200 yards away. On our return Cuban sympathizers 
informed us that the road we passed over the day before was occupied 
by the Spanish troops. This necessitated our taking another route. 
Different people along the road would inform us how to proceed to keep 
clear of the Spaniards. 

On the 1 1th considerable firing could be heard at various places along 
the route, and the smoke at Spanish camps could occasionally be seen 
a mile or two away. 

1 arrived at the headquarters of General Rabi on the night of the 12th 
instant, and joined the ship off Aserraderos Point the next morning. 
Very respectfully, 

Victor Blue, 
Lieutenant, U. S. X. 

Lieut. Commander D. Delehanty, U. S. N., 

Commanding U. S. S. Suwanee. 



127257. 

[Result of trip of Lieutenant Blue for information regarding enemy's fleet.] 

U. S. S. Suwanee, 
Off Santiago de Cuba, Cuba, June 29, 1898. 
Sir: In obedience to your verbal order of the 25th instant, to obtain 
for you information of the location of the enemy's ships in the harbor of 
Santiago de Cuba, I have to report that I communicated with the insur- 
gent camp near Acerrederos that same evening and sent Lieutenant 
Blue to procure the required information. 

About 10 a. m. of the 27th instant, by prearranged signals, I met 
Lieutenant Blue on the coast* sorne 6 miles east of Acerrederos, he 
having performed the duty most successfully. 

I herewith inclose Lieutenant Blue's report, and while it is a simple, 
modest statement of his trip and results, I beg to invite your attention 
to the perilous nature of the trip and the prompt and satisfactory man- 
ner in which it was performed. 

This is the second time Lieutenant Blue has successfully undertaken 
this hazardous duty, and while he has only done that which is expected 
of every officer, a due recognition of such valuable services is a great 
stimulant to the best efforts of both officers and men. 
Very respectfully, 

T). Delehanty,* 
Lieutenant- Commander, U. S. N., Commanding. 
' Bear- Admiral W. T. Sampson, U. S. N., 

Commanding U. S. Naval Forces, North Atlantic Station. 

* Signature inserted at the Department. 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 157 

[Page 446.] 

U. S. S. SUWANEE, 
Off Santiago de Cuba, June 27, 18D8. 

Sir : In obedience to your verbal order of tbe 25th instant, to proceed inland to a 
good point of observation for tbe purpose of locating the positions of the enemy's 
ships in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, I respectfully report as follows : 

As I landed on shore about 6 p. in. of the25th instant, I happened to meet General 
Garcia's chief of staff, who was about to embark on one of the transports that were 
taking troops to Altares. On explaining to him my mission, he gave orders to have 
me taken to the Cuban front, where I would be furnished with a necessary guard 
for going through the Spanish lines. I reached Colonel Cebroco's camp at midnight, 
and learned that his troops had been engaged in fighting the Spaniards all that day. 
This camp is about 1 mile inland from Point Cocal and about 24 miles from Acerra- 
deros Point, where I landed. 

After reading the letter sent by Garcia's chief of staff, for him to furnish me with 
a suitable guard, the colonel appeared very much displeased, as he was reluctant to 
send his men through the lines. However, he gave the necessary orders, and early 
the next morning I set out from his camp with six soldiers. Going to the northward 
and eastward for several miles I reached the outer picket line of the Cuban forces. 
This line was posted on a hill and fronting a Spanish intrenchment 600 to 700 yards 
away. At this place it was necessary to leave the mules and to proceed the rest of 
the way on foot. In order to reach a good point for observation of the harbor it was 
necessary to go on the eastern end of the same hill on which the enemy was 
intrenched, and in so doing pass near another intrenchment to the northward. In 
order to avoid the enemy's pickets we had to proceed very cautiously, at oue time 
creeping through long grass and at another climbing the steep side of a mountain. 
In going up this mountain it was necessary to cross the main road from the Spanish 
camps to the city several times. In doing so, scouts and flankers were thrown out 
to watch the turns in the road and signal the rest of the party if the way was clear. 
By proceeding step by step in this manner we managed to reach the point of obser- 
vation, 2 miles inside'' the lines, after four hours' time. After passing through a field 
where sugar cane and sweet potatoes were growing in abundance, I came to the con- 
clusion that the Spanish soldiers in that section could not be in want of food. In 
fact, we subsisted that day on sugar cane and mangoes, which I thought were very 
palatable indeed. 

Although at times it was necessary to pass through open places, yet for the 
greater part of the time we were screened by the thick foliage of the undergrowth 
on the mountain. 

From the trunk of a tree that projected beyond the dense growth on the moun- 
tain side I obtained an almost perfect view of the entire harbor. The channels on 
the east and west of Smith Cay were the only parts shut out from view. 

Eight men-of-war were observed, lour of them being the armored cruisers of Cer- 
vera's squadron. None of these vessels, as far as I could discover, had up steam. 
Two small vessels were also seen south of Smith Cay, oue of which, I thought to be 
a destroyer, steamed to the south side of Smith Cay, the other, which I could not 
clearly make out, was lying close to the land east of the channel. 

I platted the positions ol all these vessels ou the chart which I submitted to you 
on my return. 

After staying about an hour at the place of observation I set out on the return 
trip, and reached the Cuban picket line shortly after dark without incident during 
the day. 

As far as I could learn from the Cubans several thousand Spanish troops had been 
concentrated in that section to repel the advance of the Americans that might be 
lauded west of Santiago. They are intrenched on hills in strong positions that 
command the roads leading to Santiago. There are at least four of these intrench- 
ments. 

Yerv respectfullv, Victor Blue, 

Lieutenant, TJ. S. N. 

Lieutenant-Commander D. Delehanty, U. S. N., 

Commanding. 

Forwarded. 

D. Delehanty, 
Lieutenant-Commander, U. S. Navy, Commanding 



158 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

No. 44. 

U. S. S. Maebleiiead, 3d Rate, 

Guantanamo, Cuba, June 16, 189S. 

Sir : I have the honor to inform you that on the 14th instant, at the 
suggestion of Colonel Laborde, the Cubans under the command of 
himself and Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas, supported by two companies 
of marines under the command of Captain Spicer and Lieutenant 
Elliot, routed the force of about 300 Spaniards stationed in the pass 
between the marine camp and the south coast. 

One portion of the command advanced by the cliffs so far as the well 
and blockhouse, which I referred to in my No. 88, supported by the 
Dolphin. 

The other portion diverged from the coast line and advanced up the 
valley to the southeast, the two forces eventually uniting on the sides 
of the mountain in the vicinity of the blockhouse and well. 

in this vicinity the Spaniards, numbering about 300, were encountered 
and driven from their position, sustaining a loss of between 40 and 00 
killed and one officer and 17 soldiers captured. 

As the day was well advanced, it was not possible for our force to 
make a search for the Spanish wounded, and I fear that many were 
left on the held uncared for. 

We suffered a loss of two Cuban soldiers killed, 6 wounded, 4 of whom 
were Cubans. In addition 23 marines were prostrated by the heat and, 
with the wounded, were transferred to the Dolphin, from which ship 
the force was also supplied with ammunition during the engagement. 

The well and blockhouse referred to, on the south coast, were 
destroyed and a set of heliograph instruments taken. 

The object of the movement was for the purpose of relieving the 
pressure on the marine camp by an offensive movement, and it was, I 
believe, entirely successful. 

I need hardly call attention to the fact that the marines would have 
suffered much less had their campaign hats not been on the Resolute. 

I desire to call particular attention to the devotion of the Cubans to 
the cause of freeing their island, shown in so many ways, by stating 
that the last words of the Cuban who was shot through the heart and 
buried on the field were " Viva Cuba Libre." 

Inclosed, marked "A," is a list of the Spanish soldiers captured. 

The second lieutenant, also captured, is Francisco Batista, of Guan- 
tanamo City. 

The marines who were prostrated by the heat were nearly all able to 
return to their camp early in the evening. 
Very respectfully, 

B. H. McCalla, 
Commander, United States Navy, Commanding. 
The Commander in Chief, North Atlantic Station. 



No. 45. 
[Page 488.] 

[Extract under date of Juno 8 from report of Commander in Chief, North Atlantic Station, dated 

August 3, 1898.] 

The Yankee was sent to St. Nicholas Mole with the following dis- 
patches to the Secretary of the Navy: 

Yesterday morning sent from the blockade the Marblehead and the Yanlcc to 
arrive at Guantanamo early daylight. Tln-v entered harbor, taking possession of 
lower bay immediately after their arrival, and small gunboat defending position 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 159 

retreated without delay to the upper bay, which is conuected with the lower bay by 
a narrow passage defended by 11 mines. Their instructions were not to enter the 
upper portion of the bay, but to hold lower bay for the accommodation of our ships, 
and this was successfully accomplished. The crew of cable steamer Adria spent 
several days searching for Jamaica cable from Santiago and destroyed second cable, 
the St. Louis having cut first. But the crew of the Adria has refused to do any 
more work on grounds that work required of them is illegal. Therefore cable from 
Santiago to Cienfuegos has not been cut, but all communication between Cuba and 
outside world has been cut off. As there is some doubt that both Jamaica cables have 
been cut, suggest that Department make inquiry into this subject. I suggest further 
that as the crew of the Adria has failed in their contract, they should not receive 
compensation after the time at which they refused to do duty. As soon as possible 
I hope to have communication by telegraph between Guantananio and the United 
States through French cables, and will inform the Department as soon as it has been 
established. Under these circumstances, again I urge upon the Department to expe- 
dite the arrival of troops for Santiago de Cuba, the difficulty of blockading the 
Spanish ships daily increasing; and as dark and stormy nights approach, difficulty 
must be increased greatly. Army should be here now. The Spanish force ou north 
side of Cuba is insignificant absolutely, and can offer no impediment whatever. One 
cruiser could look after the whole. Yankee will wait until one for answers. The 
Marblehead will remain at Guantanamo. 

No. 46. 
[Page 491.] 

[Extract from report of Commander in Chief, North Atlantic Station, dated August 3, 1898.] 

June 12. — The torpedo boat Porter arrived from Guantanamo and 
brought the following report from Commander McCalla: 

No. 86.] U. S. S. Marblehead, 3d Rate, 

Guantanamo, Cuba, June 12, 1898. 

Sir: I have the honor to report that yesterday a scouting party of one sergeant 
and two privates from the marine camp were killed and their remains mutilated by 
a party of regular Spanish soldiery or guerrillas in their employ. 

The names of those killed are Sergeant Smith, privates Duuphy and McColgan. 

Dr. Gibbs was killed about 1 a.m. this morning in the camp, and Corporal Glass 
accidentally shot himself through the hand. 

It is possible that Dr. Gibbs may have been killed accidentally by one of our own 
men during the fire which took place about that time. 

I would respectfully suggest that P. A. Surg. Arnold, now at Key West, be ordered 
here for duty with the marine command. 

I venture to suggest for your consideration the practicability of reenforcing 
Colonel Huntington with 100 marines from the fleet, with such tents and camp gear 
as may be on the ships. 

I transmit herewith a copy of the order which I found necessary to give the com- 
manding officer of the U. S. S. Panther in order to relieve the lighting force. 

U. S. S. Marblehead, June 12, 1898. 
Sir : Break out immediately and land with the crew of the Panther 50,000 rounds 
of 6-millimeter ammunition. 

In future do not require Colonel Huntington to break out or land his stores or 
ammunition with members of his command. 

Use your own officers and crew for this purpose and supply the commanding officei 
of marines promptly with anything he may require. 

Very respectfully, B. H. McCalla, 

Commander, U. S. V., Commanding. 
Commanding Officer, 

U. S. S. Panther. 

I have the honor to transmit herewith two communications which I received to-day. 
Very respectfully, 

B. H. McCalla, 
Commander, U. S. N., Commanding. 
The Commander in Chief, 

North Atlantic Station. 



55th Congress, ) SENATE. ( Executive 

3d Session. \ ( D. 



COMMUNICATION FROM REAR-ADMIRAL W. S. SCHLEY TO THE 
COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS IN REFERENCE TO THE LET- 
TER FROM THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY OF FEBRUARY 6, 
1899. 



February 20, 1899. — Ordered to be printed for the nso of the Senate. 



Washington, D. 0., February 18, 1899. 

The Chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs, 

Senate Chamber. 

Sir : Complying with the request of the committee, I beg to submit 
the following in reference to the communication of the honorable 
Secretary of the Navy under date of February C to the Senate 
(Executive C) in "response to the Senate resolution of January 23, 
1899, submitting facts and military records affecting the proposal that 
certain officers in the Navy be advanced according to the nominations 
sent to the Senate on December 7, 1898." 

I wish, in the outset, to disclaim any purpose of controversy with 
the Navy Department: First, because my ideas of proper subordina- 
tion of all officers of the Navy to its official head forbid; and, second, 
no officer can be upon such terms of equality with that head as will 
enable him to do so. 

The letter of the Department (so far as I am concerned) can be 
divided under these heads : 

First, the alleged delay off Cienfuegos, Cuba; 

Second, the alleged slow progress toward Santiago de Cuba from 
Cienfuegos ; 

Third, the retrograde movements on the 26th and 27th of May. 

Fourth, the battle of Santiago and the destruction of Cervera's fleet. 

As to the first: My orders from Rear- Admiral Sampson of May 19 
(No. 5, p. 11) were to blockade Cienfuegos. Sampson says: "It is 
unnecessary for me to say to you that we should establish a blockade 
at Cienfuegos with the least possible delay, and that it should be main- 
tained as close as possible." This 1 proceeded immediately to do. 

1 had no knowledge that there were any insurgents about Cienfuegos 
who were friendly to us until the Marblehead arrived, on the 24th, when 
I learned from her commander, for the first time, that there were such; 
and even had I known it on the 23d of May, the surf would have pre- 
vented communication. I immediately sent Commander McCalla to 
make such communication, the result of which was made known to me 
at 3.40 p. m. of May 24, and by which I learned definitely that the 
Spanish fleet was not at Cienfuegos. Within two hours — at 5.15 — I 
started my fleet for Santiago de Cuba. What possible ground for criti- 
cism adverse to me there can be in all this I do not see. I was on the 
spot, acting under orders which gave me entire discretion, and yet 
clothed me with the responsibility of going to Santiago, only after I 
was satisfied that the Spanish fleet was not at Cienfuegos. 

11 161 



162 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

In addition to this, I desire to call special attention to a letter (No. 7) 
of Bear-Admiral Sampson to me, under date of May 20, in which he 
incloses telegram of lJith (p. 44, Ex. Doc, at top) from the Department 
and says : 

After duly considering this telegram, I have decided to make no change in the 
present plan— that is, that you should hold your squadron off Cienfuegos. If the 
Spanish ships have pnl into Santiago, they must conic either to Havana or Cienfue- 
gos to deliver the munitions of war which they are said to bring for use in Cuba. I 
am, therefore, of the opinion thai our best chance of success in capturing these 
ships will be to hold the two points— Cienfuegos and Havana— with all the force we 
can muster. If later it should develop that these vessels are at Santiago, we can 
th.n assemble off that port the ships host suited for the purpose and completely 
blockade it. Until we, then, receive more positive information we shall continue to 
hold I [avana and Cienfuegos. 

This letter is not printed either in the Appendix or the Executive 
Document C, but I received it on the 23d, and, together with No. 8, 
received same day, it shows that at that time 1 was expected to "hold 
my squadron off Cienfuegos." 

Second. The alleged slow progress toward Santiago de Cuba. 

The Secretary assumes that I was in fault for allowing the Eagle, 
which -'was of small importance as a fighting force compared with the 
rest of the force," to "reduce materially the speed of the squadron." 

In respect to this, 1 have to say that she was a part of the force which 
Admiral Sampson had thought proper to send me, together with the 
Iowa and the collier. I had no right to abandon her without a neces- 
sity not then apparent to me. The speed of a tieet must necessarily be 
regulated by that of its slowest vessel. The Eagle was not the only 
slow vessel in that fleet: the Vixen and the collier were others. The 
weather at sea was such that much greater speed could not have been 
kept up. Captain Higginson, of the Massachusetts, reports (p. 15), 
" Weather rough and squally ; " Captain Evans, of the Iowa (p. 26), says, 
"May 25, squally and rainy, long sea from ESE.;" Captain McCalla, of 
the Marblehead (p. 18), says, "May 25, rough and moderate sea, fresh to 
stiff breezes, with wind from ENE. to SE. by S." (which were head 
winds), and my own report from the Brooklyn (p. 22) says, "The run to 
Santiago was marked by rain and rough weather." 1 was ordered to 
proceed to Santiago "cautiously" (see above). If I had known that the 
Spanish fleet was in the latter port, I trust that it is not necessary for 
me to assure this honorable committee that no consideration of the 
Eagle or anything else would have prevented me from getting there at 
the earliest possible moment with the larger vessels, but the weather 
and sea and the slow-moving vessels made it impossible to do better 
than I did. 

Third. The retrograde movements of May 20 and 27. 

These are what the honorable Secretary (adopting the language of 
the letter to him from Admiral Sampson, to be found on p. 135) charac- 
terizes as "reprehensible conduct." 

In reply to this 1 can only say that never before in a professional life 
of more than forty two years was any such language used to character- 
ize conduct of mine, and I can see no reason for its use now. 

An officer's conducl should be judged, first, in the light of his known 
character for professional zeal and ability. The, honorable Secretary 
pays me a high tribute when he says (p. 6) that] was ''selected for 
command of the' Hying squadron' without any solicitation or suggestion 
on my part, or that of anyone in my behalf, and solely with a view to 
the best interests of the public service." I trust that there is no doubt 
in the mind of any member of your committee that in all 1 did while 
in command of the Hying squadron, I was animated by the sole desire 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 163 

to do my duty, fully and completely, to my country, and to deserve 
tbe high compliment that had been paid to me in assigning me to that 
command. 

Acting in accordance with my best judgment, in view of the circum- 
stances; without any certain knowledge of the whereabouts of that 
Spanish fleet; after having been informed by the " scouts," commanded 
by such officers as Sigsbee, Jewell, and Wise, that, although they had 
all been off Santiago de Cuba for a week they had seen nothing of it 
and knew nothing of its movements or its whereabouts since it had 
left Curacao; after having been assured by Sigsbee, tbat he did not 
believe it was in Santiago, and by the emphatic declaration of the pilot 
Nunez; and, knowing that, as the sea and weather then were, it would 
be impossible to coal my squadron off the port, I deemed it best to take 
the action I did, the final result of which was the location of the enemy's 
fleet in Santiago Harbor. 

The Department's dispatch under consideration (p. 34, No. 27, Execu- 
tive C) speaks of insurgent Cubans to be found "5 or 6 miles " from the 
mouth of the harbor. Through Pilot Nunez, whom I caused to be 
landed west of the harbor, I learned, on June 2, of the presence of the 
entire Spanish fleet in the harbor, and he was directed by me promptly 
to report the fact to Hear- Admiral Sampson, who was then in command. 
I would call attention to the exploits of Lieutenant Blue, as reported 
by Commander Delehanty (see p. 333 of the Appendix), wherein he 
says that on June 11 he received from Admiral Sampson an order to 
get in immediate communication with the insurgents and secure with- 
out delay reliable information as to what ships, if any, of the Spanish 
navy were in Santiago Harbor. Delehanty says: "Believing that 
reliable information could not be secured through the insurgent forces, 
1 detailed Lieutenant Blue for this duty, landing him in uniform at 
Aserraderos, and directing him to request Colonel Cebereco to furnish 
him with horses and guides in order to reach the hills near the harbor." 
And Blue reports the difficulty he was under in getting a sight of 
Cervera's fleet from those hilltops. From this it will be seen that it 
was not so easy to secure this information, even ten days after Admiral 
Sampson had arrived there, as the Cubans in Washington, of whom 
the Department speaks, thought it would be; and Aserraderos, where 
those insurgents were, was not "5 or 6 miles" but 20 miles to the west 
of the harbor; and it took Lieutenant Blue more than three days to do 
his work. 

Fourth. The battle of Santiago and destruction of Cervera's fleet. 

As to this, I have nothing to say here. The facts of that contest 
speak for themselves. 

In my official report, made to Admiral Sampson July 6, of that bat- 
tle (p. 98) I said: 

I congratulate you most sincerely upon this great victory to the squadron under 
your command, and am glad that I bad an opportunity to contribute in the least to 
a victory tbat seems big enough for all of us. 

I have treated the subject of the battle more fully in the accompany- 
ing detailed statement. 

The Department has done me the honor to refer to my dispatch of 
July 10 (p. 135), wherein I say: "Victory was secured by the force 
under command of commander in chief North Atlantic Station, and to 
him the honor is due," etc. 

I am quite willing, gentlemen of the committee, to have you contrast 
the spirit of this with the spirit that breathes through the letter begin- 
ning, "My Dear Mr. Secretary," at the close of the same page, wherein 
the commander in chief speaks of me. 



164 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

As to all this criticism of my course prior to the discovery by me on 
May 29 of Cervera's tleet, whether from Admiral Sampson or the 
1 department, none of it has ever been made by either to me; and I never 
heard a word of it from anyone until after the battle with that fleet, 
although more than Ave weeks had passed since the alleged "reprehen- 
sible ronduct"' had occurred. Although Rear-Admiral Sampson used 
this language to the Secretary concerning me on the 10th of July (just 
one week after the battle), he has never to this day. in any manner or 
to any extent, intimated to me any disapprobation or made to me any 
criticism of my conduct of the Hying squadron. 

In conclusion. I ask the attention of your honorable committee to the 
detailed statement herewith submitted, and 

1 have the honor to be, very respectfully, 

W. S. Schley, 
Rear- Admiral, U. 8. N. 



DETAILED STATEMENT. 

The Everett, 1730 II Street, 

Washington, I). C, February IS, 1899. 

Sir: In compliance with your letter dated February 16, 1899, I have the honor to 
state that on May 19, 1898, at 8 o'clock a. m., the flying squadron sailed from Key 
West tor (J ien lueses, with orders to blockade that, port, and consisted of the 
Brooklyn, the Massachusetts, the Texas, and the auxiliary Scorpion. At this time, 
owing to the press of orders and the difficulty of coaling off Sand Key anchorage, 
the Massachusetts and Brooklyn left lacking about 100 tons or more of coal to till 
their bunkers. Admiral Sampson informed the commander in chief of the flying 
squadron that he would send the Iowa and a collier to follow the Hying squadron 
the next day. The Iowa did reach the Hying squadron off Cienfuegos on May 22, the 
day following the arrival of the Hying squadron, and reported for duty. The 
Scorpion w as sent east with dispatches for scouting squadron off Santiago. 

Lieutenant -Commander Rodgers reported on hoard, as Captain Evans was slightly 
unwell, and stated that owing to the press of orders to get away from Key West, and 
the distance of the anchorage there from Key West, the Iowa had to sail to join me 
before she could entirely till her bunkers, but that with reasonably fair weather his 
ship's company, a most excellent one, could take on board about 2fi0 tons during the 
da\ light from a collier expected to arrive. On the morning of May 23 the Cast hie 
arrived, convoying the collier Merrimac; and the Iowa, Castine, and Duponi took some 
coal from this collier. On May 24 the Marhlehead, Vixen, and Eagle joined the 
squadron off Cienfuegos. During the night of May 23 there were displayed at a 
point 6 or 8 miles east and west of the port three horizontal white lights, placed 
equidistant on the, hill, but as I had not been informed before leaving Key West 
that the insurgents were in the vicinity, or that any arrangements had been made 
to communicate with them, though I asked the question, it was thought that these 
lights were signal lights of the enemy. The nature of these signals was not under- 
stood until the arrival of the Marhlehead on the morning of May 21, when Com- 
mander MeCalla was sent at once with the Marhlehead and the Eagle to the west- 
ward, some 12 miles or more, to communicate with the insurgents for information 
and to supply them with dynamite, clothing, arms, etc. He returned about 4 p. m. 
to Cienfuegos with the information, obtained from the insurgents, that Cervera's 
fleet was not at Cienfuegos. On the morning of May 23 the following communica- 
tions were received from Rear-Admiral .Sampson: 

United States Flagship New York (1st Rate), 

Key West, Fla., Mag 19, 1S9S. 
Sir: I inclose a copy of a memorandum from Commander McCalla. 
Sou will take steps to prevent, the enemy from continuing work on the new forti- 
ti( at ions nient ioneil therein. 

There is a rumor b\ way of Havana that the Spanish squadron has put into 
Santiago. 

very respectfully, W. T. Sampson, 

Rear- Admiral, U. S. V., 
Commander in chief t nited state* Naval Force, North Atlantic Station. 

The Commanding < >i btcer, 

United States Flying Squadron. 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 165 

Accompanying these instructions was the following letter, which confused the 
situation and threw grave doubts over the location of the Spanish fleet: 

No. 7.1 U. S. Flagship New York, 

Key Went, Fla., May 20, 189S. 

Dear Scttley: The Iowa leaves this morning at 11 o'clock bound for Cienfuegos. 
The Marblehead and the Eagle will both be ready to depart to-night to join you. 
Inclosed is a telegram received at Key West May 19, marked A. After duly con- 
sidering this telegram I have decided to make no change in the present plans; that 
is, that you should hold your squadron off Cienfuegos. If the Spanish ships have 
put into Santiago they must come either to Havana or Cienfuegos to deliver the 
munitions of war which they are said to bring for use in Cuba. I therefore am of 
opinion that our best chance of success in capturing their ships will be to hold the 
two points, Cienfuegos and Havana, with all the force we can muster. If later it 
should develop that these vessels are at Santiago we could then assemble off that 
port the ships best suited for the purpose and completely blockade it. Until we, 
then, receive more positive information we shall continue to hold Havana and San- 
tiago. (This evidently should be Cienfuegos.— W. S. S.) 

1 inclose a telegram received at Key West, dated May 19, marked "B." With 
regard to this second telegram, in which the consul at Capo Haytien says that a 
telegram from Port de Paix on May 17 "reports two ships," etc., is probably of no 
importance, and the vessels referred to may have been our own ships. 

The statement made by the United States minister to Venezuela, contained in a 
cablegram of the same date, is probably not true, because these ships are reported 
to have left Curacao at 6 p. m. on the 16th. If they were seen on the 17th, appar- 
ently headed lor the French West Indies, they could not possibly be at Santiago de 
Cuba as early as the 18th, as is reported. 

From the first cablegram, marked "A," it will be seen that the Department have 
ordered the crusier Minneapolis and auxiliary No. 461 to proceed to Santiago de Cuba 
to join you. Please send the Scorpion to communicate with these vessels at Santiago, 
and direct one of them to report to the Department from Nicholas Mole or Cape Hay- 
tien the change which I have made in the plan "strongly advised" by the Depart- 
ment. As soon as this vessel has communicated with the Department, at her return 
to the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba, learn the condition of affairs and immediately 
report at Havana or Cienfuegos, as he may think most advantageous. 
Very respectfully, 

W. T. Sampson, 
Rear- Admiral, U. S. N., 
Commander in Chief United States Naval Force, North Atlantic Station. 

Commodore Schley, 

United States Navy, Commanding Flying Squadron. 



Inclosure A. 

Translation of cipher telegram received at 12.30 a. m. May 20. 

"The report of the Spanish fleet being at Santiago de Cuba might very well be 
correct, so the Department strongly advises that you send word immediately by the 
Iowa to Schley to proceed off Santiago de Cuba with his whole command, leaving 
one small vessel off Cienfuegos. And meanwhile the Department will send the 
Minneapolis, now at St. Thomas, West Indies, Auxiliary No. 461, proceed at once off 
Santiago de Cuba to join Schley, who would keep up communication via Mole Haiti, 
or Cape Haitien. If Iowa (has not left yet) had gone, send orders Schley by your 
fastest dispatch vessel. 

"Long." 

Also inclosed and received May 23: 

United States Flagship New York, 

Key West, Fla., May '21, 1898. 

Sir: Spanish squadron probably at Santiago de Cuba. Four ships and three 
torpedo-boat destroyers. If you are satisfied that they are not at Cienfuegos, pro- 
ceed with all dispatch, but cautiously, to Santiago de Cuba, and if the enemy is 
there blockade him in port. You will probably find it necessary to establish com- 
munication with some of the inhabitants, fishermen, or others, to learn definitely 
that the ships are in that port, it being impossible to see into it from outside. 

When the instructions sent by Iowa and Dupont (duplicates) were written, I sup- 
posed that two fast scouts would be in the vicinity of Jamaica, but I have since 
learned that they have been ordered by the Department to get touch with the Spanish 



166 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

fleet on the north coast of Venezuela. I have just telegraphed them to report for 
orders at Nicholas Mole. 
Report from Nicholas Mole. 

Wry respectfully, W. T. Sampson. 

Rear-Admiral, U. S.Navy, 
Commando- in chief United .State* Naval Force, North Atlantic Station. 

The Commodore, United States Flying Squadron. 

Attached t<> (his order were: 

COPIES OF LATE TELEGRAMS. 

Washington, D. C, May is, 1S9S. 
Sampson, Key West, Fla. : 

( >\\ ing to absence of your armored vessels, dying squadron will coal and sent off 
Havana, Cuba. Therefore you will coal your ships and carry out the Department's 
telegraphic instructions of 17th, addressed to naval station, Key West, and begin- 
ning with the cipher words apporcam economical. Leave a suitable defense for Key 
West, and use utmost dispatch to get force off Cienl'uegos, Cuba. Oregon arrived 
to-day at Barbadoes, West Indies. 

Washington, D. C, May 19, 1S9S. 
Sampson, Key West, Fla.: 

United States consul at (ape Haitien says that telegram from Port de Paix, Haiti, 
on May 17 reports the Spanish ships cruising off Mole every night two weeks. The 
I niteil States minister to Venezuela says that cable employee reports confidentially 
the Spanish men-of-war were May 17 apparently headed for French West Indies. 

Long. 
Attached to a duplicate order of the same date was this: 

United States Flagship New York (First Rate), 

Off Havana, Cuba, May 21, 1898. 

MEMORANDUM. 

It is thought that the inclosed instructions will reach you by 2 a. m. May 23. 
This will enable you to leave before daylight (regarded as very important), so "that 
3 T our direction will not be noticed, and be at Santiago a. m. 21th. 

It is thought that the Spanish squadron will probably be still at Santiago, as 
they must have some repairs to make and coal to take. 

The St. Paul and Minneapolis have been telegraphed to scout off Santiago, and if 
the Spanish squadron goes westward one is to go west and attempt to reach you. If 
the squadron goes east, one will keep in touch and the other go into Nicholas Mole 
to telegraph me at Key West. If you arrive off Santiago and a scout meets you, 
send a vessel to cable at Nicholas Mole and get information to be left there by scouts 
as to direction taken by Spanish in case they have left Santiago de Cuba. 

The Yale has been ordered to cruise in Bahama Channel until May 24. It is 
thought possible that the Spanish, hearing of your departure from Cienfucgos, may 
attempt to go there. 

If this word does not reach you before daylight, it is suggested to mask your real 
direction as much as possible. Follow the Spanish squadron whichever direction 
they take. 

AY. T. Sampson, 

Bear-Admiral, 
Commander-in-Chief United States Naval Force on North Atlantic Station. 

The Commodore Flying Squadron. 

Written in ink on the border is the following: 

"Our experience has been that ships can be traced by their smoke from 20 to 30 
miles, and it is suggested in case you leave in the daytime to stand a good distance 
to the westward before tinning to the southward." 

Coincident with the receipt of these orders on May 23 a British steamer, Adula, 
arrived off the port with duly authentic papers from the United States consul, Dent, 
from the State Department, authorizing her to carry out neutrals wishing to leave 
Cienfucgos. She was carefully searched for any contraband matter, and finding 
nothing on board she was permitted to go in. Her captain informed me that a war 
bulletin, published at Kingston, announced the arrival of Cervera's fleet a1 Santiago 

May l'.i, and that his squadron had sailed on .May 20 from Santiago. 

It was a curious coincidence that being on the forward bridge of the Brooklyn on 

the afternoon about o'clock of May 21, as we approached Cienfuegos, and distant 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 167 

perhaps some 30 miles from the harbor, a number of heavy guns were heard in the 
direction of the port and fired with the regularity of a salute. Not knowing the 
whereabouts of the Spanish fleet, it was thought that this bring might indicate 
their arrival at Cienfuegos, and this opinion was on May 22 signaled to the squad- 
ron of their information. (See p. 29, Confidential Ex. Doc. C.) This view was 
the stronger from the generally accepted theory that this fleet was bound for Cien- 
fuegos with guns, ammunition, etc., to be run by rail to Havana, asCienfuegos 
was in railroad communication with Havana. This information of the Adula directly 
from Jamaica strengthened my belief of Cervera's presence in Cienfuegos, convinced 
me of the propriety of delay to satisfy myself, until the evening of the 24th, when 
it was definitely decided, through information of Commander McCalla, that the Span- 
ish fleet was not at Cienfuegos. 

The Dupont arrived at Cienfuegos the morning of May 22, and, being without suf- 
ficient coal to return to Key West, the flagship undertook to coal her with boats, but 
there was so much motion that it was not possible to put more than ten or twelve 
tons en board in bags during the day. It was not until the arrival of the collier, 
the day following, that coal sufficient to enable her to get back to Key West could 
be put on board. During this time the heavy surf on the beach made communica- 
tion impossible until the 24th, when Commander McCalla joined the squadron. 

Commander McCalla reported on board on his arrival on May 24, asking me if 
we had seen any signals on the shore. I informed him that on the night of May 23 
lights were seen on the hills east and west of the harbor. He stated then that they 
were signals from insurgents for communication. This was the first intimation I 
had ever received that any arrangements of any kind had been agreed upon. Com- 
mander McCalla was sent immediately westward with instructions to ascertain, if 
possible, if Cervera's fleet was in Cienfuegos, and reported about 4 p.m. that it was 
not. That fact established, the Flying Squadron mover 1 at dusk eastward for Santi- 
ago, leaving the Castine oft' Cienfuegos, as directed. 

The squadron, consisting of the Brooklyn, the Massachusetts, the Iowa, the Texas, 
Marblehead, Vixen, Eagle, and collier Merrimac, left Cienfuegos at dusk May 24 for 
Santiago at a speed of 9 knots, that being the best the smaller vessels could make in 
starting out. For the two days the squadron was off Cienfuegos the winds were 
fresh, with rolling seas; but asthe sea was gained, after leaving, the winds fresh- 
ened up, with rain, and the sea became so rough that the small craft could not keep 
up with the larger vessels, but were tossed about to such extent that it was neces- 
sary to slow down, so that they might hold position. At least two or three times 
the squadron had to stop to make minor repairs to the steering gear of the collier 
and to allow the Eagle and Vixen to gain and hold thei'* positions. The weather 
continued varied by wind squalls and occasioned much delay, as the squadron had 
to be slowed down at times to four or five knots. On the 26th the Eagle reported 
about a day's coal, more or less, on board, and there being no prospects of being able 
to coal her, as the sea was too rough, she was sent to Port Antonio, some 70 miles 
away, with orders, after coaling there, to return to Key West, so as to avoid any 
complications about the neutrality of the port — the regulations governing such sup- 
ply in neutral ports confining the amount of coal given to enough only to make the 
nearest home port, which was Key West. 

The squadron', after these various dela\ s, arrived off Santiago de Cuba about 4.30 
p. m. of May 26, and sighted several vessels to the northward and eastward, which 
proved to be the scout St. Paul, Yale, and Minneapolis. Not knowing definitely of 
their presence, the squadron was cleared for action, and closed in with these vessels 
should they have proved enemies. 

Shortly after coining up with these scouts the machinery of the Merrimac was dis- 
abled by breaking of her intermediate pressure valve and the cracking of the 
stuffing box. This unfortunate accident to the Merrimac embarrassed the squadron's 
movements, and as she was the only collier at hand, it was necessary to have her 
taken in tow, and this proved to be very difficult on account of the wiud and sea. 
In her disabled state no thought of abandoning her or the scouts could be enter- 
tained. Indeed, it required some fifteen to twenty hours to get a line to her that 
would stand the great strain of towing, and no end of hard work all night and part 
of the next day, 27th, during which the squadron drifted with the wind and sea to 
the westward of port. It was during this operation that the Harvard brought the 
Department dispatch, as follows : 

"Cotton, Harvard, Nicholas Mole. (Received at Nicholas Mole 8.30 a. m. and deliv- 
ered May 27, 1998. ) Proceed at once and inform Schley aud also the senior officer off 
Santiago de Cuba as follows: 

"All Department's information indicates the Spanish division is still at Santiago 
de Cuba. The Department looks to you to ascertain the fact and that the enemy, if 
therein, does not leave without a decisive action. Cubans familiar with Santiago 
de Cuba say there is a landing place 5 nautical miles west, or 6 from mouth of harbor, 
and that there probably insurgents will be found and not Spanish. From surround- 



168 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVT. 

ing heights can see everj vessel in port. As soon as ascertained, notify the Depart- 
ment \\ lit'tlit'i' enemy Is there. Could not squadron and also Harvard coal from Mer- 
rimao leeward CapeCrnz, Cuba; Gonaives, Haiti Channel; or Mole, Haiti? Report 

\vitlmut delay situation Santiago <lc Cuba." 

Captain Sigsbee stated verbally that he had been close into the port several times 
ami there v ei e oo indications of any kind that the enemy was present, aud, indeed, 
he doubted his presence. Pilot Nunez, an experienced Santiago ] pilot, who was sent 
on board the Brooklyn by Sigsbee, was emphatic in his belief that the squadron was 
not able to enter, on account of their size, without the assistance of tugs. He stated 
thai owing to the narrowness of the channel such large ships could not enter the 
port. Sigsbee also confirms this. (Appendix to Report Bureau Navigation, p. 413.) 

The commanding officer of the Harvard reported that he did not have coal enough 
to reach any home base and could not steam beyond twenty-four or thirty hours, 
which forced me to send him to Kingston. The commanding officer of the Yale 
reported that he could reach Key West, with some margin for bad weather. The 
Minneapolis reported his engine in bad order and his coal supply about enough to 
reach Key West. The comma nding officer of the St. Paul reported that he could 
remain at most off the port some two days, when he ought in prudence to start for 
his base. 

The Brooklyn, Iotoa, and Massachusetts were fairly well off with coal, but the Texas, 
Marblehead, and Vixen were very considerably reduced, owing to the difficulty of 
coaling the Texas in the swell off Cienfuegos, and the arrival of the two latter, both 
short of coal, at Cienfuegos on May 24, the squadron sailing therefrom on the even- 
ing of that date. The projecting sponsons of the Texaaand Marblehead made it dan- 
gerous to coal them alongside the collier with any swell in the open sea. 

It was this situation, coupled with the conclusion that the Spanish squadron 
might have touched and then moved west, as reported at Cienfuegos, and reinforced 
by the fact that Sigsbee had not seen them, and that the pilot Nunez, an experienced 
Santiago pilot, was strongly impressed with the doubt that this squadron could 
enter the port, which occasioned my telegram of May 27. The chief engineer of the 
collier, after much hard work, disconnected the broken engine while being taken in 
tow. The weather and sea having moderated considerably and the commanding 
officer of the collier reporting that he could make G or 7 knots in moderate sea and 
weather, orders were given to cast off the tow lines after about three hours' steaming 
w est. 

As to the difficulty of coaling off Santiago at that time, the following extract from 
the report of Captain Sigsbee of May 31, 1898 (p. 414, Appendix Bureau's Report), is 
pertinent. He says: ".Just before leaving Santiago I told Commodore Schley that 
the weather then prevailing ( May 29) was far more favorable for coaling outside than 
any I had observed in my eight days' continuous cruise off the entrance." 

The Texas, Marblehead, and Vixen having taken coal enough to equalize the squad- 
ron's working efficiency, I decided, before going farther west, to satisfy myself by 
close examination of the port of Santiago. If it should be discovered that the 
enemy was not in that port, the squadron, beiug equal in steaming radius (with the 
Texas, Marblehead, and Vixen coaled), could then make the best speed toward Key 
West via Yucatan Passage. 

By the Yale my dispatch of May 28 was sent to the Department and to Admiral 
Sampson to inform them that collier having been repaired, I would endeavor to coal 
Texas and Marblehead in open sea and hold my position off Santiago. 

The squadron then turned east and took up position in the afternoon about 5.30 of 
May 28, and invested Santiago de Cuba. Forming the squadron in line of battle, 
with the Marblehead and Vixen on the flanks as pickets, the squadron in column 
steamed slowly east and west before the harbor in line of battle, ready for any 
emergency, about (i miles offshore, as shown by report of Captain Evans dated July 
4 (p. 4 lit. Appendix), wherein he -ays: "Works at entrance to Santiago de Cuba in 
plain sight latter pari first dogwatch " | 1 to t> p. m. ). < >n May 29, the day following, 
shortly alter daybreak, on steaming closer in past the harbor wo discovered the 
Cristobal (Ohm, with another of the enemy's vessels and two torpedo boats, moored 
well inside the Morro and partially concealed, except the Colon, which was lying 
well inside of Cay Smith and toward I'unta Corda and head on. 

The St. Paul rejoined the squadron from the eastward on May 29 about S o'clock 
a. in., and was dispatched with cablegram announcing the discovery of several ves- 
sels of the enemy's fleet in port to the Department and Rear Admiral Sampson. 

The telegram of May 2'J to the Department and Admiral Sampson was sent by St. 
Paul to Nicholas Mole. 

"Enemy in port. Recognized Cristobal Colon and Infanta Maria Teresa, with two 
torpedo boat-, moored inside Morro, behind point. Doubtless others are here. 
We are short of coal, using every effort to get coal in. Vixen blew out manhole 
gasket. Have sent boiler maker to repair. Collier repaired, machinery being put 
together. Have about 3,0U0 tons of coal in collier left. Not easy to get onboard 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 169 

here. If no engagement the next two or three days, Sampson's squadron could 
relieve this one to coal at Gonaives or vicinity Port au Prince. Hasten me dispatch 
boats for picket work. Brooklyn, Iowa, Massachusetts, Texa», Mavhlehead, Vixen, and 
collier compose squadron here. Am sending the St. Paul to communicate with 
Sampson." 

On May 31, leaving Brooklyn and Texas coaling on offing, I made a reconnoissance 
in afternoon with the Massachusetts, Iowa, New Orleans, and Vixen to develop the 
enemy's position, and incidentally to injure or destroy, if possible, the Colon, moored 
well up in the harbor. The result of the reconnoissance determined without ques- 
tion the presence of the Spanish fleet in the harbor. That question decided, it 
would have been unwise to risk, until reenforced, any chance of serious disablement 
of the ships that would have rendered the squadron numerically inferior to the 
enemy. This, my judgment, was in line with the judgment of the Navy Department, 
set out on page 171, Appendix to Bureau's Keport, in Secretary Long's instructions 
to Rear- Admiral Sampson, in these words : 

" The Department does not wish the vessels of your squadron to be exposed to the 
fire of the batteries at Havana, Santiago de Cuba, or other strongly fortified ports 
in Cuba unless the more formidable Spanish vessels should take refuge within those 
harbors. Even in this case the Department would suggest that a rigid blockade 
and employment of our torpedo boats might accomplish this — the destruction of the 
enemy's vessels — without subjecting unnecessarily our men-of-war to the fire of the 
land batteries;" and gives the reason that lack of docking facilities made it particu- 
larly desirable that our vessels should not be crippled. This was substantially 
repeated on April 26, 1898 (p. 177, Appendix), and May 5 (366, Appendix), as to "not 
risking or crippling the vessels against fortifications." 

The Harvard joined the squadron May 31 from Kingston, with following dispatches : 

"Cotton, U. S. S. Harvard, Kingston, Jamaica: 

"Return to Schley with this message : Hold ou at all hazards. New York, Oregon, 
and New Orleans are on way. St. Louis and Yankee are leaving New York for San- 
tiago via Nicholas Mole. Two more colliers en route ; torpedo-boat destroyer reported 
at San Juan said to be damaged. 

"Long." 

The Harvard was sent on the same evening to Nicholas Mole with the following 
telegram to the Secretary : 

"Made reconnoissance this afternoon, May 31, with the Massachusetts, Iowa, New 
Orleans, to develop fortifications with their character. The range was 7,000 yards. 
Reconnoissance was intended (to) principally injure (or) to destroy Colon. Fire was 
returned without delay by heavy batteries to the east and to the west (of) entrance, 
large caliber and long range. Reconnoissance developed satisfactorily the presence 
of Spanish squadron lying beyond island near inner forts, as they fired over the hill 
at random. Quite satisfied that Spanish fleet is there. I shall send pilot to-mor- 
row morning in Vixen to ascertain fully, and I shall report. In great need of smaller 
vessels for picket duty. I would suggest that it is most important to send with col- 
lier a large number of coaling bags holding about 600 pounds, as all coaling must be 
done in such a manner. Can you send Solace here in order to give relief to exhausted 
and injured in any operation? Owing to extreme heat the suffering for all hands 
is great, particularly (in the) engineers' department. We are coaling squadron in 
the face of the enemy every good day. United States ships were not struck this 
afternoon." 

During the early morning of June 1, the Colon changed her position into the 
harbor behind the land, preventing any further operations against her, had they 
been deemed wise. 

On May 31, I wrote the following note : 

Flying Squadron, United States Flagship Brooklyn, 

Off Santiago de Cuba, May 31, 189S. 
Sir : I send to communicate with you Pilot Nunez, to arrange a system of signals 
to indicate your desire to communicate with me. I would suggest three lights at 
night, equidistant and horizontal; and during day three white flags, moved to 
right three times simultaneously. Please inform Nunez of your acquiescence, and 
oblige, 

Yours, truly, W. S. Schley, 

Commodore, U. S. Navy, Commander in Chief Flying Squadron. 
To General Minuet or General Ceberece. 

A note was sent the morning following by the Vixen with Pilot Eduard Nunez to 
General Cebereco to arrange a general system of signals for communication by day 
or night. Pilot Nunez was landed by Vixen some 15 miles west of the port to com- 



170 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

municate with Cuban general sumo 30 miles in the interior. The Vixen returned to 
the squadron alter landing Nunez and went hack for him the next afternoon. The 
insurgents confirmed the fact that the Spanish fleet was in Santiago, as my tele- 
grams of .May 29 and :il had reported, 

On June 1, about 6.30 a. m.. t he New York, with Bear-Admiral Sampson, arrived 
oil the port, and he assumed command. 

The contents of tbe dispatches which follow were all communicated by me to 
Admiral Sampson during mj visit. 

It will be semi that the telegrams to Cotton at Kingston readied me at Santiago 
May 31, 1 hi ee da v s, nearly, a Iter I ho port had been blockaded, and on the same day 
and at the same hour the following was received, through the courtesy of Mr. Wright, 
of the Associated Press, on hoard the press boat Dandy, from Port Antonio: 

(1) "Deliver following to next American war vessel to arrive: Proceed immedi- 
ately and deliver the following to Schley as soon as possible; the utmost urgency. 

•■ Unless it is unsafe for your (our) squadron, the Department wishes you remain 
oil Santiago de Cuba. So can not you take possession of < ruantanamo, Cuba, occu- 
pying as coaling station 1 If you must Leave, are authorized to sink collier in the 
mouth of harbor off Santiago de Cuba if you obstruct thereby. But if not so used, 
and it' not necessary to you, it would he ver.v desirable to leave her at Mole Haiti or 
vicinity. Vou must not leave the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba unless it is unsafe 
for your squadron, or unless Spanish division is not there." 

Also received May 31, 1898: 

(2) "The following was sent to yon 27th to Nicholas Mole: 

"The most absolutely urgent thing now is to know positively whether the Spanish 
division is in Santiago de Cuba Harbor as, if so, immediate movements against it 
and the town if it has not been made by the Navy and division of about 10,000 
United States troops, which are ready to embark. Vou must surmount difficulty 
regarding coaling hy your ingenuity and perseverance. This is a crucial time, and 
the Department relies upon you to give information quickly as to the presence of 
Cervera and to be ready for concerted action with the Army. Two colliers have 
been ordered to Mole Nicholas. Your vessels may coal singly there or in Genoives, 
Haiti channel, or leeward Cape Cruz, Cuba. Sampson will convoj army transports, 
probably around by Windward Passage, Cuba. Orders have been issued to com- 
mander A uxiliary No. 592 (St. Louis), and tho Minneapolis will go north. Cervera 
must not be allowed to escape. 

"Long." 

Received Juno 1, off Santiago de Cuba, by tug Triton, from Port Antonio, for- 
warded from United States consul: 

"Schley, Port Antonio, Jamaica: 

" It is your duty to ascertain immediately if the Spanish fleet be at Santiago de 
Cuba and report. Would he discreditable to the Navy if that fact was not ascer- 
tained immediately. All naval and military movements depend upon that point. 

" Long." 
Received by Harvard from Kingston 31st May : 

" Deliver Schley following: Where are other two armored cruisers (of) Spanish 
fleet when discovered .' Please report promptly. Commander in chief North Atlantic 
Squadron has started to join vou. 

"Long." 
Received Juno 1, 1898. 

| Translal ion of telegram. | 

'•General Miles states that if you can communicate with Cuban insurgents, request 
i larcia to assemble force at the rear of Saul iago de < luba and our army division will 
take with them to Santiago de Cuba 5,000 stand of arms and ammunition for Cubans. 

"Long." 
Received on June I, 1898. 

'• It has been suggested that an alternate line of communication could ho opened 
with General Garcia, as follows: Landing Maceo Inlet, about 30 nautical miles 
wesl of Santiago de Cuba, not far from Jucaro anchorage. A messenger would find 
the neighboring country in possession of insurgents, and Garcia would probably be 
found at Daire, 33 miles to the north over the mountains. An outpost of Garcia's 
force will probably be found at the northern foot of the mountains and aboul half- 
way from the sea to Dane. The highest point of the road is Naranjo, from where 
there are two paths over to Matias Auras, Fors Negros, the other by lianas Calientes 
and Ojo de Agua. Our Army wishes Garcia to close down on land side of Santiago 
tie Cuba, as previously telegraphed. 

"Long." 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 171 

Received on June 1 : 

"The New Orleans will meet you at Santiago de Cuba May 29 with important dis- 
patches. The Spanish squadron must be blockaded iu Santiago de Cuba at all 
hazards. Immediate communication with persons on shore must be entered upon. 
You must bo sure of the Spanish squadron being in port. I suggest communication 
with Spanish-American company pier at Daiquiri Bay, at a distance of 15 miles east 
of Santiago de Cuba. One collier for you left Tuesday. Shall send another as soon 
as possible. If Spanish squadron has left Santiago immediate pursuit must be made. 

"Sampson," 

The New Orleans did not arrive until May 30, and the dispatch announcing her 
coming only reached me June 1. 

The Department's orders dated May 25 (No. 27, Executive Document C), and 
received by me on May 27, were as follows : 

"All Department's information ..ndicates the Spanish division is still at Santiago 
de Cuba. The Department looks to you to ascertain fact, and that the enemy, if 
therein, does not leave without a decisive action." 

In obedience to the above order, and without any further order or instruction 
from anyone, I did ascertain the fact that the enemy was at Santiago de Cuba, as 
reported in my telegram of May 29 to the Department, and the enemy did not leave 
without a decisive conflict. 

With reference to the battle of July 3, the Brooklyn's movements are brought under 
review by Secretary Long in Executive Document C. 

At 8.45 a. m., July 3, Admiral Sampson made signal from his flagship "Disregard 
movements of commander in chief," and steamed eastward to Sibouey. 

This left me the senior ofhcer present, and necessarily clothed me with the respon- 
sibility of command. 

The Brooklyn's blockading position was then about SW. by W. from the Morro, 
with her head that day to the eastward. When the enemy's vessels came out the 
harbor, at 9.H5 a. m., signal was made from the Brooklyn to the fleet to "Clear ship 
for action," then followed the signal "Close action," aud this was followed by the 
signal "Enemy escaping to westward." 

Following the appearance of the Spanish squadron coming out there was a gen- 
eral inward movement of the American fleet, closing in and engaging it. 

General firing began at once. The tactics of the Spanish admiral soou made it 
evident that he intended to escape .west. The rapidity with which the Brooklyn 
approached the head of the Spanish column coming westward under high speed aud 
changing course more to westward, brought the Brooklyn heading eastward to meet 
it into a position where she would have blanketed the fire of the eastern vessels of 
our force, now changing their courses to the westward, and between them and the 
Spanish vessels. Instant decision was therefore necessary to avoid interfering in any 
way or cutting off any of the fire of our vessels, as would have occurred if she had 
turned toward the Spanish fleet, now approaching the Brooklyn. Turning outward 
left the enemy's ships unmasked by the Brooklyn and exposed them to the concen- 
trated fire of our squadron, now changing its course to the west. The result of this 
maneuver was that, in thirty minutes from the opening of the combat, four of the 
enemy's vessels were on fire and riddled with projectiles. Two torpedo boats were 
destroyed; one reached the beach about 3 miles from the mouth of the harbor; the 
Teresa and Oquendo were beached about 6 miles from the harbor. Every vessel of 
the enemy's fleet destroyed and surrendered were a little forward of the Brooklyn's 
beam when they turned toward the beach ou fire. 

At the final capture of the Colon at 1.15 p. m., the Brooklyn was nearest, and the 
Oregon next, and then the Texas and Vixen. The New York arrived at 2.23 p. m., and 
the' commander in chief assumed command of the forces present. Signals were made 
from Brooklyn to the squadron until all signal halyards were shot away, then by the 
Meyers army code. 

This turn of the Brooklyn in the battle of July 3 was the crucial and deciding 
feature of that combat. If the advantage gained by the Brooklyn's turn outward, to 
permit the concentrated fire of our squadron upon the enemy without interruption, 
had been surrendered to a turn made inward, that would have interfered with this 
tire so imperatively necessary at this vital moment, the results might have been quite 
different. 

Viewing the situation from my position, on a platform built around the conning 
tower, with unobstructed observation of the ships of both fleets, there was no ques- 
tion in mv mind that the results of the battle were aided largely by this maneuver 
of the Brooklyn at that decisive moment. It is a mistake to say that her distance 
from the enemy was increased by her tactical diameter 800 yards in this movement, 
for the enemy's ships were speeding westward at much greater speed than the speed 
of the Brookh/n, which was somewhat retarded by the backing of her starboard pro- 
peller to shorten this circle. Though this may not be of record, it is a fact, 
nevertheless. 



172 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

The chart of the hoard of navigators (p. 84, Ex. Doc. C) shows that the Brooklyn's 
position was nearest the enemy at tho beginning of the combat; she was nearest 
daring every Btage of the battle, aa shown in the various points of it on this chart, 
and was closest to the Colon when she surrendered at 1.15 p.m., when the battle 
en. led which practically destroyed the sea power of Spain this side of tho Atlantic. 

The report of the board of exective officers (p. 573, Appendix) indicates that every 
ship of the enemy examined by them showed the marks of 8-inch, 5-inch, and 6-pound 
guns. All these guns were in the battery of the Brooklyn, she was the only ves- 
sel in our lleet which carried 5-inch guns, and it is only fair to assume that the 
5 inch gun marks on these vessels favored the belief that tho 8-inch marks and 
the 6-pounder marks, in fair proportion, were made by the Brooklyn's guns also. 

The Brooklyn was struck some twenty-six times | p. 98, Ex. Doc. 6), and bore some 
forty odd wounds from I lie enemy's projectiles. We lost the only man killed in our 
fleet in the action, and had two of our crew wounded; one seriously, the other less 
gravelj . 

In my official report of tho combat, dated July 6, I make no mention of this 
maneuver, as its effect npon the battle was never a question with me. I regarded 
it only as an incident of the action which had achieved an advantage; but as the 
results flowing from it were so brilliantly successful for our forces, I did not imagine 
it needed, or could need, any explanation, as might have been required if defeat had 
occurred from the maneuver. 

On May ;>1 I received a telegram from the commander in chief congratulating me 
upon success in locating and blockading tho enemy's fleet at Santiago. If it was 
woi thy of commendation at that time, 1 am at a loss to understand how it could have 
grown into reprehensible conduct, as suggested by Admiral Sampson in his letter of 
July 10, L898, some six weeks later. 

Very respectfully, \\ . S. SCHLEY, 

Hear- Admiral U. S. A 7 . 

lion. Eugene Hale, Chairman, etc, Washington, B.C. 



ADDITIONAL LETTER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 



Navy Department. 

Washington, March 3, 1899. 

Sir: I am in receipt of the letter of March 1, from the Senate Com- 
mittee on Naval Affairs, asking if the Department desires to make any 
further statement with reference to its communication of February 6, 
in answer to Senate resolution of January 23, or in connection with 
the statements submitted to the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs by 
Rear- Admiral W. S. Schley. 

In reply I have the honor to inform you that the facts in this connec- 
tion were set forth in the letter of the Department of February 6, and 
to call your attention to the fact that Admiral Schley, in his letter of 
February 18, does not question the correctness of any of those facts. 
The Admiral, however, makes some inferences which should be referred 
to, and the Department therefore submits the following: 

Admiral Schley's mention of Admiral Sampson's letter of May 20 
seems to have given certain Senators the impression that the Depart- 
ment has withheld that letter. In this connection I desire to say: 

1. That this letter was not in the possession of the Department on 
February 6, nor was its existence known to the Department at that 
time. 

2. That it was in the possession of Admiral Schley until the 9th of 
February, when it was sent to the Department upon its request to be 
furnished with all official records relating to his duty as commander in 
chief of the Flying Squadron and as a fiag officer in the North Atlantic 
fleet. 

3. That in its instructions with regard to maintaining the blockade 
of Cienfuegos it was not more explicit than the letter of Admiral Samp- 
son of May 19, which accompanied the communication of the Depart- 
ment of February 6, and which is published in the appendix to the 
Keport of the Bureau of Navigation, on page 464. 

4. That on May 2L, the day after it was written, Admiral Sampson 
sent orders to Commodore Schley in duplicate by the Hawk and Mar- 
blehead, which orders were received by Commodore Schley during the 
early forenoon of the 23d and 24th, respectively, directing Commodore 
Schley to proceed with all dispatch, but cautiously, to Santiago if sat- 
isfied that the Spanish squadron was not at Cienfuegos. 

The set of these orders sent by the MawJc was received on the same 
day as the letter of the 20th, and bearing the later date, May 21, of course 
revoked the instructions to blockade Cienfuegos contained in the letters 
of the 19th and 20th. 

5. That in obedience to these instructions the Flying Squadron left 
Cienfuegos on the afternoon of the 24th, but did not reach the imme- 
diate vicinity of the port of Santiago until the morning of the 29th of 
May. 

173 



174 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

The Department lias stated these facts thus fully, in order that it may 
be clearly understood that nothing has been withheld from the Senate 
in this matter. 

Admiral Schley states in regard to his start to return to Key West 
as follows: 

The Department's orders, dated May 25 (No. 27 Executive C), and received by me 
Oil M;i\ 1', . was as follows : 

"All Department's information indicates the Spanish division is still at Santiago 
de Cuba. The Department looks to yon to ascertain fact, and that the enemy, if 
therein, does not leave withoul a decisive action." 

In obedience to the above order, and without any further order or instruction 
from anyone, I did ascertain the fact that the enemy was at Santiago de Cnba, as 
reported in my telegram of May 29 to the Department, and the enemy did not leave 
w i thou ( a decisive conflict. 

Commodore Schley's statement at the time of the occurrence was as 
follows: 

Kingston,* May 28, 1898. 
Secretary of the Navy. Washington: 

The receipt of telegram of May -'tit is acknowledged. Delivered by Harvard off 
Santiago de Cuba. Merrimac engines disabled; is heavy; am obliged to have towed 
to Key West. Have been unable absolutely to coal the Texas, Marblehead, then, 
Brooklyn from collier, all owing to very rough sea. Bad weather since leaving Key 
West. The Brooklyn alone has more than sufficient coal to proceed to Key West : 
can not remain off Santiago present state squadron coal account. Impossible to coal 
leeward Cape Cruz iu summer, all owing to southwesterly winds. Harvard reports 
coal sufficient for .Jamaica; leaves to-day for Kingston; reports only small vessels 
could coal at Gonaives or Mole. Minneapolis only coaled for Key West; also Yale, 
which tows Merrimac. Much to be regretted, can not obey orders of Department. 
Have striven earnestly; forced to proceed for coal to Key West by way of Yucatan 
passage. Cannot ascertain anything definite respecting enemy positive. Obliged 
to send Eagle — admitted no delay — to Port Antonio, Jamaica; bad only 25 tons of 
coal. Will require 10,000 tons of coal at Key West. Very difficult to tow collier to 
get cable hold. 

Schley. 

The order of the Department of May 25, above quoted, was received in 
cipher by the Harvard at Mole St. Nicholas on May 26, was deciphered 
and delivered to Commodore Schley in the early forenoon of May 27. 
Commodore Schley the same forenoon prepared and sent by the Harvard 
the telegram which appears above as sent from Kingston on May 28. 

It will be seen that Rear-Admiral Schley's statement to the Senate 
does not show that he started to return to Key West, and signaled to 
the squadron to that effect, and so informed the Department, and it 
might be inferred that he immediately obeyed that order, and ascertained 
the presence of the enemy at Santiago. On the contrary, his telegram 
above, dated .May 28, and written May 27, shows that, though having 
just received the telegram of the Department, and having on hand a 
sufficient supply of coal to return to Key West, he reported that he 
could not obey the order and continued to proceed toward Key West. 
However, it later became evident to him that this was unnecessary, and 
he resumed the movement toward Santiago. 

Admiral Schley's mention of the signal by Admiral Sampson at 8.45 
a. in., .Inly •>, " Disregard movements of the commander in chief," and 
his mention of the movement of the commander in chief toward Sibo- 
ney is followed by an incorrect inference, to wit: "This left me senior 
officer present, and necessarily clothed me with the responsibilities of 
command." The signal above mentioned is one which is frequently 

Written off Santiago May 27; sent from Kingston by the Harvard. 
t Sent from Washington on May 25; received at Mole, Haiti, on May 26. See 
Department's letter of Februarj i> to the President of the Senate. 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 175 

made in squadron, and is never held as in any sense a relinquishment 
of command. It is made where, for any reason, the flagship leaves its 
assigned position in formation, as was the case when the New York left 
her habitual blockading station the morning of July 3. At such times 
it is made to avoid confusion, which would result if other vessels, fixing 
their positions by reference to the flagship, were to move with her. 
Without further signal the responsibility of command would not be 
shifted until the senior officer had gone out of sigual distance. 

The Department furnishes the foregoing statement only to complete 
the record in compliance with the request of the Senate of January 
23. Desiring to do Admirals Sampson and Schley full justice for 
services rendered, it has, after full consideration of all the circum- 
stances, recommended to the President their promotion to the grade of 
rear-admiral, and begs to express the hope that his recommendations 
to the same effect may be confirmed by the Senate. 

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, 

John D. Long, Secretary. 

P. S. — I annex hereto copy of a letter received from Captain Sigsbee, 
who asks to add it to the record. 
Hon. Eugene Hale, 

Chairman Committee on Naval Affairs, United States Senate. 



LETTER OF CAPT. C. D. SIGSBEE. 

U. S. S. Texas (1st Eate), 

Havana, Cuba, February 24, 1899. 

Dear Sir: I have just read a newspaper report of Admiral Schley's 
letter to the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, relative to matters 
occurring off Santiago de Cuba during the time the St. Paul was scout- 
ing off that port. In his reference to me Admiral Schley makes an 
error of small moment to his argument, but of importance to me as 
bearing on my own responsibility. The admiral has been my warm 
personal friend for many years and will not desire to have me incor- 
rectly quoted. 

Admiral Schley says that on the occasion of his first appearance off 
Santiago de Cuba he was assured by me that I did not believe that 
the Spanish fleet was in Santiago. He refers also to the emphatic 
declaration of the pilot, Nunez, to the same eifect. What I actually 
said to the admiral was that Nunez had first expressed a belief that 
such large vessels as Cervera's cruisers could not get into Santiago be- 
cause of their length, but he afterwards admitted that they might get 
in with the aid of tugs. I transferred Nunez to the Brooklyn. He had 
been sent to me by the United States consul at Kingston, Jamaica, 
but with letters that did not bear the consular seal. Neither Admiral 
Schley nor I fully trusted him at first. 

During the period that the St. Paul was off Santiago I was resting 
on the statement contained in the Department's telegram received by 
me at Port Haitien, on May 20, which was to the etfect that Cervera 
had been reported as having arrived at Santiago the day before — the 
19th. The St. Paul was directed to proceed to Santiago, and informed 
that Admiral Schley had been or would be ordered there. She arrived 
off Santiago on the 21st, and remained there eight days continuously, 
most of the time alone. 



176 ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 

Every officer on board the St. Paul knew that I believed Cervera to 
be at Santiago; nevertheless, I considered Nunez's opinion. It was 
also well known to certain officers on board the St. Paul that I was 
very desirous that Admiral Schley should not order me away from 
Santiago. Lately I was astonished when Captain Cook of the Brook- 
lyn informed me that he had heard me state to Admiral Schley that the 
Spanish fleet was not in Santiago. The next day, however, Captain 
Cook amended his statement by acknowledging that I had said that I 
had not seen Cervera's fleet, which, it will be perceived, was quite a 
different thing. 

The St. Paul was repeatedly fairly close in to the Santiago entrance, 
barely out of gun lire. On the first day, in such a position, she lowered 
a target and had target practice. Another day she lay there for hours 
while 1 sketched the batteries. Still another day she captured the 
collier Eestormel in such a position. 

I saw nothing of Cervera's fleet until the 29th of May, when Admiral 
Schley took permanent station off that port. At daybreak sighting the 
smoke of a number of vessels to the westward, and believing it to come 
from Cervera's vessels, since 1 then supposed that Admiral Schley was 
proceeding to the westward, the St. Paul was steamed at full speed in 
the direction of the smoke, and we soon made out the high smoke 
stacks of the Brooklyn, and later made out all the vessels of the Flying 
Squadron. In passing the narrow entrance I saw the Colon and one 
other vessel anchored in the channel around Smith Cay. I signaled 
the fact to Admiral Schley, who made a return signal that he had seen 
those vessels, and also one or more torpedo boats. It is probable that 
the Admiral saw the Spanish vessels a short time before they were 
sighted by the St. Paul. I had not before seen them, or any sign of 
then). 

While I had not known, from previous observations, that Cervera's 
fleet was in Santiago, I believed that it was there because I had been 
so informed by the Navy Department, and during the eight days the 
St. Paul remained off Santiago, the different vessels touching there and 
communicating with me had brought no counter report from the Navy 
Department. 

One day, after chasing and overhauling a steamer, which proved to 
be a press boat, one of the correspondents on board shouted that the 
Flying Squadron had Admiral Cervera's squadron bottled up in Cien- 
fuegos. I replied that the St. Paul had had Cervera bottled up in 
Santiago for a week. 

In my position as commanding officer of a scout, it would have been 
a great mistake to have stated to Admiral Schley that 1 did not believe 
Admiral Cervera's squadron was in Santiago Harbor. It was quite 
proper, however, to present him Nunez's statement for what it was 
worth. I myself had followed up that statement by careful measure- 
ments of the charts. Nunez had declared that, within his knowledge, 
no vessel heavier than 5,400 tons displacement had ever entered San- 
tiago Harbor, but it was evident that he had but little knowledge of 
twin screw vessels. 

That period of eight days and nights off Santiago involved trying, 
responsible, and hazardous work for the officers and crew of the St. Paul. 
1 should not like to deprive it of any value, therefore this statement. 

The press report, to which I have referred, also states: "Captain 
Sigsbee is quoted as confirming the opinion as to the difficulty of coal- 
ing off Santiago." The Admiral's own language I do not know. 



ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY. 177 

There had been weather unfavorable for coaling, but I remember no 
statement of mine, relative to coaling, made to the admiral, excepting 
on the morniDg when we jointly discovered the Spanish vessels. The 
commanding officers were assembled on board the Brooklyn. On that 
occasion I twice informed the admiral that the weather then prevailing 
was unusually favorable for coaling at sea and I recommended that 
advantage be taken of it on the ground that so good an opportunity 
could not be expected often. At the same time I expressed the belief 
that Guantanamo Bay should be seized as a base, not necessarily by 
Admiral Schley, but as soon as troops were available to hold the place. 

I should regret entering into any controversy and shall be content to 
know that my statement is tiled in the records of the Department. I 
am sure that Admiral Schley will not take it ill. 

Yery respectfully, C. D. Sigsbee, 

Captain, United States Navy. 

Secretary of the Navy, 

Navy Department, Washington, D. G. 

12 



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